Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-63-85
R. Ruvinskiy
This paper focuses on the probable transformative effects of the application of the Chinese Social Credit System and similar projects in the realm of public administration on constitutional rights and freedoms, balances in citizen-state relations, and the model of statehood. The starting point of the research is the assumption that the Social Credit System, despite its specifically national Chinese peculiarities, can be seen as a reflection of a broader tendency towards the use of reputational information, techniques of ranking (grading) and risk management in the process of exercising the state power. To test this hypothesis, the author analyzes the actual experience of the Social Credit System’s introduction in the People’s Republic of China, compares this project with e-government projects, and proposes the umbrella-term of “social-credit mechanisms” to describe procedures and means of social control, based on the permanent collection and analysis of reputation data relating to persons. It is argued in this paper that the introduction of social-credit mechanisms to the practice of public administration ultimately leads to the emergence of a gap between formally enshrined rights and the actual ability to exercise them, between the legal capacity of a person and the ability to realise this capacity in certain legal relations. Examining the prospects of introduction of reputation-based social-credit mechanisms to the public administration, the author notices the probability of discrimination against persons who took a false step. As is demonstrated in the paper, the use of reputation data and social ratings by state authorities may result in the gradual differentiation in quality and scope of public services depending on social ratings (grades) of their addressees. This state of affairs may signify the birth of a new caste society and the end of the principle of equality before the law. According to the conclusions made in the paper, projects akin the Chinese Social Credit System reflect the global tendency towards the formation of a new type of constitutionalism. In the framework of this new constitutionalism the main emphasis will be shifted from citizens’ democratic participation in the execution of state power and the citizenry’s political subjectivity to ensure public safety and social stability. The issue of social-credit mechanisms’ introduction to the process of public administration is de facto an issue between the values of freedom and the values of security — the issue of choosing between political subjectivity and guaranteed biological existence.
{"title":"The social credit system in China: a model of constitutionalism for the era of crises","authors":"R. Ruvinskiy","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-63-85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-63-85","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on the probable transformative effects of the application of the Chinese Social Credit System and similar projects in the realm of public administration on constitutional rights and freedoms, balances in citizen-state relations, and the model of statehood. The starting point of the research is the assumption that the Social Credit System, despite its specifically national Chinese peculiarities, can be seen as a reflection of a broader tendency towards the use of reputational information, techniques of ranking (grading) and risk management in the process of exercising the state power. To test this hypothesis, the author analyzes the actual experience of the Social Credit System’s introduction in the People’s Republic of China, compares this project with e-government projects, and proposes the umbrella-term of “social-credit mechanisms” to describe procedures and means of social control, based on the permanent collection and analysis of reputation data relating to persons. It is argued in this paper that the introduction of social-credit mechanisms to the practice of public administration ultimately leads to the emergence of a gap between formally enshrined rights and the actual ability to exercise them, between the legal capacity of a person and the ability to realise this capacity in certain legal relations. Examining the prospects of introduction of reputation-based social-credit mechanisms to the public administration, the author notices the probability of discrimination against persons who took a false step. As is demonstrated in the paper, the use of reputation data and social ratings by state authorities may result in the gradual differentiation in quality and scope of public services depending on social ratings (grades) of their addressees. This state of affairs may signify the birth of a new caste society and the end of the principle of equality before the law. According to the conclusions made in the paper, projects akin the Chinese Social Credit System reflect the global tendency towards the formation of a new type of constitutionalism. In the framework of this new constitutionalism the main emphasis will be shifted from citizens’ democratic participation in the execution of state power and the citizenry’s political subjectivity to ensure public safety and social stability. The issue of social-credit mechanisms’ introduction to the process of public administration is de facto an issue between the values of freedom and the values of security — the issue of choosing between political subjectivity and guaranteed biological existence.","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121735675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-125-140
Dar’ya B Kalish
In France, the understanding of the constitutionality of law and the wider institution of constitutional control have interesting features, especially when compared to other countries that use the traditional, legal European (Kelsen’s) model. These include the originality of the standard, against which legislative acts are checked. It is the so-called constitutional bloc, which, in addition to the 1958 Constitution itself, includes the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, the 2004 Environmental Charter, as well as the principles to which the Constitutional Council attaches constitutional significance. A feature of French public law in accordance with the 1958 Constitution is the non-universal legislative competence of parliament and the delimitation of the areas of regulation of law and regulations (government acts). In this regard, one of the requirements for the constitutionality of the law in France is that it should not interfere with the sphere of regulatory power, that is, it should not touch upon issues that are not attributed to the subject of legislative regulation by the Constitution. However, Parliament’s violation of the delimitation of legislative and regulatory regulation established by the Constitution does not include the unconstitutionality of the corresponding law (its individual provisions), instead only allowing the Government to amend them by its decrees. For a long time in France, there was only preliminary constitutional control over laws, legislative proposals submitted to a referendum, regulations of the chambers of Parliament and international treaties. As a result of the 2008 constitutional reform, a specific, subsequent constitutional review was introduced. It can be initiated in the Constitutional Council by the Court of Cassation or the Council of State upon an appeal, respectively, by a court of general jurisdiction or an administrative court, before which a statement is made that the law being applied to the dispute under consideration violates constitutionally guaranteed human rights. The institution of subsequent constitutional review has proved to be in great demand, and currently, most of the Constitutional Council’s decisions are made within its framework. In modern France, the development of legislation is significantly influenced by EU law. However, neither the Constitutional Council nor the Council of State directly monitor the compliance of laws and regulations with international treaties and EU law.
{"title":"Specificity of the interpretation of constitutionality in the Fifth Republic in France","authors":"Dar’ya B Kalish","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-125-140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-125-140","url":null,"abstract":"In France, the understanding of the constitutionality of law and the wider institution of constitutional control have interesting features, especially when compared to other countries that use the traditional, legal European (Kelsen’s) model. These include the originality of the standard, against which legislative acts are checked. It is the so-called constitutional bloc, which, in addition to the 1958 Constitution itself, includes the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, the 2004 Environmental Charter, as well as the principles to which the Constitutional Council attaches constitutional significance. A feature of French public law in accordance with the 1958 Constitution is the non-universal legislative competence of parliament and the delimitation of the areas of regulation of law and regulations (government acts). In this regard, one of the requirements for the constitutionality of the law in France is that it should not interfere with the sphere of regulatory power, that is, it should not touch upon issues that are not attributed to the subject of legislative regulation by the Constitution. However, Parliament’s violation of the delimitation of legislative and regulatory regulation established by the Constitution does not include the unconstitutionality of the corresponding law (its individual provisions), instead only allowing the Government to amend them by its decrees. For a long time in France, there was only preliminary constitutional control over laws, legislative proposals submitted to a referendum, regulations of the chambers of Parliament and international treaties. As a result of the 2008 constitutional reform, a specific, subsequent constitutional review was introduced. It can be initiated in the Constitutional Council by the Court of Cassation or the Council of State upon an appeal, respectively, by a court of general jurisdiction or an administrative court, before which a statement is made that the law being applied to the dispute under consideration violates constitutionally guaranteed human rights. The institution of subsequent constitutional review has proved to be in great demand, and currently, most of the Constitutional Council’s decisions are made within its framework. In modern France, the development of legislation is significantly influenced by EU law. However, neither the Constitutional Council nor the Council of State directly monitor the compliance of laws and regulations with international treaties and EU law.","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114163211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2019-5-55-71
Aleksandra Uroshleva
{"title":"Legal reasoning in constitutional justice: at the foot of the rhetorical approach","authors":"Aleksandra Uroshleva","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2019-5-55-71","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2019-5-55-71","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130836536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2021-4-155-171
M. Mityukov
The modernisation of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in 1993–2000 was a result of the political and legal transformations of the 1990s, and the period of its procedural inaction for a year and a half was by no means time lost. It was used to prepare a new law for the Constitutional Court, which was largely prepared by the Court itself and accompanied by disputes with the State Legal Department of the Russian Federation’s president and various factions of the State Duma of the first assembly (LDPR, KPRF). Discussions were primarily held about the status of the Constitutional Court, such as the Court’s term in office, as well as its number of members, which greatly determined the effectiveness of the future “second” Constitutional Court of the 1993–1995 model and its internal structure. Filling the Constitutional Court’s six vacant seats as defined by the 1993 Constitution was not carried out by electing judges as in the previous legislation, but instead by appointing them to each of the chambers on the suggestion of the head of state. This predetermined an acute political struggle, primarily to establish the procedure for selecting candidates for judicial positions and determining the role of the president in each chamber of the Federal Assembly, the State Duma factions, legal institutions, and scientific communities of legal scholars. The independent “game” of each of these elements delayed the process of starting a functioning Constitutional Court for many months, but the democratic procedure for electing the courts’ heads allowed the issue to resolve without delay.
{"title":"The formation of the composition of the Constitutional Court of Russia in 1994–1995 (on the history of the issue and constitutional and legal aspects)","authors":"M. Mityukov","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-4-155-171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-4-155-171","url":null,"abstract":"The modernisation of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in 1993–2000 was a result of the political and legal transformations of the 1990s, and the period of its procedural inaction for a year and a half was by no means time lost. It was used to prepare a new law for the Constitutional Court, which was largely prepared by the Court itself and accompanied by disputes with the State Legal Department of the Russian Federation’s president and various factions of the State Duma of the first assembly (LDPR, KPRF). Discussions were primarily held about the status of the Constitutional Court, such as the Court’s term in office, as well as its number of members, which greatly determined the effectiveness of the future “second” Constitutional Court of the 1993–1995 model and its internal structure. Filling the Constitutional Court’s six vacant seats as defined by the 1993 Constitution was not carried out by electing judges as in the previous legislation, but instead by appointing them to each of the chambers on the suggestion of the head of state. This predetermined an acute political struggle, primarily to establish the procedure for selecting candidates for judicial positions and determining the role of the president in each chamber of the Federal Assembly, the State Duma factions, legal institutions, and scientific communities of legal scholars. The independent “game” of each of these elements delayed the process of starting a functioning Constitutional Court for many months, but the democratic procedure for electing the courts’ heads allowed the issue to resolve without delay.","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115213219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2020-6-79-114
A. Dolzhikov
The author discusses the application of the suitability test in constitutional adjudication. Then he puts forward a thesis that in comparison with the essentially philosophical categories of reasonableness and rationality, this prong of proportionality principle has practical value in judicial review of legislation. The political system has to meet the minimum standards of a deliberative democracy in order courts could use the doctrine of rationality. Among such standards are: recognition of the diversity of ideologies, real competition between political parties and other groups, a serious attitude towards discussion in society, etc. High courts, even in countries with long democratic traditions, usually use the self-restraint technique in reviewing the reasonableness of statutes. In illiberal and populist regimes, due to the unification of public discourse and the imitation of democratic institutions, the challenging of reasonableness of majority decisions can be dangerous. The argument on absurdity of legislation is relatively rare in the case-law of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. It can be found in the dissenting opinions of constitutional judges. In regard with the recent legislative ban on the publication of these opinions, the reasoning ad absurdum has rather theoretical significance for constitutional adjudication in Russia. Moreover, criticism of the reasonableness of legislation can now create additional obstacles for the difficult dialogue of the Russian Constitutional Court with the parliament and other “political” branches. An alternative to critically reviewing the unreasonableness of parliamentary decisions in constitutional adjudication are both the borrowing of economic methodology and certain principles of Legisprudence. The author puts forward the argument on utility of these principles on the judicial review of the ability of legislative means to achieve public goals. Suitability has an empirical nature and requires scientific validity of statutes. Selection of regulatory measures should be evidence-based and grounded on outcomes of research. Usually, constitutional judges do not have special knowledge of complex issues of socio-economic policy. More often than not, the absence of such an expertise means deference to the parliamentary and administrative fact-finding, which predetermined the normative decision. The intensity of the review of the suitability of legislation can be increased in those areas where constitutional judges have the necessary expertise or practical background. Constitutional tribunals recognize the broad discretion of representative bodies in forecasting the social, economic and other consequences. Otherwise, the intervention of judges in the goal-setting of regulatory policy is inevitable. Forecasting can be inaccurate and even erroneous due to the targeting of the regulatory decision for the future. A second-guess of the legislative forecast in constitutional adjudication is an exce
{"title":"Is it time to understand Russia rationally? Test of suitability in constitutional adjudication","authors":"A. Dolzhikov","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2020-6-79-114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2020-6-79-114","url":null,"abstract":"The author discusses the application of the suitability test in constitutional adjudication. Then he puts forward a thesis that in comparison with the essentially philosophical categories of reasonableness and rationality, this prong of proportionality principle has practical value in judicial review of legislation. The political system has to meet the minimum standards of a deliberative democracy in order courts could use the doctrine of rationality. Among such standards are: recognition of the diversity of ideologies, real competition between political parties and other groups, a serious attitude towards discussion in society, etc. High courts, even in countries with long democratic traditions, usually use the self-restraint technique in reviewing the reasonableness of statutes. In illiberal and populist regimes, due to the unification of public discourse and the imitation of democratic institutions, the challenging of reasonableness of majority decisions can be dangerous. The argument on absurdity of legislation is relatively rare in the case-law of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. It can be found in the dissenting opinions of constitutional judges. In regard with the recent legislative ban on the publication of these opinions, the reasoning ad absurdum has rather theoretical significance for constitutional adjudication in Russia. Moreover, criticism of the reasonableness of legislation can now create additional obstacles for the difficult dialogue of the Russian Constitutional Court with the parliament and other “political” branches. An alternative to critically reviewing the unreasonableness of parliamentary decisions in constitutional adjudication are both the borrowing of economic methodology and certain principles of Legisprudence. The author puts forward the argument on utility of these principles on the judicial review of the ability of legislative means to achieve public goals. Suitability has an empirical nature and requires scientific validity of statutes. Selection of regulatory measures should be evidence-based and grounded on outcomes of research. Usually, constitutional judges do not have special knowledge of complex issues of socio-economic policy. More often than not, the absence of such an expertise means deference to the parliamentary and administrative fact-finding, which predetermined the normative decision. The intensity of the review of the suitability of legislation can be increased in those areas where constitutional judges have the necessary expertise or practical background. Constitutional tribunals recognize the broad discretion of representative bodies in forecasting the social, economic and other consequences. Otherwise, the intervention of judges in the goal-setting of regulatory policy is inevitable. Forecasting can be inaccurate and even erroneous due to the targeting of the regulatory decision for the future. A second-guess of the legislative forecast in constitutional adjudication is an exce","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"372 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114014742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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