Harvard Kennedy School RPS, J. Shattuck, Mathias Risse
In March 2018, hundreds of thousands of young people walked out of school and marched on their local statehouses and on the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., to advocate for stricter controls on gun sales and ownership. The March for Our Lives was initially organized by students at Margery Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, where a school shooting had killed 17 students. Collectively, the marches were the largest-ever protest against gun violence, and one of the largest protests of any kind in American history.
The growing consensus over the need for some “common-sense” gun laws to regulate the sale and ownership of firearms stands in sharp contrast to the incendiary rhetoric of the National Rifle Association, which has sounded the alarm in recent years that Democrats are coming to “take away” guns or institute a national registry of firearm ownership. Indeed, the reasonableness on both sides of the debate implies that there is a middle-ground that can be achieved to limit gun violence in the United States, while still allowing for responsible ownership of firearms for hunting, sport shooting, and personal protection.
{"title":"Reimagining Rights & Responsibilities in the United States: Gun Rights and Public Safety","authors":"Harvard Kennedy School RPS, J. Shattuck, Mathias Risse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3802077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3802077","url":null,"abstract":"<br>In March 2018, hundreds of thousands of young people walked out of school and marched on their local statehouses and on the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., to advocate for stricter controls on gun sales and ownership. The March for Our Lives was initially organized by students at Margery Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, where a school shooting had killed 17 students. Collectively, the marches were the largest-ever protest against gun violence, and one of the largest protests of any kind in American history.<br><br>The growing consensus over the need for some “common-sense” gun laws to regulate the sale and ownership of firearms stands in sharp contrast to the incendiary rhetoric of the National Rifle Association, which has sounded the alarm in recent years that Democrats are coming to “take away” guns or institute a national registry of firearm ownership. Indeed, the reasonableness on both sides of the debate implies that there is a middle-ground that can be achieved to limit gun violence in the United States, while still allowing for responsible ownership of firearms for hunting, sport shooting, and personal protection.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116471279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Bourdeaux, Jessica Kaushal, Linda J. Bilmes, Annmarie Sasdi, Megan Mishra, Anne M Hoyt
The slow rollout of vaccines against SARS-CoV2, the virus that causes Covid-19 disease, and the emergence of viral variants that threaten vaccines’ efficacy demonstrate the urgent need to bolster non-vaccine public health strategies to mitigate viral transmission. Quarantine and isolation are critical epidemic mitigation strategies wherein exposed or infected individuals, respectively, stay apart from others until they are no longer contagious. For SARS-CoV-2, the CDC recommends quarantine and isolation periods ranging from 7-14 days. Successfully completing this period of separation may prove too challenging for many individuals. Challenges may include forfeiting wages, forgoing procurement of basic necessities, and failing to fulfill family or community obligations. “Supported” quarantine and isolation refers to public programs that aim to help individuals overcome these challenges by providing financial incentives and wraparound services so that they can successfully complete separation periods and stop transmission of the virus. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the need for a supported quarantine and isolation program in Massachusetts and to describe a budgeting model to help the state calculate the costs of instituting them, compared to the costs of not providing them, for the duration of the SARS-CoV2 epidemic. To assess the need for supported quarantine and isolation programs we reviewed the literature on successful support programs and interviewed public health practitioners working directly with infected individuals through the Massachusetts contact tracing program. We found three main drivers of failed quarantine and isolation: the need to go to work to maintain salary, the need to purchase essential necessities, and the need for social services counseling. Our model estimates the costs of addressing these challenges, through both home-based and facility based programs. We assessed that providing these supports would result in a weighted-average cost of $430/person. Using current projections of when the epidemic will resolve and the number of new cases per day averaged over the time period from March-December 2020, our model estimates providing these services to infected individuals and their contacts would be in the range of $300-570 million, depending on the trajectory of infections over the next 211 days and assumptions regarding the number of contacts per infected individual. In addition, we modeled the medical care costs of failed quarantines and isolation, in which onward transmission of the virus is not interrupted. Each Covid-19 case is associated with ~$2,500/person in medical care expenses.1 The model estimates how sensitive direct medical costs are to the Effective Reproduction Number, (Rt), or the average number of people an infected person will in turn infect. A supported quarantine program that reduces infection transmission can offer savings in direct medical costs. For example, if a supported quarantine progra
{"title":"Estimating the Costs and Benefits of Supported Quarantine and Isolation in Massachusetts: The Missing Link in Covid-19 Response","authors":"M. Bourdeaux, Jessica Kaushal, Linda J. Bilmes, Annmarie Sasdi, Megan Mishra, Anne M Hoyt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3790728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3790728","url":null,"abstract":"The slow rollout of vaccines against SARS-CoV2, the virus that causes Covid-19 disease, and the emergence of viral variants that threaten vaccines’ efficacy demonstrate the urgent need to bolster non-vaccine public health strategies to mitigate viral transmission. Quarantine and isolation are critical epidemic mitigation strategies wherein exposed or infected individuals, respectively, stay apart from others until they are no longer contagious. For SARS-CoV-2, the CDC recommends quarantine and isolation periods ranging from 7-14 days. Successfully completing this period of separation may prove too challenging for many individuals. Challenges may include forfeiting wages, forgoing procurement of basic necessities, and failing to fulfill family or community obligations. “Supported” quarantine and isolation refers to public programs that aim to help individuals overcome these challenges by providing financial incentives and wraparound services so that they can successfully complete separation periods and stop transmission of the virus. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the need for a supported quarantine and isolation program in Massachusetts and to describe a budgeting model to help the state calculate the costs of instituting them, compared to the costs of not providing them, for the duration of the SARS-CoV2 epidemic. \u0000 \u0000To assess the need for supported quarantine and isolation programs we reviewed the literature on successful support programs and interviewed public health practitioners working directly with infected individuals through the Massachusetts contact tracing program. We found three main drivers of failed quarantine and isolation: the need to go to work to maintain salary, the need to purchase essential necessities, and the need for social services counseling. Our model estimates the costs of addressing these challenges, through both home-based and facility based programs. We assessed that providing these supports would result in a weighted-average cost of $430/person. Using current projections of when the epidemic will resolve and the number of new cases per day averaged over the time period from March-December 2020, our model estimates providing these services to infected individuals and their contacts would be in the range of $300-570 million, depending on the trajectory of infections over the next 211 days and assumptions regarding the number of contacts per infected individual. In addition, we modeled the medical care costs of failed quarantines and isolation, in which onward transmission of the virus is not interrupted. Each Covid-19 case is associated with ~$2,500/person in medical care expenses.1 The model estimates how sensitive direct medical costs are to the Effective Reproduction Number, (Rt), or the average number of people an infected person will in turn infect. A supported quarantine program that reduces infection transmission can offer savings in direct medical costs. For example, if a supported quarantine progra","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129888450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For the twenty years following the Zapatista uprising (1994-2013), the federal government had placed a lot of resources and policy attention in an effort to reduce the large income gaps between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico. Public investment in schools, hospitals, and conditional cash transfer programs had been implemented, resulting in a significant improvement that did reduce the gap in terms of educational and health outcomes. Massive infrastructure projects had been undertaken to upgrade Chiapas' roads, ports and airports, boosting the connectivity of the state with markets within the state and elsewhere in Mexico. And yet, twenty years later the income gap between workers in Chiapas and the rest of Mexico had deepened, and Chiapas remains the poorest state in Mexico, with three quarters of its population poor and close to half in extreme poverty. Large productivity gaps - as proxied by wages - are not only observed between states, but have also expanded dramatically within the three sectors employing two-thirds of the workers in Chiapas: Agriculture, wholesale and retail, and manufacturing. One year into his term as Finance Minister for the government of Enrique Peña Nieto (2013-2018), Luis Videgaray ponders the statistical evidence available and baffles at the puzzle.
The case includes a series of videos featuring Luis Videgaray, Mexico’s former Secretary of Finance and Public Credit (2012-2016). In the first video, “The Chiapas Puzzle” (7:41 min.), to be viewed by students in preparation for the class, Mr. Videgaray explains the situation in Chiapas and the dilemmas he and the Mexican Government faced early on. The other three videos, “The Case of Yazaki” (3:55 min.), “Infrastructure and Political Economy” (4:19 min.), and “Takeaways” (5:03 min.) can be played as part of the class discussion. The videos can be viewed by clicking "Visit Website" on this page.
A supplemental slide set is also included with this case. It contains key exhibits from the case, as well as information and visuals not available in the case, that can be used by the instructor in the discussion.
{"title":"The Chiapas Puzzle","authors":"M. Santos, C. Pan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3770200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3770200","url":null,"abstract":"For the twenty years following the Zapatista uprising (1994-2013), the federal government had placed a lot of resources and policy attention in an effort to reduce the large income gaps between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico. Public investment in schools, hospitals, and conditional cash transfer programs had been implemented, resulting in a significant improvement that did reduce the gap in terms of educational and health outcomes. Massive infrastructure projects had been undertaken to upgrade Chiapas' roads, ports and airports, boosting the connectivity of the state with markets within the state and elsewhere in Mexico. And yet, twenty years later the income gap between workers in Chiapas and the rest of Mexico had deepened, and Chiapas remains the poorest state in Mexico, with three quarters of its population poor and close to half in extreme poverty. Large productivity gaps - as proxied by wages - are not only observed between states, but have also expanded dramatically within the three sectors employing two-thirds of the workers in Chiapas: Agriculture, wholesale and retail, and manufacturing. One year into his term as Finance Minister for the government of Enrique Peña Nieto (2013-2018), Luis Videgaray ponders the statistical evidence available and baffles at the puzzle. <br><br>The case includes a series of videos featuring Luis Videgaray, Mexico’s former Secretary of Finance and Public Credit (2012-2016). In the first video, “The Chiapas Puzzle” (7:41 min.), to be viewed by students in preparation for the class, Mr. Videgaray explains the situation in Chiapas and the dilemmas he and the Mexican Government faced early on. The other three videos, “The Case of Yazaki” (3:55 min.), “Infrastructure and Political Economy” (4:19 min.), and “Takeaways” (5:03 min.) can be played as part of the class discussion. The videos can be viewed by clicking \"Visit Website\" on this page. <br><br>A supplemental slide set is also included with this case. It contains key exhibits from the case, as well as information and visuals not available in the case, that can be used by the instructor in the discussion.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127856459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Classic takes on the norm of reciprocity find that receipt of a gift increases compliance with a later request. We find that giving people the opportunity to return this gift surprisingly increases compliance rates, a phenomenon we call “returnable reciprocity”. Across four studies (N = 3,786), we find evidence that returnable reciprocity leads to greater compliance in a large-scale field experiment (Study 1), as well as in conceptual lab replications (Studies 2 and 3) involving different domains. We provide evidence that this increased compliance may be due to increased feelings of guilt for non-compliance (Study 3). Finally, we find that while the economic cost of returnable reciprocity is negligible, it may create additional psychological or societal costs that must be taken into account when assessing its social welfare implications (Study 4). We end by discussing the theoretical, practical and social welfare implications of this novel compliance strategy.
{"title":"Returnable Reciprocity: When Optional Gifts Increase Compliance","authors":"Julian J. Zlatev, Todd Rogers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3552774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3552774","url":null,"abstract":"Classic takes on the norm of reciprocity find that receipt of a gift increases compliance with a later request. We find that giving people the opportunity to return this gift surprisingly increases \u0000compliance rates, a phenomenon we call “returnable reciprocity”. Across four studies (N = 3,786), we find evidence that returnable reciprocity leads to greater compliance in a large-scale field experiment (Study 1), as well as in conceptual lab replications (Studies 2 and 3) involving different domains. We provide evidence that this increased compliance may be due to increased feelings of guilt for non-compliance (Study 3). Finally, we find that while the economic cost of returnable reciprocity is negligible, it may create additional psychological or societal costs that must be taken into account when assessing its social welfare implications (Study 4). We end by discussing the theoretical, practical and social welfare implications of this novel compliance strategy.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134038688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Steve Olson, Phil Berkaw, L. Charland, E. Patton, Linda J. Bilmes
Policymakers and budgetary analysts have long argued that roads are heavily subsidized. The diffusion of spending among federal, state, and local government entities, along with the complexity of indirect costs, make it difficult to understand the fully loaded cost of the vehicle economy. Individual families may track the personal costs of car ownership to their budgets, but they rarely consider the total cost of operating and maintaining the vehicle economy because the vast majority of roads and parking areas are provided free at the point of use. This study is intended to increase transparency regarding road-related spending and to provide a comprehensive estimate of the economic cost of Massachusetts’ vehicle economy.
{"title":"The $64 Billion Massachusetts Vehicle Economy","authors":"Steve Olson, Phil Berkaw, L. Charland, E. Patton, Linda J. Bilmes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3499676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3499676","url":null,"abstract":"Policymakers and budgetary analysts have long argued that roads are heavily subsidized. The diffusion of spending among federal, state, and local government entities, along with the complexity of indirect costs, make it difficult to understand the fully loaded cost of the vehicle economy. Individual families may track the personal costs of car ownership to their budgets, but they rarely consider the total cost of operating and maintaining the vehicle economy because the vast majority of roads and parking areas are provided free at the point of use. This study is intended to increase transparency regarding road-related spending and to provide a comprehensive estimate of the economic cost of Massachusetts’ vehicle economy.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126900148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the formation of production and trading networks in an economy with general interdependencies and complex property rights. We argue that the right to exclude, a core tenet of property, grants asset owners local monopoly power that is both amplified and constrained by an economy's endogenous production network. Supply multisourcing and a bias toward shorter supply chains emerge in equilibrium. As a methodological contribution, we generalize the top trading cycles algorithm to a production economy. Applications of the framework include the study of vertical integration and government intervention in supply chains.
{"title":"The Property Rights Theory of Production Networks","authors":"Ivan Balbuzanov, M. Kotowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3491842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3491842","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the formation of production and trading networks in an economy with general interdependencies and complex property rights. We argue that the right to exclude, a core tenet of property, grants asset owners local monopoly power that is both amplified and constrained by an economy's endogenous production network. Supply multisourcing and a bias toward shorter supply chains emerge in equilibrium. As a methodological contribution, we generalize the top trading cycles algorithm to a production economy. Applications of the framework include the study of vertical integration and government intervention in supply chains.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131228143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do some state-led mass killings end quickly while others endure for over a decade? And why do some states murder millions of constituents during the course of mass killings, whereas other states seem to “retreat from the brink†after killing thousands (Straus 2012)? A large body of work has focused on the important role played by civil society and non-governmental actors in initiating different forms of rescue, evasion, and assistance in the midst of different cases of mass killings, as well as the political pressure they have applied in bringing about the ends of civil conflicts. Despite many inspiring and hopeful cases of collective action under systems of intense repression, other research finds civil society can play a much more malevolent force in the context of mass killings. In this paper, we test some basic mechanisms that emerge from the literature on more general relationships between civil society and mass killings. We find that, in general, a relatively participatory and autonomous civil society is correlated with shorter mass killings. However, we also find that active civil societies are associated with higher rates of lethality, particularly when those civil society sectors are active in highly unequal polities. Because most mass killings are relatively short, our findings suggest that civil societies in states with uneven access to power are more commonly correlated with shorter, deadlier spells of government violence. This conclusion seemingly supports the view of civil society skeptics, at least in contexts where mass killings have already begun.
{"title":"A Source of Escalation or a Source of Restraint? An Empirical Investigation of How Civil Society Affects Mass Killings","authors":"E. Chenoweth, Evan Perkoski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3451355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3451355","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some state-led mass killings end quickly while others endure for over a decade? And why do some states murder millions of constituents during the course of mass killings, whereas other states seem to “retreat from the brink†after killing thousands (Straus 2012)? A large body of work has focused on the important role played by civil society and non-governmental actors in initiating different forms of rescue, evasion, and assistance in the midst of different cases of mass killings, as well as the political pressure they have applied in bringing about the ends of civil conflicts. Despite many inspiring and hopeful cases of collective action under systems of intense repression, other research finds civil society can play a much more malevolent force in the context of mass killings. In this paper, we test some basic mechanisms that emerge from the literature on more general relationships between civil society and mass killings. We find that, in general, a relatively participatory and autonomous civil society is correlated with shorter mass killings. However, we also find that active civil societies are associated with higher rates of lethality, particularly when those civil society sectors are active in highly unequal polities. Because most mass killings are relatively short, our findings suggest that civil societies in states with uneven access to power are more commonly correlated with shorter, deadlier spells of government violence. This conclusion seemingly supports the view of civil society skeptics, at least in contexts where mass killings have already begun.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125576849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jessica Lasky-Fink, Carly D. Robinson, H. Chang, Todd Rogers
Many states mandate districts or schools notify parents when students have missed multiple unexcused days of school. We report a randomized experiment (N = 131,312) evaluating the impact of sending parents truancy notifications modified to target behavioral barriers that can hinder effective parental engagement. Modified truancy notifications that used simplified language, emphasized parental efficacy, and highlighted the negative incremental effects of missing school reduced absences by 0.07 days compared to the standard, legalistic, and punitively-worded notification — an estimated 40% improvement. This work illustrates how behavioral insights and randomized experiments can be used to improve administrative communications in education.
{"title":"Using Behavioral Insights to Improve Truancy Notifications","authors":"Jessica Lasky-Fink, Carly D. Robinson, H. Chang, Todd Rogers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3440376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3440376","url":null,"abstract":"Many states mandate districts or schools notify parents when students have missed multiple unexcused days of school. We report a randomized experiment (N = 131,312) evaluating the impact of sending parents truancy notifications modified to target behavioral barriers that can hinder effective parental engagement. Modified truancy notifications that used simplified language, emphasized parental efficacy, and highlighted the negative incremental effects of missing school reduced absences by 0.07 days compared to the standard, legalistic, and punitively-worded notification — an estimated 40% improvement. This work illustrates how behavioral insights and randomized experiments can be used to improve administrative communications in education.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124025360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Portraits served as a form of social media in the Renaissance. Prominent individuals commissioned portraits to convey their accomplishments and relationships, not merely their images. Political and church leaders, in particular, used the images to bolster their role, but these commissioned works entailed risks, importantly including risks to reputation. A portrait could be unflattering or unrecognizable. It could also be judged to be indecorous, especially if the portrait was perceived as an attempt to elevate an individual above his or her station.
{"title":"Risky Business: Commissioning Portraits in Renaissance Italy","authors":"J. Nelson, R. Zeckhauser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3423084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423084","url":null,"abstract":"Portraits served as a form of social media in the Renaissance. Prominent individuals commissioned portraits to convey their accomplishments and relationships, not merely their images. Political and church leaders, in particular, used the images to bolster their role, but these commissioned works entailed risks, importantly including risks to reputation. A portrait could be unflattering or unrecognizable. It could also be judged to be indecorous, especially if the portrait was perceived as an attempt to elevate an individual above his or her station.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124545380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget constraints. Private budget constraints introduce subtle strategic tradeoffs with first-order consequences for equilibrium bidding. In a pure-strategy, symmetric equilibrium, agents may adopt discontinuous bidding strategies resulting in a stratification of competition along the budget dimension. In an asymmetric setting, equilibria in “nondecreasing” strategies exist, albeit in a qualified sense. Private budgets introduce significant confounds for the interpretation of bidding data due to their interaction with risk preferences and their countervailing strategic implications.
{"title":"First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints","authors":"M. Kotowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3403297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3403297","url":null,"abstract":"Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget constraints. Private budget constraints introduce subtle strategic tradeoffs with first-order consequences for equilibrium bidding. In a pure-strategy, symmetric equilibrium, agents may adopt discontinuous bidding strategies resulting in a stratification of competition along the budget dimension. In an asymmetric setting, equilibria in “nondecreasing” strategies exist, albeit in a qualified sense. Private budgets introduce significant confounds for the interpretation of bidding data due to their interaction with risk preferences and their countervailing strategic implications.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127842086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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