Pub Date : 2020-07-24DOI: 10.4324/9781003061038-35
P. Klein
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The terms, 'justified', 'justification', and their cognates are most naturally understood in what we may term a "deontological" way, as having to do with obligation, permission, requirement, blame, and the like. We may think of requirement, prohibition, and permission as the basic deontological terms, with obligation, and duty as species of requirement, and with responsibility, blameworthiness, reproach, praiseworthiness, merit, being in the clear, etc. as normative conse
{"title":"The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification","authors":"W. Alston","doi":"10.2307/2214077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2214077","url":null,"abstract":"The terms, 'justified', 'justification', and their cognates are most naturally understood in what we may term a \"deontological\" way, as having to do with obligation, permission, requirement, blame, and the like. We may think of requirement, prohibition, and permission as the basic deontological terms, with obligation, and duty as species of requirement, and with responsibility, blameworthiness, reproach, praiseworthiness, merit, being in the clear, etc. as normative conse","PeriodicalId":104597,"journal":{"name":"Arguing About Knowledge","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116584933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-24DOI: 10.4324/9781003061038-23
A. Elga
{"title":"Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem","authors":"A. Elga","doi":"10.4324/9781003061038-23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003061038-23","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":104597,"journal":{"name":"Arguing About Knowledge","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129455921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-24DOI: 10.4324/9781003061038-28
Richard Feldman, E. Conee
{"title":"Evidentialism","authors":"Richard Feldman, E. Conee","doi":"10.4324/9781003061038-28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003061038-28","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":104597,"journal":{"name":"Arguing About Knowledge","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130071352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-24DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0012
R. Audi
Etude du caractere penetrant, de la psychologie, du statut epistemique et de la place du temoignage dans la cognition humaine. Eclairant les fondements individuels et sociaux de la croyance, la notion de temoignage permet d'offrir une approche comprehensive de la distinction entre les processus operationnels de la connaissance et de la justification. Soulignant l'indispensabilite epistemique du temoignage, l'A. demontre son importance primordiale dans l'acquisition des concepts et l'apprentissage du langage
{"title":"The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification","authors":"R. Audi","doi":"10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"Etude du caractere penetrant, de la psychologie, du statut epistemique et de la place du temoignage dans la cognition humaine. Eclairant les fondements individuels et sociaux de la croyance, la notion de temoignage permet d'offrir une approche comprehensive de la distinction entre les processus operationnels de la connaissance et de la justification. Soulignant l'indispensabilite epistemique du temoignage, l'A. demontre son importance primordiale dans l'acquisition des concepts et l'apprentissage du langage","PeriodicalId":104597,"journal":{"name":"Arguing About Knowledge","volume":"284 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132160388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-24DOI: 10.4324/9781003061038-49
Roderick M. Chisholm
1 Preliminaries Defining A Priority • BonJour says that two characteristics are definitive of a priority, one negative and one positive. The negative one is probably the more familiar: — " an a priori reason for thinking that a claim is true is one whose rational force or cogency does not derive from experience. " [BonJour, 2005, p.98] — This does seem at least closely related to Kant's definition of the a priori in the First Critique: " In what follows, therefore, we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. Opposed to it is empirical knowledge, which is knowledge possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. " [A2/B3] And it's also the definition that you'll find in Kripke's Naming and Necessity when he notes that many of the philosophers who came after Kant have been careless about distinguishing a priority from analyticity and necessity. (Roughly: something is a priori if it is known independently of experience, necessary if it could not have been otherwise, and analytic if it is true in virtue of meaning.) — What counts as experience? BonJour intends it to include: sense experience, including kinesthetic experience, but also introspective awareness of one's own thoughts, sensations and mental states. — BonJour notes that this definition is meant to allow that experience could be needed in order to understand the claim being made; it's the reason to believe the claim that has to be independent of experience: That such a reason is independent of experience does not mean that someone who has undergone no experience of any sort could be in possession of it, since the possession of an a priori reason requires understanding the claim for which it is a reason, and experience, even experience of some fairly specific sort, might be required for that. [BonJour, 2005, p.99] – The positive condition on a priority: — " in the most basic cases such reasons result from direct or immediate insight into the truth, indeed the necessary truth, of the relevant claim. " [BonJour, 2005, p.100] What are the objects of A priority? • In 'ordinary' philosophical conversation, we often attribute a priority to, or deny it of, propositions. For example, we say – It is a priori that triangles have three sides. – The proposition that snow is white is a posteriori.
{"title":"The a Priori","authors":"Roderick M. Chisholm","doi":"10.4324/9781003061038-49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003061038-49","url":null,"abstract":"1 Preliminaries Defining A Priority • BonJour says that two characteristics are definitive of a priority, one negative and one positive. The negative one is probably the more familiar: — \" an a priori reason for thinking that a claim is true is one whose rational force or cogency does not derive from experience. \" [BonJour, 2005, p.98] — This does seem at least closely related to Kant's definition of the a priori in the First Critique: \" In what follows, therefore, we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. Opposed to it is empirical knowledge, which is knowledge possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. \" [A2/B3] And it's also the definition that you'll find in Kripke's Naming and Necessity when he notes that many of the philosophers who came after Kant have been careless about distinguishing a priority from analyticity and necessity. (Roughly: something is a priori if it is known independently of experience, necessary if it could not have been otherwise, and analytic if it is true in virtue of meaning.) — What counts as experience? BonJour intends it to include: sense experience, including kinesthetic experience, but also introspective awareness of one's own thoughts, sensations and mental states. — BonJour notes that this definition is meant to allow that experience could be needed in order to understand the claim being made; it's the reason to believe the claim that has to be independent of experience: That such a reason is independent of experience does not mean that someone who has undergone no experience of any sort could be in possession of it, since the possession of an a priori reason requires understanding the claim for which it is a reason, and experience, even experience of some fairly specific sort, might be required for that. [BonJour, 2005, p.99] – The positive condition on a priority: — \" in the most basic cases such reasons result from direct or immediate insight into the truth, indeed the necessary truth, of the relevant claim. \" [BonJour, 2005, p.100] What are the objects of A priority? • In 'ordinary' philosophical conversation, we often attribute a priority to, or deny it of, propositions. For example, we say – It is a priori that triangles have three sides. – The proposition that snow is white is a posteriori.","PeriodicalId":104597,"journal":{"name":"Arguing About Knowledge","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130948737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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