Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.1007/s10746-022-09628-4
Anya Daly
{"title":"Ontology and Politics: Interdependence and Radical Contingency in Merleau-Ponty’s Political Interworld","authors":"Anya Daly","doi":"10.1007/s10746-022-09628-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-022-09628-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":13027,"journal":{"name":"Human Studies","volume":"45 1","pages":"341 - 359"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44250087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-23DOI: 10.1007/s10746-022-09626-6
K. Li
{"title":"Eric S. Nelson: Levinas, Adorno, and the Ethics of the Material Other","authors":"K. Li","doi":"10.1007/s10746-022-09626-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-022-09626-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":13027,"journal":{"name":"Human Studies","volume":"45 1","pages":"389-395"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48992313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1007/s10746-022-09625-7
B. de Boer, P. Verbeek
{"title":"Living in the Flesh: Technologically Mediated Chiasmic Relationships (in Times of a Pandemic)","authors":"B. de Boer, P. Verbeek","doi":"10.1007/s10746-022-09625-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-022-09625-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":13027,"journal":{"name":"Human Studies","volume":"45 1","pages":"189 - 208"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42955737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-28DOI: 10.1007/s10746-021-09617-z
Zhengai Liu
{"title":"Technological Mediation Theory and the Moral Suspension Problem","authors":"Zhengai Liu","doi":"10.1007/s10746-021-09617-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09617-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":13027,"journal":{"name":"Human Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-14"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43628810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1007/s10746-022-09645-3
Luna Dolezal
Experiences of shame are not always discrete, but can be recurrent, persistent or enduring. To use the feminist phenomenologist Sandra Lee Bartky's formulation, shame is not always an acute event, but can become a "pervasive affective attunement" (Bartky, 1990: 85). Instead of experiencing shame as a discrete event with a finite duration, it can be experienced as a persistent, and perhaps, permanent possibility in daily life. This sort of pervasive or persistent shame is commonly referred to as "chronic shame" (Pattison, 2000; Nathanson, 1992; Dolezal, 2015). Chronic shame is frequently associated with political oppression and marginalization. In chronic shame, it is the potentiality of shame, rather than the actuality, that is significant. In other words, the anticipation of shame (whether explicit or implicit) comes to be a defining feature of one's lived experience. Living with chronic shame has important socio-political consequences. Thus far, chronic shame has eluded simple phenomenological analysis, largely because chronic shame often does not have a clear experiential profile: it is frequently characterised by the absence rather than the presence of shame. The aim of this article is to provide a phenomenology of chronic shame, drawing from Edmund Husserl's formulation of the 'horizon' as a means a to discuss structural aspects of chronic shame experiences, in particular how chronic shame is characterised by structures of absence and anticipation.
羞耻的经历并不总是离散的，但可以是反复的，持续的或持久的。借用女权主义现象学家桑德拉·李·巴茨基(Sandra Lee Bartky)的表述，羞耻并不总是一个急性事件，但可以成为一种“普遍的情感调节”(巴茨基，1990:85)。与其将羞耻感作为一种持续时间有限的离散事件来体验，不如将其作为一种持续的，也许是日常生活中永久的可能性来体验。这种普遍或持续的羞耻感通常被称为“慢性羞耻感”(Pattison, 2000;内桑森,1992;Dolezal, 2015)。长期的耻辱常常与政治压迫和边缘化联系在一起。在慢性羞耻感中，重要的是羞耻感的潜在性，而不是现实性。换句话说，对羞耻的预期(无论是显性的还是隐性的)成为一个人生活经历的一个决定性特征。长期生活在羞耻感中会产生重要的社会政治后果。到目前为止，慢性羞耻感还没有得到简单的现象学分析，主要是因为慢性羞耻感通常没有明确的经验特征:它的特征往往是缺乏羞耻感，而不是存在羞耻感。本文的目的是提供慢性羞耻的现象学，借鉴埃德蒙·胡塞尔(Edmund Husserl)的“视界”(horizon)构想，作为讨论慢性羞耻体验的结构方面的手段，特别是慢性羞耻如何以缺席和预期的结构为特征。
{"title":"The Horizons of Chronic Shame.","authors":"Luna Dolezal","doi":"10.1007/s10746-022-09645-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-022-09645-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Experiences of shame are not always discrete, but can be recurrent, persistent or enduring. To use the feminist phenomenologist Sandra Lee Bartky's formulation, shame is not always an acute event, but can become a \"pervasive affective attunement\" (Bartky, 1990: 85). Instead of experiencing shame as a discrete event with a finite duration, it can be experienced as a persistent, and perhaps, permanent possibility in daily life. This sort of pervasive or persistent shame is commonly referred to as \"chronic shame\" (Pattison, 2000; Nathanson, 1992; Dolezal, 2015). Chronic shame is frequently associated with political oppression and marginalization. In chronic shame, it is the potentiality of shame, rather than the actuality, that is significant. In other words, the anticipation of shame (whether explicit or implicit) comes to be a defining feature of one's lived experience. Living with chronic shame has important socio-political consequences. Thus far, chronic shame has eluded simple phenomenological analysis, largely because chronic shame often does not have a clear experiential profile: it is frequently characterised by the <i>absence</i> rather than the <i>presence</i> of shame. The aim of this article is to provide a phenomenology of chronic shame, drawing from Edmund Husserl's formulation of the 'horizon' as a means a to discuss structural aspects of chronic shame experiences, in particular how chronic shame is characterised by structures of absence and anticipation.</p>","PeriodicalId":13027,"journal":{"name":"Human Studies","volume":"45 4","pages":"739-759"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7613895/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10373189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1007/s10746-022-09651-5
Duška Franeta
Despite an immense amount of literature on the topic of trust, there is still no account that offers a plausible epistemological framework for the phenomenon of reasonable trust. The main claim of this article is that reasonable trust and distrust are phenomena based upon practical knowledge, while non-reasonable trust and distrust result from dislocation of trust into different epistemic regimes. This dislocation can be observed in some of the influential theories such as cognitive and emotional accounts of trust and in the accounts understanding trust as a form of faith. Added to that, theoretical approaches introducing a strong idea of basic trust preclude observing the difference between reasonable and non-reasonable trust. In this article, I argue that reasonable trust is founded upon practical knowledge which includes knowledge of integrity of the trusted person and knowledge about a similarity of worldviews of the trust giver and the trust receiver. Furthermore, I elaborate on the ways reasonable trust and distrust are being transformed and disfigured in other epistemic regimes. Drawing mainly upon Aristotelian understanding of practical knowledge, I want to show how non-reasonable trust and distrust are manifested in the phenomena of blind trust, unconditional trust and absolute doubt and explain why non-reasonable trust and distrust can hardly be distinguished from loyalty, subordination, infatuation or calculation.
{"title":"Migrations of Trust: Reasonable Trust and Epistemic Transgressions.","authors":"Duška Franeta","doi":"10.1007/s10746-022-09651-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-022-09651-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Despite an immense amount of literature on the topic of trust, there is still no account that offers a plausible epistemological framework for the phenomenon of reasonable trust. The main claim of this article is that reasonable trust and distrust are phenomena based upon practical knowledge, while non-reasonable trust and distrust result from dislocation of trust into different epistemic regimes. This dislocation can be observed in some of the influential theories such as cognitive and emotional accounts of trust and in the accounts understanding trust as a form of faith. Added to that, theoretical approaches introducing a strong idea of basic trust preclude observing the difference between reasonable and non-reasonable trust. In this article, I argue that reasonable trust is founded upon practical knowledge which includes knowledge of integrity of the trusted person and knowledge about a similarity of worldviews of the trust giver and the trust receiver. Furthermore, I elaborate on the ways reasonable trust and distrust are being transformed and disfigured in other epistemic regimes. Drawing mainly upon Aristotelian understanding of practical knowledge, I want to show how non-reasonable trust and distrust are manifested in the phenomena of blind trust, unconditional trust and absolute doubt and explain why non-reasonable trust and distrust can hardly be distinguished from loyalty, subordination, infatuation or calculation.</p>","PeriodicalId":13027,"journal":{"name":"Human Studies","volume":"45 4","pages":"719-738"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9676884/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10373613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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