Sovereign debt restructuring strategies have been mostly reactive, applying only once a nation’s debt burden becomes unsustainable. Reactive strategies are suboptimal for many reasons, including that international law does not yet provide mechanisms—in the corporate sector, provided by bankruptcy law—for correcting collective action and other market failures that impede the restructuring of sovereign debt. A financially troubled nation often faces a dilemma: paying its debt would reduce its ability to provide critical public services, but defaulting would further damage the nation’s fiscal integrity and reputation and could even shock the broader economy. Building on “proactive” strategies designed to resolve corporate debt burdens, this Article examines the proactive resolution of government debt burdens, first addressing the problem of unsustainable sovereign debt and then addressing the growing crisis of unsustainable subnational debt.
{"title":"Proactive Resolution of Sovereign and Subnational Debt","authors":"S. Schwarcz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3414394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3414394","url":null,"abstract":"Sovereign debt restructuring strategies have been mostly reactive, applying only once a nation’s debt burden becomes unsustainable. Reactive strategies are suboptimal for many reasons, including that international law does not yet provide mechanisms—in the corporate sector, provided by bankruptcy law—for correcting collective action and other market failures that impede the restructuring of sovereign debt. A financially troubled nation often faces a dilemma: paying its debt would reduce its ability to provide critical public services, but defaulting would further damage the nation’s fiscal integrity and reputation and could even shock the broader economy. Building on “proactive” strategies designed to resolve corporate debt burdens, this Article examines the proactive resolution of government debt burdens, first addressing the problem of unsustainable sovereign debt and then addressing the growing crisis of unsustainable subnational debt.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114626210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides a review of the modern finance literature examining how liquidity affects the private sector demand for real assets and financial securities. This literature shows that when firms evaluate risky investments they distinguish fundamental earnings risk and liquidity risks, and choose discount rates that link the discount rates they use to the liquidity and structure of their balance sheets. The government can mimic their behaviour by adopting a procedure that (i) ranks projects by discounting their expected costs and benefits by a low ‘fundamental earnings’ discount rate, perhaps 4 – 5 percent; and (ii) imposes a second ‘liquidity’ discount based on the government’s balance sheet structure and debt objectives that simultaneously determines the quantity of investments. By more closely copying private sector practice, this approach will directly link the quantity of investments that a government makes to the discount rates it uses. It will also enable the New Zealand government to reduce the discount rates it uses to evaluate long horizon investments without compromising its aim of ensuring the public and private sectors adopt a common method of evaluating investment projects.
{"title":"Liquidity, the Government Balance Sheet, and the Public Sector Discount Rate","authors":"A. Coleman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3477069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477069","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a review of the modern finance literature examining how liquidity affects the private sector demand for real assets and financial securities. This literature shows that when firms evaluate risky investments they distinguish fundamental earnings risk and liquidity risks, and choose discount rates that link the discount rates they use to the liquidity and structure of their balance sheets. The government can mimic their behaviour by adopting a procedure that (i) ranks projects by discounting their expected costs and benefits by a low ‘fundamental earnings’ discount rate, perhaps 4 – 5 percent; and (ii) imposes a second ‘liquidity’ discount based on the government’s balance sheet structure and debt objectives that simultaneously determines the quantity of investments. By more closely copying private sector practice, this approach will directly link the quantity of investments that a government makes to the discount rates it uses. It will also enable the New Zealand government to reduce the discount rates it uses to evaluate long horizon investments without compromising its aim of ensuring the public and private sectors adopt a common method of evaluating investment projects.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125682450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marta Gómez-Puig, S. Sosvilla‐Rivero, I. Martínez‐Zarzoso
This paper uses panel data for 116 countries over the period 1995-2016 to investigate the heterogeneity of the debt-growth nexus across countries and the factors underlying it. In the first step, the grouped fixed effects (GFE) estimator proposed by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) is used to classify countries into groups, with group membership being endogenously determined. In the second step, a multinomial logit model is used to explore the drivers of the heterogeneity detected, among them the quality of institutions, the composition of debt-funded public expenditure, the relative public and private indebtedness, and the maturity of debt. Finally, the underlying factors explaining the time-varying impact of public debt on growth in the country groups identified is also investigated.
{"title":"Re-Examining the Debt-Growth Nexus: A Grouped Fixed-Effect Approach","authors":"Marta Gómez-Puig, S. Sosvilla‐Rivero, I. Martínez‐Zarzoso","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3415405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3415405","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses panel data for 116 countries over the period 1995-2016 to investigate the heterogeneity of the debt-growth nexus across countries and the factors underlying it. In the first step, the grouped fixed effects (GFE) estimator proposed by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) is used to classify countries into groups, with group membership being endogenously determined. In the second step, a multinomial logit model is used to explore the drivers of the heterogeneity detected, among them the quality of institutions, the composition of debt-funded public expenditure, the relative public and private indebtedness, and the maturity of debt. Finally, the underlying factors explaining the time-varying impact of public debt on growth in the country groups identified is also investigated.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123895863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On the back of four months of 2019, the trend of high growth rates of revenues and lower growth rates of expenditures of regional consolidated budgets have been retained. This fact allows even the lowest-income regions to decrease fiscal burden and form reserves aimed at financing events in the framework of national projects.
{"title":"Regional Budgets for Four Months of 2019: Trends Retained","authors":"A. Deryugin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3411539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3411539","url":null,"abstract":"On the back of four months of 2019, the trend of high growth rates of revenues and lower growth rates of expenditures of regional consolidated budgets have been retained. This fact allows even the lowest-income regions to decrease fiscal burden and form reserves aimed at financing events in the framework of national projects.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121360787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides a framework to assess the impact of infrastructure investment expected under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the debt vulnerabilities of countries that are located on BRI transport and connectivity corridors in the absence of comprehensive and consistent information on investments and financing terms. Key assumptions relate to the amount of public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt financing and its terms, the size and sectoral type of identified BRI investment, and the expected impact of growth in the medium and long term of that investment. BRI debt financing is expected significantly increase PPG debt in a number of countries. The paper provides estimates for both the medium and the long term. In the medium term, defined as the period 2019-2023, debt financing of BRI investment is expected to be fully disbursed while the full growth impact of BRI related infrastructure is not entirely realized. In this initial phase, around one-third of assessed BRI-recipient countries are estimated to face elevated debt vulnerabilities post- BRI, several of which have already high debt vulnerabilities. The impact of BRI on public debt would improve over the longer term under the assumption of a sustained negative interest rate-growth differential and in the absence of the materialization of BRI related fiscal risks. Still, debt to GDP ratio is expected to remain higher in one-third of countries (11 out of 30 with available data).
{"title":"A Framework to Assess Debt Sustainability and Fiscal Risks Under the Belt and Road Initiative","authors":"Luca Bandiera, Vasileios Tsiropoulos","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-8891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8891","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a framework to assess the impact of infrastructure investment expected under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the debt vulnerabilities of countries that are located on BRI transport and connectivity corridors in the absence of comprehensive and consistent information on investments and financing terms. Key assumptions relate to the amount of public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt financing and its terms, the size and sectoral type of identified BRI investment, and the expected impact of growth in the medium and long term of that investment. BRI debt financing is expected significantly increase PPG debt in a number of countries. The paper provides estimates for both the medium and the long term. In the medium term, defined as the period 2019-2023, debt financing of BRI investment is expected to be fully disbursed while the full growth impact of BRI related infrastructure is not entirely realized. In this initial phase, around one-third of assessed BRI-recipient countries are estimated to face elevated debt vulnerabilities post- BRI, several of which have already high debt vulnerabilities. The impact of BRI on public debt would improve over the longer term under the assumption of a sustained negative interest rate-growth differential and in the absence of the materialization of BRI related fiscal risks. Still, debt to GDP ratio is expected to remain higher in one-third of countries (11 out of 30 with available data).","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121387284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sofia Bernardini, C. Cottarelli, G. Galli, Carlo Valdes
This paper investigates the episodes of public debt reduction in advanced economies since the Second World War. We find 30 episodes of large reductions in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Four main approaches succeeded in lowering the debt ratio. First, after the end of WWII, high and unexpected inflation eroded a large share of public debt. Second, during the Bretton Woods era, a mix of financial repression, high economic growth and moderate inflation helped reducing public debt. Third, since the 1980s, several advanced economies followed orthodox fiscal adjustments, namely improving their primary balance by reducing expenditure and/or raising taxes. The fourth approach (debt restructuring) was implemented only in one case: Greece in 2011-12. One key finding of our paper is that debt reduction has never been achieved by relaxing fiscal policy (cutting taxes or increasing expenditure), hoping that this would set in motion a growth process sufficiently strong to lower the debt ratio (the so-called “denominator approach” which has recently become fashionable in some countries, including Italy). The empirical evidence of the last 70 years suggests that running a sufficiently strong primary surplus is the only viable option to reduce public debt ratio nowadays, particularly in countries that are part of the euro area.
{"title":"Reducing Public Debt: The Experience of Advanced Economies over the Last 70 Years","authors":"Sofia Bernardini, C. Cottarelli, G. Galli, Carlo Valdes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3405018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3405018","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the episodes of public debt reduction in advanced economies since the Second World War. We find 30 episodes of large reductions in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Four main approaches succeeded in lowering the debt ratio. First, after the end of WWII, high and unexpected inflation eroded a large share of public debt. Second, during the Bretton Woods era, a mix of financial repression, high economic growth and moderate inflation helped reducing public debt. Third, since the 1980s, several advanced economies followed orthodox fiscal adjustments, namely improving their primary balance by reducing expenditure and/or raising taxes. The fourth approach (debt restructuring) was implemented only in one case: Greece in 2011-12. One key finding of our paper is that debt reduction has never been achieved by relaxing fiscal policy (cutting taxes or increasing expenditure), hoping that this would set in motion a growth process sufficiently strong to lower the debt ratio (the so-called “denominator approach” which has recently become fashionable in some countries, including Italy). The empirical evidence of the last 70 years suggests that running a sufficiently strong primary surplus is the only viable option to reduce public debt ratio nowadays, particularly in countries that are part of the euro area.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125240354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L. Buchheit, G. Chabert, Chanda DeLong, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
This paper attempts to provide a playbook for the sovereign debt restructuring process, drawing on the experience with sovereign debt restructuring since the 1980s. It begins with a discussion of the participating actors and their interests. It then describes the considerations that must be weighed in designing, negotiating, and concluding a debt restructuring, in light of two problems: asymmetric information between the debtor and the creditors, and creditor coordination problems, which can lead to free riding (the “holdout” problem). The paper focuses on how these problems, which can lead to inefficiently negotiated outcomes, can be managed and minimized in practice.
{"title":"How to Restructure Sovereign Debt: Lessons from Four Decades","authors":"L. Buchheit, G. Chabert, Chanda DeLong, Jeromin Zettelmeyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3387455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3387455","url":null,"abstract":"This paper attempts to provide a playbook for the sovereign debt restructuring process, drawing on the experience with sovereign debt restructuring since the 1980s. It begins with a discussion of the participating actors and their interests. It then describes the considerations that must be weighed in designing, negotiating, and concluding a debt restructuring, in light of two problems: asymmetric information between the debtor and the creditors, and creditor coordination problems, which can lead to free riding (the “holdout” problem). The paper focuses on how these problems, which can lead to inefficiently negotiated outcomes, can be managed and minimized in practice.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129512709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study to what extent the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath have changed the impact of inflation on inflation uncertainty in the 12 original member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU). We adopt a time‐varying coefficient regression model with stochastic volatility effects, and extract two measures of inflation uncertainty from our data, namely, (1) The conditional volatility of inflation, (2) The conditional volatility of steady‐state inflation. (1)–(2) represent short‐run and steady‐state inflation uncertainty, respectively. The time‐varying impact of inflation on inflation uncertainty is analyzed using Markov‐switching regressions, where switching between the low and high inflation uncertainty regime is determined via an unobserved Markov process. Results suggest that the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath have changed the impact of inflation on (1) and (2) across the selected EMU member states. However, a uniform pattern cannot be detected. For some member states, we document a strong link, whereas for others, the impact of inflation on inflation uncertainty is relatively weaker.
{"title":"Has the 2008 Financial Crisis and its Aftermath Changed the Impact of Inflation on Inflation Uncertainty in Member States of the European Monetary Union?","authors":"Nima Nonejad","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12170","url":null,"abstract":"We study to what extent the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath have changed the impact of inflation on inflation uncertainty in the 12 original member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU). We adopt a time‐varying coefficient regression model with stochastic volatility effects, and extract two measures of inflation uncertainty from our data, namely, (1) The conditional volatility of inflation, (2) The conditional volatility of steady‐state inflation. (1)–(2) represent short‐run and steady‐state inflation uncertainty, respectively. The time‐varying impact of inflation on inflation uncertainty is analyzed using Markov‐switching regressions, where switching between the low and high inflation uncertainty regime is determined via an unobserved Markov process. Results suggest that the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath have changed the impact of inflation on (1) and (2) across the selected EMU member states. However, a uniform pattern cannot be detected. For some member states, we document a strong link, whereas for others, the impact of inflation on inflation uncertainty is relatively weaker.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127189854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mattia Osvaldo Picarelli, Willem Vanlaer, W. Marneffe
This paper exploits a panel dataset for 26 EU countries, between 1995 and 2015, to examine the extent to which increased levels of public debt have led to reduced public investment, the so-called ‘debt overhang’ hypothesis. To address endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach based on a GMM estimation. Our results validate the debt overhang hypothesis and remain robust across various estimation techniques. The GMM specification with year dummies indicates that a 1% increase in public debt in the EU brings about a reduction in public investment of 0.03%. Moreover, we find evidence that: 1) the results are mainly driven by high-debt countries; 2) the negative impact of debt on investment is slightly smaller in the Eurozone than in the entire EU; 3) both the stock and flow of public debt play a role in reducing public investment with the impact of the latter that is found to be more profound.
{"title":"Does Public Debt Produce a Crowding out Effect for Public Investment in the EU?","authors":"Mattia Osvaldo Picarelli, Willem Vanlaer, W. Marneffe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3376471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3376471","url":null,"abstract":"This paper exploits a panel dataset for 26 EU countries, between 1995 and 2015, to examine the extent to which increased levels of public debt have led to reduced public investment, the so-called ‘debt overhang’ hypothesis. To address endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach based on a GMM estimation. Our results validate the debt overhang hypothesis and remain robust across various estimation techniques. The GMM specification with year dummies indicates that a 1% increase in public debt in the EU brings about a reduction in public investment of 0.03%. Moreover, we find evidence that: \u0000 \u00001) the results are mainly driven by high-debt countries; \u0000 \u00002) the negative impact of debt on investment is slightly smaller in the Eurozone than in the entire EU; \u0000 \u00003) both the stock and flow of public debt play a role in reducing public investment with the impact of the latter that is found to be more profound.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116869974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As a Eurozone sovereign in desperate need of a debt restructuring, Italy faces the paradoxical pressures of protecting its domestic economy and access to international debt markets while also conducting this restructuring in a way that aligns with Eurogroup supranational policy goals. By implementing a single-limb CAC subject to important restrictions and protections, Italy can effectively obtain the relief it desperately needs while minimizing local-law legal challenges and without running afoul of the intent and purpose of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism. This paper recommends the retrofitting of a single-limb CAC on to all of Italy’s local-law debt stock. This CAC would be subject to three important restrictions. First, that it would only allow for the extension of maturities, with the length of the extension to be agreed upon by the Issuer and the holders of 50% of the outstanding principal of affected bonds. Second, the CAC would require that all affected bonds be treated identically, receiving an equal maturity extension. Third, voting would be limited to only those bonds actually affected by changes proposed under these CACs, and calculations regarding what constitutes 50% of outstanding principal would only include principal of actually affected bonds.
{"title":"A Long Road to Nowhere: The Legal and Remedial Futility of Challenges to a Restricted Single-Limb CAC Retrofit of Local-Law Italian Debt Stock","authors":"T. Zelinger","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3371876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3371876","url":null,"abstract":"As a Eurozone sovereign in desperate need of a debt restructuring, Italy faces the paradoxical pressures of protecting its domestic economy and access to international debt markets while also conducting this restructuring in a way that aligns with Eurogroup supranational policy goals. By implementing a single-limb CAC subject to important restrictions and protections, Italy can effectively obtain the relief it desperately needs while minimizing local-law legal challenges and without running afoul of the intent and purpose of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism. This paper recommends the retrofitting of a single-limb CAC on to all of Italy’s local-law debt stock. This CAC would be subject to three important restrictions. First, that it would only allow for the extension of maturities, with the length of the extension to be agreed upon by the Issuer and the holders of 50% of the outstanding principal of affected bonds. Second, the CAC would require that all affected bonds be treated identically, receiving an equal maturity extension. Third, voting would be limited to only those bonds actually affected by changes proposed under these CACs, and calculations regarding what constitutes 50% of outstanding principal would only include principal of actually affected bonds.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133716786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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