Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0007
Luke A. Patey
Across European and Western liberal market democracies, China’s rise exposes friction between economic interests and political values and challenge common foreign and security policy in the European Union. From positions of economic weakness, Greece, Hungary, and Portugal have blocked or watered down common security, human rights, and economic positions in the regional body. Beijing’s formation of a formal group with Central and Eastern European countries, the so-called 17+1, is similarly seen in Brussels as a “divide and rule” tactic. Yet while European governments receive ample criticism for neglecting their political values in order to advance economic relations with China, the economic importance of China to the EU is rarely scrutinized. For large member states like Germany and France, and smaller ones such as Denmark and Norway, trade and investment with China does not produce a relationship of economic dependency for the EU as commonly perceived, particularly as China’s state capitalist system produces new competition for European companies. Beijing’s infringements on European democratic values and competitive economic pressures are changing the public discourse on China, but without a collective response, economic relations with China will only become more asymmetric than they are today.
{"title":"What Is Best for Europe?","authors":"Luke A. Patey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Across European and Western liberal market democracies, China’s rise exposes friction between economic interests and political values and challenge common foreign and security policy in the European Union. From positions of economic weakness, Greece, Hungary, and Portugal have blocked or watered down common security, human rights, and economic positions in the regional body. Beijing’s formation of a formal group with Central and Eastern European countries, the so-called 17+1, is similarly seen in Brussels as a “divide and rule” tactic. Yet while European governments receive ample criticism for neglecting their political values in order to advance economic relations with China, the economic importance of China to the EU is rarely scrutinized. For large member states like Germany and France, and smaller ones such as Denmark and Norway, trade and investment with China does not produce a relationship of economic dependency for the EU as commonly perceived, particularly as China’s state capitalist system produces new competition for European companies. Beijing’s infringements on European democratic values and competitive economic pressures are changing the public discourse on China, but without a collective response, economic relations with China will only become more asymmetric than they are today.","PeriodicalId":137286,"journal":{"name":"How China Loses","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114981518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0003
Luke A. Patey
For Beijing, military intervention overseas is no longer an unthinkable option. Rather, China’s expanding interests and newfound confidence and capabilities on the world stage, including overseas military bases in Djibouti and Tajikistan, make it a very real possibility. Official propaganda and popular films like Wolf Warrior II build up public expectations that Beijing is able and willing to protect Chinese interests abroad. A Chinese model for establishing peace and security may soon emerge in full. This is one that does not tear down state institutions overseas to usher in regime change, but works to maintain the legitimacy and power of state institutions, despite the violence they may have sown. It draws lessons from China’s counter-terrorism and the mass detainment of its Uyghur people at home. But this intervention threatens to bog down Beijing in quagmires overseas for decades. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, Beijing’s efforts to advance its strategic interests of developing new industrial corridors through South Asia face the challenge of overcoming long-standing regional insecurity and terrorism.
{"title":"Evils under the Ground","authors":"Luke A. Patey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"For Beijing, military intervention overseas is no longer an unthinkable option. Rather, China’s expanding interests and newfound confidence and capabilities on the world stage, including overseas military bases in Djibouti and Tajikistan, make it a very real possibility. Official propaganda and popular films like Wolf Warrior II build up public expectations that Beijing is able and willing to protect Chinese interests abroad. A Chinese model for establishing peace and security may soon emerge in full. This is one that does not tear down state institutions overseas to usher in regime change, but works to maintain the legitimacy and power of state institutions, despite the violence they may have sown. It draws lessons from China’s counter-terrorism and the mass detainment of its Uyghur people at home. But this intervention threatens to bog down Beijing in quagmires overseas for decades. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, Beijing’s efforts to advance its strategic interests of developing new industrial corridors through South Asia face the challenge of overcoming long-standing regional insecurity and terrorism.","PeriodicalId":137286,"journal":{"name":"How China Loses","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125913338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0006
Luke A. Patey
For decades, Germany accepted a trade-off of technology for market access when its multinational corporations invested in China. What has changed in recent years is that China’s model of political authoritarianism and state capitalism is reaching out to the world. Increasingly competitive in China, Chinese multinationals have busied themselves with entering overseas markets and buying foreign corporations. China’s aim is to climb the global competitiveness ladder through its “Made in China 2025” policy and lead production in higher-value goods and services in the automotive, aviation, machinery, robotics, and other industries. Standing in direct competition with German industry, this set off alarm bells in Berlin. China’s investment restrictions and controls at home, coupled with its targeted investment abroad, antagonized relations in Berlin and other European capitals. New policies to protect German and European corporations from foreign takeover, and efforts to reform the World Trade Organization, have grown as this lack of reciprocity has been exposed.
{"title":"Few Illusions Left","authors":"Luke A. Patey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"For decades, Germany accepted a trade-off of technology for market access when its multinational corporations invested in China. What has changed in recent years is that China’s model of political authoritarianism and state capitalism is reaching out to the world. Increasingly competitive in China, Chinese multinationals have busied themselves with entering overseas markets and buying foreign corporations. China’s aim is to climb the global competitiveness ladder through its “Made in China 2025” policy and lead production in higher-value goods and services in the automotive, aviation, machinery, robotics, and other industries. Standing in direct competition with German industry, this set off alarm bells in Berlin. China’s investment restrictions and controls at home, coupled with its targeted investment abroad, antagonized relations in Berlin and other European capitals. New policies to protect German and European corporations from foreign takeover, and efforts to reform the World Trade Organization, have grown as this lack of reciprocity has been exposed.","PeriodicalId":137286,"journal":{"name":"How China Loses","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133476383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0008
Luke A. Patey
Some think that China and Japan are destined for war. Japan’s historical wartime aggression and present-day territorial disputes and military tensions over control of a small grouping of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, pave the way for a modern-day conflict. Beijing has even weaponized its trade with Japan to drive nationalism at home and try to shape Japan’s foreign and defense policy. Others argue China and Japan’s economic relationship will save Asia from a disastrous conflict. For decades the two economies have fed off one another. Economic interdependence forces Beijing to pull back from hard trade restrictions and consumer boycotts. Yet Xi Jinping’s calls for China to become self-sufficient by building its technological capabilities are a threat to Japan’s modern industries. Beijing’s military aggression and economic competitiveness provokes a response from Japan to build up its military and diversify its trade and investment.
有些人认为中日注定要开战。日本历史上的战时侵略，以及目前围绕东中国海(East China Sea，中国称东海)一小群无人居住岛屿(日本称尖阁列岛，中国称钓鱼岛)控制权的领土争端和军事紧张局势，为现代冲突铺平了道路。北京甚至将其与日本的贸易武器化，以推动国内的民族主义，并试图影响日本的外交和国防政策。还有人认为，中日两国的经济关系将使亚洲免于灾难性的冲突。几十年来，两国经济相互依赖。经济上的相互依赖迫使北京放弃强硬的贸易限制和消费者抵制。北京的军事侵略和经济竞争力引发了日本的反应，以加强其军事力量，并使其贸易和投资多样化。
{"title":"Behave Accordingly","authors":"Luke A. Patey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Some think that China and Japan are destined for war. Japan’s historical wartime aggression and present-day territorial disputes and military tensions over control of a small grouping of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, pave the way for a modern-day conflict. Beijing has even weaponized its trade with Japan to drive nationalism at home and try to shape Japan’s foreign and defense policy. Others argue China and Japan’s economic relationship will save Asia from a disastrous conflict. For decades the two economies have fed off one another. Economic interdependence forces Beijing to pull back from hard trade restrictions and consumer boycotts. Yet Xi Jinping’s calls for China to become self-sufficient by building its technological capabilities are a threat to Japan’s modern industries. Beijing’s military aggression and economic competitiveness provokes a response from Japan to build up its military and diversify its trade and investment.","PeriodicalId":137286,"journal":{"name":"How China Loses","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130610900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0005
Luke A. Patey
Beijing has geopolitical, economic, and geostrategic ambitions for the Belt and Road. First, it wants to harness the Belt and Road to legitimize China’s developmental model of political authoritarianism and state capitalism worldwide. Africa, and large economies such as Kenya and Ethiopia, represents a key venue for the expansion of China’s model. China also seeks to drive the global expansion of China’s state-owned enterprises and private corporations and to offshore China’s overcapacity in heavy industries on its path to full economic development and modernization. Finally, Beijing aims to harness the Belt and Road to alleviate its geostrategic vulnerabilities. But there are challenges facing the Belt and Road. China’s model will only gain long lasting legitimacy if the initiative produces tangible economic development for foreign countries. In Sri Lanka, Malaysia, the Maldives, and across Asia, China’s economic and geostrategic aims face entrenched business and political interests, changing politics, conflict, and varying economic capacities to shoulder new debt.
{"title":"The Chinese Way","authors":"Luke A. Patey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Beijing has geopolitical, economic, and geostrategic ambitions for the Belt and Road. First, it wants to harness the Belt and Road to legitimize China’s developmental model of political authoritarianism and state capitalism worldwide. Africa, and large economies such as Kenya and Ethiopia, represents a key venue for the expansion of China’s model. China also seeks to drive the global expansion of China’s state-owned enterprises and private corporations and to offshore China’s overcapacity in heavy industries on its path to full economic development and modernization. Finally, Beijing aims to harness the Belt and Road to alleviate its geostrategic vulnerabilities. But there are challenges facing the Belt and Road. China’s model will only gain long lasting legitimacy if the initiative produces tangible economic development for foreign countries. In Sri Lanka, Malaysia, the Maldives, and across Asia, China’s economic and geostrategic aims face entrenched business and political interests, changing politics, conflict, and varying economic capacities to shoulder new debt.","PeriodicalId":137286,"journal":{"name":"How China Loses","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124355706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0002
Luke A. Patey
China’s long-standing non-interference policy has been discarded in practice. In Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere, China is working to safeguard its nationals and economic interests and make peace in overseas conflicts. South Sudan represents a pioneering case for China’s diplomats entering peace talks abroad, Chinese business managers to engage in corporate responsibility, and Chinese soldiers to join the Blue Helmets of United Nations peacekeeping. Despite the efforts of Chinese oilmen and diplomats in the African country, China has struggled to shape events on the ground. Beijing’s willingness to strike short-term, transactional deals with rebel groups undermines long-term stability. Chinese peacekeepers cannot overcome the inherent challengers of modern United Nations peacekeeping. Chinese actors in the country, from arms dealers to oil companies, often frustrate one another’s interests. Neither does China coordinate well with other foreign powers, as geopolitical tensions with the United States cloud mutual interests in building peace in South Sudan, Myanmar, and other overseas conflicts.
{"title":"Waiting for Peace","authors":"Luke A. Patey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"China’s long-standing non-interference policy has been discarded in practice. In Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere, China is working to safeguard its nationals and economic interests and make peace in overseas conflicts. South Sudan represents a pioneering case for China’s diplomats entering peace talks abroad, Chinese business managers to engage in corporate responsibility, and Chinese soldiers to join the Blue Helmets of United Nations peacekeeping. Despite the efforts of Chinese oilmen and diplomats in the African country, China has struggled to shape events on the ground. Beijing’s willingness to strike short-term, transactional deals with rebel groups undermines long-term stability. Chinese peacekeepers cannot overcome the inherent challengers of modern United Nations peacekeeping. Chinese actors in the country, from arms dealers to oil companies, often frustrate one another’s interests. Neither does China coordinate well with other foreign powers, as geopolitical tensions with the United States cloud mutual interests in building peace in South Sudan, Myanmar, and other overseas conflicts.","PeriodicalId":137286,"journal":{"name":"How China Loses","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133601048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0010
Luke A. Patey
The world cannot afford for China to lose. Arguments can be made on whether or not China’s leaders will realize their global ambitions, but the direction of Chinese politics and economy will largely dictate whether global challenges, from fighting climate change to global pandemics, can be overcome. Overreaction to China’s assertive foreign policy must be avoided, as too must naïveté toward China’s global ambitions. China’s actions during the beginning of the twenty-first century present lessons for countries around the world to manage their relations with Beijing, but a collective and sustained response is paramount. The world does not require American or Chinese leadership to give it order. Common economic interests and political values exist between Asian and Western countries. Middle powers and small states will not simply follow the dictates of Washington or Beijing, but will instead blend, package, and resist big power pressures in pursuit of their own ambitions.
{"title":"Conclusion: Big or Small","authors":"Luke A. Patey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"The world cannot afford for China to lose. Arguments can be made on whether or not China’s leaders will realize their global ambitions, but the direction of Chinese politics and economy will largely dictate whether global challenges, from fighting climate change to global pandemics, can be overcome. Overreaction to China’s assertive foreign policy must be avoided, as too must naïveté toward China’s global ambitions. China’s actions during the beginning of the twenty-first century present lessons for countries around the world to manage their relations with Beijing, but a collective and sustained response is paramount. The world does not require American or Chinese leadership to give it order. Common economic interests and political values exist between Asian and Western countries. Middle powers and small states will not simply follow the dictates of Washington or Beijing, but will instead blend, package, and resist big power pressures in pursuit of their own ambitions.","PeriodicalId":137286,"journal":{"name":"How China Loses","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131801793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0009
Luke A. Patey
For many of its Asian neighbors, China aspires to renew its historical role as regional hegemon. Beijing’s consistent attempts of economic coercion to shape the foreign and defense policy decision-making of its neighbors have pushed Asia’s middle powers to develop new security partnerships. As the respective wealthiest and the largest democracies, and the second and third largest economies in Asia, Japan and India stand out as a potential counterbalance to China’s assertiveness. South Korea and Australia are also reacting to pressures from China and looking to diversify their trade and investment and deepen regional cooperation in the face of Chinese pressure. China’s militarization of strategic waterways in the South China Sea over the past decade also kicked off a new period of hedging and balancing in Southeast Asia for the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and others. Beijing’s political rhetoric has heightened fears that war across the Taiwan Strait, and over the East China and South China Seas, is on the near horizon. But the rest of Asia is not standing still.
{"title":"A Distant Part of Asia","authors":"Luke A. Patey","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"For many of its Asian neighbors, China aspires to renew its historical role as regional hegemon. Beijing’s consistent attempts of economic coercion to shape the foreign and defense policy decision-making of its neighbors have pushed Asia’s middle powers to develop new security partnerships. As the respective wealthiest and the largest democracies, and the second and third largest economies in Asia, Japan and India stand out as a potential counterbalance to China’s assertiveness. South Korea and Australia are also reacting to pressures from China and looking to diversify their trade and investment and deepen regional cooperation in the face of Chinese pressure. China’s militarization of strategic waterways in the South China Sea over the past decade also kicked off a new period of hedging and balancing in Southeast Asia for the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and others. Beijing’s political rhetoric has heightened fears that war across the Taiwan Strait, and over the East China and South China Seas, is on the near horizon. But the rest of Asia is not standing still.","PeriodicalId":137286,"journal":{"name":"How China Loses","volume":"22 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114118705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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