Women face a compensation negotiation dilemma in which they have to weigh the economic benefits of asking for higher pay with the social risks of defying prescriptive sex stereotypes (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). In four experiments, we show that enhancing the legitimacy of women's compensation requests does not eliminate the social risk of asking, and that eliminating the social risk of asking is not sufficient to legitimize their requests. We identify strategies for overcoming the compensation negotiation dilemma using "relational accounts" that simultaneously explain why the negotiating behavior is appropriate under the circumstances and affirm concern for organizational relationships.
{"title":"Relational Accounts: An Answer for Women to the Compensation Negotiation Dilemma","authors":"H. Bowles, Linda Babcock","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1296669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1296669","url":null,"abstract":"Women face a compensation negotiation dilemma in which they have to weigh the economic benefits of asking for higher pay with the social risks of defying prescriptive sex stereotypes (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). In four experiments, we show that enhancing the legitimacy of women's compensation requests does not eliminate the social risk of asking, and that eliminating the social risk of asking is not sufficient to legitimize their requests. We identify strategies for overcoming the compensation negotiation dilemma using \"relational accounts\" that simultaneously explain why the negotiating behavior is appropriate under the circumstances and affirm concern for organizational relationships.","PeriodicalId":131091,"journal":{"name":"Negotiation Applications","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123584397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose taking a two-level-game perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level One, candidates negotiate with employers. At Level Two, candidates negotiate with household members. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review research from two separate bodies of literature. Research in psychology and organizational behavior on candidate–employer negotiations sheds light on the effects of gender on Level One negotiations. Research from economics and sociology on intrahousehold bargaining elucidates how negotiations over the allocation of domestic labor at Level Two influence labor force participation at Level One. In conclusion, we integrate practical implications from these two bodies of literature to propose a set of prescriptive suggestions for candidates to approach job negotiations as a two-level game and to minimize the disadvantageous effects of gender on job negotiation outcomes.
{"title":"Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game","authors":"H. Bowles, Kathleen L. McGinn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1132784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1132784","url":null,"abstract":"We propose taking a two-level-game perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level One, candidates negotiate with employers. At Level Two, candidates negotiate with household members. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review research from two separate bodies of literature. Research in psychology and organizational behavior on candidate–employer negotiations sheds light on the effects of gender on Level One negotiations. Research from economics and sociology on intrahousehold bargaining elucidates how negotiations over the allocation of domestic labor at Level Two influence labor force participation at Level One. In conclusion, we integrate practical implications from these two bodies of literature to propose a set of prescriptive suggestions for candidates to approach job negotiations as a two-level game and to minimize the disadvantageous effects of gender on job negotiation outcomes.","PeriodicalId":131091,"journal":{"name":"Negotiation Applications","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129187204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This short paper describes a series of simulated negotiation and drafting exercises developed as a tool to teach various aspects of international sales transactions. Students get the opportunity to represent imaginary parties to such transactions and to negotiate on their behalf in front of the class solutions to various real-world problems which they are likely to meet in their future legal or business practice. The series covers the following aspects of international sales transactions: * Drafting an initial memorandum of agreement to cover the main components of the sales transaction; * Allocation of costs and risk in connection with the long shipment: the use of the ICC INCOTERMS; * The UN Convention on International Sales of Goods (CISG): the scope of application of the CISG; its substantive provisions; should one exclude it? Should one exclude some of its provisions? * Modes of payment in international commerce; Letters of Credit; * Allocation of performance risks: drafting a Force Majeure clause; * Settlement of Disputes: choosing between courts and arbitration; drafting exclusive jurisdiction clauses, arbitration and mediation clauses, and choice of law clauses. This type of exercises is very different from those students usually are required to submit in law school, where they are expected to analyze a legal problem and essentially write a judgment - thus implicitly suggesting that all problems should be solved by means of litigation. The premise of this exercise is that in international commerce, litigation is a bad option, due to the extensive costs, significant cultural problems and high level of uncertainty involved, and should only by used as a last resort. Instead, the transaction should be planned and structured in a way that minimizes the risk of a dispute, and when problems arise they should preferably be solved by negotiation.
{"title":"International Sales Transactions - A Series of Simulated Negotiation and Drafting Exercises","authors":"Arie Reich","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1114482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1114482","url":null,"abstract":"This short paper describes a series of simulated negotiation and drafting exercises developed as a tool to teach various aspects of international sales transactions. Students get the opportunity to represent imaginary parties to such transactions and to negotiate on their behalf in front of the class solutions to various real-world problems which they are likely to meet in their future legal or business practice. The series covers the following aspects of international sales transactions: * Drafting an initial memorandum of agreement to cover the main components of the sales transaction; * Allocation of costs and risk in connection with the long shipment: the use of the ICC INCOTERMS; * The UN Convention on International Sales of Goods (CISG): the scope of application of the CISG; its substantive provisions; should one exclude it? Should one exclude some of its provisions? * Modes of payment in international commerce; Letters of Credit; * Allocation of performance risks: drafting a Force Majeure clause; * Settlement of Disputes: choosing between courts and arbitration; drafting exclusive jurisdiction clauses, arbitration and mediation clauses, and choice of law clauses. This type of exercises is very different from those students usually are required to submit in law school, where they are expected to analyze a legal problem and essentially write a judgment - thus implicitly suggesting that all problems should be solved by means of litigation. The premise of this exercise is that in international commerce, litigation is a bad option, due to the extensive costs, significant cultural problems and high level of uncertainty involved, and should only by used as a last resort. Instead, the transaction should be planned and structured in a way that minimizes the risk of a dispute, and when problems arise they should preferably be solved by negotiation.","PeriodicalId":131091,"journal":{"name":"Negotiation Applications","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121667718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article provides an inside from of the transition from the GATT to the WTO, including the basic features of the system and the role of the Appellate Body as a judicial body within the WTO, as well as the relations between judicial and political bodies. IT reflects on the first ten years of activity, the reform of the DSU and the position of private parties.
{"title":"The Dispute Settlement System of the W.T.O.: Structure and Function in the Perspective of the First 10 Years","authors":"G. Sacerdoti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.981029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.981029","url":null,"abstract":"This Article provides an inside from of the transition from the GATT to the WTO, including the basic features of the system and the role of the Appellate Body as a judicial body within the WTO, as well as the relations between judicial and political bodies. IT reflects on the first ten years of activity, the reform of the DSU and the position of private parties.","PeriodicalId":131091,"journal":{"name":"Negotiation Applications","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127243879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the process of prenegotiation and the role of mediators during the negotiations between the Argentine and British governments about the dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands from immediately after the war of 1982 to 1990. In this period, the relationship between both governments evolved from rupture and no-relations to the agreement on the conditions to negotiate the renewal of full diplomatic relations concluded in early 1990. In a preliminary process of prenegotiation, the governments of Switzerland, initially, and the United States played a role in helping to reach an agreement. The former failed when the talks ended abruptly in July 1984. The latter succeeded in getting both parties to the table and keeping them there, thus avoiding a potential rupture until the two parties reached an agreement in principle. During the prenegotiation stage, the principal parties were able to reduce the risks of escalation; they defined and narrowed the boundaries of the dispute, clearly identified the trade-offs, and structured the agenda of formal negotiations. Consequently, the likelihood of successful negotiation improved significantly when the parties reach an agreement during prenegotiation on what will be discussed later. This case also illustrate that sometimes, when negotiations reach a point of stalemate, a mediator can help to find a "zone of agreement". When this situation occurs, the degree of involvement and the resources of the mediator are particularly important. Finally, this case confirms the assertions that effective mediation is more a matter of leverage and influence than a matter of impartiality.
{"title":"Prenegotiation and Mediation: The Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy After the Falklands/Malvinas War (1983-1989)","authors":"A. Corbacho","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1013663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1013663","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the process of prenegotiation and the role of mediators during the negotiations between the Argentine and British governments about the dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands from immediately after the war of 1982 to 1990. In this period, the relationship between both governments evolved from rupture and no-relations to the agreement on the conditions to negotiate the renewal of full diplomatic relations concluded in early 1990. In a preliminary process of prenegotiation, the governments of Switzerland, initially, and the United States played a role in helping to reach an agreement. The former failed when the talks ended abruptly in July 1984. The latter succeeded in getting both parties to the table and keeping them there, thus avoiding a potential rupture until the two parties reached an agreement in principle. During the prenegotiation stage, the principal parties were able to reduce the risks of escalation; they defined and narrowed the boundaries of the dispute, clearly identified the trade-offs, and structured the agenda of formal negotiations. Consequently, the likelihood of successful negotiation improved significantly when the parties reach an agreement during prenegotiation on what will be discussed later. This case also illustrate that sometimes, when negotiations reach a point of stalemate, a mediator can help to find a \"zone of agreement\". When this situation occurs, the degree of involvement and the resources of the mediator are particularly important. Finally, this case confirms the assertions that effective mediation is more a matter of leverage and influence than a matter of impartiality.","PeriodicalId":131091,"journal":{"name":"Negotiation Applications","volume":"64 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120939392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations.
{"title":"Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players","authors":"J. Péreau, A. Caparrós, Tarik Tazdait","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.771264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.771264","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations.","PeriodicalId":131091,"journal":{"name":"Negotiation Applications","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128805012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determine the outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.
{"title":"Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness","authors":"C. Carraro, C. Marchiori, A. Sgobbi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.722363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.722363","url":null,"abstract":"Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determine the outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.","PeriodicalId":131091,"journal":{"name":"Negotiation Applications","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121281146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present research deals with teaching negotiators to improve their skills for creating value. Building upon the literature in cognitive and educational psychology, we examined the effects of reflection and of achievement motivational goals (Learning versus Performance) on the transfer of integrative negotiation skills. Participants first engaged in repeated negotiations within an unchanging market simulation and then proceeded to negotiate a more complex integrative negotiation task. We found reflection to be beneficial for learning. Experience accompanied by subsequent reflection enhanced integrative performance in the transfer task more than experience without reflection. Contrary to our expectations, participants that were assigned learning goals did not improve their performance on a transfer task compared to participants that were assigned performance goals.
{"title":"The Effects of Reflection and Motivational Goals on the Transfer of Skills in Integrative Negotiations","authors":"Yoella Bereby‐Meyer, S. Moran, L. Sattler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.722841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.722841","url":null,"abstract":"The present research deals with teaching negotiators to improve their skills for creating value. Building upon the literature in cognitive and educational psychology, we examined the effects of reflection and of achievement motivational goals (Learning versus Performance) on the transfer of integrative negotiation skills. Participants first engaged in repeated negotiations within an unchanging market simulation and then proceeded to negotiate a more complex integrative negotiation task. We found reflection to be beneficial for learning. Experience accompanied by subsequent reflection enhanced integrative performance in the transfer task more than experience without reflection. Contrary to our expectations, participants that were assigned learning goals did not improve their performance on a transfer task compared to participants that were assigned performance goals.","PeriodicalId":131091,"journal":{"name":"Negotiation Applications","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125058393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can Germany in the 1990s provide a contemporary example of the "uneasy triangle" posited by The Economist in the early 1950s? As the millennium approached, Germany's inflation rate was very low; its unemployment rate unacceptably high; and its system of collective bargaining arguably the strongest to be found in any major industrial country. Public opinion appears to have played a more limiting role in the first of these corners of Germany's triangles than in the other two.
{"title":"An Essay on Collective Bargaining and Unemployment in Germany","authors":"L. Ulman, K. Gerlach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.418305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.418305","url":null,"abstract":"Can Germany in the 1990s provide a contemporary example of the \"uneasy triangle\" posited by The Economist in the early 1950s? As the millennium approached, Germany's inflation rate was very low; its unemployment rate unacceptably high; and its system of collective bargaining arguably the strongest to be found in any major industrial country. Public opinion appears to have played a more limiting role in the first of these corners of Germany's triangles than in the other two.","PeriodicalId":131091,"journal":{"name":"Negotiation Applications","volume":"5 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126036053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Social, economic, and organizational development require a degree of stable policy making. The instability of group decision making under majority rule has preoccupied social theorists since Condorcet in the late 18th century. In theory, subtle institutional modifications to pure majority rule may be sufficient to induce stability. This paper reviews experimental evidence regarding these stability inducing modifications. The experiments examine the impact of agenda control, super-majority voting requirements, veto powers, and bicameralism on group decision making.
{"title":"Institutional Modifications of Majority Rule","authors":"W. Bottom, L. Handlin, Ronald R. King, G. Miller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.317762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.317762","url":null,"abstract":"Social, economic, and organizational development require a degree of stable policy making. The instability of group decision making under majority rule has preoccupied social theorists since Condorcet in the late 18th century. In theory, subtle institutional modifications to pure majority rule may be sufficient to induce stability. This paper reviews experimental evidence regarding these stability inducing modifications. The experiments examine the impact of agenda control, super-majority voting requirements, veto powers, and bicameralism on group decision making.","PeriodicalId":131091,"journal":{"name":"Negotiation Applications","volume":"13 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130044661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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