Pub Date : 2019-11-22DOI: 10.5040/9781509920969.ch-005
R. Moon
Religious beliefs/practices are excluded and insulated from political contest not because they are intrinsically valuable but instead because they are aspects of a collective or cultural identity and markers of membership in the collective. If the state’s duty to accommodate religious practices is about the status of religious groups rather than the liberty of individuals (a matter of equality rather than liberty) then it may not extend to practices that are idiosyncratic and have no link to a religious or cultural group/tradition. The requirement that the state should accommodate religious beliefs or practices (and sometimes compromise its policies) is most often justified as necessary to ensure that the individual’s deepest values and commitments and more generally his/her autonomy in decision- making are respected. I argue, however, that reasonable accommodation is better understood as a form of equality right that is based on the importance of community or group membership to the individual. Understood in this way, the accommodation requirement may not extend to an individual’s deeply held non-religious practices, if they are not part of a shared belief system. The willingness of the courts to protect certain non- religious practices (to require their accommodation by the state) may rest simply on their formal similarity to familiar religious practices such as pacifism or vegetarianism – that are specific in content, peremptory in force and that diverge from mainstream practices. Yet, as a practical matter, practices of this kind are seldom sustained outside a religious or cultural community. It is not an accident then that the very few instances of non-religious, ‘conscientious’, practices that have been accommodated are similar in content and structure to familiar religious practices, and indeed may have arisen from these religious practices.
{"title":"Conscience in the Image of Religion","authors":"R. Moon","doi":"10.5040/9781509920969.ch-005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509920969.ch-005","url":null,"abstract":"Religious beliefs/practices are excluded and insulated from political contest not because they are intrinsically valuable but instead because they are aspects of a collective or cultural identity and markers of membership in the collective. If the state’s duty to accommodate religious practices is about the status of religious groups rather than the liberty of individuals (a matter of equality rather than liberty) then it may not extend to practices that are idiosyncratic and have no link to a religious or cultural group/tradition. The requirement that the state should accommodate religious beliefs or practices (and sometimes compromise its policies) is most often justified as necessary to ensure that the individual’s deepest values and commitments and more generally his/her autonomy in decision- making are respected. I argue, however, that reasonable accommodation is better understood as a form of equality right that is based on the importance of community or group membership to the individual. Understood in this way, the accommodation requirement may not extend to an individual’s deeply held non-religious practices, if they are not part of a shared belief system. The willingness of the courts to protect certain non- religious practices (to require their accommodation by the state) may rest simply on their formal similarity to familiar religious practices such as pacifism or vegetarianism – that are specific in content, peremptory in force and that diverge from mainstream practices. Yet, as a practical matter, practices of this kind are seldom sustained outside a religious or cultural community. It is not an accident then that the very few instances of non-religious, ‘conscientious’, practices that have been accommodated are similar in content and structure to familiar religious practices, and indeed may have arisen from these religious practices.","PeriodicalId":154459,"journal":{"name":"Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131559459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-13DOI: 10.5040/9781509920969.ch-006
I. Leigh
{"title":"The Courts and Conscience Claims","authors":"I. Leigh","doi":"10.5040/9781509920969.ch-006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509920969.ch-006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":154459,"journal":{"name":"Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129388442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-13DOI: 10.5040/9781509920969.ch-008
Mary Neal
In recent years there has been a marked increase in academic interest in the phenomenon of conscientious objection (CO) in healthcare. The resulting literature, which is already substantial and continually expanding, reflects a spectrum of opinion on the practice ranging from support through mere toleration to barely disguised (and occasionally open) hostility. Despite some forceful academic opposition, however, most scholars who engage with the issue recognise the appropriateness of accommodating CO at least to some extent. The usual way of explaining why it is necessary and/or desirable to accommodate CO involves citing the need to protect individuals from being obliged to violate their moral integrity in the course of performing their professional roles. The meaning of ‘moral integrity’ is itself the subject of detailed philosophical debate, and is not my focus in this chapter: here, I presuppose that ‘a physician’s interest in moral integrity is a very important interest that has substantial moral weight’ and that the primary reason for accommodating and exercising CO is that we recognise the value of moral integrity and wish to respect and preserve it.
{"title":"Conscientious Objection, ‘Proper Medical Treatment’ and Professionalism: The Limits of Accommodation for Conscience in Healthcare","authors":"Mary Neal","doi":"10.5040/9781509920969.ch-008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509920969.ch-008","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years there has been a marked increase in academic interest in the phenomenon of conscientious objection (CO) in healthcare. The resulting literature, which is already substantial and continually expanding, reflects a spectrum of opinion on the practice ranging from support through mere toleration to barely disguised (and occasionally open) hostility. Despite some forceful academic opposition, however, most scholars who engage with the issue recognise the appropriateness of accommodating CO at least to some extent. The usual way of explaining why it is necessary and/or desirable to accommodate CO involves citing the need to protect individuals from being obliged to violate their moral integrity in the course of performing their professional roles. The meaning of ‘moral integrity’ is itself the subject of detailed philosophical debate, and is not my focus in this chapter: here, I presuppose that ‘a physician’s interest in moral integrity is a very important interest that has substantial moral weight’ and that the primary reason for accommodating and exercising CO is that we recognise the value of moral integrity and wish to respect and preserve it.","PeriodicalId":154459,"journal":{"name":"Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128713845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-13DOI: 10.5040/9781509920969.CH-013
J. Adenitire
{"title":"Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","authors":"J. Adenitire","doi":"10.5040/9781509920969.CH-013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509920969.CH-013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":154459,"journal":{"name":"Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128173717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5040/9781509920969.ch-003
Peter Jones
{"title":"Conscientious Claims, Ill-Founded Belief and Religious Exemption","authors":"Peter Jones","doi":"10.5040/9781509920969.ch-003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509920969.ch-003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":154459,"journal":{"name":"Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122975609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5040/9781509920969.ch-011
J. Adenitire, Y. Nehushtan
{"title":"Who Should Give Effect to Conscientious Exemptions? The Case for Institutional Synergy","authors":"J. Adenitire, Y. Nehushtan","doi":"10.5040/9781509920969.ch-011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509920969.ch-011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":154459,"journal":{"name":"Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132368706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5040/9781509920969.ch-004
Paul Billingham
. Liberal justifications of exemptions for religious groups appeal to the rights or interests of individuals. Individuals’ interests in freedom of religion and association are said to be served through religious groups being granted a level of autonomy from state control, which includes their enjoying exemptions from certain otherwise ap-plicable laws. All such justifications face a significant problem, how-ever, which is that religious groups invariably contain dissenters, who object to the group’s decisions, policies, or current exercise of an exemption. It is unclear how these internal dissenters’ interests are served by the group being granted exemptions. This chapter explores, and seeks to resolve, this problem. I show that three standard liberal responses—appealing to the religious groups’ own decision-making procedures, to implied consent, and to exit rights—contain important insights, but do not provide a satisfactory solution. I then argue that liberal political theory nonetheless has the resources to justify exemptions for religious groups in the face of internal dissent, by highlight-ing the way in which dissenters’ own interest in freedom of religion can be protected and promoted through religious group autonomy. This enables liberal theorists to justify internally contested exemptions for religious groups.
{"title":"Exemptions for Religious Groups and the Problem of Internal Dissent","authors":"Paul Billingham","doi":"10.5040/9781509920969.ch-004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509920969.ch-004","url":null,"abstract":". Liberal justifications of exemptions for religious groups appeal to the rights or interests of individuals. Individuals’ interests in freedom of religion and association are said to be served through religious groups being granted a level of autonomy from state control, which includes their enjoying exemptions from certain otherwise ap-plicable laws. All such justifications face a significant problem, how-ever, which is that religious groups invariably contain dissenters, who object to the group’s decisions, policies, or current exercise of an exemption. It is unclear how these internal dissenters’ interests are served by the group being granted exemptions. This chapter explores, and seeks to resolve, this problem. I show that three standard liberal responses—appealing to the religious groups’ own decision-making procedures, to implied consent, and to exit rights—contain important insights, but do not provide a satisfactory solution. I then argue that liberal political theory nonetheless has the resources to justify exemptions for religious groups in the face of internal dissent, by highlight-ing the way in which dissenters’ own interest in freedom of religion can be protected and promoted through religious group autonomy. This enables liberal theorists to justify internally contested exemptions for religious groups.","PeriodicalId":154459,"journal":{"name":"Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123385905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5040/9781509920969.CH-012
Frank Cranmer
{"title":"Can Secular Non-Natural Persons be Said to Have a ‘Conscience’?","authors":"Frank Cranmer","doi":"10.5040/9781509920969.CH-012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509920969.CH-012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":154459,"journal":{"name":"Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129478497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5040/9781509920969.CH-009
G. Chipeur, R. Clarke
{"title":"The Art of Living with Ourselves: What Does the Law Have to do with Conscience?","authors":"G. Chipeur, R. Clarke","doi":"10.5040/9781509920969.CH-009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509920969.CH-009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":154459,"journal":{"name":"Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122570690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.5040/9781509920969.ch-002
J. Corvino, J. Corvino, R. Anderson, S. Girgis
{"title":"Is Religion Special? Exemptions, Conscience and the Culture Wars","authors":"J. Corvino, J. Corvino, R. Anderson, S. Girgis","doi":"10.5040/9781509920969.ch-002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509920969.ch-002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":154459,"journal":{"name":"Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132641168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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