Pub Date : 2019-02-21DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198830238.003.0011
Gary Watson
This chapter addresses critical questions about Watson’s distinction between two “faces” of responsibility—responsibility as attributability and responsibility as accountability—addressing the nature of each and what each has to do with responsibility. Along the way, a distinction is elaborated between first-personal and second-personal forms of answerability, the first of which is implicit in attributability and the second of which is a form of accountability. The chapter bemoans the emphasis in much recent writing on reactive attitudes, narrowly construed; this ignores many of the responses that constitute holding others responsible. It also rejects the prevalent idea that moral criticism is basically a response to agents’ quality of will. This leaves out culpable and other forms of objectionable inadvertence. Finally, the chapter explains the motivation behind Watson’s earlier position on weakness of will, and why he now regards that position as misguided.
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