Facing used apparel collection and social donation under government regulations (i.e., carbon tax policy or cap-and-trade policy), this study investigates whether the responsibility should lie with the manufacturer or a third-party platform. Our study indicates that the traditional closed-loop supply chain fails to achieve 'Social Donation'. The findings of this study reveal that both the unit value of recycled products by the manufacturer and the unit value of charitable donations play significant roles in promoting the recycling of used apparel. And the study shows that when the carbon tax rate increases, it diminishes the benefits of supply chain members. On the other hand, when the carbon trading price increases, it reduces the benefits of third-party platforms but enhances the benefits of manufacturers within the carbon quotas while decreasing the benefits beyond the carbon quotas. In addition, this study conducts an analytical examination to determine the optimal used apparel recycling strategy under government regulations mechanism from the perspectives of economic benefit, environmental benefit, social donation contribution and customer surplus. Furthermore, the study reveals that the company's preference for the carbon tax policy only when the carbon quota is small and identifies that under cap-and-trade regulations, the recycling strategy adopted by the manufacturer yields the highest benefits for the government. Significantly, the study highlights that the most effective approach to reducing carbon emissions and promoting social donation is through the implementation of a circular economy, this entails elevating recycling levels, placing emphasis on remanufacturing, and reducing the production of new products.
{"title":"The optimal recycle mechanism for used apparel considering social donation under government carbon regulations","authors":"Zhi-Tang Li, Cui-Hua Zhang, Ru-Xia Lyu","doi":"10.3934/jimo.2023123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2023123","url":null,"abstract":"Facing used apparel collection and social donation under government regulations (i.e., carbon tax policy or cap-and-trade policy), this study investigates whether the responsibility should lie with the manufacturer or a third-party platform. Our study indicates that the traditional closed-loop supply chain fails to achieve 'Social Donation'. The findings of this study reveal that both the unit value of recycled products by the manufacturer and the unit value of charitable donations play significant roles in promoting the recycling of used apparel. And the study shows that when the carbon tax rate increases, it diminishes the benefits of supply chain members. On the other hand, when the carbon trading price increases, it reduces the benefits of third-party platforms but enhances the benefits of manufacturers within the carbon quotas while decreasing the benefits beyond the carbon quotas. In addition, this study conducts an analytical examination to determine the optimal used apparel recycling strategy under government regulations mechanism from the perspectives of economic benefit, environmental benefit, social donation contribution and customer surplus. Furthermore, the study reveals that the company's preference for the carbon tax policy only when the carbon quota is small and identifies that under cap-and-trade regulations, the recycling strategy adopted by the manufacturer yields the highest benefits for the government. Significantly, the study highlights that the most effective approach to reducing carbon emissions and promoting social donation is through the implementation of a circular economy, this entails elevating recycling levels, placing emphasis on remanufacturing, and reducing the production of new products.","PeriodicalId":16022,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135599902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fei Yan, Hong-Zhuan Chen, Teng-Jiao Li, Abdul Waheed Siyal
Transferring the using right of the dual-use defense technology in China is that the military licensors license the dual-use defense technology to two or more civilian manufacturers which are usually the military licensor's shareholding manufacturers. We study a military research institute's discriminatory licensing pricing strategies when the civilian licensees are asymmetric with different allocative efficiencies under a military shareholding contract. We show that, (ⅰ) the discriminatory licensing pricing strategy can increase the overall profits of the military research institute and the civilian manufacturers by realizing the civilian-military integration; (ⅱ) the military licensor will charge a higher royalty to the efficient civilian manufacturer when the military licensor holds a significantly higher shareholding equity to the inefficient manufacturer than the efficient civilian manufacturer, or when the military licensor holds a slightly higher shareholding equity to the inefficient manufacturer than the efficient civilian manufacturer and the market competition is fierce, which decreases the social allocative efficiency, otherwise, the military licensor will charge a lower royalty to the efficient civilian manufacturer, which improves the social allocative efficiency. Moreover, we show that the military licensor's shareholding equities have a more significant impact on the discriminatory licensing pricing strategy and the social allocative efficiency than the market competition intensity; (ⅲ) the military shareholding contract provides a rational explanation for the sustainability of the discriminatory licensing pricing contract, and the military research institute can reduce the licensing pricing gap by adjusting the shareholding equity ratio to the efficient manufacturer to avoid violating the 'Anti-monopoly' Laws.
{"title":"Licensing pricing discrimination and allocative efficiency about the Chinese dual-use defense technology under a military shareholding contract","authors":"Fei Yan, Hong-Zhuan Chen, Teng-Jiao Li, Abdul Waheed Siyal","doi":"10.3934/jimo.2023115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2023115","url":null,"abstract":"Transferring the using right of the dual-use defense technology in China is that the military licensors license the dual-use defense technology to two or more civilian manufacturers which are usually the military licensor's shareholding manufacturers. We study a military research institute's discriminatory licensing pricing strategies when the civilian licensees are asymmetric with different allocative efficiencies under a military shareholding contract. We show that, (ⅰ) the discriminatory licensing pricing strategy can increase the overall profits of the military research institute and the civilian manufacturers by realizing the civilian-military integration; (ⅱ) the military licensor will charge a higher royalty to the efficient civilian manufacturer when the military licensor holds a significantly higher shareholding equity to the inefficient manufacturer than the efficient civilian manufacturer, or when the military licensor holds a slightly higher shareholding equity to the inefficient manufacturer than the efficient civilian manufacturer and the market competition is fierce, which decreases the social allocative efficiency, otherwise, the military licensor will charge a lower royalty to the efficient civilian manufacturer, which improves the social allocative efficiency. Moreover, we show that the military licensor's shareholding equities have a more significant impact on the discriminatory licensing pricing strategy and the social allocative efficiency than the market competition intensity; (ⅲ) the military shareholding contract provides a rational explanation for the sustainability of the discriminatory licensing pricing contract, and the military research institute can reduce the licensing pricing gap by adjusting the shareholding equity ratio to the efficient manufacturer to avoid violating the 'Anti-monopoly' Laws.","PeriodicalId":16022,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135555715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Online trade-ins are becoming a booming business for B2C platforms. A B2C platform usually pays the trade-in rebate by gift card, which can be used in both self-operated and third-party stores (WP) or can only be used in self-operated stores (SR). The recycling models of B2C platforms also vary. To address the decision-making issues B2C and Internet recycling platforms, this paper considers four models: Model BWP, Model BSR(i.e., the B2C platform recycling itself and using WP or SR to pay the trade-in rebate), Model TWP and Model TSR(i.e., the B2C platform collaborating with an Internet recycling platform and using WP or SR to pay the trade-in rebate).The results imply that the B2C platform's optimal trade-in payment method depends on the utility discount rate in the SR model and the commission rate charged by the B2C platform. We also find that if the commission rate is above a given threshold, the optimal trade-in effort level in the WP model is higher than that in the SR model and the B2C platform should offer a higher subsidy in Model TWP than in Model TSR. Moreover, the proportion of the trade-in cost shared by the Internet recycling platform becomes an essential factor in the selection of the recycling model and the optimal effort level under different recycling models. We ultimately find that the recycling platform should collaborate with a B2C platform that pays the trade-in rebate by WP and offer a lower trade-in rebate if the commission rate is very high.
{"title":"Optimal trade-in rebate payment strategies for B2C platforms under different recycling models","authors":"Huayi Li, Yuyin Yi","doi":"10.3934/jimo.2023129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2023129","url":null,"abstract":"Online trade-ins are becoming a booming business for B2C platforms. A B2C platform usually pays the trade-in rebate by gift card, which can be used in both self-operated and third-party stores (WP) or can only be used in self-operated stores (SR). The recycling models of B2C platforms also vary. To address the decision-making issues B2C and Internet recycling platforms, this paper considers four models: Model BWP, Model BSR(i.e., the B2C platform recycling itself and using WP or SR to pay the trade-in rebate), Model TWP and Model TSR(i.e., the B2C platform collaborating with an Internet recycling platform and using WP or SR to pay the trade-in rebate).The results imply that the B2C platform's optimal trade-in payment method depends on the utility discount rate in the SR model and the commission rate charged by the B2C platform. We also find that if the commission rate is above a given threshold, the optimal trade-in effort level in the WP model is higher than that in the SR model and the B2C platform should offer a higher subsidy in Model TWP than in Model TSR. Moreover, the proportion of the trade-in cost shared by the Internet recycling platform becomes an essential factor in the selection of the recycling model and the optimal effort level under different recycling models. We ultimately find that the recycling platform should collaborate with a B2C platform that pays the trade-in rebate by WP and offer a lower trade-in rebate if the commission rate is very high.","PeriodicalId":16022,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization","volume":"281 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135754828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Robust optimal investment strategy for a DC pension plan in the market with mispricing and constant elasticity of variance","authors":"Jin-Tu Sun, H. Yao, Zhongfei Li","doi":"10.3934/jimo.2023008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2023008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":16022,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70078245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cong Li, Mingkai Xu, Jie Yang, Yiheng Yao, Shuying Wang, Xiang Gao, Shuai Shao, Xianda Chen, Xiaojing Zheng, Yibin Liu
{"title":"A unifying review of edge intelligent computing technique applications in the field of energy networks","authors":"Cong Li, Mingkai Xu, Jie Yang, Yiheng Yao, Shuying Wang, Xiang Gao, Shuai Shao, Xianda Chen, Xiaojing Zheng, Yibin Liu","doi":"10.3934/jimo.2023027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2023027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":16022,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70078922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Developing a symbiotic relationship between recyclers and manufacturers: An evolutionary game perspective","authors":"","doi":"10.3934/jimo.2023043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2023043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":16022,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70079110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"New pseudo polynomial algorithms for a partial resource-constrained project scheduling problem","authors":"Han-ying Wei, Zhixiong Su, Jian-xun Qi","doi":"10.3934/jimo.2023038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2023038","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":16022,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70079499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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