Pub Date : 2012-04-24DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218398
D. Matolak, R. Apaza
As recently noted, the wireless channel in the very high frequency (VHF) band has not been thoroughly quantitatively characterized for airport surface areas. For future services such as VHF Data Communications, channel characteristics are needed to enable system optimization. Given the narrow bandwidth of VHF communications (25 kHz), channel dispersion is not significant, but propagation path loss is vitally important. This paper serves as a companion paper to our prior work in the area of VHF propagation path loss modeling on the airport surface area (ASA). We made path loss measurements in the aeronautical VHF band at Clevel and Hopkins International Airport (CLE) in June 2011. The non-mobile transmitter used a continuous wave (sinusoidal) signal and a mobile receiver moved about the airport surface area in a prescribed path. Both transmitter and receiver were located in vans, enabling “peer-to-peer” propagation path loss estimation via basic link budget analysis. We obtained path loss data for both line-of-sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) conditions, from which we derived the log-distance path loss models. The propagation path loss exponents were found to be approximately 4 for NLOS regions and 2.9 for LOS regions in Cleveland.
{"title":"Peer-to-peer VHF propagation path loss in the airport surface area","authors":"D. Matolak, R. Apaza","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218398","url":null,"abstract":"As recently noted, the wireless channel in the very high frequency (VHF) band has not been thoroughly quantitatively characterized for airport surface areas. For future services such as VHF Data Communications, channel characteristics are needed to enable system optimization. Given the narrow bandwidth of VHF communications (25 kHz), channel dispersion is not significant, but propagation path loss is vitally important. This paper serves as a companion paper to our prior work in the area of VHF propagation path loss modeling on the airport surface area (ASA). We made path loss measurements in the aeronautical VHF band at Clevel and Hopkins International Airport (CLE) in June 2011. The non-mobile transmitter used a continuous wave (sinusoidal) signal and a mobile receiver moved about the airport surface area in a prescribed path. Both transmitter and receiver were located in vans, enabling “peer-to-peer” propagation path loss estimation via basic link budget analysis. We obtained path loss data for both line-of-sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) conditions, from which we derived the log-distance path loss models. The propagation path loss exponents were found to be approximately 4 for NLOS regions and 2.9 for LOS regions in Cleveland.","PeriodicalId":126055,"journal":{"name":"2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126774581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-04-24DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218502
N. Fistas
{"title":"Bridging CNS and ATM - Harmonisation between NextGen and SESAR","authors":"N. Fistas","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218502","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":126055,"journal":{"name":"2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference","volume":"272 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122470752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-04-24DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218480
J. Griner
{"title":"UAS Integration in the NAS Project Communications Sub-Project Overview","authors":"J. Griner","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218480","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":126055,"journal":{"name":"2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131566305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-04-24DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218481
J. Griner, D. Matolak
{"title":"UAS integration in the NAS project communications: Channel sounding","authors":"J. Griner, D. Matolak","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218481","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":126055,"journal":{"name":"2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129800641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-04-24DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218392
A. Karmarkar, L. Martin
In support of NextGen data communications applications, the FAA (Federal Aviation Authority) and the other ANSPs (Air Navigation Service Providers) plan to share the existing data radio currently used for supporting airline operations. Traditionally, ANSPs have operated all their communication in a relatively closed network environment. Air Traffic control data communications between the controller and the pilot; using existing Communication Service Provider (CSP) infrastructure over the existing data radio exposes the air traffic control message traffic to vulnerabilities in the network outside the ANSP domain. The use of shared radio and the ground infrastructure necessitates operation in a relatively open network environment where the ANSP network is interconnected with the CSP network which in turn is connected to airlines operations. Network hackers can probe for vulnerabilities in the network and launch a covert network attack at an appropriate time. While the air to ground communication security is subjected to collaborative standards evolution, there is a need to address the potential of distributed network attacks that may be launched from outside on the ground network. This paper explores potential vulnerabilities in the ground network, possible techniques to mitigate attacks, such as distributed denial of service attacks launched by hackers on the ground infrastructure outside the ANSP domain. The network attacks described in this paper are not restricted to data communications they are equally applicable to surveillance systems. The paper also explores the heightened possibility of penetrating the ANSP infrastructure firewall when network attacks are in progress.
{"title":"Aviation communication infrastructure security","authors":"A. Karmarkar, L. Martin","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218392","url":null,"abstract":"In support of NextGen data communications applications, the FAA (Federal Aviation Authority) and the other ANSPs (Air Navigation Service Providers) plan to share the existing data radio currently used for supporting airline operations. Traditionally, ANSPs have operated all their communication in a relatively closed network environment. Air Traffic control data communications between the controller and the pilot; using existing Communication Service Provider (CSP) infrastructure over the existing data radio exposes the air traffic control message traffic to vulnerabilities in the network outside the ANSP domain. The use of shared radio and the ground infrastructure necessitates operation in a relatively open network environment where the ANSP network is interconnected with the CSP network which in turn is connected to airlines operations. Network hackers can probe for vulnerabilities in the network and launch a covert network attack at an appropriate time. While the air to ground communication security is subjected to collaborative standards evolution, there is a need to address the potential of distributed network attacks that may be launched from outside on the ground network. This paper explores potential vulnerabilities in the ground network, possible techniques to mitigate attacks, such as distributed denial of service attacks launched by hackers on the ground infrastructure outside the ANSP domain. The network attacks described in this paper are not restricted to data communications they are equally applicable to surveillance systems. The paper also explores the heightened possibility of penetrating the ANSP infrastructure firewall when network attacks are in progress.","PeriodicalId":126055,"journal":{"name":"2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128878150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-04-24DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218388
Mohamed Slim Ben Mahmoud, N. Larrieu, Alain Pirovano
This paper presents the simulation results relevant to the 15.2.7 Working Package of the European SESAR Project1. The main goal was to conduct a risk assessment of network security for the AeroMACS airport network. The risk analysis is based on a new approach for network security assessment that measures quantitatively the network risk level. Critical aspects such as the impact of a successful attack on a node and the risk propagation of that attack within an aeronautical wireless airport communication network have been taken into account. We specifically focus on the access network vulnerabilities, and a first network risk study is conducted for a predefined scenario. Some security guideline are provided to enhance the security policies and to improve the end-to-end security using some additional mechanisms such as certificate-based authentication.
{"title":"Quantitative risk assessment to enhance aeromacs security in SESAR","authors":"Mohamed Slim Ben Mahmoud, N. Larrieu, Alain Pirovano","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218388","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the simulation results relevant to the 15.2.7 Working Package of the European SESAR Project1. The main goal was to conduct a risk assessment of network security for the AeroMACS airport network. The risk analysis is based on a new approach for network security assessment that measures quantitatively the network risk level. Critical aspects such as the impact of a successful attack on a node and the risk propagation of that attack within an aeronautical wireless airport communication network have been taken into account. We specifically focus on the access network vulnerabilities, and a first network risk study is conducted for a predefined scenario. Some security guideline are provided to enhance the security policies and to improve the end-to-end security using some additional mechanisms such as certificate-based authentication.","PeriodicalId":126055,"journal":{"name":"2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132861132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-04-24DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218421
D. Domino, H. Bateman, A. Mundra, J. Goh, A. Smith, H. Stassen, D. Tuomey
This paper summarizes the findings of a pilot-in-the-loop simulation which examined the initial feasibility of an air traffic management operations concept for using a cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) to support a delegated separation task in the vertical domain. In this concept a flight crew is directed to maintain safe vertical separation from one other aircraft during a climb through en route transition airspace. This is one of several delegated separation concepts known broadly as CDTI Enabled Delegated Separation or CEDS. The CEDS concepts evaluated in previous studies have been adaptations of visual separation as conducted in today's operations. Although visual separation in the vertical domain is occasionally used in the current system, it is more of an exception, and visual separation in general is relatively rare in the en route domain due to the high speeds and larger distances involved. The application reported in this study, delegated vertical separation, introduces the feasibility of a visual-like procedure enabled by a CDTI in the en route domain where visual separation is rarely used today, and in a flight segment (i.e., climb) where it is used even less. In this vertical separation concept the traffic can be ahead, directly above or below, or even behind ownship; the ability to achieve visual contact is not assumed and is not required. The separation task is conducted entirely using information from the CDTI.
{"title":"CDTI Enabled Delegated Separation (CEDS) in the vertical domain: Initial feasibility assessment","authors":"D. Domino, H. Bateman, A. Mundra, J. Goh, A. Smith, H. Stassen, D. Tuomey","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218421","url":null,"abstract":"This paper summarizes the findings of a pilot-in-the-loop simulation which examined the initial feasibility of an air traffic management operations concept for using a cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) to support a delegated separation task in the vertical domain. In this concept a flight crew is directed to maintain safe vertical separation from one other aircraft during a climb through en route transition airspace. This is one of several delegated separation concepts known broadly as CDTI Enabled Delegated Separation or CEDS. The CEDS concepts evaluated in previous studies have been adaptations of visual separation as conducted in today's operations. Although visual separation in the vertical domain is occasionally used in the current system, it is more of an exception, and visual separation in general is relatively rare in the en route domain due to the high speeds and larger distances involved. The application reported in this study, delegated vertical separation, introduces the feasibility of a visual-like procedure enabled by a CDTI in the en route domain where visual separation is rarely used today, and in a flight segment (i.e., climb) where it is used even less. In this vertical separation concept the traffic can be ahead, directly above or below, or even behind ownship; the ability to achieve visual contact is not assumed and is not required. The separation task is conducted entirely using information from the CDTI.","PeriodicalId":126055,"journal":{"name":"2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134639100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-04-24DOI: 10.1109/DASC.2012.6383092
P. Perkinson
Presents a collection of slides from the author's conference presentation. ■ Key to achievement of Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) goals is the concept of Net-Centric Operations (NCO) - Improved Situational Awareness, Speed and Quality of Decision Making ■ “New technologies and processes are necessary to meet the need for increased capacity and efficiency, while maintaining safety…” - NextGen CONOPS - Diverse Stakeholders - Air to Air, Air to Ground and Ground and Ground Communications - New Networked Methods and Technologies integrated with Legacy ■ Increasing Dependence on Sophisticated Enterprises for Critical Infrastructure and Security ■ No longer assured to keep intruders out - must have a plan for combating adversary inside our Enterprises ■ Valuable lessons learned from Air C4I system Active Cyber Defense deployment pilot apply directly to NextGen Air Transportation System
{"title":"Lessons learned from an active cyber defense deployment pilot program","authors":"P. Perkinson","doi":"10.1109/DASC.2012.6383092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DASC.2012.6383092","url":null,"abstract":"Presents a collection of slides from the author's conference presentation. ■ Key to achievement of Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) goals is the concept of Net-Centric Operations (NCO) - Improved Situational Awareness, Speed and Quality of Decision Making ■ “New technologies and processes are necessary to meet the need for increased capacity and efficiency, while maintaining safety…” - NextGen CONOPS - Diverse Stakeholders - Air to Air, Air to Ground and Ground and Ground Communications - New Networked Methods and Technologies integrated with Legacy ■ Increasing Dependence on Sophisticated Enterprises for Critical Infrastructure and Security ■ No longer assured to keep intruders out - must have a plan for combating adversary inside our Enterprises ■ Valuable lessons learned from Air C4I system Active Cyber Defense deployment pilot apply directly to NextGen Air Transportation System","PeriodicalId":126055,"journal":{"name":"2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131009538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-04-24DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218389
B. Horio, A. DeCicco, R. Hemm, Virginia L. Stouffer
The concepts, operating paradigms, and required technologies of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) are still evolving. These continuing changes highlight a need for a modeling platform that can effectively address the complexity of diverse future scenarios and help assess their impact on safety. We discuss this need in detail with respect to the requirements and benefits of such a flexible modeling platform. We describe the LMI ACAS (Airspace Conflict Analysis Simulation) tool, a simulation modeling framework with 3-dimensional visualization, and we show how such an application can meet these analytical requirements and discuss the benefits of implementing a multi-dimensional visualization.
{"title":"Safety risk assessment case study using Airspace Conflict Analysis Simulation","authors":"B. Horio, A. DeCicco, R. Hemm, Virginia L. Stouffer","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218389","url":null,"abstract":"The concepts, operating paradigms, and required technologies of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) are still evolving. These continuing changes highlight a need for a modeling platform that can effectively address the complexity of diverse future scenarios and help assess their impact on safety. We discuss this need in detail with respect to the requirements and benefits of such a flexible modeling platform. We describe the LMI ACAS (Airspace Conflict Analysis Simulation) tool, a simulation modeling framework with 3-dimensional visualization, and we show how such an application can meet these analytical requirements and discuss the benefits of implementing a multi-dimensional visualization.","PeriodicalId":126055,"journal":{"name":"2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129814307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-04-24DOI: 10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218393
R. Koelle, M. Hawley
Significant efforts are underway to modernise global air traffic management systems. This will result in a level of connectivity between different systems that has never before been achieved, creating a `system of systems' that requires a very high level of dependability. To achieve this dependability, security must be designed-in rather than relying on hardening of systems post implementation. This is also expected to minimise the costs of security. The European ATM modernisation programme, SESAR, has been taking a systems engineering approach to ensure that R&D is rapidly transferred to industrialisation and then deployment. This approach has been applied to security, organised around `operational focus areas' that represent discrete operational improvements. In such a complex programme, traditional risk analysis and mitigation was thought to be limited when attempting a system wide coherence for security. Hence the SESAR programme is adopting a `security case' approach, drawing on lessons learned in safety cases, validation & verification of ATM R&D, and aligned to the system engineering approach.
{"title":"Sesar security 2020: How to embed and assure security in system-of-systems engineering?","authors":"R. Koelle, M. Hawley","doi":"10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2012.6218393","url":null,"abstract":"Significant efforts are underway to modernise global air traffic management systems. This will result in a level of connectivity between different systems that has never before been achieved, creating a `system of systems' that requires a very high level of dependability. To achieve this dependability, security must be designed-in rather than relying on hardening of systems post implementation. This is also expected to minimise the costs of security. The European ATM modernisation programme, SESAR, has been taking a systems engineering approach to ensure that R&D is rapidly transferred to industrialisation and then deployment. This approach has been applied to security, organised around `operational focus areas' that represent discrete operational improvements. In such a complex programme, traditional risk analysis and mitigation was thought to be limited when attempting a system wide coherence for security. Hence the SESAR programme is adopting a `security case' approach, drawing on lessons learned in safety cases, validation & verification of ATM R&D, and aligned to the system engineering approach.","PeriodicalId":126055,"journal":{"name":"2012 Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132194276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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