Pub Date : 2018-07-10DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.9
M. Steenbergen, Céline Colombo
Politics is a complex affair. Whether one is a legislator or a citizen, making political decisions is rarely easy. The question of how people deal with this complexity has been on the minds of scholars for decades, if not centuries. One important answer, which emerged in the 1970s, is that decision makers rely on heuristics to tame the intricacies of politics. Heuristics are (cognitive) shortcuts that allow decision makers to bypass a great deal of information while producing an output in the form of a judgment or choice. Often such outputs are indistinguishable from what a complete consideration of the decision-relevant information would have produced. At other times the outputs may not be optimal, but they are good enough. It can also happen, however, that heuristics introduce formidable biases and result in inferior decisions. This chapter reviews the literature on heuristics use by the mass public and political elites. It discusses the kinds of heuristics that are used, how they function, and why they are both inevitable and fallible. Finally, the chapter considers the normative implications of heuristics in political behavior.
{"title":"Heuristics in Political Behavior","authors":"M. Steenbergen, Céline Colombo","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.9","url":null,"abstract":"Politics is a complex affair. Whether one is a legislator or a citizen, making political decisions is rarely easy. The question of how people deal with this complexity has been on the minds of scholars for decades, if not centuries. One important answer, which emerged in the 1970s, is that decision makers rely on heuristics to tame the intricacies of politics. Heuristics are (cognitive) shortcuts that allow decision makers to bypass a great deal of information while producing an output in the form of a judgment or choice. Often such outputs are indistinguishable from what a complete consideration of the decision-relevant information would have produced. At other times the outputs may not be optimal, but they are good enough. It can also happen, however, that heuristics introduce formidable biases and result in inferior decisions. This chapter reviews the literature on heuristics use by the mass public and political elites. It discusses the kinds of heuristics that are used, how they function, and why they are both inevitable and fallible. Finally, the chapter considers the normative implications of heuristics in political behavior.","PeriodicalId":106674,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117318060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-10DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.22
K. Barr, A. Mintz
This chapter examines the effect of group dynamics on the 2016 decision within the administration of President Barack Obama to lead the international coalition in a mission to liberate Raqqa, Syria, from the Islamic State. The authors show that whereas the groupthink syndrome characterized the decision-making process of the US-led coalition’s decision to attack Raqqa, it was polythink that characterized the decision-making dynamics both in the US-led coalition and within the inner circle of Obama’s own foreign policy advisors. Through case-study analysis, the authors illustrate that groupthink is more likely in strategic decisions, whereas polythink is more likely in tactical decisions.
{"title":"Did Groupthink or Polythink Derail the 2016 Raqqa Offensive?","authors":"K. Barr, A. Mintz","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.22","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the effect of group dynamics on the 2016 decision within the administration of President Barack Obama to lead the international coalition in a mission to liberate Raqqa, Syria, from the Islamic State. The authors show that whereas the groupthink syndrome characterized the decision-making process of the US-led coalition’s decision to attack Raqqa, it was polythink that characterized the decision-making dynamics both in the US-led coalition and within the inner circle of Obama’s own foreign policy advisors. Through case-study analysis, the authors illustrate that groupthink is more likely in strategic decisions, whereas polythink is more likely in tactical decisions.","PeriodicalId":106674,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130278026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-10DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.11
J. Sidanius, S. Hudson, Gregory Davis, R. Bergh
Over the last twenty-five years or so, there has been a growing awareness among race and gender scholars that a fully adequate analysis of these two forms of societal oppression cannot be done in isolation from one another. That is, an understanding of racism and sexism is fundamentally incomplete without an appreciation of how race and gender intersect and interact with one another in the creation and maintenance of group-based hierarchy and oppression. This chapter argues that while intersectionalist and critical race theorists have qualitatively (and occasionally quantitatively) drawn attention to the fact that the racial and gender dimensions of oppression are both interactively implicated in the maintenance of group-based inequality, a fully satisfactory empirical analysis of the dynamics of racism and sexism has yet to be achieved. Using the theoretical frameworks of evolutionary psychology and social dominance theory (SDT), this chapter offers an alternative understanding of the intersectional entanglement of racism and sexism. This chapter introduces the theory of gendered prejudice, a derivative of SDT, and posits that a satisfactory account of racism, or what social dominance theorists generalize as “arbitrary-set” oppression, is a deeply gendered phenomenon.
{"title":"The Theory of Gendered Prejudice: A Social Dominance and Intersectionalist Perspective","authors":"J. Sidanius, S. Hudson, Gregory Davis, R. Bergh","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.11","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last twenty-five years or so, there has been a growing awareness among race and gender scholars that a fully adequate analysis of these two forms of societal oppression cannot be done in isolation from one another. That is, an understanding of racism and sexism is fundamentally incomplete without an appreciation of how race and gender intersect and interact with one another in the creation and maintenance of group-based hierarchy and oppression. This chapter argues that while intersectionalist and critical race theorists have qualitatively (and occasionally quantitatively) drawn attention to the fact that the racial and gender dimensions of oppression are both interactively implicated in the maintenance of group-based inequality, a fully satisfactory empirical analysis of the dynamics of racism and sexism has yet to be achieved. Using the theoretical frameworks of evolutionary psychology and social dominance theory (SDT), this chapter offers an alternative understanding of the intersectional entanglement of racism and sexism. This chapter introduces the theory of gendered prejudice, a derivative of SDT, and posits that a satisfactory account of racism, or what social dominance theorists generalize as “arbitrary-set” oppression, is a deeply gendered phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":106674,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117321832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-10DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.21
Jonathan Bendor
Although Herbert Simon and Allen Newell studied problem-solving by experts as well as nonexperts, political scientists generally understand “bounded rationality” to refer primarily to cognitive constraints: how we fall short of completely rational decision-making. This incomplete understanding deprives us of an enormously useful intellectual legacy, built not only by Newell and Simon but also by a wide array of cognitive scientists who have explored how humans have collectively solved very difficult problems such as eliminating smallpox or designing nuclear submarines. This chapter surveys this richer understanding of bounded rationality. Cognitive capacities receive as much attention as cognitive constraints. The chapter reports work on how cultural storehouses of knowledge and certain organizational arrangements amplify our cognitive capacities in both the short and the long run. Finally, it extracts from the literature a set of thematically related propositions that are building blocks for constructing macro-theories of politics out of cognitively realistic micro-premises.
{"title":"Bounded Rationality in Political Science and Politics","authors":"Jonathan Bendor","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.21","url":null,"abstract":"Although Herbert Simon and Allen Newell studied problem-solving by experts as well as nonexperts, political scientists generally understand “bounded rationality” to refer primarily to cognitive constraints: how we fall short of completely rational decision-making. This incomplete understanding deprives us of an enormously useful intellectual legacy, built not only by Newell and Simon but also by a wide array of cognitive scientists who have explored how humans have collectively solved very difficult problems such as eliminating smallpox or designing nuclear submarines. This chapter surveys this richer understanding of bounded rationality. Cognitive capacities receive as much attention as cognitive constraints. The chapter reports work on how cultural storehouses of knowledge and certain organizational arrangements amplify our cognitive capacities in both the short and the long run. Finally, it extracts from the literature a set of thematically related propositions that are building blocks for constructing macro-theories of politics out of cognitively realistic micro-premises.","PeriodicalId":106674,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132671157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-10DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.32
J. T. Chatagnier
A leader’s approach to foreign policy decision-making is a critical explanatory factor in understanding why certain decisions are made. While several tools are available to analysts who wish to examine the process by which decision makers settle upon their chosen alternative, one of the most compelling is applied decision analysis (ADA), which allows scholars to uncover the unique “decision DNA” associated with a given leader. This chapter surveys the literature that has used the ADA methodology to examine questions of foreign policy decision-making. It pulls from twenty studies of leaders’ decisions—with more than twenty different leaders, ranging from Winston Churchill to Mao Zedong to Osama bin Laden—which comprise more than one hundred total unique decisions, examining and discussing the findings of each. It draws inferences about which decision rules best explain leaders’ policy choices, concluding that the works in question show overwhelming support for the poliheuristic theory of decision; and it discusses how future scholars can build on the ADA research program and how this information can best be used by policymakers.
{"title":"Using Applied Decision Analysis to Understand Foreign Policy Decision-Making","authors":"J. T. Chatagnier","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.32","url":null,"abstract":"A leader’s approach to foreign policy decision-making is a critical explanatory factor in understanding why certain decisions are made. While several tools are available to analysts who wish to examine the process by which decision makers settle upon their chosen alternative, one of the most compelling is applied decision analysis (ADA), which allows scholars to uncover the unique “decision DNA” associated with a given leader. This chapter surveys the literature that has used the ADA methodology to examine questions of foreign policy decision-making. It pulls from twenty studies of leaders’ decisions—with more than twenty different leaders, ranging from Winston Churchill to Mao Zedong to Osama bin Laden—which comprise more than one hundred total unique decisions, examining and discussing the findings of each. It draws inferences about which decision rules best explain leaders’ policy choices, concluding that the works in question show overwhelming support for the poliheuristic theory of decision; and it discusses how future scholars can build on the ADA research program and how this information can best be used by policymakers.","PeriodicalId":106674,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128649472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-10DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.7
L. G. Conway, P. Suedfeld, P. Tetlock
Political action is often a product of political thinking, and one of the most important aspects of political thought is its complexity. Thus, it is not surprising that the study of integrative complexity—the level of cognitive differentiation and subsequent integration of idea elements pertaining to an issue—has had a long and rich history in understanding political behavior. This chapter explores two arenas in which integrative complexity has contributed to our understanding of political behavior: political violence and political success. It then pursues multiple perspectives that help explain where integrative complexity comes from, including the cognitive manager model, the value pluralism model, and a strategic communication model. The chapter concludes by placing past research in the context of new developments in integrative complexity theory and measurement and considers productive directions for future complexity research in an increasingly social media–driven environment.
{"title":"Integrative Complexity in Politics","authors":"L. G. Conway, P. Suedfeld, P. Tetlock","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.7","url":null,"abstract":"Political action is often a product of political thinking, and one of the most important aspects of political thought is its complexity. Thus, it is not surprising that the study of integrative complexity—the level of cognitive differentiation and subsequent integration of idea elements pertaining to an issue—has had a long and rich history in understanding political behavior. This chapter explores two arenas in which integrative complexity has contributed to our understanding of political behavior: political violence and political success. It then pursues multiple perspectives that help explain where integrative complexity comes from, including the cognitive manager model, the value pluralism model, and a strategic communication model. The chapter concludes by placing past research in the context of new developments in integrative complexity theory and measurement and considers productive directions for future complexity research in an increasingly social media–driven environment.","PeriodicalId":106674,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131590724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-10DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.19
B. Jones, Zachary A. McGee
This chapter reviews the existing scholarship on agenda setting, focusing on two aspects of human choice. The first aspect centers on behavioral analyses of choice, especially cognitive limits to rationality (e.g., limits to the human attention span, the process of satisficing, and the use of heuristics), directed at understanding how individuals prioritize action. The second aspect focuses on organizational choice, with an emphasis on the impacts of information processing, search processes, and organizational structure. The chapter examines linkages between micro and macro processes, showing how studies of organizations and broader political systems based on a model of comprehensive rationality fail. Focusing on behavioral foundations allows for a more accurate and holistic explanation of issue prioritization (agenda setting) in complex organizations based on behavioral models of choice. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future directions of research.
{"title":"Agenda Setting and Bounded Rationality","authors":"B. Jones, Zachary A. McGee","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.19","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reviews the existing scholarship on agenda setting, focusing on two aspects of human choice. The first aspect centers on behavioral analyses of choice, especially cognitive limits to rationality (e.g., limits to the human attention span, the process of satisficing, and the use of heuristics), directed at understanding how individuals prioritize action. The second aspect focuses on organizational choice, with an emphasis on the impacts of information processing, search processes, and organizational structure. The chapter examines linkages between micro and macro processes, showing how studies of organizations and broader political systems based on a model of comprehensive rationality fail. Focusing on behavioral foundations allows for a more accurate and holistic explanation of issue prioritization (agenda setting) in complex organizations based on behavioral models of choice. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future directions of research.","PeriodicalId":106674,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116480537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-10DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.28
M. Maor
Although research examining overreaction in politics and policy remains at an early stage, it is clear that it largely develops along three paths: 1) psychological explanations which put all overreactions down to errors derived from cognitive biases and constraints on information processing, as well as sociopsychological dynamics in small decision-making groups; 2) emerging institutional explanations which put all overreaction down to errors derived from institutional values, procedures, myths, and routines; 3) emerging strategic explanations centering on the idea that overreactions in politics and policy at times reflect intentional choices which may derive from the desire of political executives to pander to voters’ policy positions, to appear more competent than challengers, or to signal extremity to voters. This chapter outlines the conceptual foundations of these explanations, their analytical anatomy, and their conceptual reach. It starts by defining overreaction in politics and policy and then elaborates on the analytical foundations of these explanations and the ways they integrate theories and findings from cognitive sciences. It then highlights the disproportionate policy perspective and the derived repertoire of deliberate policy overreactions. Next, it elaborates on the way strategic explanations reconcile intentionality with behavioral micro-foundation. It then looks at policy and political overreaction which are sustained by positive feedback processes over a relatively long period of time—termed “policy bubbles” and “political bubbles,” respectively. It concludes by describing a number of directions in which the overreaction agenda could be experimentally broadened to better encompass scope conditions of its cognitive causes and the dynamics of policy bubbles.
{"title":"Overreaction and Bubbles in Politics and Policy","authors":"M. Maor","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.28","url":null,"abstract":"Although research examining overreaction in politics and policy remains at an early stage, it is clear that it largely develops along three paths: 1) psychological explanations which put all overreactions down to errors derived from cognitive biases and constraints on information processing, as well as sociopsychological dynamics in small decision-making groups; 2) emerging institutional explanations which put all overreaction down to errors derived from institutional values, procedures, myths, and routines; 3) emerging strategic explanations centering on the idea that overreactions in politics and policy at times reflect intentional choices which may derive from the desire of political executives to pander to voters’ policy positions, to appear more competent than challengers, or to signal extremity to voters. This chapter outlines the conceptual foundations of these explanations, their analytical anatomy, and their conceptual reach. It starts by defining overreaction in politics and policy and then elaborates on the analytical foundations of these explanations and the ways they integrate theories and findings from cognitive sciences. It then highlights the disproportionate policy perspective and the derived repertoire of deliberate policy overreactions. Next, it elaborates on the way strategic explanations reconcile intentionality with behavioral micro-foundation. It then looks at policy and political overreaction which are sustained by positive feedback processes over a relatively long period of time—termed “policy bubbles” and “political bubbles,” respectively. It concludes by describing a number of directions in which the overreaction agenda could be experimentally broadened to better encompass scope conditions of its cognitive causes and the dynamics of policy bubbles.","PeriodicalId":106674,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125602486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-10DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.4
S. Walker, M. Schafer, Gary Smith
This chapter profiles the bounded rationality of two major candidates for US president in the 2016 presidential election. It identifies their philosophical beliefs regarding (1) the friendly or hostile nature of the political universe, (2) the achievement of fundamental political values, (3) the predictability of the future, (4) control over historical development, and (5) the role of chance in political life. It also examines their instrumental beliefs regarding (1) the optimum strategic approach to political goals, (2) tactical flexibility in carrying out a strategy, (3) calculation and management of risk, (4) role of timing, and (5) utility of various means in taking political action. These beliefs define a leader’s “operational code” regarding the exercise of power by self and others in world politics. The chapter extrapolates from these beliefs some game theory predictions for how Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton as the next US president would exercise power in world politics.
{"title":"The Operational Codes of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton","authors":"S. Walker, M. Schafer, Gary Smith","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190634131.013.4","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter profiles the bounded rationality of two major candidates for US president in the 2016 presidential election. It identifies their philosophical beliefs regarding (1) the friendly or hostile nature of the political universe, (2) the achievement of fundamental political values, (3) the predictability of the future, (4) control over historical development, and (5) the role of chance in political life. It also examines their instrumental beliefs regarding (1) the optimum strategic approach to political goals, (2) tactical flexibility in carrying out a strategy, (3) calculation and management of risk, (4) role of timing, and (5) utility of various means in taking political action. These beliefs define a leader’s “operational code” regarding the exercise of power by self and others in world politics. The chapter extrapolates from these beliefs some game theory predictions for how Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton as the next US president would exercise power in world politics.","PeriodicalId":106674,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127856871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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