Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2021-2-131-148
A. Chirninov
According to Article 56 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, “a judge and a juror may not be examined as a witness about the circumstances of a criminal case which they have become aware of while participating in it”. The Russian Supreme Court has interpreted this rule as imposing a categorical prohibition to examine a juror even though the defense submits and tries to prove that jurors were not impartial due to the extraneous influence and unlawful threats that they confronted in a jury room. As a result, this approach, instead of ensuring the confidentiality of jury deliberations, has been rather used to preclude the discovery of procedural irregularities in reaching a verdict. In its judgment of 7 July 2020, the Russian Constitutional Court has softened this unreasonable restriction by ruling that jurors’ witness immunity is not absolute and appellate courts must use their testimony to establish facts relating to alleged attempts to place unlawful pressure on a jury by undermining the secrecy of jury deliberations. Based on a case file, including the petition that the author of this article drafted and filed to the Russian Constitutional Court, the article reconstructs the arguments invoked by the parties in the course of constitutional proceedings and assesses the approach taken by the Russian Constitutional Court to decide the case. In particular, the court has allowed examining jurors, but only with their consent. Having studied the experience of the countries where a jury system has been present for a long time, namely the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, the author argues that a post-trial examination of jurors is a recognized way to ensure the right of a defendant to an impartial jury. Among other things, the foreign jurisdictions obligate a juror to inform a judge about attempts to unlawfully influence a jury, empowers a judge to determine if there are sufficient grounds for summoning jurors as witnesses, and sets standards of examination. However, none of these legal orders requires that a juror give consent for examination. Therefore, the article concludes that the integrity of jurors in Russia should be protected not by enabling them to testify before an appellate court at their discretion but by strengthening their legal immunity, which in turn will strike an optimal balance between competing constitutional values.
{"title":"Janus turns out to be one-faced: the judgment of the Russian Constitutional Court on the permissibility of examination of jurors in the light of foreign law","authors":"A. Chirninov","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-2-131-148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-2-131-148","url":null,"abstract":"According to Article 56 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, “a judge and a juror may not be examined as a witness about the circumstances of a criminal case which they have become aware of while participating in it”. The Russian Supreme Court has interpreted this rule as imposing a categorical prohibition to examine a juror even though the defense submits and tries to prove that jurors were not impartial due to the extraneous influence and unlawful threats that they confronted in a jury room. As a result, this approach, instead of ensuring the confidentiality of jury deliberations, has been rather used to preclude the discovery of procedural irregularities in reaching a verdict. In its judgment of 7 July 2020, the Russian Constitutional Court has softened this unreasonable restriction by ruling that jurors’ witness immunity is not absolute and appellate courts must use their testimony to establish facts relating to alleged attempts to place unlawful pressure on a jury by undermining the secrecy of jury deliberations. Based on a case file, including the petition that the author of this article drafted and filed to the Russian Constitutional Court, the article reconstructs the arguments invoked by the parties in the course of constitutional proceedings and assesses the approach taken by the Russian Constitutional Court to decide the case. In particular, the court has allowed examining jurors, but only with their consent. Having studied the experience of the countries where a jury system has been present for a long time, namely the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, the author argues that a post-trial examination of jurors is a recognized way to ensure the right of a defendant to an impartial jury. Among other things, the foreign jurisdictions obligate a juror to inform a judge about attempts to unlawfully influence a jury, empowers a judge to determine if there are sufficient grounds for summoning jurors as witnesses, and sets standards of examination. However, none of these legal orders requires that a juror give consent for examination. Therefore, the article concludes that the integrity of jurors in Russia should be protected not by enabling them to testify before an appellate court at their discretion but by strengthening their legal immunity, which in turn will strike an optimal balance between competing constitutional values.","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126619185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2020-4-55-79
A. Chirninov
{"title":"When political questions and constitutional justice meet: the starting points of argumentation in a comparative perspective","authors":"A. Chirninov","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2020-4-55-79","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2020-4-55-79","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127312586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2020-4-131-133
T. Morshchakova
{"title":"The rule of law and standards of restorative (conciliatory) justice: Instead of a foreword","authors":"T. Morshchakova","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2020-4-131-133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2020-4-131-133","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"178 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126746101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-17-38
A. Salenko
The main purpose of the article is to analyze the content of dissenting opinions of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Russia regarding the implementation of freedom of peaceful assembly. The author concluded that in 2009–2020, there were three judgements (postanovlenie) and one decision (opredelenie) by the Constitutional Court of Russia (hereinafter also referred to as the CCR) that were accompanied by dissenting opinions of CCR judges. In 2013, one single judgment of the CCR was accompanied by three dissenting opinions. This research analyzes the six dissenting opinions of the judges of the Russian Constitutional Court, which considered various problematic issues regarding the implementation of freedom of peaceful assembly in the contemporary Russian Federation. The author also analyzes the role and significance of the dissenting opinions in the context of amendments to the Russian Constitution in 2020, and changes in legislation that significantly limited the publicity of dissenting opinions of CCR judges. This article shows the role of dissenting opinions as: a means to raising the level of legal consciousness in society, a guarantee of a fair and open trial, a guarantee of the independence of judiciary and judicial democracy, and a means of improving legislation and law enforcement practice. The author concludes that the CCR judges’ dissenting opinions could in some cases be regarded as “sleeping law”, because the European Court of Human Rights later confirmed the judges’ minority report in findings. The article uses traditional research methods such as analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, logical method, and comparative legal methods. The author expresses that it is necessary to keep the democratic tradition of constitutional justice, which allowed the publicity of dissenting opinions of CCR judges during 1991–2020. It is also concluded that the dissenting opinions of the Constitutional Court judges enable a deeper understanding of the political and legal nature, features, and main stages of the development of Russian public assembly law, one of direct democracy’s most important institutions alongside elections and referendums. The author argues that dissenting opinions of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Russia make it possible to identify gaps and defects in the legal regulation of public events in Russia. The study was funded by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) and the Expert Institute for Social Research (EISR) in the framework of the research project no.20-011-31740.
{"title":"Dissenting opinions on the freedom of peaceful assembly","authors":"A. Salenko","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-17-38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-17-38","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of the article is to analyze the content of dissenting opinions of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Russia regarding the implementation of freedom of peaceful assembly. The author concluded that in 2009–2020, there were three judgements (postanovlenie) and one decision (opredelenie) by the Constitutional Court of Russia (hereinafter also referred to as the CCR) that were accompanied by dissenting opinions of CCR judges. In 2013, one single judgment of the CCR was accompanied by three dissenting opinions. This research analyzes the six dissenting opinions of the judges of the Russian Constitutional Court, which considered various problematic issues regarding the implementation of freedom of peaceful assembly in the contemporary Russian Federation. The author also analyzes the role and significance of the dissenting opinions in the context of amendments to the Russian Constitution in 2020, and changes in legislation that significantly limited the publicity of dissenting opinions of CCR judges. This article shows the role of dissenting opinions as: a means to raising the level of legal consciousness in society, a guarantee of a fair and open trial, a guarantee of the independence of judiciary and judicial democracy, and a means of improving legislation and law enforcement practice. The author concludes that the CCR judges’ dissenting opinions could in some cases be regarded as “sleeping law”, because the European Court of Human Rights later confirmed the judges’ minority report in findings. The article uses traditional research methods such as analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, logical method, and comparative legal methods. The author expresses that it is necessary to keep the democratic tradition of constitutional justice, which allowed the publicity of dissenting opinions of CCR judges during 1991–2020. It is also concluded that the dissenting opinions of the Constitutional Court judges enable a deeper understanding of the political and legal nature, features, and main stages of the development of Russian public assembly law, one of direct democracy’s most important institutions alongside elections and referendums. The author argues that dissenting opinions of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Russia make it possible to identify gaps and defects in the legal regulation of public events in Russia. The study was funded by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) and the Expert Institute for Social Research (EISR) in the framework of the research project no.20-011-31740.","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124941296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-15-41
A. Medushevsky
The European integration project as designed by its founders seventy years ago is experiencing difficulties in the current conditions of globalization, confronting challenges which were unpredictable beforehand. Many of these are of crucial character for the European Union, putting in question its constitutional organization, institutional structure, and political sustainability in the international balance of power. The list of most important issues includes ones like the yet incomplete character of the Union’s legal construction, which is balanced between supranational and national forms of regulation; the erosion of legitimacy of European institutions; the growing democracy deficits in transnational and national governance; the decline of solidarity in inter-governmental relations; and the falling level of accountability and decision-making mechanisms in Europe. The very natural response to these problems was a Pan-European discussion, stimulated by European elites after Brexit, on the future of the European project in order to frame existing opinions, provide a fresh start to “the European dream”, and possibly find appropriate solutions to legitimacy problems. An analysis of this ongoing discussion is the main subject of this article. This analysis involves such key issues as the future role of the EU founding agreements, as to keeping them or amending them in order to reconstruct the European constitutional settlement. It demonstrates the complex nature of the basic communitarian concept, in view of its various interpretations by different ideological trends such as cosmopolitism and confederation and federation movements. It explores the current agenda of institutional reforms involving parliamentarian and presidential strategies and reviews proposed solutions of the European leadership problem. The conclusion of the article makes it clear that the European Union is confronted today with the most dramatic challenge in its entire history. It consists in the necessity of making a decisive choice between two polar options — to preserve an amorphous conglomerate of states or to establish a new federal state. This must be done in a rather short period in order to avoid falling apart and to become a full-fledged and independent global political player.
{"title":"The future of Europe: a political discussion of prospects of the European Union integration project","authors":"A. Medushevsky","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-15-41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-5-15-41","url":null,"abstract":"The European integration project as designed by its founders seventy years ago is experiencing difficulties in the current conditions of globalization, confronting challenges which were unpredictable beforehand. Many of these are of crucial character for the European Union, putting in question its constitutional organization, institutional structure, and political sustainability in the international balance of power. The list of most important issues includes ones like the yet incomplete character of the Union’s legal construction, which is balanced between supranational and national forms of regulation; the erosion of legitimacy of European institutions; the growing democracy deficits in transnational and national governance; the decline of solidarity in inter-governmental relations; and the falling level of accountability and decision-making mechanisms in Europe. The very natural response to these problems was a Pan-European discussion, stimulated by European elites after Brexit, on the future of the European project in order to frame existing opinions, provide a fresh start to “the European dream”, and possibly find appropriate solutions to legitimacy problems. An analysis of this ongoing discussion is the main subject of this article. This analysis involves such key issues as the future role of the EU founding agreements, as to keeping them or amending them in order to reconstruct the European constitutional settlement. It demonstrates the complex nature of the basic communitarian concept, in view of its various interpretations by different ideological trends such as cosmopolitism and confederation and federation movements. It explores the current agenda of institutional reforms involving parliamentarian and presidential strategies and reviews proposed solutions of the European leadership problem. The conclusion of the article makes it clear that the European Union is confronted today with the most dramatic challenge in its entire history. It consists in the necessity of making a decisive choice between two polar options — to preserve an amorphous conglomerate of states or to establish a new federal state. This must be done in a rather short period in order to avoid falling apart and to become a full-fledged and independent global political player.","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131767920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2020-6-115-140
Aleksandra Uroshleva
The author examines the essence and characteristic features of the evolutionary interpretation in constitutional review bodies decisions and concludes given the relationship between processes of argumentation and interpretation, as well as definite characteristics and trends in the application of the evolutionary interpretation in different countries, that it is more appropriate to talk about the evolutionary approach in argumentation, not about a separate method of interpretation. An evolutionary constitutional interpretation, as it is stated in the article, does not necessarily mean going beyond the literal text of the basic law. A literal (textual) interpretation and an evolutionary approach are combined phenomena of different nature; they are allocated based on various criteria – the source (orientation on the text) and the socially adaptive result, respectively. The value of the evolutionary approach is associated with the possibility of “adjusting” constitutional norms to real social canvas without making changes to the text of a constitution. The author shows using the case law examples that an evolutionary interpretation can be expansive, that is aimed at increasing the scope of constitutional regulation (“filling” constitutional norms with “new” (additional) content, picking out new human rights, increasing their level of protection), and restrictive, that is narrowing the scope regulated and (or) protected by a constitution (reducing level of human rights guarantees or subject area of constitutional regulation). Considering through the prism of specific constitutional justice cases such doctrines as of a “living constitution” in the United States of America, a “living tree” in Canada and the concept of “judicial law development” in Germany, the author comes to the conclusion that an independent concept of the evolutionary approach in legal reasoning has not been formed yet in the Russian practice of constitutional justice. In this regard, it seems to be perspective direction to develop such a concept, especially in the context of a possibility of combining the evolutionary approach with original interpretation. It seems that despite the fact that the problem of judicial activism is not now a problem of current urgent interest in Russia, the constitutional amendments of 2020 have actualized the potential for an evolutionary interpretation of certain constitutional provisions.
{"title":"Evolutionary approach in reasoning practice of constitutional justice","authors":"Aleksandra Uroshleva","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2020-6-115-140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2020-6-115-140","url":null,"abstract":"The author examines the essence and characteristic features of the evolutionary interpretation in constitutional review bodies decisions and concludes given the relationship between processes of argumentation and interpretation, as well as definite characteristics and trends in the application of the evolutionary interpretation in different countries, that it is more appropriate to talk about the evolutionary approach in argumentation, not about a separate method of interpretation. An evolutionary constitutional interpretation, as it is stated in the article, does not necessarily mean going beyond the literal text of the basic law. A literal (textual) interpretation and an evolutionary approach are combined phenomena of different nature; they are allocated based on various criteria – the source (orientation on the text) and the socially adaptive result, respectively. The value of the evolutionary approach is associated with the possibility of “adjusting” constitutional norms to real social canvas without making changes to the text of a constitution. The author shows using the case law examples that an evolutionary interpretation can be expansive, that is aimed at increasing the scope of constitutional regulation (“filling” constitutional norms with “new” (additional) content, picking out new human rights, increasing their level of protection), and restrictive, that is narrowing the scope regulated and (or) protected by a constitution (reducing level of human rights guarantees or subject area of constitutional regulation). Considering through the prism of specific constitutional justice cases such doctrines as of a “living constitution” in the United States of America, a “living tree” in Canada and the concept of “judicial law development” in Germany, the author comes to the conclusion that an independent concept of the evolutionary approach in legal reasoning has not been formed yet in the Russian practice of constitutional justice. In this regard, it seems to be perspective direction to develop such a concept, especially in the context of a possibility of combining the evolutionary approach with original interpretation. It seems that despite the fact that the problem of judicial activism is not now a problem of current urgent interest in Russia, the constitutional amendments of 2020 have actualized the potential for an evolutionary interpretation of certain constitutional provisions.","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130184063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-63-85
R. Ruvinskiy
This paper focuses on the probable transformative effects of the application of the Chinese Social Credit System and similar projects in the realm of public administration on constitutional rights and freedoms, balances in citizen-state relations, and the model of statehood. The starting point of the research is the assumption that the Social Credit System, despite its specifically national Chinese peculiarities, can be seen as a reflection of a broader tendency towards the use of reputational information, techniques of ranking (grading) and risk management in the process of exercising the state power. To test this hypothesis, the author analyzes the actual experience of the Social Credit System’s introduction in the People’s Republic of China, compares this project with e-government projects, and proposes the umbrella-term of “social-credit mechanisms” to describe procedures and means of social control, based on the permanent collection and analysis of reputation data relating to persons. It is argued in this paper that the introduction of social-credit mechanisms to the practice of public administration ultimately leads to the emergence of a gap between formally enshrined rights and the actual ability to exercise them, between the legal capacity of a person and the ability to realise this capacity in certain legal relations. Examining the prospects of introduction of reputation-based social-credit mechanisms to the public administration, the author notices the probability of discrimination against persons who took a false step. As is demonstrated in the paper, the use of reputation data and social ratings by state authorities may result in the gradual differentiation in quality and scope of public services depending on social ratings (grades) of their addressees. This state of affairs may signify the birth of a new caste society and the end of the principle of equality before the law. According to the conclusions made in the paper, projects akin the Chinese Social Credit System reflect the global tendency towards the formation of a new type of constitutionalism. In the framework of this new constitutionalism the main emphasis will be shifted from citizens’ democratic participation in the execution of state power and the citizenry’s political subjectivity to ensure public safety and social stability. The issue of social-credit mechanisms’ introduction to the process of public administration is de facto an issue between the values of freedom and the values of security — the issue of choosing between political subjectivity and guaranteed biological existence.
{"title":"The social credit system in China: a model of constitutionalism for the era of crises","authors":"R. Ruvinskiy","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-63-85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2021-3-63-85","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on the probable transformative effects of the application of the Chinese Social Credit System and similar projects in the realm of public administration on constitutional rights and freedoms, balances in citizen-state relations, and the model of statehood. The starting point of the research is the assumption that the Social Credit System, despite its specifically national Chinese peculiarities, can be seen as a reflection of a broader tendency towards the use of reputational information, techniques of ranking (grading) and risk management in the process of exercising the state power. To test this hypothesis, the author analyzes the actual experience of the Social Credit System’s introduction in the People’s Republic of China, compares this project with e-government projects, and proposes the umbrella-term of “social-credit mechanisms” to describe procedures and means of social control, based on the permanent collection and analysis of reputation data relating to persons. It is argued in this paper that the introduction of social-credit mechanisms to the practice of public administration ultimately leads to the emergence of a gap between formally enshrined rights and the actual ability to exercise them, between the legal capacity of a person and the ability to realise this capacity in certain legal relations. Examining the prospects of introduction of reputation-based social-credit mechanisms to the public administration, the author notices the probability of discrimination against persons who took a false step. As is demonstrated in the paper, the use of reputation data and social ratings by state authorities may result in the gradual differentiation in quality and scope of public services depending on social ratings (grades) of their addressees. This state of affairs may signify the birth of a new caste society and the end of the principle of equality before the law. According to the conclusions made in the paper, projects akin the Chinese Social Credit System reflect the global tendency towards the formation of a new type of constitutionalism. In the framework of this new constitutionalism the main emphasis will be shifted from citizens’ democratic participation in the execution of state power and the citizenry’s political subjectivity to ensure public safety and social stability. The issue of social-credit mechanisms’ introduction to the process of public administration is de facto an issue between the values of freedom and the values of security — the issue of choosing between political subjectivity and guaranteed biological existence.","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121735675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2019-6-61-85
Sergei Manzhosov
{"title":"Reasoning by precedent in terms of balancing","authors":"Sergei Manzhosov","doi":"10.21128/1812-7126-2019-6-61-85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2019-6-61-85","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":113514,"journal":{"name":"Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie","volume":"2012 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129416554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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