Food and drug law journal最新文献

The regulation of stem cell-based therapies is challenging in many respects, given their unique safety, efficacy, and quality issues. At the same time, public interest in these innovative therapies has led some to question FDA's regulation of them, while others urge strict regulation and stronger enforcement. Within the context of this broader debate, this article examines recent attempts in other jurisdictions to craft specific provisions allowing additional flexibility in regulating cell and tissue therapies: Australia's exemption for autologous cell and tissue therapies, and the hospital exemption in Europe's regulation for advanced therapies.

Mobile applications provide limitless possibilities for the future of medical care. Yet these changes have also created concerns about patient safety. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the authority to regulate a much broader spectrum of products beyond traditional medical devices like stethoscopes or pacemakers. The regulatory question is not if FDA has the statutory. authority to regulate health-related software, but rather how it will exercise its regulatory authority. In September 2013, FDA published guidance on Mobile Medical Applications; in it, the Agency limited its oversight to a small subset of medical-related mobile applications, referred to as "mobile medical applications." For the guidance to be effective, FDA must continue to work directly with all actors--including innovators, doctors, and patients--as the market for mobile health applications continues to develop. This Article argues that FDA should adopt a two-step plan--a pre-market notification program and a mobile medical application database--to aid in the successful implementation of its 2013 guidance. By doing so, FDA will ensure that this burgeoning market can reach its fullest potential.

One might expect--given the vastly different look, feel, and function of the ubiquitous (and innocuous) Nutrition Facts panel and the "inflammatory" graphic warning labels for cigarettes--that the statutes establishing such disclosure requirements would exhibit similar disparities. In fact, the relevant provisions of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 are. quite analogous. Like other mandated disclosures, the nutrition label and the cigarette. graphic warnings seek to simultaneously inform and influence consumer decisions. Both statutes grant FDA considerable discretion in.the implementation of the labeling requirements, generally allowing the agency to alter the format and content of the labels as necessary to promote the statutory goals. Thus, the differences in the nutrition and cigarette warning labels are not the product of the statutory schemes alone; rather, they reflect important differences in FDA's interpretation and prioritization of the dual regulatory goals, and in the agency's implicit or explicit assumptions about human behavior.

The Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal ushered in a new federal pleading standard, requiring plaintiffs to state a "plausible" claim to relief before they can access discovery. Plausibility pleading, however, presents a unique burden for plaintiffs who have been injured by a Class III medical device. In Riegel, the Supreme Court held that state-law claims against device manufacturers are preempted unless they "parallel" federal requirements. However, the relevant federal requirements are located in the manufacturer's premarket approval agreement, which is confidential. Thus, it is nearly impossible for plaintiffs to allege a plausible claim against a Class III device manufacturer because they do not know what to plead in the first place. The Seventh Circuit tried to remedy this Catch-22 by lowering the pleading standards for parallel claims. However, its approach misapplies Twombly and Iqbal and overburdens device manufacturers. Instead of tinkering with pleading standards, this paper advocates a different approach. Congress should create a one-way fee-shifting mechanism that allows plaintiffs to access premarket approval agreements if they agree to pay the defendant's discovery fees (should their claim prove unsuccessful). Fee-shifting is a middle-ground approach that would better compensate plaintiffs without overdeterring device manufacturers.

Internet crowdfunding, a new and increasingly popular method of raising capital to develop products and businesses, has recently come into conflict with the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) regulation of medical devices. This Article examines the issues that arise when companies pre-sell medical devices via crowdfunding campaigns before gaining FDA approval of the devices. Because Internet crowdfunding has only been in use for a few years, little has been written about it academically, particularly about its interaction with FDA regulations. The rising interest in crowdfunding, coupled with the downturn in investment in the American medical device industry, make this a salient issue that is ripe for FDA review. This Article uses the crowdfunding campaign Scanadu, a medical device company, conducted in 2013 to raise money to develop its in-home diagnostic device, the "Scout," as a starting point for this analysis. Because it is extremely costly to develop a device and obtain FDA approval, medical device companies should be able to utilize crowdfunding to raise the necessary capital. However, because of the possible dangers medical devices pose, FDA needs to review the risks created by allowing companies to crowdfund medical devices and should issue guidance to help companies comply with FDA regulations while still allowing them to take advantage of the benefits of crowdfunding. This guidance should ensure the continued commitment to consumer safety that is at the core of FDA regulation.

The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recently signaled its interest in subjecting clinical investigations that employ high-throughput gene sequencing, also called next-generation sequencing, to the agency's Part 812 investigational device exemption (IDE) regulation. Genome sequencing--for reasons explained in this article--blurs the line between categories of in vitro diagnostic (IVD) research that FDA traditionally has regulated and categories of research that FDA traditionally has not regulated. This blurring creates a risk that FDA may overstep its proper authority to regulate fundamental genomic and medical research. This article surveys the legal limits of FDA's authority'to subject genomic research to its IDE requirements. Section 1 explains that FDA has authority to regulate clinical investigations of devices, but is not authorized to regulate investigations that merely use devices to expand medical knowledge or to conduct fundamental research, unless special circumstances apply. Section 2 discusses the special circumstances that can expand or limit FDA's authority to regulate a specific clinical investigation, and Section 3 demonstrates these using an example. Section 4 explores concerns that arose in recent years about risks to human subjects in a certain type of investigation known as sponsor-investigator studies. In response to these concerns, FDA has suggested that it can regulate such studies in ways that threaten to expand FDA's regulation of research at academic medical centers beyond its proper scope. These concerns, while valid in some academic research contexts, seem inapposite in the setting of genomic research programs funded by responsible.entities such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Moreover, FDA's regulations do not. appear to support the proposition that FDA can regulate sponsor-investigator studies more expansively than it regulates other studies. Section 5 explores specific ways that NIH, clinical investigators, and FDA might work together to rationalize FDA's regulation of NIH-funded-genomic research.

Vaccines represent one of the greatest achievements of medicine, dramatically reducing the incidence of serious or life-threatening infectious diseases and allowing people to live longer, healthier lives. As life expectancy has increased, however, the burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as cancer, hypertension, atherosclerosis, and diabetes has increased. This shifting burden of disease has heightened the already urgent need for therapies that treat or prevent NCDs, a need that is now being met with increased efforts to develop NCD vaccines. Like traditional vaccines, NCD vaccines work by modulating the human immune system, but target cells, proteins or other molecules that are associated with the NCD in question rather than pathogens or pathogen-infected cells. Efforts are underway to develop NCD vaccines to address not only cancer and hypertension, but also addiction, obesity, asthma, arthritis, psoriasis, multiple sclerosis, and Crohn's disease, among others. NCD vaccines present an interesting challenge for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is tasked with approving new treatments on the basis of efficacy and safety. Should NCD vaccines be evaluated under the same analytic frame as traditional vaccines, or that of biologic drugs? Despite the borrowed nomenclature, NCD vaccines differ in important ways from infectious disease vaccines. Because infectious disease vaccines are generally administered to healthy individuals, often children, tolerance for adverse events is low and willingness to pay is limited. It is important to have infectious disease vaccines even for rare or eradicated disease (e.g., smallpox), in the event of an outbreak. The efficacy of infectious disease vaccines is generally high, and the vaccines convey population level benefits associated with herd immunity and potential eradication. The combination of substantial population-level benefits, low willingness to pay, and low tolerance for adverse events explains the need for the federal National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act, which encourages production and uptake by providing immunity from liability to industry and compensation to injured patients. These characteristics and considerations contrast sharply with those of NCD vaccines, raising the question of whether the term "vaccine" is appropriate for this new category of drugs. The article explores the emerging class of NCD vaccines, explains how they differ from traditional vaccines, and describes some regulatory implications of this innovative type of therapeutic.

The development and marketing of new probiotic products, substances containing live microorganisms that have a beneficial effect on the human body, have dramatically increased over the last few years. This article examines how the Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission currently regulate probiotics and makes recommendations as to changes that might be made to ensure that probiotic products are made available to the general public in a way that is both safe and effective.

A Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") registration is not only a necessity, but also an invaluable commodity for doctors, pharmacists, hospitals and drug wholesalers who prescribe, stock, and distribute controlled substances. While the DEA may only suspend a registration by issuing an immediate suspension order ("ISO) after an ex parte finding of "imminent danger to the public health or safety," the law fails to explicitly protect the registrant by way of a post-suspension hearing on the ISO, despite the registrant's constitutionally protected property interest in the registration. A registrant has only two procedural options--which are often unsuccessful--to challenge the ISO: endure a long and arduous administrative review proceeding or petition the court for a "not-so-easily proven" injunction, all the while the suspension remains in effect and the controlled substance business operations cease. Accordingly, a suspension of the registration may be certain death to doctors and pharmacists without the financial means to operate the business in the absence of the registration. Because the DEA registration is a constitutionally-protected interest, there is a better way to challenge the suspension. The Supreme Court has held that once a license is issued, the continued possession of it is essential to the registrant's livelihood. Therefore suspension or revocation of such a protected interest requires due process. Due-process hearings, while varied, will provide the necessary avenues of review to provide a fair review of the justification of the suspension and its continuance, i.e., whether there truly is imminent danger to public health or safety and whether the suspension is overbroad and should be limited. To date, this thesis remains to be tested and awaits a petitioner with a justiciable claim and the financial resources to challenge the DEA in court. But in the field of DEA ISO challenges, it is time for a new tact!

The United States' medical device color additive regulations are unknown to some, and confusing to many. This article reviews statutory language on color additives in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), as amended, including the Delaney Clause on carcinogenicity; color additive regulatory language as it relates to medical devices in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Parts 70-82; reports on the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) likely current and historical practices in dealing with color additives in medical devices; and speculates on what may have given rise to decades of seemingly ad hoc color additives practices, which may now be difficult to reconstruct and satisfactorily modify. Also addressed is the Center for Devices and Radiological Health's (CDRH's) recent publicly-vetted approach to color additives in Section 7 of its April 2013 draft guidance, Use of International Standard ISO-10993, "Biological Evaluation of Medical Devices Part 1: Evaluation and Testing," which the author concludes is a change in the right direction, but which, at least in its current draft form, is not a fix to the CDRH's color additives dilemma. Lastly, the article suggests what the CDRH might consider in further developing a new approach to color additives. Such an approach would treat color additives as if they were any other potentially toxic group of chemicals, and could be fashioned in such a way that the CDRH could still satisfy the broad aspects of Congressional color additives mandates, and.yet be consistent with ISO 10993. In doing this, the CDRH would need to recommend a more directed use of its Quality System Regulation, 21 C.F.R. Part 820, for material and vendor qualification and validation in general; approach Congress for needed statutory changes; or make administrative changes. In order for any approach to be successful, whether it is a new twist on past practices, or an entirely new path forward, the FDA must, to the best of its ability, better understand its past medical device color additive practices (as well as the variations that have developed within the last twenty or so years), and engage in a dialogue with stakeholders on how it and the medical device industry should consider unlisted color additives currently used in marketed devices in the United States.