Pub Date : 2019-05-21DOI: 10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0012
M. Wan
This chapter examines the cultural dimension of Hong Kong’s Occupy Central movement by analyzing a theatrical production from the period in light of Jacques Derrida’s notion of hauntology. It argues that despite its purported focus on legal issues surrounding electoral reform, Occupy Central addresses more fundamental tensions about “Britishness” and “Chineseness” that structure Hong Kong identity. It posits that such tensions are creatively registered in Marcus Woo’s Find Ghost Do the CE and that Derrida’s Specters of Marx provides a framework for bringing them to light. It concludes by asking what it might mean to do justice to the complexity of Hong Kong identity in a time of constitutional uncertainty.
{"title":"A Ghost Story:","authors":"M. Wan","doi":"10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the cultural dimension of Hong Kong’s Occupy Central movement by analyzing a theatrical production from the period in light of Jacques Derrida’s notion of hauntology. It argues that despite its purported focus on legal issues surrounding electoral reform, Occupy Central addresses more fundamental tensions about “Britishness” and “Chineseness” that structure Hong Kong identity. It posits that such tensions are creatively registered in Marcus Woo’s Find Ghost Do the CE and that Derrida’s Specters of Marx provides a framework for bringing them to light. It concludes by asking what it might mean to do justice to the complexity of Hong Kong identity in a time of constitutional uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":111677,"journal":{"name":"Administering Interpretation","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123429685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-21DOI: 10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0005
M. Rosenfeld
Law and justice are in crucial ways against nature as well as against solidarity. As David Hume proclaimed, justice is an “artificial virtue” in contrast to the social bonds of family and community, which are affectively grounded in solidarity and manifestations of mutual sympathy. Law as a self-standing normative order propelled by its own inner logic remains too abstract to command heartfelt internalization or commitment. Moreover, law often stands against justice, as some laws are unjust and full justice ever elusive. Accordingly, difficult questions arise for jurisprudence. Derrida and Agamben confront these difficulties in the context of the nexus between the singular, the universal, and the plural. For Derrida, law cannot achieve justice, as there is tragically no way to reconcile the universal and the singular. For Agamben, in contrast, the gaps become masked by a ceremonial spectacle of religiously inspired harmony and acclamation by those subject to law and an unbridgeable gap between law and administration. This chapter situates and compares Derrida’s deconstruction of law with Agamben’s reconstruction, focusing on whether they complement one another and on whether they point to solutions that may open a way beyond despair or artifice.
{"title":"Law against Justice and Solidarity","authors":"M. Rosenfeld","doi":"10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Law and justice are in crucial ways against nature as well as against solidarity. As David Hume proclaimed, justice is an “artificial virtue” in contrast to the social bonds of family and community, which are affectively grounded in solidarity and manifestations of mutual sympathy. Law as a self-standing normative order propelled by its own inner logic remains too abstract to command heartfelt internalization or commitment. Moreover, law often stands against justice, as some laws are unjust and full justice ever elusive. Accordingly, difficult questions arise for jurisprudence. Derrida and Agamben confront these difficulties in the context of the nexus between the singular, the universal, and the plural. For Derrida, law cannot achieve justice, as there is tragically no way to reconcile the universal and the singular. For Agamben, in contrast, the gaps become masked by a ceremonial spectacle of religiously inspired harmony and acclamation by those subject to law and an unbridgeable gap between law and administration. This chapter situates and compares Derrida’s deconstruction of law with Agamben’s reconstruction, focusing on whether they complement one another and on whether they point to solutions that may open a way beyond despair or artifice.","PeriodicalId":111677,"journal":{"name":"Administering Interpretation","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123493109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-21DOI: 10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0003
S. Fish
Addressing textualism in its various manifestations, this chapter argues, in critique of Schlink and Scalia, that genuine interpretation is governed by the attempt to determine the author’s intention. Examining Scalia’s divergence from this hermeneutic norm, Fish argues not only that his theory as exemplified in Heller is bad, but also that as an interpretative practice, it is evil.
{"title":"Antonin Scalia, Bernhard Schlink, and Lancelot Andrewes","authors":"S. Fish","doi":"10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Addressing textualism in its various manifestations, this chapter argues, in critique of Schlink and Scalia, that genuine interpretation is governed by the attempt to determine the author’s intention. Examining Scalia’s divergence from this hermeneutic norm, Fish argues not only that his theory as exemplified in Heller is bad, but also that as an interpretative practice, it is evil.","PeriodicalId":111677,"journal":{"name":"Administering Interpretation","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123298076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-21DOI: 10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0002
B. Schlink
The interpretations of legal norms, which are abstract and general, are also abstract and general. Legal norms are if-then-sentences—if this factual constellation occurs, then these are the legal consequences—and their interpretations aim to cover all cases that are similar enough to fall under the if-clause and all variations that the legal consequences can take on. These normative if-then sentences have something important in common with the factual if-then sentences of empirical science. Both claim relevance for an infinite number of instances, an infinite universe of discourse. Therefore, both can never be verified, only falsified. This also means that there can be no rules that have only to be followed to discover the right legal interpretation or scientific hypothesis. In the context of discovery, anything goes, so long as it is imaginative and creative. Rules come into play in the context of justification; they demand that legal interpretations and scientific hypotheses are justified by demonstrating that all ways to falsify them have been tried and tested without resulting in a falsification. Scientific hypotheses are falsified by consensus about how to understand reality. Legal interpretations are also falsified by consensus: about what the text of the norm says, about what the legislature intended, and about the consequences of a legal interpretation being compatible or incompatible with the rest of the legal system. Since legal interpretations are and can only be hypotheses, there is no one right interpretation, and the quest for it goes astray.
{"title":"Interpretations as Hypotheses","authors":"B. Schlink","doi":"10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The interpretations of legal norms, which are abstract and general, are also abstract and general. Legal norms are if-then-sentences—if this factual constellation occurs, then these are the legal consequences—and their interpretations aim to cover all cases that are similar enough to fall under the if-clause and all variations that the legal consequences can take on. These normative if-then sentences have something important in common with the factual if-then sentences of empirical science. Both claim relevance for an infinite number of instances, an infinite universe of discourse. Therefore, both can never be verified, only falsified. This also means that there can be no rules that have only to be followed to discover the right legal interpretation or scientific hypothesis. In the context of discovery, anything goes, so long as it is imaginative and creative. Rules come into play in the context of justification; they demand that legal interpretations and scientific hypotheses are justified by demonstrating that all ways to falsify them have been tried and tested without resulting in a falsification. Scientific hypotheses are falsified by consensus about how to understand reality. Legal interpretations are also falsified by consensus: about what the text of the norm says, about what the legislature intended, and about the consequences of a legal interpretation being compatible or incompatible with the rest of the legal system. Since legal interpretations are and can only be hypotheses, there is no one right interpretation, and the quest for it goes astray.","PeriodicalId":111677,"journal":{"name":"Administering Interpretation","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129700941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-21DOI: 10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0006
P. Legrand
This essay examines key aspects of Jacques Derrida’s thinking about law. After probing Derrida’s anti-foundationalism, the text claims that Derrida’s appreciation of law was always effectively an understanding of droit. The further argument is that Derrida’s deconstructive strategy is haunted by the latent presence of the only droit with which he was familiar, French law, which would have manifested itself to him in the standard form of a particularly persistent, uncompromising, and indeed crude version of positivism well-known to comparativists and at variance with the mainstream views prevailing in the anglophone world where the common-law tradition obtains. Ultimately, this essay challenges every single interpretation of Derrida in English translation whenever Derrida’s readers have reflexively assumed that the word “law” meant “law” as usually understood in the anglophone world. In fact, in Derrida’s work “law” never carried that meaning, for Derrida was only ever acquainted with droit. And since he always wrote in French, he never had anything in mind but droit. Specifically, Jacques Derrida never wrote about law.
{"title":"Jacques Derrida Never Wrote about Law","authors":"P. Legrand","doi":"10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/FORDHAM/9780823283798.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This essay examines key aspects of Jacques Derrida’s thinking about law. After probing Derrida’s anti-foundationalism, the text claims that Derrida’s appreciation of law was always effectively an understanding of droit. The further argument is that Derrida’s deconstructive strategy is haunted by the latent presence of the only droit with which he was familiar, French law, which would have manifested itself to him in the standard form of a particularly persistent, uncompromising, and indeed crude version of positivism well-known to comparativists and at variance with the mainstream views prevailing in the anglophone world where the common-law tradition obtains. Ultimately, this essay challenges every single interpretation of Derrida in English translation whenever Derrida’s readers have reflexively assumed that the word “law” meant “law” as usually understood in the anglophone world. In fact, in Derrida’s work “law” never carried that meaning, for Derrida was only ever acquainted with droit. And since he always wrote in French, he never had anything in mind but droit. Specifically, Jacques Derrida never wrote about law.","PeriodicalId":111677,"journal":{"name":"Administering Interpretation","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131158062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-21DOI: 10.5422/fordham/9780823283798.003.0007
Bernadette A. Meyler
The aim of this essay is to suggest what Jacques Derrida’s late forays into law and politics might contribute to thinking in legal theory beyond what can be derived from Michel Foucault and his inheritors. The key differences pertain to time and timing. In particular, Derrida’s writings lead us to reconsider the timing of the relation between the subject and the law, whether that subject is declaring independence or awaiting death. Through the vector of time, the trace of the subject—not self-present or autonomous but a subject nonetheless—is recovered within the juridico-political sphere.
{"title":"Derrida’s Legal Times","authors":"Bernadette A. Meyler","doi":"10.5422/fordham/9780823283798.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823283798.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this essay is to suggest what Jacques Derrida’s late forays into law and politics might contribute to thinking in legal theory beyond what can be derived from Michel Foucault and his inheritors. The key differences pertain to time and timing. In particular, Derrida’s writings lead us to reconsider the timing of the relation between the subject and the law, whether that subject is declaring independence or awaiting death. Through the vector of time, the trace of the subject—not self-present or autonomous but a subject nonetheless—is recovered within the juridico-political sphere.","PeriodicalId":111677,"journal":{"name":"Administering Interpretation","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132371292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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