We analyze the benefits of network sharing between telecommunications operators. Sharing is seen as one way to speed the roll out of expensive technologies such as 5G since it allows the service providers to divide the cost of providing ubiquitous coverage. Our theoretical analysis focuses on scenarios with two service providers and compares the system dynamics when they are competing with the dynamics when they are cooperating. We show that sharing can be beneficial to a service provider even when it has the power to drive the other service provider out of the market, a byproduct of a non-convex cost function. A key element of this study is an analysis of the competitive equilibria for both cooperative and non-cooperative 2-person games in the presence of (non-convex) cost functions that involve a fixed cost component.
{"title":"Quantifying the benefits of infrastructure sharing","authors":"M. Andrews, M. Bradonjic, I. Saniee","doi":"10.1145/3106723.3106734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3106723.3106734","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the benefits of network sharing between telecommunications operators. Sharing is seen as one way to speed the roll out of expensive technologies such as 5G since it allows the service providers to divide the cost of providing ubiquitous coverage. Our theoretical analysis focuses on scenarios with two service providers and compares the system dynamics when they are competing with the dynamics when they are cooperating. We show that sharing can be beneficial to a service provider even when it has the power to drive the other service provider out of the market, a byproduct of a non-convex cost function. A key element of this study is an analysis of the competitive equilibria for both cooperative and non-cooperative 2-person games in the presence of (non-convex) cost functions that involve a fixed cost component.","PeriodicalId":130519,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115233598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We explore spatial price discrimination in the context of a ridesharing platform that serves a network of locations. Riders are heterogeneous in terms of their destination preferences and their willingness to pay for receiving service. Drivers decide whether, when, and where to provide service so as to maximize their expected earnings, given the platform's prices. Our findings highlight the impact of the demand pattern on the platform's prices, profits, and the induced consumer surplus. In particular, we establish that profits and consumer surplus are maximized when the demand pattern is "balanced" across the network's locations. In addition, we show that they both increase monotonically with the balancedness of the demand pattern (as formalized by its structural properties). Furthermore, if the demand pattern is not balanced, the platform can benefit substantially from pricing rides differently depending on the location they originate from. Finally, we consider a number of alternative pricing and compensation schemes that are commonly used in practice and explore their performance for the platform.
{"title":"Spatial pricing in ride-sharing networks","authors":"K. Bimpikis, Ozan Candogan, D. Sabán","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2868080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2868080","url":null,"abstract":"We explore spatial price discrimination in the context of a ridesharing platform that serves a network of locations. Riders are heterogeneous in terms of their destination preferences and their willingness to pay for receiving service. Drivers decide whether, when, and where to provide service so as to maximize their expected earnings, given the platform's prices. Our findings highlight the impact of the demand pattern on the platform's prices, profits, and the induced consumer surplus. In particular, we establish that profits and consumer surplus are maximized when the demand pattern is \"balanced\" across the network's locations. In addition, we show that they both increase monotonically with the balancedness of the demand pattern (as formalized by its structural properties). Furthermore, if the demand pattern is not balanced, the platform can benefit substantially from pricing rides differently depending on the location they originate from. Finally, we consider a number of alternative pricing and compensation schemes that are commonly used in practice and explore their performance for the platform.","PeriodicalId":130519,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130113135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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