We address a counterfeiter who pretends to be the legitimate producer of software or content, charges the same price as the latter and competes with her in the same market. We examine the legitimate producer's joint determination of the profit-maximizing price and intensity of monitoring the counterfeiter's illegal activity. Our approach involves an explicit solution of the profit-maximizing level of counterfeiting, based on a real probability of detection function. The analysis reveals that the profit-maximizing price is lower than the price set in the absence of counterfeiting and must be accompanied with some minimum level of monitoring to be positive. Depending on the level of counterfeiting, the profit-maximizing monitoring rate may rise or fall with an increase in the penalty rate or in the legitimate producer's share in the counterfeiter's fine and back payments, and may counter-intuitively rise with improvements in detection technology.
{"title":"Counterfeiting and anti-counterfeitingof software and content","authors":"Y. Yacobi, Gideon Yaniv","doi":"10.1145/1456520.1456522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1456520.1456522","url":null,"abstract":"We address a counterfeiter who pretends to be the legitimate producer of software or content, charges the same price as the latter and competes with her in the same market. We examine the legitimate producer's joint determination of the profit-maximizing price and intensity of monitoring the counterfeiter's illegal activity. Our approach involves an explicit solution of the profit-maximizing level of counterfeiting, based on a real probability of detection function. The analysis reveals that the profit-maximizing price is lower than the price set in the absence of counterfeiting and must be accompanied with some minimum level of monitoring to be positive. Depending on the level of counterfeiting, the profit-maximizing monitoring rate may rise or fall with an increase in the penalty rate or in the legitimate producer's share in the counterfeiter's fine and back payments, and may counter-intuitively rise with improvements in detection technology.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"242 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114414481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hongxia Jin, J. Lotspiech, Michael J. Nelson, N. Megiddo
In this paper we focus on traitor tracing technologies for the anonymous re-broadcasting attack where the attackers re-distribute the per-content encrypting key or the decrypted plain content. To defend against an anonymous attack, content is usually built with different variations. For example, content is divided into multiple segments, each segment comes with multiple variations, and each variation is differently encrypted. Each user/player can only play back one variation per segment through the content. A typical traitor tracing scheme for re-broadcasting attack involves two basic steps, assigning the key/variation to devices (the assignment step) and detecting at least one traitor in the coalition when a series of pirated key/content are recovered (the coalition detection step). The traceability of a traitor tracing scheme is defined to be the number of recovered pirate copies of the content/keys needed in order to detect traitors. In [1] we presented a traitor detection scheme that tries to detect the entire coalition all together. This significantly improved the traditional one-by-one detection approaches in the literature. However, the traceability of the traitor detection scheme has a up limit that is constrained by the number of variations q one can build into the content. We are motivated to improve the traceability on a larger collusion attack and lift the up-limit on traceability with a given q. In this paper we will show a new traitor tracing approach that will assign the variations with skewed probabilities. Our approach not only lifts the tracing up-limit but also enables the tracing agency to assign the variations so as to maximize the traceability for a given coalition size. Our traceability results show that it is possible to achieve good traceability when traitor size exceeds q, and continue doing well even after the coalition size reaches q log q.
{"title":"Adaptive traitor tracing for large anonymous attack","authors":"Hongxia Jin, J. Lotspiech, Michael J. Nelson, N. Megiddo","doi":"10.1145/1456520.1456524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1456520.1456524","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we focus on traitor tracing technologies for the anonymous re-broadcasting attack where the attackers re-distribute the per-content encrypting key or the decrypted plain content. To defend against an anonymous attack, content is usually built with different variations. For example, content is divided into multiple segments, each segment comes with multiple variations, and each variation is differently encrypted. Each user/player can only play back one variation per segment through the content.\u0000 A typical traitor tracing scheme for re-broadcasting attack involves two basic steps, assigning the key/variation to devices (the assignment step) and detecting at least one traitor in the coalition when a series of pirated key/content are recovered (the coalition detection step). The traceability of a traitor tracing scheme is defined to be the number of recovered pirate copies of the content/keys needed in order to detect traitors. In [1] we presented a traitor detection scheme that tries to detect the entire coalition all together. This significantly improved the traditional one-by-one detection approaches in the literature. However, the traceability of the traitor detection scheme has a up limit that is constrained by the number of variations q one can build into the content. We are motivated to improve the traceability on a larger collusion attack and lift the up-limit on traceability with a given q. In this paper we will show a new traitor tracing approach that will assign the variations with skewed probabilities. Our approach not only lifts the tracing up-limit but also enables the tracing agency to assign the variations so as to maximize the traceability for a given coalition size. Our traceability results show that it is possible to achieve good traceability when traitor size exceeds q, and continue doing well even after the coalition size reaches q log q.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127591142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public-key traitor-tracing schemes is a supporting technology for content distribution that discourages abuse and resale of cryptographic keys used for the distribution. These schemes enable a system manager to maintain a set of subscribers so that any external content provider can use the public key nature of the method and transmit data to the subscribers, while assuring that if a coalition of users generate a pirate deciphering device, they can be identified via a procedure called "traitor tracing." The usefulness of efficient decoding in this context was exemplified in the work of Boneh and Franklin that showed how a specific family of codes can be combined with ElGamal encryption to produce a public-key traitor tracing scheme that supports non-black-box traitor tracing and recovers all traitors that contributed to the pirate key. In this work we are motivated by the notion of "Traitor Tracing with unbounded enrollment" that we define here, and we look for proper implementation thereof. To this end, we first generalize the Boneh Franklin approach to arbitrary code families by introducing Extended ElGamal encryption and showing an explicit condition under which the encryption can be transformed to traitor tracing, while also identifying cases where such transformation would not work; the properties are presented in terms of efficient decoding algorithms. The approach sheds light on the superlogarithmic (non-black-box) traceability of the Kurosawa-Desmedt public-key traitor tracing scheme that was only shown to support efficient tracing for a logarithmic number of traitors (in the black-box sense, where it was shown that logarithmic is optimal). Recall that the original non-black-box tracing algorithm of this scheme was found to be insufficient. We also show how to take advantage of list decoding techniques for non-black-box traitor tracing to extend the number of traitors that can be successfully traced. Finally, the Kurosawa Desmedt scheme accompanied with our tracing method is shown to be the first construction to implement traitor tracing with unbounded enrollment for an optimal number of traitors (for such a scheme) in both the non-black-box tracing case and the black-box tracing case.
{"title":"Public-key traitor tracing from efficient decoding and unbounded enrollment: extended abstract","authors":"A. Kiayias, M. Yung","doi":"10.1145/1456520.1456525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1456520.1456525","url":null,"abstract":"Public-key traitor-tracing schemes is a supporting technology for content distribution that discourages abuse and resale of cryptographic keys used for the distribution. These schemes enable a system manager to maintain a set of subscribers so that any external content provider can use the public key nature of the method and transmit data to the subscribers, while assuring that if a coalition of users generate a pirate deciphering device, they can be identified via a procedure called \"traitor tracing.\"\u0000 The usefulness of efficient decoding in this context was exemplified in the work of Boneh and Franklin that showed how a specific family of codes can be combined with ElGamal encryption to produce a public-key traitor tracing scheme that supports non-black-box traitor tracing and recovers all traitors that contributed to the pirate key.\u0000 In this work we are motivated by the notion of \"Traitor Tracing with unbounded enrollment\" that we define here, and we look for proper implementation thereof. To this end, we first generalize the Boneh Franklin approach to arbitrary code families by introducing Extended ElGamal encryption and showing an explicit condition under which the encryption can be transformed to traitor tracing, while also identifying cases where such transformation would not work; the properties are presented in terms of efficient decoding algorithms. The approach sheds light on the superlogarithmic (non-black-box) traceability of the Kurosawa-Desmedt public-key traitor tracing scheme that was only shown to support efficient tracing for a logarithmic number of traitors (in the black-box sense, where it was shown that logarithmic is optimal). Recall that the original non-black-box tracing algorithm of this scheme was found to be insufficient. We also show how to take advantage of list decoding techniques for non-black-box traitor tracing to extend the number of traitors that can be successfully traced. Finally, the Kurosawa Desmedt scheme accompanied with our tracing method is shown to be the first construction to implement traitor tracing with unbounded enrollment for an optimal number of traitors (for such a scheme) in both the non-black-box tracing case and the black-box tracing case.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121528738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Nair, A. Tanenbaum, Gabriela Gheorghe, B. Crispo
In this paper we present Trishul-UCON (T-UCON), a DRM system based on the UCON_ABC model. T-UCON is designed to be capable of enforcing not only application-specific policies, as any existing software-based DRM solution does, but also DRM policies across applications. This is achieved by binding the DRM policy only to the content it protects with no relations to the application(s) which will use this content. Furthermore, to guarantee that the policy is continuously enforced, we designed T-UCON as a JVM-based middleware that mediates the usage requests of any Java application to the protected content. Each request is granted or denied according to the content policy. We illustrate the unique features of T-UCON by using typical examples of DRM policies such as the pay-per-use and the use only N times scenarios. Preliminary results on the overhead of our solution are also provided.
{"title":"Enforcing DRM policies across applications","authors":"S. Nair, A. Tanenbaum, Gabriela Gheorghe, B. Crispo","doi":"10.1145/1456520.1456535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1456520.1456535","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we present Trishul-UCON (T-UCON), a DRM system based on the UCON_ABC model. T-UCON is designed to be capable of enforcing not only application-specific policies, as any existing software-based DRM solution does, but also DRM policies across applications. This is achieved by binding the DRM policy only to the content it protects with no relations to the application(s) which will use this content. Furthermore, to guarantee that the policy is continuously enforced, we designed T-UCON as a JVM-based middleware that mediates the usage requests of any Java application to the protected content. Each request is granted or denied according to the content policy. We illustrate the unique features of T-UCON by using typical examples of DRM policies such as the pay-per-use and the use only N times scenarios. Preliminary results on the overhead of our solution are also provided.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132691636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The main aim of this paper is to examine privacy protection legislations within the European Union (EU) and their implications for the deployment of Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems. For this purpose we note that there are two EU legislations of particular interest: Directive 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC. Based on these directives, we derive a list of elementary criteria for DRM systems and analyse the extent to which modern DRM systems may be built adhering to these requirements. In particular, we consider these implications in reference to a prospective deployment of an OMA DRM v2.0 system. Furthermore, we present seals for IT services and IT products that represent a way of standardizing privacy requirements for implementations.
{"title":"Assessing privacy criteria for drm using eu privacy legislation","authors":"Anja Becker, A. Arnab, Mercè Serra","doi":"10.1145/1456520.1456534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1456520.1456534","url":null,"abstract":"The main aim of this paper is to examine privacy protection legislations within the European Union (EU) and their implications for the deployment of Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems. For this purpose we note that there are two EU legislations of particular interest: Directive 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC. Based on these directives, we derive a list of elementary criteria for DRM systems and analyse the extent to which modern DRM systems may be built adhering to these requirements. In particular, we consider these implications in reference to a prospective deployment of an OMA DRM v2.0 system. Furthermore, we present seals for IT services and IT products that represent a way of standardizing privacy requirements for implementations.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115034298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The recent attack on Apple iTunes Digital Rights Management [17] has brought to light the usefulness of proxy re-encryption schemes for Digital Rights Management. It is known that the use of proxy re-encryption would have prevented the attack in [17]. With this utility in mind and with the added requirement of non-repudiation, we propose the first ever signcryption scheme with proxy re-encryption that does not involve bilinear maps. Our scheme is called RSA-TBOS-PRE and is based on the RSA-TBOS signcryption scheme of Mao and Malone-Lee [7]. We adapt various models available in the literature concerning authenticity, unforgeability and non-repudiation and propose a signature non-repudiation model suitable for signcryption schemes with proxy re-encryption. We show the non-repudiability of our scheme in this model. We also introduce and define a new security notion of Weak-IND-CCA2, a slightly weakened adaptation of the IND-CCA2 security model for signcryption schemes and prove that RSA-TBOS-PRE is secure in this model. Our scheme is Weak-IND-CCA2 secure, unidirectional, extensible to multi-use and does not use bilinear maps. This represents significant progress towards solving the open problem of designing an IND-CCA2 secure, unidirectional, multi-use scheme not using bilinear maps proposed in [15][12].
最近对苹果iTunes数字版权管理的攻击[17]揭示了代理重新加密方案对数字版权管理的有用性。众所周知，使用代理重新加密可以阻止[17]中的攻击。考虑到这个实用程序和不可抵赖性的附加要求，我们提出了有史以来第一个不涉及双线性映射的代理重新加密的签名加密方案。我们借鉴了文献中关于真实性、不可伪造性和不可否认性的各种模型，提出了一个适用于具有代理再加密的签名加密方案的签名不可否认模型。我们在这个模型中证明了我们的方案的不可否认性。我们还引入并定义了一个新的安全概念- Weak-IND-CCA2，这是对签名加密方案中IND-CCA2安全模型的略微弱化的适应，并证明了RSA-TBOS-PRE在该模型中是安全的。我们的方案是弱- ind - cca2安全，单向，可扩展的多用途，不使用双线性映射。这代表了在解决未使用[15][12]中提出的双线性映射的IND-CCA2安全、单向、多用途方案设计的开放性问题方面取得的重大进展。
{"title":"RSA-TBOS signcryption with proxy re-encryption","authors":"Varad Kirtane, Pandu Rangan","doi":"10.1145/1456520.1456531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1456520.1456531","url":null,"abstract":"The recent attack on Apple iTunes Digital Rights Management [17] has brought to light the usefulness of proxy re-encryption schemes for Digital Rights Management. It is known that the use of proxy re-encryption would have prevented the attack in [17]. With this utility in mind and with the added requirement of non-repudiation, we propose the first ever signcryption scheme with proxy re-encryption that does not involve bilinear maps. Our scheme is called RSA-TBOS-PRE and is based on the RSA-TBOS signcryption scheme of Mao and Malone-Lee [7]. We adapt various models available in the literature concerning authenticity, unforgeability and non-repudiation and propose a signature non-repudiation model suitable for signcryption schemes with proxy re-encryption. We show the non-repudiability of our scheme in this model. We also introduce and define a new security notion of Weak-IND-CCA2, a slightly weakened adaptation of the IND-CCA2 security model for signcryption schemes and prove that RSA-TBOS-PRE is secure in this model. Our scheme is Weak-IND-CCA2 secure, unidirectional, extensible to multi-use and does not use bilinear maps. This represents significant progress towards solving the open problem of designing an IND-CCA2 secure, unidirectional, multi-use scheme not using bilinear maps proposed in [15][12].","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116876028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Emergence of different digital rights management (DRM) systems and various rights expression languages (RELs) has led to problems with DRM interoperability and smooth flow of content across different content management systems. The complexity, varied scope, undefined boundaries, and lack of formalism in current RELs pose some of the biggest challenges in addressing DRM interoperability. In this paper, we define a formal language neutral conceptual model for rights expression statements that provides a platform upon which rights statements from different RELs can be mapped, reasoned, and manipulated.
{"title":"A formal conceptual model for rights","authors":"Pramod A. Jamkhedkar, G. Heileman","doi":"10.1145/1456520.1456528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1456520.1456528","url":null,"abstract":"Emergence of different digital rights management (DRM) systems and various rights expression languages (RELs) has led to problems with DRM interoperability and smooth flow of content across different content management systems. The complexity, varied scope, undefined boundaries, and lack of formalism in current RELs pose some of the biggest challenges in addressing DRM interoperability. In this paper, we define a formal language neutral conceptual model for rights expression statements that provides a platform upon which rights statements from different RELs can be mapped, reasoned, and manipulated.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124986517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Content identification can help link content to its legal creators. How robust can content identification become? In part-I of the talk we speculate about its asymptotic computational complexity (joint with Kivanc M. Mihcak), and in part-II we discuss the economics of such systems (joint with Gideon Yaniv; see full paper in this proceeding).
内容识别可以帮助将内容链接到其合法创作者。内容识别可以变得多健壮?在演讲的第一部分中，我们推测了它的渐近计算复杂性(与Kivanc M. Mihcak联合)，在第二部分中，我们讨论了这种系统的经济学(与Gideon Yaniv;请参阅本文全文)。
{"title":"Content identification","authors":"Y. Yacobi","doi":"10.1145/1456520.1456521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1456520.1456521","url":null,"abstract":"Content identification can help link content to its legal creators. How robust can content identification become? In part-I of the talk we speculate about its asymptotic computational complexity (joint with Kivanc M. Mihcak), and in part-II we discuss the economics of such systems (joint with Gideon Yaniv; see full paper in this proceeding).","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126257236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In software protection we typically have to deal with the white-box attack model. In this model an attacker is assumed to have full access to the software and full control over its execution. The goal of white-box cryptography is to implement cryptographic algorithms in software such that it is hard for an attacker to extract the key by a white-box attack. Chow et al. present white-box implementations for AES and DES. Based on their ideas, white-box implementations can be derived for other block ciphers as well. In the white-box implementations the key of the underlying block cipher is expanded from several bytes to a collection of lookup tables with a total size in the order of hundreds of kilobytes. In this paper we present a technique that uses a white-box implementation to make software tamper resistant. The technique interprets the binary of software code as lookup tables, which are next incorporated into the collection of lookup tables of a white-box implementation. This makes the code tamper resistant as the dual interpretation implies that a change in the code results in an unintentional change in the white-box implementation. We also indicate in the paper that it is difficult for an attacker to make modifications to the white-box implementation such that its original operation is restored.
{"title":"Mechanism for software tamper resistance: an application of white-box cryptography","authors":"Wil Michiels, Paul Gorissen","doi":"10.1145/1314276.1314291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1314276.1314291","url":null,"abstract":"In software protection we typically have to deal with the white-box attack model. In this model an attacker is assumed to have full access to the software and full control over its execution. The goal of white-box cryptography is to implement cryptographic algorithms in software such that it is hard for an attacker to extract the key by a white-box attack. Chow et al. present white-box implementations for AES and DES. Based on their ideas, white-box implementations can be derived for other block ciphers as well. In the white-box implementations the key of the underlying block cipher is expanded from several bytes to a collection of lookup tables with a total size in the order of hundreds of kilobytes. In this paper we present a technique that uses a white-box implementation to make software tamper resistant. The technique interprets the binary of software code as lookup tables, which are next incorporated into the collection of lookup tables of a white-box implementation. This makes the code tamper resistant as the dual interpretation implies that a change in the code results in an unintentional change in the white-box implementation. We also indicate in the paper that it is difficult for an attacker to make modifications to the white-box implementation such that its original operation is restored.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117263989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The title of this presentation is a slight modification of that of an earlier lecture on a closely related topic [5]. It reflects a slight exaggeration, but only a slight one, of the general thesis that Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies will continue to play only a modest role in the future of ecommerce. DRM is attractive for several related reasons. Content providers feel they can get more control over their wares. Such control is comforting in general, and could enable new methods of charging, which might provide greater revenues. More generally, the Internet is enabling sellers to find out much more about buyers’ ability and willingness to pay, and also (through DRM and other techniques) is providing sellers with tools to control usage (and thus prevent arbitrage), leading to unprecedented opportunities and incentives for price discrimination [8, 9]. Thus it should not be surprising that extensive efforts have gone into research, development, and deployment of DRM. Yet the record of DRM so far is not too inspiring. And it has been uninspiring from the very beginning. It has been argued that the concentration on a pervasive form of DRM was one of the main flaws that hindered Ted Nelson’s Project Xanadu, the first hypertext system. And a rising chorus of voices (including Steve Jobs of Apple) is urging the content industry to give up or at least relax its insistence on DRM. The lecture summarized here will review the arguments of DRM skeptics. This abstract provides a very brief overview of some of the main points. References are given to my papers, where those points are explained in more detail, and citations are provided to the extensive literature on the subject.
{"title":"Digital rights management: desirable, inevitable, and almost irrelevant","authors":"A. Odlyzko","doi":"10.1145/1314276.1314277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1314276.1314277","url":null,"abstract":"The title of this presentation is a slight modification of that of an earlier lecture on a closely related topic [5]. It reflects a slight exaggeration, but only a slight one, of the general thesis that Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies will continue to play only a modest role in the future of ecommerce. DRM is attractive for several related reasons. Content providers feel they can get more control over their wares. Such control is comforting in general, and could enable new methods of charging, which might provide greater revenues. More generally, the Internet is enabling sellers to find out much more about buyers’ ability and willingness to pay, and also (through DRM and other techniques) is providing sellers with tools to control usage (and thus prevent arbitrage), leading to unprecedented opportunities and incentives for price discrimination [8, 9]. Thus it should not be surprising that extensive efforts have gone into research, development, and deployment of DRM. Yet the record of DRM so far is not too inspiring. And it has been uninspiring from the very beginning. It has been argued that the concentration on a pervasive form of DRM was one of the main flaws that hindered Ted Nelson’s Project Xanadu, the first hypertext system. And a rising chorus of voices (including Steve Jobs of Apple) is urging the content industry to give up or at least relax its insistence on DRM. The lecture summarized here will review the arguments of DRM skeptics. This abstract provides a very brief overview of some of the main points. References are given to my papers, where those points are explained in more detail, and citations are provided to the extensive literature on the subject.","PeriodicalId":124354,"journal":{"name":"ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop","volume":"185 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114749046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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