Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10864415.2023.2226900
Margot Racat, D. Plotkina
ABSTRACT Haptics are innovative sensory-enabling technologies that can be used to improve consumers’ online shopping experiences. These technologies can be used in addition to other actual sensory stimulation, such as visual and auditory. However, little is known of how the addition of haptics affects consumers’ mobile shopping behavior. Therefore, this article examines the effect of the presence of haptic feedback (i.e., vibrations) when shopping on a retailer mobile app. Drawing on the results of three quantitative studies, the findings show that the presence of haptic feedback influences consumer behavior, but consumers’ perceptions modify the outcome, which is also moderated by individual need for touch. Moreover, the findings herein show a sequential mediating effect of psychological and affective variables on purchasing outcomes. These findings therefore stress the importance of considering haptics as a potential economic value for online shopping. Accordingly, we suggest that retailers should be more aware of their online sensory strategies and think about disclaimers and personalizing the consumer interface (e.g., turning off the haptic feedback).
{"title":"Sensory-enabling Technology in M-commerce: The Effect of Haptic Stimulation on Consumer Purchasing Behavior","authors":"Margot Racat, D. Plotkina","doi":"10.1080/10864415.2023.2226900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2023.2226900","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Haptics are innovative sensory-enabling technologies that can be used to improve consumers’ online shopping experiences. These technologies can be used in addition to other actual sensory stimulation, such as visual and auditory. However, little is known of how the addition of haptics affects consumers’ mobile shopping behavior. Therefore, this article examines the effect of the presence of haptic feedback (i.e., vibrations) when shopping on a retailer mobile app. Drawing on the results of three quantitative studies, the findings show that the presence of haptic feedback influences consumer behavior, but consumers’ perceptions modify the outcome, which is also moderated by individual need for touch. Moreover, the findings herein show a sequential mediating effect of psychological and affective variables on purchasing outcomes. These findings therefore stress the importance of considering haptics as a potential economic value for online shopping. Accordingly, we suggest that retailers should be more aware of their online sensory strategies and think about disclaimers and personalizing the consumer interface (e.g., turning off the haptic feedback).","PeriodicalId":13928,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Electronic Commerce","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48749113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10864415.2023.2226901
Shiu-li Huang, Yu-Min Zhao
ABSTRACT E-tailers often use different types of promotions to increase consumers’ willingness to buy. However, little research has been done to explore how to reduce inaction inertia caused by online promotions. Inaction inertia refers to the condition in which people who have missed a previously attractive opportunity are less likely to accept the current less attractive opportunity. This study explores how uncertainty, in combination with monetary and nonmonetary promotion types, impacts inaction inertia. The effect of the best possible outcome in an uncertain promotion is also examined. Two experiments are conducted in the context of online shopping to test the effects. The research findings can help e-tailers devise effective promotion strategies.
{"title":"How Uncertain Promotions Affect Inaction Inertia in an Online Retail Context","authors":"Shiu-li Huang, Yu-Min Zhao","doi":"10.1080/10864415.2023.2226901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2023.2226901","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT E-tailers often use different types of promotions to increase consumers’ willingness to buy. However, little research has been done to explore how to reduce inaction inertia caused by online promotions. Inaction inertia refers to the condition in which people who have missed a previously attractive opportunity are less likely to accept the current less attractive opportunity. This study explores how uncertainty, in combination with monetary and nonmonetary promotion types, impacts inaction inertia. The effect of the best possible outcome in an uncertain promotion is also examined. Two experiments are conducted in the context of online shopping to test the effects. The research findings can help e-tailers devise effective promotion strategies.","PeriodicalId":13928,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Electronic Commerce","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45243059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/10864415.2023.2184239
Jianghua Wu, Chenchen Zhao
ABSTRACT Online businesses have become an important sector of the retail industry, generating fierce competition with traditional offline retailers. In light of the growing online retail channels, we have designed a randomized pricing strategy for the online retailer, as the offline retailer’s price remains unchanged over an infinite period. This study compares two competing retailers’ pricing strategies, profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare, in two different scenarios—one in which the online retailer will implement a randomized pricing strategy, and one in which it will not. Conventional wisdom holds that online retailers possess greater flexibility when it comes to offering online promotions that attract more consumers to buy online at lower prices, negatively impacting offline retailers’ profits. Our model suggests that the randomized pricing can also benefit offline retailers and social welfare, but not consumer surplus. We also discuss how consumers’ strategic behavior affects retailers’ pricing strategies and profits. It has been suggested that online retailers should not consider offline transaction costs when formulating promotion probabilities. Finally, we consider cases in which an offline retailer can adjust its strategy. A price-matching policy can help the offline retailer significantly increase profits, but can also benefit the online retailer when consumers are very patient and the utility discount factor is sufficiently small. An offline retailer can benefit from adding an online store only when the offline transaction costs are sufficiently high.
{"title":"The Online Retailer’s Randomized Pricing Strategy to Compete With an Offline Retailer","authors":"Jianghua Wu, Chenchen Zhao","doi":"10.1080/10864415.2023.2184239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2023.2184239","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Online businesses have become an important sector of the retail industry, generating fierce competition with traditional offline retailers. In light of the growing online retail channels, we have designed a randomized pricing strategy for the online retailer, as the offline retailer’s price remains unchanged over an infinite period. This study compares two competing retailers’ pricing strategies, profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare, in two different scenarios—one in which the online retailer will implement a randomized pricing strategy, and one in which it will not. Conventional wisdom holds that online retailers possess greater flexibility when it comes to offering online promotions that attract more consumers to buy online at lower prices, negatively impacting offline retailers’ profits. Our model suggests that the randomized pricing can also benefit offline retailers and social welfare, but not consumer surplus. We also discuss how consumers’ strategic behavior affects retailers’ pricing strategies and profits. It has been suggested that online retailers should not consider offline transaction costs when formulating promotion probabilities. Finally, we consider cases in which an offline retailer can adjust its strategy. A price-matching policy can help the offline retailer significantly increase profits, but can also benefit the online retailer when consumers are very patient and the utility discount factor is sufficiently small. An offline retailer can benefit from adding an online store only when the offline transaction costs are sufficiently high.","PeriodicalId":13928,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Electronic Commerce","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45869799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/10864415.2023.2184237
Yue Liu, Minghui Jiang, Hang Wu
ABSTRACT We study a pervasive fraudulent strategy, called “brushing,” employed by retailers operating in e-commerce platforms: Retailers place fake orders of their own products to inflate sales and boost the visibility of their store links in search results. Using a duopolistic pricing game with heterogeneous consumer search behavior, we show that the retailer at a more prominent position in product listing enjoys greater profit as well as an advantage in future position allocation if the platform charges a per-sale commission fee and uses a sales-based ranking mechanism to display store-link positions. To fight for better visibility, retailers may employ brushing to boost their sales metrics. We characterize the equilibrium brushing behavior for the position competition game between the retailers. Under a sufficiently high commission rate, the game has a pure-strategy equilibrium and entails no-brushing outcome. Otherwise, retailers fully engage in brushing activity and the brushing equilibrium exists only in mixed strategies. Model extensions incorporating heterogeneities in wholesale cost and product quality show that retailers with cost and quality advantages are able to gain profit improvement at a less prominent position and thereby have less incentive to invest in brushing. Our results provide platform managers and retailers with economic insights to better understand the logic for brushing fraud and strategic decisions in online marketplaces.
{"title":"The Brushing Game in Online Marketplaces","authors":"Yue Liu, Minghui Jiang, Hang Wu","doi":"10.1080/10864415.2023.2184237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2023.2184237","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We study a pervasive fraudulent strategy, called “brushing,” employed by retailers operating in e-commerce platforms: Retailers place fake orders of their own products to inflate sales and boost the visibility of their store links in search results. Using a duopolistic pricing game with heterogeneous consumer search behavior, we show that the retailer at a more prominent position in product listing enjoys greater profit as well as an advantage in future position allocation if the platform charges a per-sale commission fee and uses a sales-based ranking mechanism to display store-link positions. To fight for better visibility, retailers may employ brushing to boost their sales metrics. We characterize the equilibrium brushing behavior for the position competition game between the retailers. Under a sufficiently high commission rate, the game has a pure-strategy equilibrium and entails no-brushing outcome. Otherwise, retailers fully engage in brushing activity and the brushing equilibrium exists only in mixed strategies. Model extensions incorporating heterogeneities in wholesale cost and product quality show that retailers with cost and quality advantages are able to gain profit improvement at a less prominent position and thereby have less incentive to invest in brushing. Our results provide platform managers and retailers with economic insights to better understand the logic for brushing fraud and strategic decisions in online marketplaces.","PeriodicalId":13928,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Electronic Commerce","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46374011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/10864415.2023.2184236
Vladimir Zwass
There are many faces of e-commerce fraud, all of them ugly. On second thought, with the arrival of “digital humans,” possibly as mimetic avatars playing on the target’s emotions, the faces can even be attractive—which is a part of the problem. The first article in this issue of IJEC deals with a fraud strategy enacted by dishonest online retailers and serving to inflate the actual sales volume in order to enhance the visibility of their firm by moving up its ranking and the listing position. Employing this fraud technique, called brushing, the retailer places fake orders to itself with the intent of being more readily found during a prospective customer’s search. The authors, Yue Liu, Minghui Jiang, and Hang Wu, build a game-theoretic model to show the economic outcomes of brushing in a competition between an honest and a brushing retailer on an e-commerce platform. The advantage of brushing hinges on the commission rate charged by the platform for a sale—and thus the fraudulent brushing strategy can be defeated. The authors' model surfaces the variety of contingencies and the level of platform-use charges that can help defeat brushing. Online reviews have brought forth a broad seam of research. These reviews are frequently a dialogue between the reviewing customer and the responding merchant. It has been long established that a skillful response to a service failure can serve the merchant well, even when confronting a significantly negative review. Yes, but do the responding merchants follow up on their promise of seeking redemption by action? Algorithms can determine from the future reviews whether the merchant’s response was made in good faith—or amounted to deception. Here, Xiaolin Li, Li Ma, Benjiang Lu, and Kexin Huang construct and exercise a novel indicator of consistency between a merchant’s words and deeds, as reflected in the follow-up reviews. The authors show both the obvious practical worth of such an index and the contribution to theory they make. Two subsequent articles in the issue address with formal modeling the always salient problem of pricing that underlies the market-making mechanisms. In the first article, Jianghua Wu and Chenchen Zhao focus on dynamic pricing, where online retailers have a seemingly incontrovertible advantage in the competition with the offline merchants. With randomized dynamic pricing, the consumers with a monetized higher valuation for the product would buy at a higher initial offering price, while others would wait for promotions. The authors present a pricing model comparing a set of outcomes for an online and offline retailers, or for an omni-channel retailer, in which the online sales feature a randomized pricing strategy. The results are directly applicable to the pricing strategies in dual-channel markets and push our knowledge forward. Co-creation of value by a firm and consumers is ever more exploited in the competitive marketplaces, where the companies are able to benefit from the explicit or
{"title":"Editor’s Introduction","authors":"Vladimir Zwass","doi":"10.1080/10864415.2023.2184236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2023.2184236","url":null,"abstract":"There are many faces of e-commerce fraud, all of them ugly. On second thought, with the arrival of “digital humans,” possibly as mimetic avatars playing on the target’s emotions, the faces can even be attractive—which is a part of the problem. The first article in this issue of IJEC deals with a fraud strategy enacted by dishonest online retailers and serving to inflate the actual sales volume in order to enhance the visibility of their firm by moving up its ranking and the listing position. Employing this fraud technique, called brushing, the retailer places fake orders to itself with the intent of being more readily found during a prospective customer’s search. The authors, Yue Liu, Minghui Jiang, and Hang Wu, build a game-theoretic model to show the economic outcomes of brushing in a competition between an honest and a brushing retailer on an e-commerce platform. The advantage of brushing hinges on the commission rate charged by the platform for a sale—and thus the fraudulent brushing strategy can be defeated. The authors' model surfaces the variety of contingencies and the level of platform-use charges that can help defeat brushing. Online reviews have brought forth a broad seam of research. These reviews are frequently a dialogue between the reviewing customer and the responding merchant. It has been long established that a skillful response to a service failure can serve the merchant well, even when confronting a significantly negative review. Yes, but do the responding merchants follow up on their promise of seeking redemption by action? Algorithms can determine from the future reviews whether the merchant’s response was made in good faith—or amounted to deception. Here, Xiaolin Li, Li Ma, Benjiang Lu, and Kexin Huang construct and exercise a novel indicator of consistency between a merchant’s words and deeds, as reflected in the follow-up reviews. The authors show both the obvious practical worth of such an index and the contribution to theory they make. Two subsequent articles in the issue address with formal modeling the always salient problem of pricing that underlies the market-making mechanisms. In the first article, Jianghua Wu and Chenchen Zhao focus on dynamic pricing, where online retailers have a seemingly incontrovertible advantage in the competition with the offline merchants. With randomized dynamic pricing, the consumers with a monetized higher valuation for the product would buy at a higher initial offering price, while others would wait for promotions. The authors present a pricing model comparing a set of outcomes for an online and offline retailers, or for an omni-channel retailer, in which the online sales feature a randomized pricing strategy. The results are directly applicable to the pricing strategies in dual-channel markets and push our knowledge forward. Co-creation of value by a firm and consumers is ever more exploited in the competitive marketplaces, where the companies are able to benefit from the explicit or ","PeriodicalId":13928,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Electronic Commerce","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49290812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/10864415.2023.2184240
Siyuan Zhu, Shaofu Du, Tengfei Nie, Yangguang Zhu
ABSTRACT Collaborative innovation, in which multiple companies try to incorporate content generated by consumers into new product development, is becoming increasingly popular. The fact that overconfidence usually increases with more data means that companies integrating large amounts of consumer-generated content in collaborative innovation have a strong tendency to be overconfident. We study the effects associated with overconfidence in collaborative innovation, where overconfidence is defined as a decision maker’s cognitive bias that leads to an overestimation of the precision of an uncertain event. In our collaborative innovation model, an online shopping platform collects and assimilates content (such as online reviews) generated by consumers to generate a product design and then sells that design to the manufacturer, after which the manufacturer produces a corresponding new product and sets a retail price. In this article, we mainly focus on how overconfidence impacts the product design strategy, pricing strategies, and decision makers’ equilibrium profit levels. We demonstrate that overconfidence can be a positive force for collaborative innovation and even lead to a win-win-win situation for the platform, manufacturer, and consumer. We show that overconfidence can make the platform change its product design strategy from aesthetic-oriented in the unbiased scenario to functionality-oriented in the biased scenario. Furthermore, we show that each of the two product design strategies has its own scope of application; neither is universally dominant.
{"title":"Product Pricing and Design Strategy in Platform-Based Collaborative Innovation With Cognitive Bias","authors":"Siyuan Zhu, Shaofu Du, Tengfei Nie, Yangguang Zhu","doi":"10.1080/10864415.2023.2184240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2023.2184240","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Collaborative innovation, in which multiple companies try to incorporate content generated by consumers into new product development, is becoming increasingly popular. The fact that overconfidence usually increases with more data means that companies integrating large amounts of consumer-generated content in collaborative innovation have a strong tendency to be overconfident. We study the effects associated with overconfidence in collaborative innovation, where overconfidence is defined as a decision maker’s cognitive bias that leads to an overestimation of the precision of an uncertain event. In our collaborative innovation model, an online shopping platform collects and assimilates content (such as online reviews) generated by consumers to generate a product design and then sells that design to the manufacturer, after which the manufacturer produces a corresponding new product and sets a retail price. In this article, we mainly focus on how overconfidence impacts the product design strategy, pricing strategies, and decision makers’ equilibrium profit levels. We demonstrate that overconfidence can be a positive force for collaborative innovation and even lead to a win-win-win situation for the platform, manufacturer, and consumer. We show that overconfidence can make the platform change its product design strategy from aesthetic-oriented in the unbiased scenario to functionality-oriented in the biased scenario. Furthermore, we show that each of the two product design strategies has its own scope of application; neither is universally dominant.","PeriodicalId":13928,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Electronic Commerce","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46700509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/10864415.2023.2184238
Xiaolin Li, Li Ma, Benjiang Lu, Kexin Huang
ABSTRACT Academia and industry widely believe that merchants’ customized response is an indispensable tool for handling online reviews, particularly negative reviews caused by service failures. However, whether merchants actually fulfill the promises they make in their responses remains unclear. On the basis of the literature on online reviews and service recovery, this study utilizes a series of textual features of online reviews and merchant responses via text analysis, including review topics, review sentiments, and response pertinence, to construct a novel indicator. This indicator, the consistency between merchants’ words and deeds (hereafter referred to as CWD), can be used to infer the degree of merchant response fulfillment. In particular, this study first proposes two indicators, namely, response and action levels, and then measures their difference to evaluate the CWD level of merchants. CWD can reflect the effort exerted by merchants to achieve service recovery. This study significantly contributes to the literature on service recovery and online reviews. The research findings derived from this study can help urge merchants to provide consumers with improved products and services. They can also be applied to the online ranking system to enhance platform fairness and protect the long-term interests of consumers and other stakeholders.
{"title":"Sincere or Falsehearted? Investigation of Online Reviews and Merchant Response","authors":"Xiaolin Li, Li Ma, Benjiang Lu, Kexin Huang","doi":"10.1080/10864415.2023.2184238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2023.2184238","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Academia and industry widely believe that merchants’ customized response is an indispensable tool for handling online reviews, particularly negative reviews caused by service failures. However, whether merchants actually fulfill the promises they make in their responses remains unclear. On the basis of the literature on online reviews and service recovery, this study utilizes a series of textual features of online reviews and merchant responses via text analysis, including review topics, review sentiments, and response pertinence, to construct a novel indicator. This indicator, the consistency between merchants’ words and deeds (hereafter referred to as CWD), can be used to infer the degree of merchant response fulfillment. In particular, this study first proposes two indicators, namely, response and action levels, and then measures their difference to evaluate the CWD level of merchants. CWD can reflect the effort exerted by merchants to achieve service recovery. This study significantly contributes to the literature on service recovery and online reviews. The research findings derived from this study can help urge merchants to provide consumers with improved products and services. They can also be applied to the online ranking system to enhance platform fairness and protect the long-term interests of consumers and other stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":13928,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Electronic Commerce","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46123015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/10864415.2023.2184241
B. Dan, Yu Tian, Xumei Zhang, Molin Liu, Songxuan Ma
ABSTRACT This article considers a fresh produce supply chain where the supplier provides freshness-keeping effort and the e-commerce platform owns private demand information. The supplier can choose to cooperate with the platform in reselling or agency selling mode, and the platform can choose whether to share information. Considering that demand is affected mainly by freshness and price, we model a multistage game and explore the supplier’s cooperation mode choice and the platform’s information sharing strategy. We reveal that the supplier should consider scale economics while investing in freshness-keeping resources. The platform should be cautious in setting the commission fee because she does not always benefit from the increased commission rate. We also show that the platform may benefit or suffer from information sharing, depending on the freshness sensitivity and the cooperation mode choice. As information sharing benefits responsive decision making, we reveal that the supplier may choose agency selling to induce information sharing even at a high commission rate. We also find that the interaction between cooperation mode selection and information sharing may lead to a win–win or lose–lose equilibrium strategy. Specifically, the supplier and the platform may achieve win–win cooperation under agency selling (reselling) at a low (high) commission rate. Then, to improve supply-chain performance, we design incentive contracts to motivate information sharing and adjust the cooperation mode choice. After the strategy adjustment, we find that the supplier may adopt a strategy of high quality with a low price under agency selling.
{"title":"Cooperation Mode Selection and Information Sharing in a Fresh Produce Supply Chain With Freshness-Keeping Effort","authors":"B. Dan, Yu Tian, Xumei Zhang, Molin Liu, Songxuan Ma","doi":"10.1080/10864415.2023.2184241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2023.2184241","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article considers a fresh produce supply chain where the supplier provides freshness-keeping effort and the e-commerce platform owns private demand information. The supplier can choose to cooperate with the platform in reselling or agency selling mode, and the platform can choose whether to share information. Considering that demand is affected mainly by freshness and price, we model a multistage game and explore the supplier’s cooperation mode choice and the platform’s information sharing strategy. We reveal that the supplier should consider scale economics while investing in freshness-keeping resources. The platform should be cautious in setting the commission fee because she does not always benefit from the increased commission rate. We also show that the platform may benefit or suffer from information sharing, depending on the freshness sensitivity and the cooperation mode choice. As information sharing benefits responsive decision making, we reveal that the supplier may choose agency selling to induce information sharing even at a high commission rate. We also find that the interaction between cooperation mode selection and information sharing may lead to a win–win or lose–lose equilibrium strategy. Specifically, the supplier and the platform may achieve win–win cooperation under agency selling (reselling) at a low (high) commission rate. Then, to improve supply-chain performance, we design incentive contracts to motivate information sharing and adjust the cooperation mode choice. After the strategy adjustment, we find that the supplier may adopt a strategy of high quality with a low price under agency selling.","PeriodicalId":13928,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Electronic Commerce","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47721303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10864415.2022.2158593
Vladimir Zwass
The collaboration between the human agency and algorithms takes various forms and is a subject of intensive research and development, leading largely toward the increasing replacement of the human decision making by algorithmic control. To what effect? Obviously, the question can be answered only in a more or less specific context, as contingencies abound. The authors of the opening article of this IJEC issue address the problem in the context of online advertising platforms. Such platforms are represented here by Google Ads, where the algorithmic decision making in ad allocation and pricing is progressively on the increase. In their survey-based research, the authors, Joni Salminen, Bernard J. Jansen, and Mekhail Mustak, find that this substitution is actually welcomed by the advertisers using the platform. The authors are able to identify three meaningful categories of human advertisers in their relationship with the platform automation. This categorization can be further generalized beyond the present setting, as the speed of decision making inexorably drives platforms toward the algorithmic approach. Big data analytics (BDA) have become common in addressing business problems at all levels of decision-making. Do they actually create value for the focal firms? The question is addressed empirically by Yuan Liu, Yuzhu Zheng, June Wei, and Yang Yang in the next work. The authors dichotomize BDA into two categories: Inside-out BDA focus on the internal organizational entities (e.g., products and processes), while the outside-in BDA bring in the data on the external entities (such as customers and suppliers). The authors base themselves theoretically in the knowledge-based view of the firm and perform a granular analysis of performance effects of the two different types of BDA on the firms with various levels of performance. This allows them to offer significantly novel results to the controversial question of the value-added of BDA. Online brand communities are an important means of co-creation of value by customers, binding the participants more tightly to a brand. Clearly, the more engaged customers (posters) play a greater role than the passive ones (known as lurkers). Yet the value of lurker participation is often unduly neglected. In their empirical research based a rich theoretical foundation, Sahar Mousavi and Stuart Roper show the differential value added by each type of community participants to the brand. The general message here is: Do not forget the lurkers! Based on their research, the authors offer actionable recommendations to the brands on the management of the relationships with the two types of value-generating participants of online brand communities. Two concluding articles present the results of formal modeling of online–offline supply chains under asymmetric information, characteristic of such ecosystems. Jianghua Wu, Yan Zong, and Xin Liu develop a model of cooperative advertising in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of
人类代理和算法之间的合作有多种形式，是一个深入研究和开发的主题，主要是由算法控制越来越多地取代人类决策。效果如何?显然，这个问题只能在或多或少特定的上下文中回答，因为有很多偶然性。这一期IJEC的开篇文章的作者在网络广告平台的背景下解决了这个问题。这些平台在这里以b谷歌Ads为代表，在广告分配和定价方面的算法决策正在逐步增加。在他们基于调查的研究中，作者Joni Salminen, Bernard J. Jansen和Mekhail Mustak发现，这种替代实际上受到使用该平台的广告商的欢迎。作者能够在他们与平台自动化的关系中识别出三种有意义的人类广告商类别。这种分类可以在目前的情况下进一步推广，因为决策的速度无情地推动着平台走向算法方法。大数据分析(BDA)在解决各级决策的业务问题方面已经变得很普遍。他们真的为重点公司创造了价值吗?在接下来的研究中，刘元、郑玉珠、魏君和杨阳对这个问题进行了实证研究。作者将业务数据分析分为两类:由内到外的业务数据分析侧重于内部组织实体(如产品和流程)，而由外到内的业务数据分析则引入外部实体(如客户和供应商)的数据。作者在理论上以企业的知识为基础，并对两种不同类型的BDA对不同绩效水平的企业的绩效影响进行了细致的分析。这使他们能够为有争议的BDA增值问题提供显著新颖的结果。在线品牌社区是客户共同创造价值的重要手段，将参与者与品牌更紧密地联系在一起。显然，更投入的客户(海报)比被动的客户(潜伏者)发挥更大的作用。然而，潜伏者参与的价值往往被过度忽视。在基于丰富理论基础的实证研究中，Sahar Mousavi和Stuart Roper展示了不同类型的社区参与者对品牌增加的差异价值。这里的一般信息是:不要忘记潜伏者!基于他们的研究，作者为品牌提供了可操作的建议，以管理与在线品牌社区的两种类型的价值创造参与者的关系。两篇结论性文章给出了信息不对称下的在线-离线供应链的形式化建模结果，这是这种生态系统的特征。吴江华、宗艳和刘鑫开发了一个双渠道供应链中的合作广告模型，该供应链由可以直接在线销售的制造商和零售商组成。制造商有动力为零售商的广告成本做出贡献，因为这种影响会溢出到整个品牌的销售。此外，该模型还考虑了零售商与制造商共享信息的影响，零售商至少在一定程度上有这样做的动机。《国际电子商务杂志》2023年第27卷第1期的核心内容是厂商-零售商信息共享的内部化。1,1 - 2 https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2022.2158593
{"title":"Editor’s Introduction","authors":"Vladimir Zwass","doi":"10.1080/10864415.2022.2158593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2022.2158593","url":null,"abstract":"The collaboration between the human agency and algorithms takes various forms and is a subject of intensive research and development, leading largely toward the increasing replacement of the human decision making by algorithmic control. To what effect? Obviously, the question can be answered only in a more or less specific context, as contingencies abound. The authors of the opening article of this IJEC issue address the problem in the context of online advertising platforms. Such platforms are represented here by Google Ads, where the algorithmic decision making in ad allocation and pricing is progressively on the increase. In their survey-based research, the authors, Joni Salminen, Bernard J. Jansen, and Mekhail Mustak, find that this substitution is actually welcomed by the advertisers using the platform. The authors are able to identify three meaningful categories of human advertisers in their relationship with the platform automation. This categorization can be further generalized beyond the present setting, as the speed of decision making inexorably drives platforms toward the algorithmic approach. Big data analytics (BDA) have become common in addressing business problems at all levels of decision-making. Do they actually create value for the focal firms? The question is addressed empirically by Yuan Liu, Yuzhu Zheng, June Wei, and Yang Yang in the next work. The authors dichotomize BDA into two categories: Inside-out BDA focus on the internal organizational entities (e.g., products and processes), while the outside-in BDA bring in the data on the external entities (such as customers and suppliers). The authors base themselves theoretically in the knowledge-based view of the firm and perform a granular analysis of performance effects of the two different types of BDA on the firms with various levels of performance. This allows them to offer significantly novel results to the controversial question of the value-added of BDA. Online brand communities are an important means of co-creation of value by customers, binding the participants more tightly to a brand. Clearly, the more engaged customers (posters) play a greater role than the passive ones (known as lurkers). Yet the value of lurker participation is often unduly neglected. In their empirical research based a rich theoretical foundation, Sahar Mousavi and Stuart Roper show the differential value added by each type of community participants to the brand. The general message here is: Do not forget the lurkers! Based on their research, the authors offer actionable recommendations to the brands on the management of the relationships with the two types of value-generating participants of online brand communities. Two concluding articles present the results of formal modeling of online–offline supply chains under asymmetric information, characteristic of such ecosystems. Jianghua Wu, Yan Zong, and Xin Liu develop a model of cooperative advertising in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of ","PeriodicalId":13928,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Electronic Commerce","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45987949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10864415.2022.2158597
Jianghua Wu, Yan Zong, Xin Liu
ABSTRACT This study investigates cooperative advertising and retailers’ demand- information sharing in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer sells products through a traditional retail channel and a direct online channel. Owing to the spillover effect of advertising, the manufacturer pays local advertising expenditure at a certain ratio to pump sales in both channels. In this setting, we examine the influence of information sharing on the optimal advertising expenditure, pricing mechanism, and performance of the manufacturer and retailer. The results show that the manufacturer benefits from information sharing, whereas the retailer benefits when the retail channel accounts for a small market share. Moreover, the more significant spillover effect of advertising increases the probability that the retailer shares information voluntarily. This study contributes to the literature by simultaneously considering information asymmetry and manufacturers’ advertising participation rate in the cooperative advertising problem. We find that a supplementary effect exists between cooperative advertising and information sharing, which provides guidelines to companies. If manufacturers set a higher advertising participation rate, the probability of signing an information-sharing contract with retailers increases. Moreover, retailers’ information sharing can induce manufacturers to offer a higher participation rate.
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