Using data on political contributions and government enforcement actions from 1999 through 2010, we document a negative relationship between political contributions and the severity of government enforcement outcomes. Specifically, a $10,000 increase in contributions is associated with a reduction in the number of years accused executives are penalized with an officer ban (0.47 fewer years), probation (0.19 fewer years) and prison (0.32 fewer years), as well as the probability of receiving the harshest penalty from each agency (10%). Executives who personally contribute see similar effects. Results are robust to controlling for alternate reasons for disparate penalties (net benefit to shareholders and earned leniency), alternate discipline mechanisms (class action lawsuits, termination by the board, and firm delisting), and the level of discretion the agencies have in imposing penalties. We find some evidence to support a delay mechanism in criminal sanctions.
{"title":"Negation of Sanctions: The Personal Effect of Political Contributions","authors":"Sarah Fulmer, April M. Knill, Xiaoyun Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2024069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024069","url":null,"abstract":"Using data on political contributions and government enforcement actions from 1999 through 2010, we document a negative relationship between political contributions and the severity of government enforcement outcomes. Specifically, a $10,000 increase in contributions is associated with a reduction in the number of years accused executives are penalized with an officer ban (0.47 fewer years), probation (0.19 fewer years) and prison (0.32 fewer years), as well as the probability of receiving the harshest penalty from each agency (10%). Executives who personally contribute see similar effects. Results are robust to controlling for alternate reasons for disparate penalties (net benefit to shareholders and earned leniency), alternate discipline mechanisms (class action lawsuits, termination by the board, and firm delisting), and the level of discretion the agencies have in imposing penalties. We find some evidence to support a delay mechanism in criminal sanctions.","PeriodicalId":135286,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133066622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze how market design choices about counterparty information and costs related to the “plumbing” (i.e., clearing, settlement, and custody) of securities markets affect market quality and welfare. Our model compares two post-trade fee structures for allocating these costs. One charges a uniform fee for all trades and the other, marginal cost–based structure a reduced fee for internalized trades (which, both traders being from the same broker, is less costly to process). Both market design and fee structure affect quote aggressiveness and trading volume and its composition. With marginal cost–based fees and counterparty information being available, traders decide which counterparties to target through quote aggressiveness, trading off execution probability against fee. A social planner can maximize welfare by requiring marginal cost–based fees and providing traders the choice to disclose counterparty information. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
{"title":"Plumbing of Securities Markets: The Impact of Post-Trade Fees on Trading and Welfare","authors":"H. Degryse, Mark Van Achter, Gunther Wuyts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2023597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023597","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze how market design choices about counterparty information and costs related to the “plumbing” (i.e., clearing, settlement, and custody) of securities markets affect market quality and welfare. Our model compares two post-trade fee structures for allocating these costs. One charges a uniform fee for all trades and the other, marginal cost–based structure a reduced fee for internalized trades (which, both traders being from the same broker, is less costly to process). Both market design and fee structure affect quote aggressiveness and trading volume and its composition. With marginal cost–based fees and counterparty information being available, traders decide which counterparties to target through quote aggressiveness, trading off execution probability against fee. A social planner can maximize welfare by requiring marginal cost–based fees and providing traders the choice to disclose counterparty information. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.","PeriodicalId":135286,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127806147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In India, commercial banks are the oldest, largest and fastest growing financial intermediaries. They have been playing a very important role in the process of development. In 1949 RBI was nationalized followed by nationalization of Imperial Bank Of India (New State Bank Of India) in 1995. In July 1969, 14 major commercial banks were nationalized and in April 1980, 6 more were nationalized. Reforms in banking sector have led to the setting up of new private sector banks as well as entry of more foreign banks. As banks are expanding in to virtual banking, supervision and audit will have to be strengthened. Banks will have to pay greater attention to fool proof security arrangements and systems to safeguard against frauds.
{"title":"Banking Sector Reforms in India","authors":"M. Murali","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2303731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2303731","url":null,"abstract":"In India, commercial banks are the oldest, largest and fastest growing financial intermediaries. They have been playing a very important role in the process of development. In 1949 RBI was nationalized followed by nationalization of Imperial Bank Of India (New State Bank Of India) in 1995. In July 1969, 14 major commercial banks were nationalized and in April 1980, 6 more were nationalized. Reforms in banking sector have led to the setting up of new private sector banks as well as entry of more foreign banks. As banks are expanding in to virtual banking, supervision and audit will have to be strengthened. Banks will have to pay greater attention to fool proof security arrangements and systems to safeguard against frauds.","PeriodicalId":135286,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129077480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent government interventions in the banking sector have raised a considerable controversy among the academicians, politicians and policymakers. One of the reasons is an increasing concern about long-run effects of government banks' bailouts. The existing academic literature is very mute with this respect. This paper closes the gap and investigates the effect of various bailout strategies on long-term banking sector stability. Investigating the behavior of bailed banks versus non-bailed competitors it also identifies the sources of these effects. Our results show that government interventions destabilize banking sectors in the long-run. Especially, public guarantees, nationalization of private institutions as well as creation of asset management companies (AMCs) (also so-called "The Troubled Asset Relief Funds" or "Bad Banks") increase the risk-taking of bailed institutions several years afterwards. We show that these effects are related to lack of appropriate restructuring changes in the bailed institutions what does not allow them to restore their operating performance. This in turn is a result of state ownership and diminished market control.
{"title":"Government Interventions - Restoring or Destroying Financial Stability in the Long-Run?","authors":"Aneta Hryckiewicz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1978776","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1978776","url":null,"abstract":"Recent government interventions in the banking sector have raised a considerable controversy among the academicians, politicians and policymakers. One of the reasons is an increasing concern about long-run effects of government banks' bailouts. The existing academic literature is very mute with this respect. This paper closes the gap and investigates the effect of various bailout strategies on long-term banking sector stability. Investigating the behavior of bailed banks versus non-bailed competitors it also identifies the sources of these effects. Our results show that government interventions destabilize banking sectors in the long-run. Especially, public guarantees, nationalization of private institutions as well as creation of asset management companies (AMCs) (also so-called \"The Troubled Asset Relief Funds\" or \"Bad Banks\") increase the risk-taking of bailed institutions several years afterwards. We show that these effects are related to lack of appropriate restructuring changes in the bailed institutions what does not allow them to restore their operating performance. This in turn is a result of state ownership and diminished market control.","PeriodicalId":135286,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129267179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Iceland was the first developed economy to fall into crisis in 2008, with the collapse of its banking sector, currency value, and economy. The collapse threw Iceland into a political crisis and provoked a serious international dispute between Iceland and Britain and the Netherlands over responsibility for the failed banks. Prior to 2008 Iceland had been treated as the poster child for deregulation; since 2008 it has been held up as the poster child for the dangers of financial liberalization. Neither is accurate. Rather, Iceland presents a cautionary tale about the inter-relationships between fiscal and monetary policy and regulatory measures. Excessive liquidity fostered by central banks around the world, expansionary fiscal policies in Iceland, and inadequate understanding of fundamental economic linkages created conditions under which capital flooded Iceland and overwhelmed its financial institutions. Regulatory failures at the EU and Icelandic levels meant regulatory measures such as central bank interventions and deposit insurance exacerbated problems rather than correcting them. This paper explores those relationships, uncovering connections made visible by both Iceland’s relatively small size and the comprehensive parliamentary investigation into the crisis. It concludes that regulators need to focus attention on enhancing market-feedback mechanisms rather than on attempting to steer economies if they are to avoid “the next Iceland.”
{"title":"Global Economies, Regulatory Failure, & Loose Money: Lessons for Regulating the Finance Sector from Iceland's Financial Crisis","authors":"Andrew P. Morriss, Birgir T. Petursson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2016295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2016295","url":null,"abstract":"Iceland was the first developed economy to fall into crisis in 2008, with the collapse of its banking sector, currency value, and economy. The collapse threw Iceland into a political crisis and provoked a serious international dispute between Iceland and Britain and the Netherlands over responsibility for the failed banks. Prior to 2008 Iceland had been treated as the poster child for deregulation; since 2008 it has been held up as the poster child for the dangers of financial liberalization. Neither is accurate. Rather, Iceland presents a cautionary tale about the inter-relationships between fiscal and monetary policy and regulatory measures. Excessive liquidity fostered by central banks around the world, expansionary fiscal policies in Iceland, and inadequate understanding of fundamental economic linkages created conditions under which capital flooded Iceland and overwhelmed its financial institutions. Regulatory failures at the EU and Icelandic levels meant regulatory measures such as central bank interventions and deposit insurance exacerbated problems rather than correcting them. This paper explores those relationships, uncovering connections made visible by both Iceland’s relatively small size and the comprehensive parliamentary investigation into the crisis. It concludes that regulators need to focus attention on enhancing market-feedback mechanisms rather than on attempting to steer economies if they are to avoid “the next Iceland.”","PeriodicalId":135286,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122625962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-03-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00418.x
Rajni Mala, Parmod Chand
Fair value accounting (FVA) is threatening the convergence of accounting practices around the world. It has been regarded as one of the contributing factors of the recent financial crisis. Given that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have embraced FVA, this financial crisis raises concerns about their suitability for financial reporting across the world. This study explores important implications of the global financial crisis for financial reporting, in particular seeking to identify whether the trend towards convergence has been impeded by inherent problems in the IFRS. Contrary to our expectations, analyses show that the financial crisis has made the case for global convergence of accounting standards more compelling than before. The majority of countries intending to converge in the near future have not been affected by the global financial crisis and are committed to adopt IFRS as planned. The analyses also show that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has been facing pressure from the financial institutions, regulators, policy‐makers and finance ministers to review its rules on FVA. Consequently, the IASB has been undertaking measures to improve the reporting requirements in the light of the financial crisis.
{"title":"Effect of the Global Financial Crisis on Accounting Convergence","authors":"Rajni Mala, Parmod Chand","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00418.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00418.x","url":null,"abstract":"Fair value accounting (FVA) is threatening the convergence of accounting practices around the world. It has been regarded as one of the contributing factors of the recent financial crisis. Given that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have embraced FVA, this financial crisis raises concerns about their suitability for financial reporting across the world. This study explores important implications of the global financial crisis for financial reporting, in particular seeking to identify whether the trend towards convergence has been impeded by inherent problems in the IFRS. Contrary to our expectations, analyses show that the financial crisis has made the case for global convergence of accounting standards more compelling than before. The majority of countries intending to converge in the near future have not been affected by the global financial crisis and are committed to adopt IFRS as planned. The analyses also show that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has been facing pressure from the financial institutions, regulators, policy‐makers and finance ministers to review its rules on FVA. Consequently, the IASB has been undertaking measures to improve the reporting requirements in the light of the financial crisis.","PeriodicalId":135286,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130821435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the effects of the two waves of financial reforms implemented between 2002 and 2008 in the Taiwan banking industry. The first financial reform aimed to raise capital adequacy ratio and reduced non-performing loans. The second financial reform encouraged banks to merge. We investigate the impacts of the reforms on market competition and consumers’ welfare. Using a structural model for saving and borrowing demand in a differentiated market, we find that a bank’s capital adequacy rate has a positive impact on the utility of both savers and borrowers. Contrarily, the ratio of non-performing loans has no significant effect. During these reforms, market competition tended to decline while consumers’ welfare also dropped for both savers and borrowers. Nonetheless, when we use counterfactual experiments to isolate the direct effect of reform policies from other factors, we find the first reform actually had little effect on market competition while raised both savers’ and borrowers’ welfare. On the other hand, the second reform reduced market competition, increased savers’ welfare, but decrease borrowers’ welfare.
{"title":"The Impacts of Financial Reforms on Competition and Consumer Welfare in the Taiwan Banking Industry","authors":"Ching-I Huang, Ching-Hsiang Chuang","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1997814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1997814","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the effects of the two waves of financial reforms implemented between 2002 and 2008 in the Taiwan banking industry. The first financial reform aimed to raise capital adequacy ratio and reduced non-performing loans. The second financial reform encouraged banks to merge. We investigate the impacts of the reforms on market competition and consumers’ welfare. Using a structural model for saving and borrowing demand in a differentiated market, we find that a bank’s capital adequacy rate has a positive impact on the utility of both savers and borrowers. Contrarily, the ratio of non-performing loans has no significant effect. During these reforms, market competition tended to decline while consumers’ welfare also dropped for both savers and borrowers. Nonetheless, when we use counterfactual experiments to isolate the direct effect of reform policies from other factors, we find the first reform actually had little effect on market competition while raised both savers’ and borrowers’ welfare. On the other hand, the second reform reduced market competition, increased savers’ welfare, but decrease borrowers’ welfare.","PeriodicalId":135286,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130379047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.
{"title":"Bank Funding Structures and Risk: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis","authors":"Francisco Vázquez, P. Federico","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1997439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1997439","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.","PeriodicalId":135286,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124191560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As demonstrated by the market reactions to downgrades of various sovereign credit ratings in 2011, the credit rating agencies occupy an important role in today’s globalized financial markets. This article provides an overview of the central characteristics of credit ratings and discusses risks arising from both their widespread use as market information and from the increasing references to credit ratings contained in laws, legal regulations and private contracts.
{"title":"Three Letters that Move the Markets: Credit Ratings between Market Information and Legal Regulation","authors":"Ulrich G. Schroeter","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/97nq3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/97nq3","url":null,"abstract":"As demonstrated by the market reactions to downgrades of various sovereign credit ratings in 2011, the credit rating agencies occupy an important role in today’s globalized financial markets. This article provides an overview of the central characteristics of credit ratings and discusses risks arising from both their widespread use as market information and from the increasing references to credit ratings contained in laws, legal regulations and private contracts.","PeriodicalId":135286,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127112565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) ended the quasi-monopoly of traditional exchanges and enabled alternative platforms, so-called multilateral trading facilities (MTF), to compete for order flow. European regulation imposes neither a formal linkage nor a consolidated market record. This raises questions about the contribution to market quality of MTFs in an increasingly fragmented trading environment. We find that Chi-X, an MTF, contributes most to the price discovery process. Chi-X is competitive in liquidity supply and posts the tightest quoted spreads. Our results suggest that MTFs contribute positively to market quality and that investors benefit from competition.
{"title":"Do Multilateral Trading Facilities Contribute to Market Quality?","authors":"Ryan Riordan, Andreas Storkenmaier, M. Wagener","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1852769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1852769","url":null,"abstract":"The introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) ended the quasi-monopoly of traditional exchanges and enabled alternative platforms, so-called multilateral trading facilities (MTF), to compete for order flow. European regulation imposes neither a formal linkage nor a consolidated market record. This raises questions about the contribution to market quality of MTFs in an increasingly fragmented trading environment. We find that Chi-X, an MTF, contributes most to the price discovery process. Chi-X is competitive in liquidity supply and posts the tightest quoted spreads. Our results suggest that MTFs contribute positively to market quality and that investors benefit from competition.","PeriodicalId":135286,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation of Financial Markets (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125659544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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