Pub Date : 1976-03-01DOI: 10.1080/00213624.1976.11503326
Victor P. Goldberg
The Coase Theorem in its most innocuous form appears to be little more than a restatement of the Pareto criterion. In a zero transaction costs (hereafter ZTC) world, transactions will continue to occur until there remains no possibility for further transactions which would make at least one party better off while making no other party worse off. If transaction costs are defined broadly enough to include all strategic and bargaining costs, then, as Guido Calabresi asserts, the proposition would appear true by definition.' It must, as he suggests, hold not only for the short run, but for the long run as well.2 However, except by using a very strained characterization of contract (to be discussed below), it can be shown that even this modest version of the Coase Theorem is vulnerable. Before showing this it is worth pausing first to ask whether this trip is really necessary. While exploring all the ramifications of the ZTC assumption may be intellectually challenging, it is not likely that a detailed knowledge of that mythical world will be of much practical use. Indeed, the Coase Theorem-especially in the minimal form presented here-was not proffered as a serious attempt to analyze a ZTC world.3 Rather, Coase was concerned with showing that the treatment of externalities in the Pigovian tradition implicitly partitioned the world into two categories: those things which the market handled perfectly (normal goods with ZTC) and those which
{"title":"Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract","authors":"Victor P. Goldberg","doi":"10.1080/00213624.1976.11503326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1976.11503326","url":null,"abstract":"The Coase Theorem in its most innocuous form appears to be little more than a restatement of the Pareto criterion. In a zero transaction costs (hereafter ZTC) world, transactions will continue to occur until there remains no possibility for further transactions which would make at least one party better off while making no other party worse off. If transaction costs are defined broadly enough to include all strategic and bargaining costs, then, as Guido Calabresi asserts, the proposition would appear true by definition.' It must, as he suggests, hold not only for the short run, but for the long run as well.2 However, except by using a very strained characterization of contract (to be discussed below), it can be shown that even this modest version of the Coase Theorem is vulnerable. Before showing this it is worth pausing first to ask whether this trip is really necessary. While exploring all the ramifications of the ZTC assumption may be intellectually challenging, it is not likely that a detailed knowledge of that mythical world will be of much practical use. Indeed, the Coase Theorem-especially in the minimal form presented here-was not proffered as a serious attempt to analyze a ZTC world.3 Rather, Coase was concerned with showing that the treatment of externalities in the Pigovian tradition implicitly partitioned the world into two categories: those things which the market handled perfectly (normal goods with ZTC) and those which","PeriodicalId":104514,"journal":{"name":"The Chicago School of Political Economy","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1976-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131957351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1976-03-01DOI: 10.1080/00213624.1976.11503324
S. Lowry
Social Cost."'1 It is the purpose of this study to examine the definitions and premises underlying the concept of bargain, upon which theories of transaction costs such as Coase's are predicated. It also will be necessary to examine the concept of contract, the economic implications of which deserve more specific attention. It is hoped that this approach will frame the diverse literature in the field in a clearer perspective. Since so much of the current discussion has been provoked by the formulation that has come to be called the "Coase theorem," it will be desirable to use this specific formulation of the issues as a point of departure even though some of Coase's premises have not been conspicuous in subsequent literature purporting to be in the same tradition. In general terms, the Coase theorem states that individual bargaining will result in similar allocations of resources regardless of the presence or
{"title":"Bargain and Contract Theory in Law and Economics","authors":"S. Lowry","doi":"10.1080/00213624.1976.11503324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1976.11503324","url":null,"abstract":"Social Cost.\"'1 It is the purpose of this study to examine the definitions and premises underlying the concept of bargain, upon which theories of transaction costs such as Coase's are predicated. It also will be necessary to examine the concept of contract, the economic implications of which deserve more specific attention. It is hoped that this approach will frame the diverse literature in the field in a clearer perspective. Since so much of the current discussion has been provoked by the formulation that has come to be called the \"Coase theorem,\" it will be desirable to use this specific formulation of the issues as a point of departure even though some of Coase's premises have not been conspicuous in subsequent literature purporting to be in the same tradition. In general terms, the Coase theorem states that individual bargaining will result in similar allocations of resources regardless of the presence or","PeriodicalId":104514,"journal":{"name":"The Chicago School of Political Economy","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1976-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130525482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1976-03-01DOI: 10.1080/00213624.1976.11503329
H. Trebing
The Chicago School, while it has served to promote discussion on regulation of public utilities, has not provided adequate alternatives or consistent, unbiased criticism. Representatives of the Chicago School tend to be uncompromising in their position concerning the inability of government regulations to promote efficient allocation of resources. The Chicago School is also criticized for oversimplifying the issues. Historically, while the Chicago School saw all forms of monopoly as the great enemy of democracy, it has shown a trend since the 1960's of looking at private monopoly as a lesser evil than public monopoly. This shift in emphasis has included a proposed passive role for the government, preservation of the market, emphasis on abstract policies, and reliance on the consumer as the final arbiter. A review of these positions points out their limitations. (51 references) (DCK)
{"title":"The Chicago School versus Public Utility Regulation","authors":"H. Trebing","doi":"10.1080/00213624.1976.11503329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1976.11503329","url":null,"abstract":"The Chicago School, while it has served to promote discussion on regulation of public utilities, has not provided adequate alternatives or consistent, unbiased criticism. Representatives of the Chicago School tend to be uncompromising in their position concerning the inability of government regulations to promote efficient allocation of resources. The Chicago School is also criticized for oversimplifying the issues. Historically, while the Chicago School saw all forms of monopoly as the great enemy of democracy, it has shown a trend since the 1960's of looking at private monopoly as a lesser evil than public monopoly. This shift in emphasis has included a proposed passive role for the government, preservation of the market, emphasis on abstract policies, and reliance on the consumer as the final arbiter. A review of these positions points out their limitations. (51 references) (DCK)","PeriodicalId":104514,"journal":{"name":"The Chicago School of Political Economy","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1976-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124533493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1975-12-01DOI: 10.1080/00213624.1975.11503320
Warren S. Gramm
{"title":"Chicago Economics: From Individualism True to Individualism False","authors":"Warren S. Gramm","doi":"10.1080/00213624.1975.11503320","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1975.11503320","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":104514,"journal":{"name":"The Chicago School of Political Economy","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1975-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134633500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1975-12-01DOI: 10.1080/00213624.1975.11503319
E. Mishan
According to a recent statement by Milton Friedman (1974, p. 11), "in discussions of economic policy, 'Chicago' stands for belief in the efficacy of the free market as a means of organizing resources, for scepticism about government intervention into economic affairs, and for emphasis on the quantity of money as a key factor in producing inflation." "In discussions of economic science," the statement continues, " 'Chicago' stands for an approach that takes seriously the use of economic theory as a tool for analyzing a startlingly wide range of concrete problems, rather than as an abstract mathematical structure of great beauty but little power; for an approach that insists on the empirical testing of theoretical generalizations and that rejects alike facts without theory and theory without facts." In this preliminary investigation into the validity and relevance of the economic presuppositions and the belief-system of the Chicago School, I shall concentrate chiefly on the arguments that bear on its belief in the efficacy of free markets in organizing resources, in extending individual choice, and in preserving political freedom.
{"title":"The Folklore of the Market: An Inquiry into the Economic Doctrines of the Chicago School","authors":"E. Mishan","doi":"10.1080/00213624.1975.11503319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1975.11503319","url":null,"abstract":"According to a recent statement by Milton Friedman (1974, p. 11), \"in discussions of economic policy, 'Chicago' stands for belief in the efficacy of the free market as a means of organizing resources, for scepticism about government intervention into economic affairs, and for emphasis on the quantity of money as a key factor in producing inflation.\" \"In discussions of economic science,\" the statement continues, \" 'Chicago' stands for an approach that takes seriously the use of economic theory as a tool for analyzing a startlingly wide range of concrete problems, rather than as an abstract mathematical structure of great beauty but little power; for an approach that insists on the empirical testing of theoretical generalizations and that rejects alike facts without theory and theory without facts.\" In this preliminary investigation into the validity and relevance of the economic presuppositions and the belief-system of the Chicago School, I shall concentrate chiefly on the arguments that bear on its belief in the efficacy of free markets in organizing resources, in extending individual choice, and in preserving political freedom.","PeriodicalId":104514,"journal":{"name":"The Chicago School of Political Economy","volume":"119 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1975-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129255235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1975-12-01DOI: 10.1080/00213624.1975.11503315
R. Solo
This article will attempt to survey and interpret structuralism, or, as some would have it, "French Structuralism," an amorphous, multifaceted, and complex phenomenon, without a disciplinary boundary or any established authority to settle controversies concerning it. This interpretation will be based, alas, on the limited experience of one who can claim expertise neither in linguistics, psychology, nor anthropology, where structuralist thought has had its greatest impact. The essay will be divided into five parts. The first will suggest the rationale of the conscious, partially organized structuralist movement with its recognized masters and committed disciples, research centers and institutes, and niches in university curricula. The second will consider the need for a structuralist movement in economics. The third will examine those bodies of thought that have developed spontaneously and independently here and there over the spectrum of the disciplines sharing an analytic approach or outlook that can be identified as structuralist; that is, abstracting from the structuralist movement, the character of structuralist thought will be specified, with Jean Piaget's psychology taken as its prototype. The fourth part reviews and compares structuralist thought in anthropology, linguistics, the history and philosophy of
{"title":"What Is Structuralism? Piaget's Genetic Epistemology and the Varieties of Structuralist Thought","authors":"R. Solo","doi":"10.1080/00213624.1975.11503315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1975.11503315","url":null,"abstract":"This article will attempt to survey and interpret structuralism, or, as some would have it, \"French Structuralism,\" an amorphous, multifaceted, and complex phenomenon, without a disciplinary boundary or any established authority to settle controversies concerning it. This interpretation will be based, alas, on the limited experience of one who can claim expertise neither in linguistics, psychology, nor anthropology, where structuralist thought has had its greatest impact. The essay will be divided into five parts. The first will suggest the rationale of the conscious, partially organized structuralist movement with its recognized masters and committed disciples, research centers and institutes, and niches in university curricula. The second will consider the need for a structuralist movement in economics. The third will examine those bodies of thought that have developed spontaneously and independently here and there over the spectrum of the disciplines sharing an analytic approach or outlook that can be identified as structuralist; that is, abstracting from the structuralist movement, the character of structuralist thought will be specified, with Jean Piaget's psychology taken as its prototype. The fourth part reviews and compares structuralist thought in anthropology, linguistics, the history and philosophy of","PeriodicalId":104514,"journal":{"name":"The Chicago School of Political Economy","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1975-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125798980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1975-12-01DOI: 10.1080/00213624.1975.11503321
Jonathan McKinney
{"title":"Frank H. Knight and Chicago Libertarianism","authors":"Jonathan McKinney","doi":"10.1080/00213624.1975.11503321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1975.11503321","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":104514,"journal":{"name":"The Chicago School of Political Economy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1975-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122521813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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