The regulation of stem cell-based therapies is challenging in many respects, given their unique safety, efficacy, and quality issues. At the same time, public interest in these innovative therapies has led some to question FDA's regulation of them, while others urge strict regulation and stronger enforcement. Within the context of this broader debate, this article examines recent attempts in other jurisdictions to craft specific provisions allowing additional flexibility in regulating cell and tissue therapies: Australia's exemption for autologous cell and tissue therapies, and the hospital exemption in Europe's regulation for advanced therapies.
{"title":"Revising the Regulation of Stem Cell-Based Therapies: Critical Assessment of Potential Models.","authors":"Barbara von Tigerstrom","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The regulation of stem cell-based therapies is challenging in many respects, given their unique safety, efficacy, and quality issues. At the same time, public interest in these innovative therapies has led some to question FDA's regulation of them, while others urge strict regulation and stronger enforcement. Within the context of this broader debate, this article examines recent attempts in other jurisdictions to craft specific provisions allowing additional flexibility in regulating cell and tissue therapies: Australia's exemption for autologous cell and tissue therapies, and the hospital exemption in Europe's regulation for advanced therapies.</p>","PeriodicalId":12282,"journal":{"name":"Food and drug law journal","volume":"70 2","pages":"315-37, iii"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33947023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mobile applications provide limitless possibilities for the future of medical care. Yet these changes have also created concerns about patient safety. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the authority to regulate a much broader spectrum of products beyond traditional medical devices like stethoscopes or pacemakers. The regulatory question is not if FDA has the statutory. authority to regulate health-related software, but rather how it will exercise its regulatory authority. In September 2013, FDA published guidance on Mobile Medical Applications; in it, the Agency limited its oversight to a small subset of medical-related mobile applications, referred to as "mobile medical applications." For the guidance to be effective, FDA must continue to work directly with all actors--including innovators, doctors, and patients--as the market for mobile health applications continues to develop. This Article argues that FDA should adopt a two-step plan--a pre-market notification program and a mobile medical application database--to aid in the successful implementation of its 2013 guidance. By doing so, FDA will ensure that this burgeoning market can reach its fullest potential.
{"title":"Can You Diagnose Me Now? A Proposal to Modify FDA's Regulation of Smartphone Mobile Health Applications with a Pre-Market Notification and Application Database System.","authors":"Stephen McInerney","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Mobile applications provide limitless possibilities for the future of medical care. Yet these changes have also created concerns about patient safety. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the authority to regulate a much broader spectrum of products beyond traditional medical devices like stethoscopes or pacemakers. The regulatory question is not if FDA has the statutory. authority to regulate health-related software, but rather how it will exercise its regulatory authority. In September 2013, FDA published guidance on Mobile Medical Applications; in it, the Agency limited its oversight to a small subset of medical-related mobile applications, referred to as \"mobile medical applications.\" For the guidance to be effective, FDA must continue to work directly with all actors--including innovators, doctors, and patients--as the market for mobile health applications continues to develop. This Article argues that FDA should adopt a two-step plan--a pre-market notification program and a mobile medical application database--to aid in the successful implementation of its 2013 guidance. By doing so, FDA will ensure that this burgeoning market can reach its fullest potential.</p>","PeriodicalId":12282,"journal":{"name":"Food and drug law journal","volume":"70 1","pages":"161-85, ii"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"34108003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One might expect--given the vastly different look, feel, and function of the ubiquitous (and innocuous) Nutrition Facts panel and the "inflammatory" graphic warning labels for cigarettes--that the statutes establishing such disclosure requirements would exhibit similar disparities. In fact, the relevant provisions of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 are. quite analogous. Like other mandated disclosures, the nutrition label and the cigarette. graphic warnings seek to simultaneously inform and influence consumer decisions. Both statutes grant FDA considerable discretion in.the implementation of the labeling requirements, generally allowing the agency to alter the format and content of the labels as necessary to promote the statutory goals. Thus, the differences in the nutrition and cigarette warning labels are not the product of the statutory schemes alone; rather, they reflect important differences in FDA's interpretation and prioritization of the dual regulatory goals, and in the agency's implicit or explicit assumptions about human behavior.
{"title":"\"Bringing a Butter Knife to a Gun Fight\"? Salience, Disclosure, and FDA's Differing Approaches to the Tobacco Use and Obesity Epidemics.","authors":"Josef Weimholt","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>One might expect--given the vastly different look, feel, and function of the ubiquitous (and innocuous) Nutrition Facts panel and the \"inflammatory\" graphic warning labels for cigarettes--that the statutes establishing such disclosure requirements would exhibit similar disparities. In fact, the relevant provisions of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 are. quite analogous. Like other mandated disclosures, the nutrition label and the cigarette. graphic warnings seek to simultaneously inform and influence consumer decisions. Both statutes grant FDA considerable discretion in.the implementation of the labeling requirements, generally allowing the agency to alter the format and content of the labels as necessary to promote the statutory goals. Thus, the differences in the nutrition and cigarette warning labels are not the product of the statutory schemes alone; rather, they reflect important differences in FDA's interpretation and prioritization of the dual regulatory goals, and in the agency's implicit or explicit assumptions about human behavior.</p>","PeriodicalId":12282,"journal":{"name":"Food and drug law journal","volume":"70 4","pages":"501-51, i"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138795364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal ushered in a new federal pleading standard, requiring plaintiffs to state a "plausible" claim to relief before they can access discovery. Plausibility pleading, however, presents a unique burden for plaintiffs who have been injured by a Class III medical device. In Riegel, the Supreme Court held that state-law claims against device manufacturers are preempted unless they "parallel" federal requirements. However, the relevant federal requirements are located in the manufacturer's premarket approval agreement, which is confidential. Thus, it is nearly impossible for plaintiffs to allege a plausible claim against a Class III device manufacturer because they do not know what to plead in the first place. The Seventh Circuit tried to remedy this Catch-22 by lowering the pleading standards for parallel claims. However, its approach misapplies Twombly and Iqbal and overburdens device manufacturers. Instead of tinkering with pleading standards, this paper advocates a different approach. Congress should create a one-way fee-shifting mechanism that allows plaintiffs to access premarket approval agreements if they agree to pay the defendant's discovery fees (should their claim prove unsuccessful). Fee-shifting is a middle-ground approach that would better compensate plaintiffs without overdeterring device manufacturers.
{"title":"Drugs, Devices & Discovery: Using Fee-Shifting to Resolve the Twombly/Iqbal Problem for Parallel Claims Under the FDCA.","authors":"Cameron T Norris","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal ushered in a new federal pleading standard, requiring plaintiffs to state a \"plausible\" claim to relief before they can access discovery. Plausibility pleading, however, presents a unique burden for plaintiffs who have been injured by a Class III medical device. In Riegel, the Supreme Court held that state-law claims against device manufacturers are preempted unless they \"parallel\" federal requirements. However, the relevant federal requirements are located in the manufacturer's premarket approval agreement, which is confidential. Thus, it is nearly impossible for plaintiffs to allege a plausible claim against a Class III device manufacturer because they do not know what to plead in the first place. The Seventh Circuit tried to remedy this Catch-22 by lowering the pleading standards for parallel claims. However, its approach misapplies Twombly and Iqbal and overburdens device manufacturers. Instead of tinkering with pleading standards, this paper advocates a different approach. Congress should create a one-way fee-shifting mechanism that allows plaintiffs to access premarket approval agreements if they agree to pay the defendant's discovery fees (should their claim prove unsuccessful). Fee-shifting is a middle-ground approach that would better compensate plaintiffs without overdeterring device manufacturers.</p>","PeriodicalId":12282,"journal":{"name":"Food and drug law journal","volume":"70 1","pages":"187-207, ii-iii"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"34109504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recently signaled its interest in subjecting clinical investigations that employ high-throughput gene sequencing, also called next-generation sequencing, to the agency's Part 812 investigational device exemption (IDE) regulation. Genome sequencing--for reasons explained in this article--blurs the line between categories of in vitro diagnostic (IVD) research that FDA traditionally has regulated and categories of research that FDA traditionally has not regulated. This blurring creates a risk that FDA may overstep its proper authority to regulate fundamental genomic and medical research. This article surveys the legal limits of FDA's authority'to subject genomic research to its IDE requirements. Section 1 explains that FDA has authority to regulate clinical investigations of devices, but is not authorized to regulate investigations that merely use devices to expand medical knowledge or to conduct fundamental research, unless special circumstances apply. Section 2 discusses the special circumstances that can expand or limit FDA's authority to regulate a specific clinical investigation, and Section 3 demonstrates these using an example. Section 4 explores concerns that arose in recent years about risks to human subjects in a certain type of investigation known as sponsor-investigator studies. In response to these concerns, FDA has suggested that it can regulate such studies in ways that threaten to expand FDA's regulation of research at academic medical centers beyond its proper scope. These concerns, while valid in some academic research contexts, seem inapposite in the setting of genomic research programs funded by responsible.entities such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Moreover, FDA's regulations do not. appear to support the proposition that FDA can regulate sponsor-investigator studies more expansively than it regulates other studies. Section 5 explores specific ways that NIH, clinical investigators, and FDA might work together to rationalize FDA's regulation of NIH-funded-genomic research.
美国食品和药物管理局(FDA)最近表示,有意将采用高通量基因测序(也称新一代测序)的临床研究纳入该局的第 812 部分研究设备豁免 (IDE) 法规。基因组测序--出于本文解释的原因--模糊了 FDA 传统上监管的体外诊断 (IVD) 研究类别与 FDA 传统上不监管的研究类别之间的界限。这种模糊造成了一种风险,即 FDA 可能会越权监管基础基因组和医学研究。本文探讨了 FDA 将基因组研究置于其 IDE 要求之下的权力的法律限制。第 1 节解释了 FDA 有权监管器械的临床研究,但无权监管仅使用器械扩展医学知识或进行基础研究的研究,特殊情况除外。第 2 节讨论了可扩大或限制食品及药物管理局监管特定临床研究的权力的特殊情况,第 3 节用一个例子说明了这些情况。第 4 节探讨了近年来出现的对某类调查中人类受试者所面临风险的关注,这 类调查被称为 "赞助者-调查者研究"。针对这些担忧,食品及药物管理局提出,它可以对这类研究进行监管,从而有可能将食品及药物管理局对学术医学中心研究的监管扩大到适当范围之外。这些担忧虽然在某些学术研究中是有道理的,但在由负责任的实体如美国国立卫生研究院(NIH)资助的基因组研究项目中似乎并不适用。此外,FDA 的法规似乎并不支持 FDA 可以比监管其他研究更广泛地监管赞助者-研究者研究的主张。第 5 节探讨了 NIH、临床研究者和 FDA 共同合作的具体方式,使 FDA 对 NIH 资助的基因组研究的监管合理化。
{"title":"The Limits of FDA's Authority to Regulate Clinical Research Involving High-Throughput DNA Sequencing.","authors":"Barbara J Evans","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recently signaled its interest in subjecting clinical investigations that employ high-throughput gene sequencing, also called next-generation sequencing, to the agency's Part 812 investigational device exemption (IDE) regulation. Genome sequencing--for reasons explained in this article--blurs the line between categories of in vitro diagnostic (IVD) research that FDA traditionally has regulated and categories of research that FDA traditionally has not regulated. This blurring creates a risk that FDA may overstep its proper authority to regulate fundamental genomic and medical research. This article surveys the legal limits of FDA's authority'to subject genomic research to its IDE requirements. Section 1 explains that FDA has authority to regulate clinical investigations of devices, but is not authorized to regulate investigations that merely use devices to expand medical knowledge or to conduct fundamental research, unless special circumstances apply. Section 2 discusses the special circumstances that can expand or limit FDA's authority to regulate a specific clinical investigation, and Section 3 demonstrates these using an example. Section 4 explores concerns that arose in recent years about risks to human subjects in a certain type of investigation known as sponsor-investigator studies. In response to these concerns, FDA has suggested that it can regulate such studies in ways that threaten to expand FDA's regulation of research at academic medical centers beyond its proper scope. These concerns, while valid in some academic research contexts, seem inapposite in the setting of genomic research programs funded by responsible.entities such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Moreover, FDA's regulations do not. appear to support the proposition that FDA can regulate sponsor-investigator studies more expansively than it regulates other studies. Section 5 explores specific ways that NIH, clinical investigators, and FDA might work together to rationalize FDA's regulation of NIH-funded-genomic research.</p>","PeriodicalId":12282,"journal":{"name":"Food and drug law journal","volume":"70 2","pages":"259-87, ii"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4576719/pdf/nihms-708248.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33947020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Internet crowdfunding, a new and increasingly popular method of raising capital to develop products and businesses, has recently come into conflict with the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) regulation of medical devices. This Article examines the issues that arise when companies pre-sell medical devices via crowdfunding campaigns before gaining FDA approval of the devices. Because Internet crowdfunding has only been in use for a few years, little has been written about it academically, particularly about its interaction with FDA regulations. The rising interest in crowdfunding, coupled with the downturn in investment in the American medical device industry, make this a salient issue that is ripe for FDA review. This Article uses the crowdfunding campaign Scanadu, a medical device company, conducted in 2013 to raise money to develop its in-home diagnostic device, the "Scout," as a starting point for this analysis. Because it is extremely costly to develop a device and obtain FDA approval, medical device companies should be able to utilize crowdfunding to raise the necessary capital. However, because of the possible dangers medical devices pose, FDA needs to review the risks created by allowing companies to crowdfund medical devices and should issue guidance to help companies comply with FDA regulations while still allowing them to take advantage of the benefits of crowdfunding. This guidance should ensure the continued commitment to consumer safety that is at the core of FDA regulation.
{"title":"Scouting For Approval: Lessons on Medical Device Regulation in an Era of Crowdfunding from Scanadu's \"Scout\".","authors":"Colleen Smith","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Internet crowdfunding, a new and increasingly popular method of raising capital to develop products and businesses, has recently come into conflict with the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) regulation of medical devices. This Article examines the issues that arise when companies pre-sell medical devices via crowdfunding campaigns before gaining FDA approval of the devices. Because Internet crowdfunding has only been in use for a few years, little has been written about it academically, particularly about its interaction with FDA regulations. The rising interest in crowdfunding, coupled with the downturn in investment in the American medical device industry, make this a salient issue that is ripe for FDA review. This Article uses the crowdfunding campaign Scanadu, a medical device company, conducted in 2013 to raise money to develop its in-home diagnostic device, the \"Scout,\" as a starting point for this analysis. Because it is extremely costly to develop a device and obtain FDA approval, medical device companies should be able to utilize crowdfunding to raise the necessary capital. However, because of the possible dangers medical devices pose, FDA needs to review the risks created by allowing companies to crowdfund medical devices and should issue guidance to help companies comply with FDA regulations while still allowing them to take advantage of the benefits of crowdfunding. This guidance should ensure the continued commitment to consumer safety that is at the core of FDA regulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":12282,"journal":{"name":"Food and drug law journal","volume":"70 1","pages":"209-35, iii"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"34109505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vaccines represent one of the greatest achievements of medicine, dramatically reducing the incidence of serious or life-threatening infectious diseases and allowing people to live longer, healthier lives. As life expectancy has increased, however, the burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as cancer, hypertension, atherosclerosis, and diabetes has increased. This shifting burden of disease has heightened the already urgent need for therapies that treat or prevent NCDs, a need that is now being met with increased efforts to develop NCD vaccines. Like traditional vaccines, NCD vaccines work by modulating the human immune system, but target cells, proteins or other molecules that are associated with the NCD in question rather than pathogens or pathogen-infected cells. Efforts are underway to develop NCD vaccines to address not only cancer and hypertension, but also addiction, obesity, asthma, arthritis, psoriasis, multiple sclerosis, and Crohn's disease, among others. NCD vaccines present an interesting challenge for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is tasked with approving new treatments on the basis of efficacy and safety. Should NCD vaccines be evaluated under the same analytic frame as traditional vaccines, or that of biologic drugs? Despite the borrowed nomenclature, NCD vaccines differ in important ways from infectious disease vaccines. Because infectious disease vaccines are generally administered to healthy individuals, often children, tolerance for adverse events is low and willingness to pay is limited. It is important to have infectious disease vaccines even for rare or eradicated disease (e.g., smallpox), in the event of an outbreak. The efficacy of infectious disease vaccines is generally high, and the vaccines convey population level benefits associated with herd immunity and potential eradication. The combination of substantial population-level benefits, low willingness to pay, and low tolerance for adverse events explains the need for the federal National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act, which encourages production and uptake by providing immunity from liability to industry and compensation to injured patients. These characteristics and considerations contrast sharply with those of NCD vaccines, raising the question of whether the term "vaccine" is appropriate for this new category of drugs. The article explores the emerging class of NCD vaccines, explains how they differ from traditional vaccines, and describes some regulatory implications of this innovative type of therapeutic.
{"title":"A New Wave of Vaccines for Non-Communicable Diseases: What Are the Regulatory Challenges?","authors":"Jonathan J Darrow, Aaron S Kesselheim","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Vaccines represent one of the greatest achievements of medicine, dramatically reducing the incidence of serious or life-threatening infectious diseases and allowing people to live longer, healthier lives. As life expectancy has increased, however, the burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as cancer, hypertension, atherosclerosis, and diabetes has increased. This shifting burden of disease has heightened the already urgent need for therapies that treat or prevent NCDs, a need that is now being met with increased efforts to develop NCD vaccines. Like traditional vaccines, NCD vaccines work by modulating the human immune system, but target cells, proteins or other molecules that are associated with the NCD in question rather than pathogens or pathogen-infected cells. Efforts are underway to develop NCD vaccines to address not only cancer and hypertension, but also addiction, obesity, asthma, arthritis, psoriasis, multiple sclerosis, and Crohn's disease, among others. NCD vaccines present an interesting challenge for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is tasked with approving new treatments on the basis of efficacy and safety. Should NCD vaccines be evaluated under the same analytic frame as traditional vaccines, or that of biologic drugs? Despite the borrowed nomenclature, NCD vaccines differ in important ways from infectious disease vaccines. Because infectious disease vaccines are generally administered to healthy individuals, often children, tolerance for adverse events is low and willingness to pay is limited. It is important to have infectious disease vaccines even for rare or eradicated disease (e.g., smallpox), in the event of an outbreak. The efficacy of infectious disease vaccines is generally high, and the vaccines convey population level benefits associated with herd immunity and potential eradication. The combination of substantial population-level benefits, low willingness to pay, and low tolerance for adverse events explains the need for the federal National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act, which encourages production and uptake by providing immunity from liability to industry and compensation to injured patients. These characteristics and considerations contrast sharply with those of NCD vaccines, raising the question of whether the term \"vaccine\" is appropriate for this new category of drugs. The article explores the emerging class of NCD vaccines, explains how they differ from traditional vaccines, and describes some regulatory implications of this innovative type of therapeutic.</p>","PeriodicalId":12282,"journal":{"name":"Food and drug law journal","volume":"70 2","pages":"243-58, i"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33947019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Diane E Hoffmann, Claire M Fraser, Francis Palumbo, Jacques Ravel, Virginia Rowthorn, Jack Schwartz
The development and marketing of new probiotic products, substances containing live microorganisms that have a beneficial effect on the human body, have dramatically increased over the last few years. This article examines how the Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission currently regulate probiotics and makes recommendations as to changes that might be made to ensure that probiotic products are made available to the general public in a way that is both safe and effective.
{"title":"Probiotics: achieving a better regulatory fit.","authors":"Diane E Hoffmann, Claire M Fraser, Francis Palumbo, Jacques Ravel, Virginia Rowthorn, Jack Schwartz","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The development and marketing of new probiotic products, substances containing live microorganisms that have a beneficial effect on the human body, have dramatically increased over the last few years. This article examines how the Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission currently regulate probiotics and makes recommendations as to changes that might be made to ensure that probiotic products are made available to the general public in a way that is both safe and effective.</p>","PeriodicalId":12282,"journal":{"name":"Food and drug law journal","volume":"69 2","pages":"237-72, ii"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6114170/pdf/nihms-985211.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"32618691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The United States' medical device color additive regulations are unknown to some, and confusing to many. This article reviews statutory language on color additives in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), as amended, including the Delaney Clause on carcinogenicity; color additive regulatory language as it relates to medical devices in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Parts 70-82; reports on the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) likely current and historical practices in dealing with color additives in medical devices; and speculates on what may have given rise to decades of seemingly ad hoc color additives practices, which may now be difficult to reconstruct and satisfactorily modify. Also addressed is the Center for Devices and Radiological Health's (CDRH's) recent publicly-vetted approach to color additives in Section 7 of its April 2013 draft guidance, Use of International Standard ISO-10993, "Biological Evaluation of Medical Devices Part 1: Evaluation and Testing," which the author concludes is a change in the right direction, but which, at least in its current draft form, is not a fix to the CDRH's color additives dilemma. Lastly, the article suggests what the CDRH might consider in further developing a new approach to color additives. Such an approach would treat color additives as if they were any other potentially toxic group of chemicals, and could be fashioned in such a way that the CDRH could still satisfy the broad aspects of Congressional color additives mandates, and.yet be consistent with ISO 10993. In doing this, the CDRH would need to recommend a more directed use of its Quality System Regulation, 21 C.F.R. Part 820, for material and vendor qualification and validation in general; approach Congress for needed statutory changes; or make administrative changes. In order for any approach to be successful, whether it is a new twist on past practices, or an entirely new path forward, the FDA must, to the best of its ability, better understand its past medical device color additive practices (as well as the variations that have developed within the last twenty or so years), and engage in a dialogue with stakeholders on how it and the medical device industry should consider unlisted color additives currently used in marketed devices in the United States.
美国的医疗器械颜色添加剂法规对一些人来说是未知的,对许多人来说是困惑的。本文回顾了经修订的《联邦食品、药品和化妆品法》(FFDCA)中关于颜色添加剂的法定语言,包括关于致癌性的德莱尼条款;联邦法规第21篇(cfr)第70-82部分中与医疗器械相关的颜色添加剂监管语言;关于美国食品和药物管理局(FDA)在处理医疗器械中颜色添加剂方面可能的当前和历史做法的报告;并推测可能是什么导致了几十年来看似特别的颜色添加剂的做法,现在可能很难重建和令人满意的修改。还讨论了设备和放射健康中心(CDRH)最近在其2013年4月指南草案第7节中对颜色添加剂的公开审查方法,使用国际标准ISO-10993,“医疗器械的生物评价第1部分:评估和测试”,作者认为这是朝着正确方向的改变,但是,至少在其目前的草案形式中,这并不能解决CDRH的颜色添加剂困境。最后,文章提出了CDRH在进一步开发颜色添加剂的新方法时可能考虑的问题。这种方法将把颜色添加剂视为任何其他潜在有毒的化学物质,并且可以以这样一种方式形成,即CDRH仍然可以满足国会颜色添加剂授权的广泛方面,并且。但与ISO 10993一致。在此过程中,CDRH需要建议更直接地使用其质量体系法规,21 cfr Part 820,用于材料和供应商的资格和验证;向国会提出必要的法律变更;或者进行管理上的改变。为了任何方法获得成功,是否一个新的转折在过去的做法,或一个全新的路径前进,FDA必须尽其能力,更好地了解它的过去医疗设备颜色添加剂实践(以及发达的变化在过去的二十年左右),并参与对它如何与利益相关者对话和医疗设备行业应该考虑未上市的颜色添加剂目前在销售设备在美国使用。
{"title":"The grays of medical device color additives.","authors":"Brenda Seidman","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The United States' medical device color additive regulations are unknown to some, and confusing to many. This article reviews statutory language on color additives in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), as amended, including the Delaney Clause on carcinogenicity; color additive regulatory language as it relates to medical devices in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Parts 70-82; reports on the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) likely current and historical practices in dealing with color additives in medical devices; and speculates on what may have given rise to decades of seemingly ad hoc color additives practices, which may now be difficult to reconstruct and satisfactorily modify. Also addressed is the Center for Devices and Radiological Health's (CDRH's) recent publicly-vetted approach to color additives in Section 7 of its April 2013 draft guidance, Use of International Standard ISO-10993, \"Biological Evaluation of Medical Devices Part 1: Evaluation and Testing,\" which the author concludes is a change in the right direction, but which, at least in its current draft form, is not a fix to the CDRH's color additives dilemma. Lastly, the article suggests what the CDRH might consider in further developing a new approach to color additives. Such an approach would treat color additives as if they were any other potentially toxic group of chemicals, and could be fashioned in such a way that the CDRH could still satisfy the broad aspects of Congressional color additives mandates, and.yet be consistent with ISO 10993. In doing this, the CDRH would need to recommend a more directed use of its Quality System Regulation, 21 C.F.R. Part 820, for material and vendor qualification and validation in general; approach Congress for needed statutory changes; or make administrative changes. In order for any approach to be successful, whether it is a new twist on past practices, or an entirely new path forward, the FDA must, to the best of its ability, better understand its past medical device color additive practices (as well as the variations that have developed within the last twenty or so years), and engage in a dialogue with stakeholders on how it and the medical device industry should consider unlisted color additives currently used in marketed devices in the United States.</p>","PeriodicalId":12282,"journal":{"name":"Food and drug law journal","volume":"69 4","pages":"491-529, i"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33356688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") registration is not only a necessity, but also an invaluable commodity for doctors, pharmacists, hospitals and drug wholesalers who prescribe, stock, and distribute controlled substances. While the DEA may only suspend a registration by issuing an immediate suspension order ("ISO) after an ex parte finding of "imminent danger to the public health or safety," the law fails to explicitly protect the registrant by way of a post-suspension hearing on the ISO, despite the registrant's constitutionally protected property interest in the registration. A registrant has only two procedural options--which are often unsuccessful--to challenge the ISO: endure a long and arduous administrative review proceeding or petition the court for a "not-so-easily proven" injunction, all the while the suspension remains in effect and the controlled substance business operations cease. Accordingly, a suspension of the registration may be certain death to doctors and pharmacists without the financial means to operate the business in the absence of the registration. Because the DEA registration is a constitutionally-protected interest, there is a better way to challenge the suspension. The Supreme Court has held that once a license is issued, the continued possession of it is essential to the registrant's livelihood. Therefore suspension or revocation of such a protected interest requires due process. Due-process hearings, while varied, will provide the necessary avenues of review to provide a fair review of the justification of the suspension and its continuance, i.e., whether there truly is imminent danger to public health or safety and whether the suspension is overbroad and should be limited. To date, this thesis remains to be tested and awaits a petitioner with a justiciable claim and the financial resources to challenge the DEA in court. But in the field of DEA ISO challenges, it is time for a new tact!
{"title":"Challenging an immediate suspension of a DEA registration: is it time for a new tact?","authors":"Douglas J Behr","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A Drug Enforcement Administration (\"DEA\") registration is not only a necessity, but also an invaluable commodity for doctors, pharmacists, hospitals and drug wholesalers who prescribe, stock, and distribute controlled substances. While the DEA may only suspend a registration by issuing an immediate suspension order (\"ISO) after an ex parte finding of \"imminent danger to the public health or safety,\" the law fails to explicitly protect the registrant by way of a post-suspension hearing on the ISO, despite the registrant's constitutionally protected property interest in the registration. A registrant has only two procedural options--which are often unsuccessful--to challenge the ISO: endure a long and arduous administrative review proceeding or petition the court for a \"not-so-easily proven\" injunction, all the while the suspension remains in effect and the controlled substance business operations cease. Accordingly, a suspension of the registration may be certain death to doctors and pharmacists without the financial means to operate the business in the absence of the registration. Because the DEA registration is a constitutionally-protected interest, there is a better way to challenge the suspension. The Supreme Court has held that once a license is issued, the continued possession of it is essential to the registrant's livelihood. Therefore suspension or revocation of such a protected interest requires due process. Due-process hearings, while varied, will provide the necessary avenues of review to provide a fair review of the justification of the suspension and its continuance, i.e., whether there truly is imminent danger to public health or safety and whether the suspension is overbroad and should be limited. To date, this thesis remains to be tested and awaits a petitioner with a justiciable claim and the financial resources to challenge the DEA in court. But in the field of DEA ISO challenges, it is time for a new tact!</p>","PeriodicalId":12282,"journal":{"name":"Food and drug law journal","volume":"69 1","pages":"25-38, i"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"32296288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}