Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0006
J. Compton
This chapter tells the story of how J. Howard Pew and a band of conservative activists attempted to infiltrate the National Council of Churches with the aim of undermining religious support for the welfare state. As with many odd pairings, financial considerations helped bring the parties together. The courtship began when the NCC’s architects hatched the idea of a National Lay Committee—a body of prominent laymen and women that would help the Council keep its finger on the pulse of lay opinion while also boosting the Council’s budget. From Pew’s perspective, the Lay Committee offered a potential backdoor into the citadel of the Social Gospel. The NCC needed money, and he was willing and able to supply it. In return, he asked only that the Council cease issuing pronouncements in favor of government aid to the less fortunate and instead transform itself into a champion of the free-enterprise system. The plan sounded simple enough on paper, yet it ultimately failed to accomplish its principal objective of prompting the NCC to abandon its commitment to a robust social welfare state. And, perhaps surprisingly, it was a group of prominent business leaders, not the alleged communists in the ranks of the clergy, who led the opposition to Pew’s short-lived Lay Committee.
{"title":"Assaulting the Citadel","authors":"J. Compton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter tells the story of how J. Howard Pew and a band of conservative activists attempted to infiltrate the National Council of Churches with the aim of undermining religious support for the welfare state. As with many odd pairings, financial considerations helped bring the parties together. The courtship began when the NCC’s architects hatched the idea of a National Lay Committee—a body of prominent laymen and women that would help the Council keep its finger on the pulse of lay opinion while also boosting the Council’s budget. From Pew’s perspective, the Lay Committee offered a potential backdoor into the citadel of the Social Gospel. The NCC needed money, and he was willing and able to supply it. In return, he asked only that the Council cease issuing pronouncements in favor of government aid to the less fortunate and instead transform itself into a champion of the free-enterprise system. The plan sounded simple enough on paper, yet it ultimately failed to accomplish its principal objective of prompting the NCC to abandon its commitment to a robust social welfare state. And, perhaps surprisingly, it was a group of prominent business leaders, not the alleged communists in the ranks of the clergy, who led the opposition to Pew’s short-lived Lay Committee.","PeriodicalId":158837,"journal":{"name":"The End of Empathy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129491394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0003
J. Compton
This chapter examines how Protestant elites responded to the political and cultural turmoil of the 1920s. It argues that while the failure of prohibition and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan shattered Protestantism’s sense of unity, the mainline churches nonetheless emerged from the decade with their core ideals and institutions intact. The 1920s also witnessed the birth of several new ecumenical initiatives, including an extensive network of state and local church councils, that worked to direct believers’ energies toward urgent social problems. The church councils, in particular, would later play an important role in building support for New Deal-era economic programs and postwar civil rights reforms.
{"title":"The Brief Reign of Whirl","authors":"J. Compton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines how Protestant elites responded to the political and cultural turmoil of the 1920s. It argues that while the failure of prohibition and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan shattered Protestantism’s sense of unity, the mainline churches nonetheless emerged from the decade with their core ideals and institutions intact. The 1920s also witnessed the birth of several new ecumenical initiatives, including an extensive network of state and local church councils, that worked to direct believers’ energies toward urgent social problems. The church councils, in particular, would later play an important role in building support for New Deal-era economic programs and postwar civil rights reforms.","PeriodicalId":158837,"journal":{"name":"The End of Empathy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127619642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0004
J. Compton
This chapter shows how mainline Protestant religious leaders, often working in conjunction with Jewish and Catholic groups, were instrumental in building popular support for New Deal programs including unemployment insurance, the National Recovery Administration, and the Wagner Act. It shows that Protestant elites offered the Roosevelt administration a variety of tangible forms of assistance—from local educational sessions to letter-writing campaigns to “NRA Sundays”—that went well beyond their public expressions of support. Arguably the churches’ greatest contribution to the construction of the New Deal-era welfare state, however, was to serve as a bulwark against attacks from a growing cadre of proto-libertarian entities on the far right. So long as most Protestants attended mainline churches, and so long as mainline leaders were monolithic in their support of social welfare programs, claims that there was something un-American about redirecting resources to aid the downtrodden remained an exceedingly tough sell.
{"title":"The Churches Do Their Part","authors":"J. Compton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter shows how mainline Protestant religious leaders, often working in conjunction with Jewish and Catholic groups, were instrumental in building popular support for New Deal programs including unemployment insurance, the National Recovery Administration, and the Wagner Act. It shows that Protestant elites offered the Roosevelt administration a variety of tangible forms of assistance—from local educational sessions to letter-writing campaigns to “NRA Sundays”—that went well beyond their public expressions of support. Arguably the churches’ greatest contribution to the construction of the New Deal-era welfare state, however, was to serve as a bulwark against attacks from a growing cadre of proto-libertarian entities on the far right. So long as most Protestants attended mainline churches, and so long as mainline leaders were monolithic in their support of social welfare programs, claims that there was something un-American about redirecting resources to aid the downtrodden remained an exceedingly tough sell.","PeriodicalId":158837,"journal":{"name":"The End of Empathy","volume":"175 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125224899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0005
J. Compton
Covering the period from 1945 to 1960, this chapter examines a series of clergy education initiatives that attempted to build support for libertarian economic ideas. Launched by conservative activists and organizations, these programs sought to undermine clerical support for the New Deal–era welfare state, but they mostly ended in failure. With financial support from the wealthy oil executive J. Howard Pew, organizations like Spiritual Mobilization and the Christian Freedom Foundation spread the gospel of free enterprise using newsletters, radio broadcasts, and sermon contests. But polls funded by Pew himself found they had little impact on the political or economic views of rank-and-file ministers. The National Association of Manufacturers’ (NAM) clergy-industry program was marginally more successful, though its organizers were similarly disappointed at their inability to stoke clerical opposition to the New Deal/Fair Deal agenda. The chapter concludes with a series of observations on why Christian Libertarianism gained little traction with either ministers or lay people during the 1950s.
{"title":"The Battle for the Clergy","authors":"J. Compton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Covering the period from 1945 to 1960, this chapter examines a series of clergy education initiatives that attempted to build support for libertarian economic ideas. Launched by conservative activists and organizations, these programs sought to undermine clerical support for the New Deal–era welfare state, but they mostly ended in failure. With financial support from the wealthy oil executive J. Howard Pew, organizations like Spiritual Mobilization and the Christian Freedom Foundation spread the gospel of free enterprise using newsletters, radio broadcasts, and sermon contests. But polls funded by Pew himself found they had little impact on the political or economic views of rank-and-file ministers. The National Association of Manufacturers’ (NAM) clergy-industry program was marginally more successful, though its organizers were similarly disappointed at their inability to stoke clerical opposition to the New Deal/Fair Deal agenda. The chapter concludes with a series of observations on why Christian Libertarianism gained little traction with either ministers or lay people during the 1950s.","PeriodicalId":158837,"journal":{"name":"The End of Empathy","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133143963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0002
J. Compton
This chapter examines the social and theological underpinnings of the large Protestant membership groups that helped build support for major Progressive Era reforms, including child labor restrictions, maternal health programs, and prohibition. It argues that the three factors were particularly important in motivating progressive religious activism in the early twentieth century. The first was the revival of a strand of Protestant social thought that stretched back to the Puritans—a prophetic tradition built on the interconnected ideas of stewardship, providential duty, and collective accountability for sin. The second was the sect dynamic observed by the sociologist Max Weber during his early twentieth-century visit to the United States—a social dynamic that incentivized upwardly mobile citizens to seek membership in Protestant churches and membership groups while also endowing church and group leaders with considerable influence over the beliefs and behaviors of their members. The third was the rise of an ecumenical infrastructure that promoted cooperation between elite reformers and average citizens, and also between believers of different social and denominational backgrounds.
{"title":"The Road to Armageddon","authors":"J. Compton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the social and theological underpinnings of the large Protestant membership groups that helped build support for major Progressive Era reforms, including child labor restrictions, maternal health programs, and prohibition. It argues that the three factors were particularly important in motivating progressive religious activism in the early twentieth century. The first was the revival of a strand of Protestant social thought that stretched back to the Puritans—a prophetic tradition built on the interconnected ideas of stewardship, providential duty, and collective accountability for sin. The second was the sect dynamic observed by the sociologist Max Weber during his early twentieth-century visit to the United States—a social dynamic that incentivized upwardly mobile citizens to seek membership in Protestant churches and membership groups while also endowing church and group leaders with considerable influence over the beliefs and behaviors of their members. The third was the rise of an ecumenical infrastructure that promoted cooperation between elite reformers and average citizens, and also between believers of different social and denominational backgrounds.","PeriodicalId":158837,"journal":{"name":"The End of Empathy","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128239159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0012
J. Compton
Many present-day Protestant congregations are deeply involved in humanitarian projects—from feeding the homeless to promoting interracial and interfaith understanding. Yet when it comes to political behavior, white evangelicals remain overwhelmingly opposed to programs that benefit the less fortunate, or that run counter to the free market ethos of the modern Republican party. During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, a trio of failed reform campaigns by evangliecal elites—targeting climate change, foreign aid, and immigration, respectively—underscored the fragile nature of evangelical religious authority. In contrast to their postwar predecessors in the Protestant mainline, evangelical elites possess neither the intrinsic religious authority nor the institutional resources necessary to shape the political convictions of their followers. Instead, they serve at the pleasure of the rank and file.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"J. Compton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"Many present-day Protestant congregations are deeply involved in humanitarian projects—from feeding the homeless to promoting interracial and interfaith understanding. Yet when it comes to political behavior, white evangelicals remain overwhelmingly opposed to programs that benefit the less fortunate, or that run counter to the free market ethos of the modern Republican party. During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, a trio of failed reform campaigns by evangliecal elites—targeting climate change, foreign aid, and immigration, respectively—underscored the fragile nature of evangelical religious authority. In contrast to their postwar predecessors in the Protestant mainline, evangelical elites possess neither the intrinsic religious authority nor the institutional resources necessary to shape the political convictions of their followers. Instead, they serve at the pleasure of the rank and file.","PeriodicalId":158837,"journal":{"name":"The End of Empathy","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134104016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0011
J. Compton
This chapter examines the fate of liberal and moderate evangelicals from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s. It argues that moderate evangelicals—an ascendant force in the 1970s—were marginalized less by the rise of so-called “values” issues than by economic anxieties and a broader white reaction against federal civil rights initiatives. That white evangelicals drifted to the political Right for essentially secular reasons—and often in the face of counterpressures from prominent evangelical leaders and institutions—provides further confirmation of religion’s limited ability to shape political behavior in an age of religious autonomy. In short, it is the weakness of evangelical institutions, not their strength, that best explains why the term “conservative evangelical” has come to seem redundant.
{"title":"Why the Prophetic Torch Wasn’t Passed","authors":"J. Compton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the fate of liberal and moderate evangelicals from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s. It argues that moderate evangelicals—an ascendant force in the 1970s—were marginalized less by the rise of so-called “values” issues than by economic anxieties and a broader white reaction against federal civil rights initiatives. That white evangelicals drifted to the political Right for essentially secular reasons—and often in the face of counterpressures from prominent evangelical leaders and institutions—provides further confirmation of religion’s limited ability to shape political behavior in an age of religious autonomy. In short, it is the weakness of evangelical institutions, not their strength, that best explains why the term “conservative evangelical” has come to seem redundant.","PeriodicalId":158837,"journal":{"name":"The End of Empathy","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132187318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0008
J. Compton
This chapter examines the role of mainline Protestant religious leaders in building support for the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Using both archival evidence and public opinion data, it argues that church-based educational campaigns played an important role in the law’s passage. Although the general arc of the story will be familiar from prior histories of the Civil Rights Act, the focus here is on religious authority and its role in shaping the views and actions of average believers. With that in mind, the chapter concludes with a section in which data from the 1964 American National Election Study (ANES) is used to test whether church involvement affected white Protestants’ views concerning the Civil Rights Act. The public opinion data confirm the picture that emerges from the archival record—namely, that the churches’ educational efforts were, in fact, a critical factor in building northern white support for a meaningful civil rights bill.
{"title":"The Last Hurrah","authors":"J. Compton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the role of mainline Protestant religious leaders in building support for the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Using both archival evidence and public opinion data, it argues that church-based educational campaigns played an important role in the law’s passage. Although the general arc of the story will be familiar from prior histories of the Civil Rights Act, the focus here is on religious authority and its role in shaping the views and actions of average believers. With that in mind, the chapter concludes with a section in which data from the 1964 American National Election Study (ANES) is used to test whether church involvement affected white Protestants’ views concerning the Civil Rights Act. The public opinion data confirm the picture that emerges from the archival record—namely, that the churches’ educational efforts were, in fact, a critical factor in building northern white support for a meaningful civil rights bill.","PeriodicalId":158837,"journal":{"name":"The End of Empathy","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116409953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0007
J. Compton
This chapter examines the founding and rise to prominence of Christianity Today, the most important religious magazine of the 1960s and 1970s. It details the magazine’s founding by the revivalist Billy Graham and his father-in-law L. Nelson Bell, both of whom envisioned a periodical that would target ministers with a mix of theological content and conservative political commentary. With financial backing from J. Howard Pew and long list of conservative businessmen, the magazine soon outpaced its liberal rivals; and under the editorial guidance of Carl Henry, a noted theologian, it developed a novel critique of mainline religious authority that may well have exacerbated the divide between mainline elites and average churchgoers. Yet Henry’s insistence that evangelicals were obligated take notice of social problems such as racial discrimination ultimately created an inbridgable rift between the magazine’s editor and its financial backers, and in 1967 Henry was forced to relinquish his post.
本章考察了《今日基督教》的创立和崛起，这是20世纪60年代和70年代最重要的宗教杂志。书中详细介绍了该杂志由复兴派牧师葛培理(Billy Graham)和他的岳父l·纳尔逊·贝尔(L. Nelson Bell)创办，两人都设想创办一份针对牧师的期刊，内容既有神学内容，也有保守的政治评论。在j·霍华德·皮尤(J. Howard Pew)和一长串保守派商人的资金支持下，该杂志很快超越了自由派对手;在著名神学家卡尔·亨利(Carl Henry)的编辑指导下，它对主流宗教权威提出了一种新颖的批评，这种批评很可能加剧了主流精英和普通信徒之间的分歧。然而，亨利坚持认为福音派教徒有义务关注种族歧视等社会问题，最终在杂志编辑和其财务支持者之间造成了不可弥合的裂痕，1967年亨利被迫辞去了他的职位。
{"title":"Inventing the Old-Time Religion","authors":"J. Compton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the founding and rise to prominence of Christianity Today, the most important religious magazine of the 1960s and 1970s. It details the magazine’s founding by the revivalist Billy Graham and his father-in-law L. Nelson Bell, both of whom envisioned a periodical that would target ministers with a mix of theological content and conservative political commentary. With financial backing from J. Howard Pew and long list of conservative businessmen, the magazine soon outpaced its liberal rivals; and under the editorial guidance of Carl Henry, a noted theologian, it developed a novel critique of mainline religious authority that may well have exacerbated the divide between mainline elites and average churchgoers. Yet Henry’s insistence that evangelicals were obligated take notice of social problems such as racial discrimination ultimately created an inbridgable rift between the magazine’s editor and its financial backers, and in 1967 Henry was forced to relinquish his post.","PeriodicalId":158837,"journal":{"name":"The End of Empathy","volume":"215 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132734888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0009
J. Compton
This chapter examines some of the forces that led to the decline of mainline Protestant religious authority in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, it argues that the waning of religious authority during these decades liberated upwardly mobile white Americans to follow their own inclinations and interests, not only in their personal lives but also in their thinking about politics and society. And it was at precisely this point that many of them developed a sudden affinity for the extreme libertarian view that the use of state power to correct systemic injustice or redirect resources to the less fortunate was fundamentally illegitimate. The chapter concludes with an account of mainline Protestant leaders’ failed campaign to defeat Proposition 14, a 1964 ballot measure that repealed California’s fair housing law.
{"title":"Revolt in the Suburbs","authors":"J. Compton","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190069186.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines some of the forces that led to the decline of mainline Protestant religious authority in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, it argues that the waning of religious authority during these decades liberated upwardly mobile white Americans to follow their own inclinations and interests, not only in their personal lives but also in their thinking about politics and society. And it was at precisely this point that many of them developed a sudden affinity for the extreme libertarian view that the use of state power to correct systemic injustice or redirect resources to the less fortunate was fundamentally illegitimate. The chapter concludes with an account of mainline Protestant leaders’ failed campaign to defeat Proposition 14, a 1964 ballot measure that repealed California’s fair housing law.","PeriodicalId":158837,"journal":{"name":"The End of Empathy","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133172530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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