We construct an axiomatic index of spatial concentration around a center or capital point of interest, a concept with wide applicability from urban economics, economic geography and trade, to political economy and industrial organization. We propose basic axioms (decomposability and monotonicity) and refinement axioms (order preservation, convexity, and local monotonicity) for how the index should respond to changes in the underlying distribution. We obtain a unique class of functions satisfying all these properties, defined over any n-dimensional Euclidian space: the sum of a decreasing, isoelastic function of individual distances to the capital point of interest, with specific boundaries for the elasticity coefficient that depend on n. We apply our index to measure the concentration of population around capital cities across countries and US states, and also in US metropolitan areas. We show its advantages over alternative measures, and explore its correlations with many economic and political variables of interest.
{"title":"A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration: Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital Cities","authors":"Filipe R. Campante, Quoc-Anh Do","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1404746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1404746","url":null,"abstract":"We construct an axiomatic index of spatial concentration around a center or capital point of interest, a concept with wide applicability from urban economics, economic geography and trade, to political economy and industrial organization. We propose basic axioms (decomposability and monotonicity) and refinement axioms (order preservation, convexity, and local monotonicity) for how the index should respond to changes in the underlying distribution. We obtain a unique class of functions satisfying all these properties, defined over any n-dimensional Euclidian space: the sum of a decreasing, isoelastic function of individual distances to the capital point of interest, with specific boundaries for the elasticity coefficient that depend on n. We apply our index to measure the concentration of population around capital cities across countries and US states, and also in US metropolitan areas. We show its advantages over alternative measures, and explore its correlations with many economic and political variables of interest.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128832823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent work on good governance implies a one best way model of effective government. This work has isomorphic influences on academic, donor and reform engagements in developing countries. But the one best way model actually does not hold, even for governments that score highly on governance indicators. Governments actually look different, even if they are similarly called 'effective' or 'models of good government.' The current article examines this issue and proposes a contingent approach to explain why good governments can look different. It suggests that government structures need to be explained in terms of the governing context--not the isomorphic influence of what indicators suggest good governance is. Key contextual factors that a contingent approach would consider in appraising government include economic challenges, demographic realities, and socio and political structures. The paper draws these factors out of an inductive analysis of differences in a set of OECD countries considered examples of 'good government.'
{"title":"Good Government Means Different Things in Different Countries","authors":"M. Andrews","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1314437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1314437","url":null,"abstract":"Recent work on good governance implies a one best way model of effective government. This work has isomorphic influences on academic, donor and reform engagements in developing countries. But the one best way model actually does not hold, even for governments that score highly on governance indicators. Governments actually look different, even if they are similarly called 'effective' or 'models of good government.' The current article examines this issue and proposes a contingent approach to explain why good governments can look different. It suggests that government structures need to be explained in terms of the governing context--not the isomorphic influence of what indicators suggest good governance is. Key contextual factors that a contingent approach would consider in appraising government include economic challenges, demographic realities, and socio and political structures. The paper draws these factors out of an inductive analysis of differences in a set of OECD countries considered examples of 'good government.'","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130757013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Majority rule is often adopted almost by default as a group decision rule. One might think, therefore, that the conditions under which it applies, and the argument on its behalf, are well-understood. However, the standard arguments in support of majority rule display systematic deficiencies. This article explores these weaknesses, and assesses what can be said on behalf of majority rule.
{"title":"On the Philosophy of Group Decision Methods I: The Non-Obviousness of Majority Rule","authors":"Mathias Risse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1296638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1296638","url":null,"abstract":"Majority rule is often adopted almost by default as a group decision rule. One might think, therefore, that the conditions under which it applies, and the argument on its behalf, are well-understood. However, the standard arguments in support of majority rule display systematic deficiencies. This article explores these weaknesses, and assesses what can be said on behalf of majority rule.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132209360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much of development policy has been based on the search for a short to do list that would get countries moving. In this paper I argue that economic activity requires a large and highly interacting set of public policies and services, which constitute inputs into the production process. This is reflected in the presence, in all countries, of hundreds of thousands of pages of legislation and hundreds of public agencies. Finding out what is the right mix of the public inputs, and more importantly, what is a valuable change from the current provision is as complex as determining what is the right mix of private provision of goods. In the latter case, economists agree that this process cannot be achieved through central planning and that the invisible hand of the market is the right approach, because it allows decisions to be made in a more decentralized manner with more information. I argue that a similar solution is required to deal with the complexity of the public policy mix.
{"title":"The Other Hand: High Bandwidth Development Policy","authors":"R. Hausmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1314799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1314799","url":null,"abstract":"Much of development policy has been based on the search for a short to do list that would get countries moving. In this paper I argue that economic activity requires a large and highly interacting set of public policies and services, which constitute inputs into the production process. This is reflected in the presence, in all countries, of hundreds of thousands of pages of legislation and hundreds of public agencies. Finding out what is the right mix of the public inputs, and more importantly, what is a valuable change from the current provision is as complex as determining what is the right mix of private provision of goods. In the latter case, economists agree that this process cannot be achieved through central planning and that the invisible hand of the market is the right approach, because it allows decisions to be made in a more decentralized manner with more information. I argue that a similar solution is required to deal with the complexity of the public policy mix.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133870362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The global climate regime, as represented by the Kyoto Protocol, may be on a collision course with the global trade policy regime, as represented by the WTO (World Trade Organization). Environmentalists fear that international trade will undercut reductions in greenhouse gas emissions as dirty production migrates to non-participating countries, a phenomenon known as leakage. Meanwhile businesspeople fear the effects on their own competitiveness of the same phenomenon. These fears have now become prominent in the policy-making process. In early 2008, legislation to enact long-term targets for reduced emission of greenhouse gases included provisions for possible barriers against imports from countries perceived as non-participating--in both Washington, DC (where the bills have not yet passed) and in Brussels (where the EU Commission Directive has gone into effect). Such provisions could be interpreted as violations of the rules of the WTO, which poses the nightmare scenario of a WTO panel rejecting a major country's climate change legislation. In light of the hostile feelings that such a scenario would unleash, it would be a nightmare for the supporters of the WTO and free trade as much as for the supporters of the Kyoto Protocol and environmental protection. The issue is just the latest and largest instance of fears among many environmentalists that the WTO is an obstacle to their goals in general. The issue transcends institutions. For the critics, the WTO is a symbol of globalization, and their fears attach also to that larger phenomenon. The first part of this paper discusses the broader issue of whether environmental goals in general are threatened by free trade and the WTO. The second half of the paper focuses exclusively on the narrower question of trade aspects of nations' efforts to implement climate change policy and whether they are likely to come into conflict with the WTO.
{"title":"Global Environmental Policy and Global Trade Policy","authors":"J. Frankel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1354671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1354671","url":null,"abstract":"The global climate regime, as represented by the Kyoto Protocol, may be on a collision course with the global trade policy regime, as represented by the WTO (World Trade Organization). Environmentalists fear that international trade will undercut reductions in greenhouse gas emissions as dirty production migrates to non-participating countries, a phenomenon known as leakage. Meanwhile businesspeople fear the effects on their own competitiveness of the same phenomenon. These fears have now become prominent in the policy-making process. In early 2008, legislation to enact long-term targets for reduced emission of greenhouse gases included provisions for possible barriers against imports from countries perceived as non-participating--in both Washington, DC (where the bills have not yet passed) and in Brussels (where the EU Commission Directive has gone into effect). Such provisions could be interpreted as violations of the rules of the WTO, which poses the nightmare scenario of a WTO panel rejecting a major country's climate change legislation. In light of the hostile feelings that such a scenario would unleash, it would be a nightmare for the supporters of the WTO and free trade as much as for the supporters of the Kyoto Protocol and environmental protection. The issue is just the latest and largest instance of fears among many environmentalists that the WTO is an obstacle to their goals in general. The issue transcends institutions. For the critics, the WTO is a symbol of globalization, and their fears attach also to that larger phenomenon. The first part of this paper discusses the broader issue of whether environmental goals in general are threatened by free trade and the WTO. The second half of the paper focuses exclusively on the narrower question of trade aspects of nations' efforts to implement climate change policy and whether they are likely to come into conflict with the WTO.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125650142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent work I have tried to revitalize the standpoint of humanity's commonly owning the earth. This standpoint has implications for a range of problems that have recently preoccupied us at the global level, including immigration, obligations to future generations, climate change, and human rights. In particular, this approach helps illuminate what moral claims to international aid small island nations have whose existence is threatened by global climate change. A recent proposal for relocating his people across different nations by President Tong of Kiribati is a case in point. My approach vindicates President Tong's proposal.
{"title":"The Moral Case for a Human Right to Relocation: Disappearing Island Nations and Common Ownership of the Earth","authors":"Mathias Risse","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1380425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1380425","url":null,"abstract":"In recent work I have tried to revitalize the standpoint of humanity's commonly owning the earth. This standpoint has implications for a range of problems that have recently preoccupied us at the global level, including immigration, obligations to future generations, climate change, and human rights. In particular, this approach helps illuminate what moral claims to international aid small island nations have whose existence is threatened by global climate change. A recent proposal for relocating his people across different nations by President Tong of Kiribati is a case in point. My approach vindicates President Tong's proposal.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130360364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In earlier work I argue that, despite increasing global interconnectedness, shared membership in states remains morally relevant. At the same time states are historically contingent forms of political organization with considerable drawbacks. Once we have clarified what an assessment of the state’s normative peculiarity contributes to its overall normative evaluation, the historical contingency and the drawbacks of the state come in view when we explore how to respond to another question central to that evaluation, whether there ought to be states (or, synonymously, countries) in the first place. One could answer affirmatively, negatively, or in a manner that finds the question problematic. My response is of the latter sort, but entails that, since ours is a world of states, we should try to make this world as good as possible, rather than to aspire at a world with a fundamentally different political structure. Together with the account of the state’s normative peculiarity in my earlier work, this view aims to get into focus both the moral relevance and the historical contingency of the state. To explain the Lennon-reference: “Imagine there’s no countries:” this is how the second stanza of one of the most famous songs of recent times begins. “You may say I’m a dreamer,” sings John Lennon, “But I’m not the only one/I hope someday you’ll join us,” suggesting that reaching a stage without certain alleged evils is realistic enough to be action-guiding. Yet Lennon’s is not a dream in which we ought to join. We cannot imagine what he asks us to imagine in any action-guiding way.
{"title":"'Imagine There's No Countries:' A Reply to John Lennon","authors":"Mathias Risse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1266804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1266804","url":null,"abstract":"In earlier work I argue that, despite increasing global interconnectedness, shared membership in states remains morally relevant. At the same time states are historically contingent forms of political organization with considerable drawbacks. Once we have clarified what an assessment of the state’s normative peculiarity contributes to its overall normative evaluation, the historical contingency and the drawbacks of the state come in view when we explore how to respond to another question central to that evaluation, whether there ought to be states (or, synonymously, countries) in the first place. One could answer affirmatively, negatively, or in a manner that finds the question problematic. My response is of the latter sort, but entails that, since ours is a world of states, we should try to make this world as good as possible, rather than to aspire at a world with a fundamentally different political structure. Together with the account of the state’s normative peculiarity in my earlier work, this view aims to get into focus both the moral relevance and the historical contingency of the state. To explain the Lennon-reference: “Imagine there’s no countries:” this is how the second stanza of one of the most famous songs of recent times begins. “You may say I’m a dreamer,” sings John Lennon, “But I’m not the only one/I hope someday you’ll join us,” suggesting that reaching a stage without certain alleged evils is realistic enough to be action-guiding. Yet Lennon’s is not a dream in which we ought to join. We cannot imagine what he asks us to imagine in any action-guiding way.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"348 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122549074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The main purpose of industrial policy is to speed up the process of structural change towards higher productivity activities. This paper builds on our earlier writings to present an overall design for the conduct of industrial policy in a low- to middle-income country. It is stimulated by the specific problems faced by South Africa and by our discussions with business and government officials in that country. We present specific recommendations for the South African government in the penultimate section of the paper.
{"title":"Reconfiguring Industrial Policy: A Framework with an Application to South Africa","authors":"R. Hausmann, D. Rodrik, C. Sabel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1245702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1245702","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of industrial policy is to speed up the process of structural change towards higher productivity activities. This paper builds on our earlier writings to present an overall design for the conduct of industrial policy in a low- to middle-income country. It is stimulated by the specific problems faced by South Africa and by our discussions with business and government officials in that country. We present specific recommendations for the South African government in the penultimate section of the paper.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133390983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The overarching strategic challenge facing the United States is revitalizing the international system so that the nation might conserve its strength and power even as the global environment shifts. The United States, which has been the primary beneficiary of a stable international system and remains its preeminent power, must lead and shape a process of adapting the international system to provide greater stability and security in the 21st century. The interstate system of international rules and institutions related to politics, economics, and security is under stress as many sub-state and transnational actors and processes undermine the wellbeing and security of states and persons. This erosion of state and interstate capacity is a broad phenomenon that directly and indirectly undermines U.S. security and the American way of life. This paper focuses on two new complementary components of U.S. grand strategy: strategic flexibility and an indirect method. Strategic flexibility encompasses a host of policies designed to allow the United States to maintain its power and to shape the emerging security environment. The policies that enable strategic flexibility reflect a long-overdue update of the political, economic, and security assumptions that once buttressed U.S. foreign policy. America’s unipolar moment is already en route to being eclipsed by an increasingly diverse cast of global characters with the capacity to degrade or enhance U.S. security. The United States retains predominance in many arenas, but longer-term demographic and economic trends in key states and the diffusion of power from states to other entities suggest an emerging, if still largely invisible, shift of global power.
{"title":"A Strategy of Conservation: American Power and the International System","authors":"Sarah B. Sewall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1124298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1124298","url":null,"abstract":"The overarching strategic challenge facing the United States is revitalizing the international system so that the nation might conserve its strength and power even as the global environment shifts. The United States, which has been the primary beneficiary of a stable international system and remains its preeminent power, must lead and shape a process of adapting the international system to provide greater stability and security in the 21st century. The interstate system of international rules and institutions related to politics, economics, and security is under stress as many sub-state and transnational actors and processes undermine the wellbeing and security of states and persons. This erosion of state and interstate capacity is a broad phenomenon that directly and indirectly undermines U.S. security and the American way of life. This paper focuses on two new complementary components of U.S. grand strategy: strategic flexibility and an indirect method. Strategic flexibility encompasses a host of policies designed to allow the United States to maintain its power and to shape the emerging security environment. The policies that enable strategic flexibility reflect a long-overdue update of the political, economic, and security assumptions that once buttressed U.S. foreign policy. America’s unipolar moment is already en route to being eclipsed by an increasingly diverse cast of global characters with the capacity to degrade or enhance U.S. security. The United States retains predominance in many arenas, but longer-term demographic and economic trends in key states and the diffusion of power from states to other entities suggest an emerging, if still largely invisible, shift of global power.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"18 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123033914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As part of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA), the National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa convened an international panel of economists through Harvard's Center for International Development. This panel spent two years analyzing the South African economy and its growth prospects, and composed 20 papers spanning all aspects of economic policy. The present paper synthesizes this body of work. We summarize the panel's assessment of the binding constraints to growth in South Africa and provide specific policy recommendations to help achieve the goal of accelerated and shared growth.
{"title":"Final Recommendations of the International Panel on the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA)","authors":"R. Hausmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1124292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1124292","url":null,"abstract":"As part of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA), the National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa convened an international panel of economists through Harvard's Center for International Development. This panel spent two years analyzing the South African economy and its growth prospects, and composed 20 papers spanning all aspects of economic policy. The present paper synthesizes this body of work. We summarize the panel's assessment of the binding constraints to growth in South Africa and provide specific policy recommendations to help achieve the goal of accelerated and shared growth.","PeriodicalId":110014,"journal":{"name":"John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series","volume":"50 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132008111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}