IDS Working Papers最新文献

Interest in prospects for policy processes that contribute to development, climate change adaptation and mitigation, known as ‘climate compatible development’, has been growing in response to increasing awareness of the impacts of climate change. This paper provides insight into the complex political economy of climate compatible development in Ghana's artisanal fisheries, a sector that has received comparatively little attention in climate change literature and policy processes. It focuses on two contentious policy areas where there is potential for climate compatible development, namely the subsidized premix fuel provided to artisanal fishermen, and mangrove protection. Regarding the premix subsidy, while there is theoretical scope for a ‘triple win’ outcome by removing the subsidy to reduce incentives to unsustainable fishing and supporting alternative policies, in practice this is highly problematic. Artisanal fishermen strongly oppose removing the subsidy on the grounds that it would damage their livelihoods, and do not have the confidence that they would be appropriately compensated for any hypothetical reform. Moreover, it is argued that removing it could have negative unintended consequences if fishermen are forced into alternative livelihoods that are themselves unsustainable. There is, however, a need to make considerable improvements to the distribution of the premix fuel so that it reaches the intended beneficiaries and is not siphoned off for contraband. Meanwhile, although improved mangrove protection could have significant ‘triple-win’ benefits, this area suffers from a lack of funding and administrative coordination across ministries and agencies, leading it to be neglected. The case studies reveal, therefore, that the major constraint to climate compatible development is institutional failing, rather than a lack of policies per se. The paper emphasizes the need to conceptualize climate compatible development as a process which is dynamic across space and time, such that potential for triple win outcomes is fluctuate to vary according to changing circumstances. It is necessary to recognize, furthermore, that pressures from a number of actors, including those at the grass roots, may demand short term improvements to current problems rather than aspiring to triple win outcomes in the long term, creating a major challenge for climate compatible development.

The objective of this paper is twofold. First it illustrates and discusses some of the challenges related to the measurement of resilience by reviewing some of the most recently published and grey literature on resilience in relation to food security. Second it proposes a new framework that addresses some of the concerns and limitations of resilience measurement identified in that literature. The main postulate of this framework is that the ‘costs of resilience’ (that is, the different ex-ante and ex-post investments, losses, sacrifices, and costs that people have to undertake at individual and collective levels to ‘go through’ a shock or an adverse event) provide an appropriate and independent metric to measure resilience across scales and dimensions. The paper shows how the independent nature of this metrics offers an explanatory power that can be used to infer, in a testable and rigorous manner potential, causalities between the metric and household and/or community characteristics. Empirical and theoretical examples are used throughout the paper to illustrate the arguments.

There is growing international focus on how to support more integrated approaches to addressing climate change in ways that capture synergies and minimise the trade-offs between climate change mitigation, adaptation and development. These aims are embodied in the concept of climate compatible development (CCD). But what does this look like in practice in Kenya?

With a National Action Plan on Climate Change, a Vision 2030 Strategy, a new constitution and a revised Energy Policy, Kenya is at a critical cross-roads with respect to defining its energy future for the years to come. The challenge is to enable a just transition to a lower carbon economy that delivers poverty reduction and climate resilience at the same time. But thinking about who sets the terms of transition and for whom, raises key political questions about the role of actors, interests and institutions in the energy sector. In other words, who has the power to change power?

Drawing on 29 interviews with government officials, donors and businesses conducted during 2013, insights gleaned from an interactive workshop with practitioners on the themes of the research, as well as available academic and grey literature, this paper explores the role of politics, actors and institutions in enabling or frustrating the pursuit of climate compatible energy development in Kenya. This is a critical time for Kenya in deciding its energy future and whether and how it will aim to make it ‘climate compatible’. Issues of power and political economy will play a key role in determining technological and social outcomes: the winners and losers from different energy pathways and on whose terms and how the trade-offs between competing policy objectives are resolved. In particular political economy analysis helps to understand the potential for energy systems to meet climate, development and adaptation needs simultaneously.

It is now commonplace for development policy makers to refer to the contributions of businesses to the achievement of development goals and the importance of collaborations between businesses and development agencies. Many businesses give greater attention to the development impacts of their activities. There has been relatively little systematic and critical thinking about where and how businesses can contribute most effectively to the achievement of development objectives and, accordingly, how development agents should prioritise and focus their collaborations with businesses. This paper initiates such a systematic and critical approach, starting from the question ‘How can development policy work with and on businesses and the business environment so that the private goals of businesses contribute to most effectively to public development objectives?’ It identifies three basic categories of business and development initiatives: increasing the overall level of business activity, addressing sustainability challenges and promoting business activities that are particular benefit to the poor. The paper considers three major challenges for maximising the contributions businesses to the achievement of development goals. The first is increasing the alignments between business and objectives and development objectives, and the paper considers both the different ways this can be achieved and when such alignments are overly difficult to achieve. The second is to prioritise interventions. When resources are scarce, it is essential to pursue interventions that have the biggest development impact. This implies choosing interventions with goals and approaches that are most likely to be successful; in so doing, examining issues of feasibility, effectiveness and efficiency. So that scarce resources are focused on the areas of greatest benefit. The third is to achieve scaling up and systemic change. There are many examples of business activities that have positive development impacts but which are being pursued at small-scale and/or in quite specific geographical or sectoral contexts. How can such initiatives be up-scaled, translated and/or replicated in order to enhance impacts on the poor in ways that endure beyond the specific interventions applied?

The food riots of 2007–8 in dozens of developing countries placed food security on the agendas of the global political economy. Material outcomes remain to be assessed. The problematic of the politics of provisions is: Under what circumstances do the common people's necessities create a political necessity for their rulers to act? What combination of ingredients gives them political leverage (or not)? Food riots (crowd violence: usually seizing food, intercepting carts and barges, or setting prices) set in motion political processes that often led to food relief and/or repression. To riot about food, rioters needed much more than motivations of hunger and outrage, or else world history would consist mostly of food riots. In addition rioters needed both sufficient solidarities to be able to act collectively, and sufficient confidence that the benefits (getting food, both immediately and in more sustained supply) would outweigh the risks and costs of repression and punishment. The latter would be based on reciprocal relationships with the rulers. The outcomes of such ‘trials-by-ordeal’ were then entered into social memory to be consulted in the next crisis. Of course rulers also had their social memories and political calculations. So the ‘politics of provisions’ – the political economy of food crises and their resolutions – has typically included such components as: political, social, and economic structures; the players' sociopolitical assets, capacities, and relationships; shared ideologies; strategic bargaining in the moment between chief actors; and accidental factors. Those components vary from one time and place to another, so this paper compares the politics of provisions in: pre-modern England and France; famines in Ireland and India; ‘famine-proofed’ Ming and Qing China; Mao's Great Leap Forward Famine; the IMF austerity riots of the 1970s and 80s; and the food riots of 2008, particularly in Egypt, West Africa, and Haiti. The point of such comparisons is not to construct a unified theory of provision politics, but to illuminate significant parameters that shape policies and conflicts over food.

Many low and middle-income countries have pluralistic health systems with a variety of providers of health-related goods and services in terms of their level of training, their ownership (public or private) and their relationship with the regulatory system. The development of institutional arrangements to influence their performance has lagged behind the spread of these markets. This paper presents a framework for analysing a pluralistic health system. The relationships between private providers of health services and government, or other organisations that represent the public interest, strongly influence their performance in meeting the needs of the poor. Their impact on the pattern of service delivery depends on how the relationships are managed and the degree to which they respond to the interests of the population. Many governments of low and middle-income countries are under pressure to increase access to safe, effective and affordable health services. In a context of economic growth, it should be possible to improve access by the poor to health services substantially. Innovations in information technologies and in low cost diagnostics are creating important new opportunities for achieving this. It will be important to mobilise both public and private providers of health-related goods and services. This will involve big changes in the roles and responsibilities of all health sector actors. Governments, businesses and civil society organizations will need to learn how to make pluralist health systems work better through experimentation and systematic learning about what works and why.

This paper examines the nature of the political struggle over the status, role and identity of women in Egypt in between the two revolutions (January 2011 and June 2013). It presents a situational analysis of the various actors, relations and agendas that have both informed the backlash against women's rights and the mass movements of resistance. It acknowledges that while women's rights have historically suffered as a consequence of a hostile political will of the ruling authority and parts of political and civil society that are inimical to expanding women's rights (and sometimes mobilise around revoking what already exists), women's rights faced new threats after January 2011 because of the political settlement between the Supreme Council for Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood. The threats to women's rights worsened under President Morsi's regime and while they were not the prime reason why women mobilised in the largest numbers ever to oust the president in June 2013, encroachments on their freedoms was a catalysing factor.

The paper's principle argument is that while a constellation of factors influence prospects of advancing women's equality in Egypt, collective action matters both for policy and for building constituencies that grant legitimacy to the cause being championed. The fragmentation and internal rivalry that characterised the myriad civil society organisations and coalitions during Mubarak's reign left advocates of gender equality unequipped to exploit the (few) opportunities of influencing the political configuration of power after the revolution of 2011. The threats to women's rights thereafter propelled old and newly formed non-state actors into a mass mobilisation of resistance. This represented a case where collective action in its various forms succeeded in challenging the status quo in critical ways. However, the political polarisation between supporters and opponents of the outcome of the 30 June revolution has led to a de-collectivisation of efforts. If the opportunities for influence are to be seized, and threats to influencing a progressive gender agenda challenged in the next phase, prioritising local pathways of re-building and strengthening collective action is of primary importance.

For the past two decades, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has been considered the dominant paradigm in water resources. It is the flagship project of supranational global bodies such as the Global Water Partnership (GWP) and has also been actively promoted by multilateral and regional development banks (e.g. the World Bank; African Development Bank) as well as bilateral donor agencies which make it out to be the panacea to address the water management crisis in the global south, leading to major water reforms programmes and the rewriting of national policies drawing on IWRM principles in a range of countries in southern Africa. This paper offers a conceptual approach for studying the evolution, spread and uptake of IWRM. It then turns to the actual practices, and how IWRM has been interpreted in multiple ways, and how it aligns with existing patterns of legal pluralism. The paper proposes a conceptual framework that builds on three main themes, the flow of IWRM as an idea in international and national fora, the translation and adoption of IWRM into national contexts, and the practice of IWRM in local contexts. In constructing such a conceptual framework, we draw on several strands of thought, including policy discourse, network and regime theory (flows), translation theory and donor-recipient studies (translation and adoption) and theories of legal pluralism, institutional bricolage and agency (practices). With this framework we hope it will be possible to trace the spread, transformation and uptake of IWRM across global, national and local scales, to unearth the convergences and divergences in understandings and applications of the notion of IWRM raising challenges and issues for debate and further research and key actors operating at different levels mediating/moderating/articulating the travel of policy ideas. The latter may create generic insights on policy processes and practice that goes beyond the concept of IWRM and the water world. This framework will guide the critical study of various interpretations and challenges of how policy ideas travel at multiple political and geographical scales, from macro political forums to localised arenas and communities, speaking to wider themes such as policy translation and uptake and the politics of the development process.

Developing countries face increasing environmental pressures across a range of dimensions. At the same time, the capacity of these governments to effectively pursue policy goals is often constrained by a lack of resources, with tax revenues in many countries being half of what is common in developed economies. For some, these are distinct issues that should be considered separately. For others, they can and should be dealt with together. This paper reviews the potential of one type of mechanism to address both goals simultaneously: environmental taxation.

After distinguishing between different forms, the paper uses a Pigouvian framework to organise and analyse theoretical and empirical evidence on the impacts of environmental taxes in developing countries. Despite limited evidence it is possible to draw some conclusions. First, taxes that are carefully designed and reflect local conditions can be effective in achieving environmental goals, and may be the best instruments under some conditions. Second, while it is possible to raise significant revenues, there may be less potential than is often supposed: environmental goals are more likely to be achieved where tax revenues are used, in part, to further the same ends; it may also be necessary – and desirable – to use some revenue to offset regressive effects; also, support for environmental taxes is likely to be undermined if they are seen to be revenue raising tools. More broadly, limits to the effectiveness of environmental taxes become more severe as the number of policy goals increases: achieving ‘double-dividends’ may be hard, and ‘triple-dividends’ harder still. A more realistic aim, therefore, may be a ‘one and a half’ dividend approach, with the environmental goal being the primary focus. Third, regardless of the quality of design, environmental taxes may fail without strong, high-level political support, particularly where they conflict with other policy goals that do have this support.

In the light of this analysis, the penultimate section of the paper develops a decision-making framework, designed to help policy-makers weigh the merits of environmental taxes to achieve specified goals. The paper concludes with a comprehensive research agenda.

This working paper argues we need to reimagine development tactics to fashion Development 3.0, to match what business analysts now call World 3.0, a global system characterized by high turbulence and new threats. It begins by contrasting our former classification of countries spatially into First, Second and Third worlds with a new division of development epochs in sequence since the end of World War II. World 1.0 emphasized industrialization, urbanization, and modernization, lasting from 1945 to 1980. World 2.0 emphasized global trade, and a shift to private actors doing the work of development, from 1980 to the early 2000s. World 3.0 can be seen as superceding globalization by concern with emergent threats. World 1.0 privileged state actions to accelerate “nation building” within former colonies, whereas World 2.0 privileged private capital and free trade as engines for economic growth. Now, following wars, disasters, and the near meltdown of the global financial system in 2007/08, we enter World 3.0 as depicted by Ghemawat and others.

We review thirteen major changes not recognized within World 2.0 or its accompanying Development 2.0 regime. The major changes include the rise of homeless capital, the Conservative counter-revolution of the 1980s, the implosion of the USSR, rise of modern China, emergence of BRIC nations, a pan-urban world, rise of identity politics, reemergence of Africa, shift to non-state warfare, growing threat of climate change, MENA nations experience Arab Spring, digital worlds expand, and velocity increases. They suggest coming turbulence and unexpected outcomes, or “mashups” (Ramo).

These changes suggest a different emergent system, becoming World 3.0 which has profound differences from how we view our planet's political economy (World 2.0).

If so, the paper outlines implications which suggest the time has come to “take on board” our changed planetary circumstances, and thus begin crafting Development 3.0.

“Where the wild things are”, introduces metaphors to change the ‘meta-narratives’ used for viewing World 3.0: “herding elephants,” “taming feral capital”, “swimming with tides” and “avoiding mashups”. They help us realize that long recognized problems (or “elephants”) may show unexpected behaviors to pose new threats within World 3.0.

The main argument of the paper then lays out a baker's dozen changes needed if we hope to fashion more effective ways to promote development for us all. We must “rebalance society” (ala Mintzberg), refashion aid, privilege sustainability, emphasize fair trade, tame feral capital, devise better metrics, include all nations & peoples, seat G-20 not G-8, recognize semi-sovereigns, focus on a pan-urban world, build coalitions in networks, involve women & youth, and rebuild community leadership. All of which assumes we can offset a strong tide towards return