Pub Date : 2018-04-04DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0196
D. Yang, Wen-feng Qi, Huajin Chen
Truncated differential attack (TDA) proposed by Knudsen in Fast Software Encryption 1995 (FSE'95) has been widely used in the analysis of block ciphers. In this study, the authors specifically study the security of SP block ciphers against TDA. In FSE'15, Li et al. introduced a meet-in-the-middle technique to construct truncated differential for Feistel ciphers. They first apply Li's technique to SP block ciphers and get some further results. Second, they introduce the concept of generalised truncated difference to control the diffusion of active S-boxes in the truncated differential. On the basis of these, two 5-round truncated differential distinguishers for mCrypton and CRYPTON V1.0 have been constructed. Using these two 5-round distinguishers, they present the first 8-round DA on mCrypton-64 and improve the former best TDA on CRYPTON V1.0 by one round.
{"title":"Observations on the truncated differential of SP block ciphers and their applications to mCrypton and CRYPTON V1.0","authors":"D. Yang, Wen-feng Qi, Huajin Chen","doi":"10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0196","url":null,"abstract":"Truncated differential attack (TDA) proposed by Knudsen in Fast Software Encryption 1995 (FSE'95) has been widely used in the analysis of block ciphers. In this study, the authors specifically study the security of SP block ciphers against TDA. In FSE'15, Li et al.\u0000 introduced a meet-in-the-middle technique to construct truncated differential for Feistel ciphers. They first apply Li's technique to SP block ciphers and get some further results. Second, they introduce the concept of generalised truncated difference to control the diffusion of active S-boxes in the truncated differential. On the basis of these, two 5-round truncated differential distinguishers for mCrypton and CRYPTON V1.0 have been constructed. Using these two 5-round distinguishers, they present the first 8-round DA on mCrypton-64 and improve the former best TDA on CRYPTON V1.0 by one round.","PeriodicalId":13305,"journal":{"name":"IET Inf. Secur.","volume":"50 1","pages":"419-424"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87377338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-04-04DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0460
Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Santanu Kumar Dash, P. García-Teodoro, J. Camacho, L. Cavallaro
Smartphone platforms are becoming increasingly complex, which gives way to software vulnerabilities difficult to identify and that might allow malware developers to gain unauthorised privileges through technical exploitation. However, the authors maintain that these types of attacks indirectly renders a number of unexpected behaviours in the system that can be profiled. In this work, the authors present CoME , an anomaly-based methodology aiming at detecting software exploitation in Android systems. CoME models the normal behaviour of a given software component or service and it is capable of identifying any unanticipated behaviour. To this end, they first monitor the normal operation of a given exploitable component through lightweight virtual introspection. Then, they use a multivariate analysis approach to estimate the normality model and detect anomalies. They evaluate their system against one of the most critical vulnerable and widely exploited services in Android, i.e. the mediaserver. Results show that the proposed approach can not only provide a meaningful explanatory of discriminant features for illegitimate activities, but can also be used to accurately detect malicious software exploitations at runtime.
{"title":"Anomaly-based exploratory analysis and detection of exploits in android mediaserver","authors":"Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Santanu Kumar Dash, P. García-Teodoro, J. Camacho, L. Cavallaro","doi":"10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0460","url":null,"abstract":"Smartphone platforms are becoming increasingly complex, which gives way to software vulnerabilities difficult to identify and that might allow malware developers to gain unauthorised privileges through technical exploitation. However, the authors maintain that these types of attacks indirectly renders a number of unexpected behaviours in the system that can be profiled. In this work, the authors present CoME\u0000, an anomaly-based methodology aiming at detecting software exploitation in Android systems. CoME\u0000 models the normal behaviour of a given software component or service and it is capable of identifying any unanticipated behaviour. To this end, they first monitor the normal operation of a given exploitable component through lightweight virtual introspection. Then, they use a multivariate analysis approach to estimate the normality model and detect anomalies. They evaluate their system against one of the most critical vulnerable and widely exploited services in Android, i.e. the mediaserver. Results show that the proposed approach can not only provide a meaningful explanatory of discriminant features for illegitimate activities, but can also be used to accurately detect malicious software exploitations at runtime.","PeriodicalId":13305,"journal":{"name":"IET Inf. Secur.","volume":"4 1","pages":"404-413"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82257278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-04DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0173
Jiqiang Lu, W. Yap, Yongzhuang Wei
The MISTY1 block cipher has a 64-bit block size, a 128-bit master key, and a total of 8 rounds. It is an ISO international standard, a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, and a European NESSIE selected cipher. In this study, the authors show another cryptographic weakness of the full MISTY1 cipher: they describe four classes of 2 90 weak keys of the full MISTY1 cipher for a related-key amplified boomerang attack that has a data complexity of 2 60.5 chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of 2 87.33 encryptions under each class of weak keys. The result shows that the MISTY1 cipher can be distinguishable from an ideal cipher in terms of related-key amplified boomerang cryptanalysis, and users should be very careful when using MISTY1 for a full security in relevant application situations.
{"title":"Weak keys of the full MISTY1 block cipher for related-key amplified boomerang cryptanalysis","authors":"Jiqiang Lu, W. Yap, Yongzhuang Wei","doi":"10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0173","url":null,"abstract":"The MISTY1 block cipher has a 64-bit block size, a 128-bit master key, and a total of 8 rounds. It is an ISO international standard, a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, and a European NESSIE selected cipher. In this study, the authors show another cryptographic weakness of the full MISTY1 cipher: they describe four classes of 2 90 weak keys of the full MISTY1 cipher for a related-key amplified boomerang attack that has a data complexity of 2 60.5 chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of 2 87.33 encryptions under each class of weak keys. The result shows that the MISTY1 cipher can be distinguishable from an ideal cipher in terms of related-key amplified boomerang cryptanalysis, and users should be very careful when using MISTY1 for a full security in relevant application situations.","PeriodicalId":13305,"journal":{"name":"IET Inf. Secur.","volume":"62 1","pages":"389-397"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73137202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-22DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0342
Girraj Kumar Verma, B. Singh
Blind signature (BS) schemes are a vital tool to design electronic cash (e-cash), online transaction, electronic voting (e-voting), digital right management (DRM) systems etc. The communication systems designed for such applications need small size and more confidential signature schemes. This article presents the first provably secure and efficient identity-based message recovery BS scheme from pairing. Since, in this scheme, the message is not transmitted with signature and recovered during verification phase, the total message–signature length is the lowest. Due to the blindness, the scheme provides authentication along with anonymity. The performance comparison shows that the authors' scheme consumes the lowest computation cost. Thus, it inspires the energy efficient (green) technology as well as is the most appealing BS scheme towards applications such as e-cash, e-voting, DRM systems etc. using low bandwidth and high security.
{"title":"Efficient identity-based blind message recovery signature scheme from pairings","authors":"Girraj Kumar Verma, B. Singh","doi":"10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0342","url":null,"abstract":"Blind signature (BS) schemes are a vital tool to design electronic cash (e-cash), online transaction, electronic voting (e-voting), digital right management (DRM) systems etc. The communication systems designed for such applications need small size and more confidential signature schemes. This article presents the first provably secure and efficient identity-based message recovery BS scheme from pairing. Since, in this scheme, the message is not transmitted with signature and recovered during verification phase, the total message–signature length is the lowest. Due to the blindness, the scheme provides authentication along with anonymity. The performance comparison shows that the authors' scheme consumes the lowest computation cost. Thus, it inspires the energy efficient (green) technology as well as is the most appealing BS scheme towards applications such as e-cash, e-voting, DRM systems etc. using low bandwidth and high security.","PeriodicalId":13305,"journal":{"name":"IET Inf. Secur.","volume":"55 1","pages":"150-156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86346876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-11-24DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0390
Xiaonan Wang, Zhengxiong Dou, Y. Mu
Content-centric networking (CCN) used the name of an Interest to seek the target content, where the name was a plaintext and unprotected. Apart from the name, the content in one Data is also unprotected. If an unauthorised node intercepted an Interest, it could infer what kind of content is requested. If the node intercepted a response Data, it could illegally acquire the content. This study focused on the privacy issues of CCN and proposed a CCN framework with privacy support. In this framework, the concept of a privacy name was proposed and accordingly the forwarding information base (FIB) and pending Interest table (PIT) establishment algorithms based on privacy names were proposed. On the basis of the proposed FIB and PIT, the content communication algorithm based on privacy names was presented. In this algorithm, one authorised consumer could use a privacy name to seek, retrieve and share the ciphertext of the content, so the privacy was achieved. Finally, the privacy of this framework was analysed and the performance was evaluated to justify its advantages.
{"title":"CCN framework with privacy support","authors":"Xiaonan Wang, Zhengxiong Dou, Y. Mu","doi":"10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0390","url":null,"abstract":"Content-centric networking (CCN) used the name of an Interest to seek the target content, where the name was a plaintext and unprotected. Apart from the name, the content in one Data is also unprotected. If an unauthorised node intercepted an Interest, it could infer what kind of content is requested. If the node intercepted a response Data, it could illegally acquire the content. This study focused on the privacy issues of CCN and proposed a CCN framework with privacy support. In this framework, the concept of a privacy name was proposed and accordingly the forwarding information base (FIB) and pending Interest table (PIT) establishment algorithms based on privacy names were proposed. On the basis of the proposed FIB and PIT, the content communication algorithm based on privacy names was presented. In this algorithm, one authorised consumer could use a privacy name to seek, retrieve and share the ciphertext of the content, so the privacy was achieved. Finally, the privacy of this framework was analysed and the performance was evaluated to justify its advantages.","PeriodicalId":13305,"journal":{"name":"IET Inf. Secur.","volume":"51 1","pages":"157-164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89801844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-11-23DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2016.0005
J. Shao, Yu Qin, D. Feng
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a system component that provides a hardware-based approach to establish trust in a platform. The latest TPM2.0 specification was accepted as the ISO standard in 2015. It offers functionality for key management by storing keys into the TPM's protected storage. The access to the TPM-resident key object is protected by the session-based authorisation mechanism. This mechanism is keyed to the object's authorisation value known as authValue and the session-bound secret value known as sessionKey. The new authValue introduced into the TPM is protected by the sessionbased encryption mechanism, which is also keyed on the sessionKey. In the authors' study, they conduct a formal analysis of the TPM2.0 HMAC (hash message authentication code) authorisation mechanism used in the key management. They first use the stateful applied π calculus to formalise the session-based HMAC authorisation and encryption mechanisms in a model of TPM2.0 API commands. They propose a threat model to formalise the secrecy and authentication properties. Then they discuss several attacking scenarios in practice where the sessionKey could be disclosed. They also instantiate their threat model according to specific attacking scenarios. By using the SAPIC tool and the tamarin prover, they automatically give out the analysis results of their models.
{"title":"Formal analysis of HMAC authorisation in the TPM2.0 specification","authors":"J. Shao, Yu Qin, D. Feng","doi":"10.1049/iet-ifs.2016.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2016.0005","url":null,"abstract":"The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a system component that provides a hardware-based approach to establish trust in a platform. The latest TPM2.0 specification was accepted as the ISO standard in 2015. It offers functionality for key management by storing keys into the TPM's protected storage. The access to the TPM-resident key object is protected by the session-based authorisation mechanism. This mechanism is keyed to the object's authorisation value known as authValue and the session-bound secret value known as sessionKey. The new authValue introduced into the TPM is protected by the sessionbased encryption mechanism, which is also keyed on the sessionKey. In the authors' study, they conduct a formal analysis of the TPM2.0 HMAC (hash message authentication code) authorisation mechanism used in the key management. They first use the stateful applied π calculus to formalise the session-based HMAC authorisation and encryption mechanisms in a model of TPM2.0 API commands. They propose a threat model to formalise the secrecy and authentication properties. Then they discuss several attacking scenarios in practice where the sessionKey could be disclosed. They also instantiate their threat model according to specific attacking scenarios. By using the SAPIC tool and the tamarin prover, they automatically give out the analysis results of their models.","PeriodicalId":13305,"journal":{"name":"IET Inf. Secur.","volume":"57 1","pages":"133-140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90677078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-11-17DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0259
Shuaijianni Xu, L. Zhang
Verifiable computation (VC) allows a client to outsource (delegate) the computation of a function f on an input x to a server and then verify the server's results with substantially less time than computing f(x) from scratch. The security of VC requires no efficient adversary can persuade the client to accept any wrong results. Morillo and Obrador (PST 2013) proposed three VC schemes for outsourcing the computation of polynomial functions and claimed that all schemes are secure under the decisional subgroup membership assumption. The authors show a simple attack against the security of their first scheme and then extend the attack to the other two schemes. Morillo and Obrador (PST 2013) also claimed that their third scheme keeps the client's input private under the square root assumption. The authors show that this is not true under the standard definition of input privacy. In particular, a curious server can extract the client's input x, if the x is not too large. The authors' results show that Morillo-Obrador schemes cannot be used in the polynomial delegation.
{"title":"Cryptanalysis of Morillo-Obrador polynomial delegation schemes","authors":"Shuaijianni Xu, L. Zhang","doi":"10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0259","url":null,"abstract":"Verifiable computation (VC) allows a client to outsource (delegate) the computation of a function f on an input x to a server and then verify the server's results with substantially less time than computing f(x) from scratch. The security of VC requires no efficient adversary can persuade the client to accept any wrong results. Morillo and Obrador (PST 2013) proposed three VC schemes for outsourcing the computation of polynomial functions and claimed that all schemes are secure under the decisional subgroup membership assumption. The authors show a simple attack against the security of their first scheme and then extend the attack to the other two schemes. Morillo and Obrador (PST 2013) also claimed that their third scheme keeps the client's input private under the square root assumption. The authors show that this is not true under the standard definition of input privacy. In particular, a curious server can extract the client's input x, if the x is not too large. The authors' results show that Morillo-Obrador schemes cannot be used in the polynomial delegation.","PeriodicalId":13305,"journal":{"name":"IET Inf. Secur.","volume":"48 1","pages":"127-132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79936239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-04DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0430
Abdurrahman Pektas, T. Acarman
This study presents the runtime behaviour-based classification procedure for Windows malware. Runtime behaviours are extracted with a particular focus on the determination of a malicious sequence of application programming interface (API) calls in addition to the file, network and registry activities. Mining and searching n-gram over API call sequences is introduced to discover episodes representing behaviour-based features of a malware. Voting Experts algorithm is used to extract malicious API patterns over API calls. The classification model is built by applying online machine learning algorithms and compared with the baseline classifiers. The model is trained and tested with a fairly large set of 17,400 malware samples belonging to 60 distinct families and 532 benign samples. The malware classification accuracy is reached at 98%.
{"title":"Malware classification based on API calls and behaviour analysis","authors":"Abdurrahman Pektas, T. Acarman","doi":"10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0430","url":null,"abstract":"This study presents the runtime behaviour-based classification procedure for Windows malware. Runtime behaviours are extracted with a particular focus on the determination of a malicious sequence of application programming interface (API) calls in addition to the file, network and registry activities. Mining and searching n-gram over API call sequences is introduced to discover episodes representing behaviour-based features of a malware. Voting Experts algorithm is used to extract malicious API patterns over API calls. The classification model is built by applying online machine learning algorithms and compared with the baseline classifiers. The model is trained and tested with a fairly large set of 17,400 malware samples belonging to 60 distinct families and 532 benign samples. The malware classification accuracy is reached at 98%.","PeriodicalId":13305,"journal":{"name":"IET Inf. Secur.","volume":"321 1","pages":"107-117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84661945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-10-04DOI: 10.1049/IET-IFS.2016.0621
W. Buchanan, Scott Helme, Alan Woodward
With the increase in the number of threats within web-based systems, a more integrated approach is required to ensure the enforcement of security policies from the server to the client. These policies aim to stop man-in-the-middle attacks, code injection, and so on. This study analyses some of the newest security options used within HTTP responses, and scans the Alexa Top 1 Million sites for their implementation within HTTP responses. These options scanned for include: content security policy, public key pinning extension for HTTP, HTTP strict transport security, and HTTP header field X-frame-options, in order to understand the impact that these options have on the most popular websites. The results show that, while the implementation of the parameters is increasing, it is still not implemented on many of the top sites. Along with this, the study shows the profile of adoption of Let's Encrypt digital certificates across the one million sites, along with a way of assessing the quality of the security headers.
{"title":"Analysis of the adoption of security headers in HTTP","authors":"W. Buchanan, Scott Helme, Alan Woodward","doi":"10.1049/IET-IFS.2016.0621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1049/IET-IFS.2016.0621","url":null,"abstract":"With the increase in the number of threats within web-based systems, a more integrated approach is required to ensure the enforcement of security policies from the server to the client. These policies aim to stop man-in-the-middle attacks, code injection, and so on. This study analyses some of the newest security options used within HTTP responses, and scans the Alexa Top 1 Million sites for their implementation within HTTP responses. These options scanned for include: content security policy, public key pinning extension for HTTP, HTTP strict transport security, and HTTP header field X-frame-options, in order to understand the impact that these options have on the most popular websites. The results show that, while the implementation of the parameters is increasing, it is still not implemented on many of the top sites. Along with this, the study shows the profile of adoption of Let's Encrypt digital certificates across the one million sites, along with a way of assessing the quality of the security headers.","PeriodicalId":13305,"journal":{"name":"IET Inf. Secur.","volume":"76 1","pages":"118-126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76035034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-07-01DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2015.0119
Binglong Chen, Chuangqiang Hu, Chang-An Zhao
Scalar multiplication is the most important and expensive operation in elliptic curve cryptosystems. In this study, the authors improve the efficiency of the elliptic net algorithm to compute scalar multiplication by using the equivalence of elliptic nets. The proposed method saves four multiplications by a constant in each iteration loop. Experimental results also indicate that the proposed algorithm will be more efficient than the previously known results on this line while it is still slower than the state-of-the-art algorithm to compute scalar multiplication.
{"title":"Note on scalar multiplication using division polynomials","authors":"Binglong Chen, Chuangqiang Hu, Chang-An Zhao","doi":"10.1049/iet-ifs.2015.0119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2015.0119","url":null,"abstract":"Scalar multiplication is the most important and expensive operation in elliptic curve cryptosystems. In this study, the authors improve the efficiency of the elliptic net algorithm to compute scalar multiplication by using the equivalence of elliptic nets. The proposed method saves four multiplications by a constant in each iteration loop. Experimental results also indicate that the proposed algorithm will be more efficient than the previously known results on this line while it is still slower than the state-of-the-art algorithm to compute scalar multiplication.","PeriodicalId":13305,"journal":{"name":"IET Inf. Secur.","volume":"37 1","pages":"195-198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87312814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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