Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.21140/MCUJ.20201102009
Matthew Ludlow
Abstract:Much has been written of renewed great power competition and the characteristics of a potential armed conflict with the People’s Republic of China. This article surveys the strategic environment and the features of the current military strategies, detailing how such a conflict might be waged. In preparation for a potential conflict with China in which defense of the first island chain is required, the Joint force, and in particular the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, have invested heavily in technology intended for amphibious expeditionary operations. However, most of the investment has centered on intricate and expensive aviation technology. Meanwhile, surface expeditionary technology has continued to age and now significantly lags its aviation counterparts such as the MV-22 Osprey and Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. As a result, a strategic gap in capabilities has emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy.
{"title":"Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals","authors":"Matthew Ludlow","doi":"10.21140/MCUJ.20201102009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21140/MCUJ.20201102009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Much has been written of renewed great power competition and the characteristics of a potential armed conflict with the People’s Republic of China. This article surveys the strategic environment and the features of the current military strategies, detailing how such a conflict might be waged. In preparation for a potential conflict with China in which defense of the first island chain is required, the Joint force, and in particular the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, have invested heavily in technology intended for amphibious expeditionary operations. However, most of the investment has centered on intricate and expensive aviation technology. Meanwhile, surface expeditionary technology has continued to age and now significantly lags its aviation counterparts such as the MV-22 Osprey and Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. As a result, a strategic gap in capabilities has emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy.","PeriodicalId":168300,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Advanced Military Studies","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114644077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.21140/MCUJ.20201102001
Matthew J. Flynn
Abstract:This article parallels the U.S. Marine Corps’ purpose of achieving naval integration with that of the British success in defeating Napoleonic France. The historical context emphasizes the need to ensure that naval integration seeks a unity of the operational art and resists an inclination to bow to operational art as distinct in each domain. Britain’s ability to marshal this response via all instruments of national power proved a key determinant of success that is worth emulating today.
{"title":"The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration","authors":"Matthew J. Flynn","doi":"10.21140/MCUJ.20201102001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21140/MCUJ.20201102001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article parallels the U.S. Marine Corps’ purpose of achieving naval integration with that of the British success in defeating Napoleonic France. The historical context emphasizes the need to ensure that naval integration seeks a unity of the operational art and resists an inclination to bow to operational art as distinct in each domain. Britain’s ability to marshal this response via all instruments of national power proved a key determinant of success that is worth emulating today.","PeriodicalId":168300,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Advanced Military Studies","volume":"229 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122084503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.21140/MCUJ.20201102008
S. Yeadon
Abstract:There are calls by some experts to accept that an amphibious assault of coastline is simply too risky to attempt due to current threats. So, what are the challenges facing amphibious assaults? Is the amphibious assault still a viable type of military operation in the current threat environment? These questions are at the heart of the mission and role of the United States Marine Corps. This analysis delves deep into the problems facing amphibious assaults, and it serves as a primer for future discussions pertaining to improving amphibious assault capabilities.
{"title":"The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assaults","authors":"S. Yeadon","doi":"10.21140/MCUJ.20201102008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21140/MCUJ.20201102008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:There are calls by some experts to accept that an amphibious assault of coastline is simply too risky to attempt due to current threats. So, what are the challenges facing amphibious assaults? Is the amphibious assault still a viable type of military operation in the current threat environment? These questions are at the heart of the mission and role of the United States Marine Corps. This analysis delves deep into the problems facing amphibious assaults, and it serves as a primer for future discussions pertaining to improving amphibious assault capabilities.","PeriodicalId":168300,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Advanced Military Studies","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115011097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.21140/MCUJ.20201102006
J. Kuehn
Abstract:This article argues that American naval force packages built around aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships no longer serve maritime security interests as effectively as in the past. It further claims that the current commitment in the published maritime strategy of the United States to the twin shibboleths of “carriers and amphibs” comes from a variety of attitudes held by senior decision makers and military leaders. This commitment betrays both cultural misunderstanding or even ignorance of seapower—“sea blindness”—as well as less than rational attachments to two operational capabilities that served the United States well in the past, but in doing so engendered emotional commitments that are little grounded in the facts.
{"title":"Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power","authors":"J. Kuehn","doi":"10.21140/MCUJ.20201102006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21140/MCUJ.20201102006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article argues that American naval force packages built around aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships no longer serve maritime security interests as effectively as in the past. It further claims that the current commitment in the published maritime strategy of the United States to the twin shibboleths of “carriers and amphibs” comes from a variety of attitudes held by senior decision makers and military leaders. This commitment betrays both cultural misunderstanding or even ignorance of seapower—“sea blindness”—as well as less than rational attachments to two operational capabilities that served the United States well in the past, but in doing so engendered emotional commitments that are little grounded in the facts.","PeriodicalId":168300,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Advanced Military Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129858501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Force Design 2030 describes major organizational changes to the U.S. Marine Corps. Arguably, these changes will affect the Joint force, allies, and partners. The United States, and in particular the Marine Corps, is an important part of the deterrence and defense of many countries, especially Norway. Thus, the Norwegian Armed Forces should adapt to these changes to increase interoperability and strengthen the common warfighting capability. A comprehensive implementation plan, including allies and partners to operationalize the changes in the Marine Corps as well as the new U.S. Service and Joint concepts, is needed to succeed in creating an advantage over China and Russia.
{"title":"Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway","authors":"Lieutenant Colonel Terje Bruøygard, Lieutenant Colonel Jørn Qviller","doi":"10.21140/MCUJ.20201102010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21140/MCUJ.20201102010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Force Design 2030 describes major organizational changes to the U.S. Marine Corps. Arguably, these changes will affect the Joint force, allies, and partners. The United States, and in particular the Marine Corps, is an important part of the deterrence and defense of many countries, especially Norway. Thus, the Norwegian Armed Forces should adapt to these changes to increase interoperability and strengthen the common warfighting capability. A comprehensive implementation plan, including allies and partners to operationalize the changes in the Marine Corps as well as the new U.S. Service and Joint concepts, is needed to succeed in creating an advantage over China and Russia.","PeriodicalId":168300,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Advanced Military Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134584106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.21140/MCUJ.20201102004
Colonel Scott Erdelatz, Colonel J. D. Canty, Colonel Mark Desens, Captain Chris Senenko
Abstract:Current debates on naval integration mostly focus on whether the naval Services’ warfighting concepts are on target—the why of naval integration—or whether integration efforts are jeopardizing the Marine Corps’ ability to fulfill longstanding roles and missions. An underappreciated aspect of this topic is the process, or the how, of naval integration. The actions of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps during the interwar period are a positive example of naval integration and indicative of the long-term effects that can follow. Many current developments, in particular the growing partnership of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and fleet commands, are examples of effective naval integration and will help ensure that the Services arrive at the proper end state.
{"title":"Naval Integration: An Old Approach for a New Era","authors":"Colonel Scott Erdelatz, Colonel J. D. Canty, Colonel Mark Desens, Captain Chris Senenko","doi":"10.21140/MCUJ.20201102004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21140/MCUJ.20201102004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Current debates on naval integration mostly focus on whether the naval Services’ warfighting concepts are on target—the why of naval integration—or whether integration efforts are jeopardizing the Marine Corps’ ability to fulfill longstanding roles and missions. An underappreciated aspect of this topic is the process, or the how, of naval integration. The actions of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps during the interwar period are a positive example of naval integration and indicative of the long-term effects that can follow. Many current developments, in particular the growing partnership of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and fleet commands, are examples of effective naval integration and will help ensure that the Services arrive at the proper end state.","PeriodicalId":168300,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Advanced Military Studies","volume":"794 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123740930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.21140/MCUJ.20201102007
Major B. A. Friedman
Abstract:General David H. Berger’s tenure as Commandant of the Marine Corps has set the stage for drastic change toward a Marine Corps more focused on maritime operations. The Commandant has called on these changes to be concept driven and capabilities tested, driving experimentation, wargaming, analysis, research and development, and acquisitions. The Marine Corps is pursuing or developing a number of concepts but lacks an overarching concept that provides context and coherence for conceptual exploration. The author proposes advanced force operations, a concept designed to be broad enough to link together modern concepts like expeditionary advanced base operations and distributed operations, while building on the Marine Corps’ traditions and strengths. Advanced force operations envision Marine Corps forces acting as a vanguard force, competing for maritime access, shaping naval campaigns, and enabling the introduction of Joint forces.
摘要:大卫·h·伯杰(David H. Berger)将军担任海军陆战队司令，为海军陆战队向更加注重海上作战的方向进行重大变革奠定了基础。指挥官呼吁这些变化以概念为驱动，并对能力进行测试，推动实验、兵棋推演、分析、研发和采办。海军陆战队正在追求或发展一些概念，但缺乏一个总体概念，为概念探索提供背景和连贯性。作者提出了先进部队作战的概念，这一概念被设计得足够广泛，可以将远征先进基地作战和分布式作战等现代概念联系起来，同时建立在海军陆战队的传统和优势之上。先进部队作战设想海军陆战队部队作为先锋部队，争夺海上通道，塑造海军战役，并使联合部队的引入成为可能。
{"title":"First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps","authors":"Major B. A. Friedman","doi":"10.21140/MCUJ.20201102007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21140/MCUJ.20201102007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:General David H. Berger’s tenure as Commandant of the Marine Corps has set the stage for drastic change toward a Marine Corps more focused on maritime operations. The Commandant has called on these changes to be concept driven and capabilities tested, driving experimentation, wargaming, analysis, research and development, and acquisitions. The Marine Corps is pursuing or developing a number of concepts but lacks an overarching concept that provides context and coherence for conceptual exploration. The author proposes advanced force operations, a concept designed to be broad enough to link together modern concepts like expeditionary advanced base operations and distributed operations, while building on the Marine Corps’ traditions and strengths. Advanced force operations envision Marine Corps forces acting as a vanguard force, competing for maritime access, shaping naval campaigns, and enabling the introduction of Joint forces.","PeriodicalId":168300,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Advanced Military Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130933723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.21140/MCUJ.20201102003
M. Manning
Abstract:As the United States faces a rise in credible antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) started developing counteraccess denial strategies early in the twenty-first century. Access denial strategies are not a new defensive strategy; what makes access denial challenging on the modern battlefield is the dramatic improvement and proliferation of weapons capable of denying access to or freedom of action within an operational area. Through a historical review of Japanese naval battles during the early twentieth century, a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain is possible. Control of the maritime domain is the prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. In this article, recommendations for achieving success in this new operating environment are offered, including investing in low-cost technology that extends ranges of A2/AD capabilities.
{"title":"Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative","authors":"M. Manning","doi":"10.21140/MCUJ.20201102003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21140/MCUJ.20201102003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:As the United States faces a rise in credible antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) started developing counteraccess denial strategies early in the twenty-first century. Access denial strategies are not a new defensive strategy; what makes access denial challenging on the modern battlefield is the dramatic improvement and proliferation of weapons capable of denying access to or freedom of action within an operational area. Through a historical review of Japanese naval battles during the early twentieth century, a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain is possible. Control of the maritime domain is the prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. In this article, recommendations for achieving success in this new operating environment are offered, including investing in low-cost technology that extends ranges of A2/AD capabilities.","PeriodicalId":168300,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Advanced Military Studies","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134411420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.21140/MCUJ.20201102005
M. Kohler
Abstract:Marine integration with the Navy contributes to meeting vital U.S. naval operational requirements, especially when organized as a Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) in the Black Sea against Russian threats. The global operating model addresses integration across escalating levels of competition and conflict called contact, blunt, and surge layers. In the contact layer, Marine integration allows the JFMCC to maintain regional access, assure allies, and counter expanding Russian influence. In the blunt layer, Marine integration supports the JFMCC’s operational objectives of denying Russian sea control and freedom of movement. Finally, in the surge layer, a Navy and Marine integrated JFMCC gains a greater ability to project power against a robust antiaccess and area-denial network and decisively defeat Russian aggression. This article contends that naval integration is also an important component of defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region.
{"title":"The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight","authors":"M. Kohler","doi":"10.21140/MCUJ.20201102005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21140/MCUJ.20201102005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Marine integration with the Navy contributes to meeting vital U.S. naval operational requirements, especially when organized as a Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) in the Black Sea against Russian threats. The global operating model addresses integration across escalating levels of competition and conflict called contact, blunt, and surge layers. In the contact layer, Marine integration allows the JFMCC to maintain regional access, assure allies, and counter expanding Russian influence. In the blunt layer, Marine integration supports the JFMCC’s operational objectives of denying Russian sea control and freedom of movement. Finally, in the surge layer, a Navy and Marine integrated JFMCC gains a greater ability to project power against a robust antiaccess and area-denial network and decisively defeat Russian aggression. This article contends that naval integration is also an important component of defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region.","PeriodicalId":168300,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Advanced Military Studies","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130781376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-15DOI: 10.21140/MCUJ.2020110105
James R. R. Van Eerden
Despite the billions of dollars invested in the security cooperation enterprise each year, the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense (DOD) have failed to implement standardized metrics and processes for evaluating security cooperation engagements at the tactical level. Without such data, it is nearly impossible for the security cooperation enterprise to accurately assess progress in achieving national security objectives, such as partner nation basing access and partner force capacity building. Without clear signposts of progress, cooperation engagements will continue to be hampered by redundant or irrelevant training that limits the return on investment for the DOD and strategic U.S. partners.
{"title":"Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise: A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations","authors":"James R. R. Van Eerden","doi":"10.21140/MCUJ.2020110105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21140/MCUJ.2020110105","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the billions of dollars invested in the security cooperation enterprise each year, the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense (DOD) have failed to implement standardized metrics and processes for evaluating security cooperation engagements at the tactical level. Without such data, it is nearly impossible for the security cooperation enterprise to accurately assess progress in achieving national security objectives, such as partner nation basing access and partner force capacity building. Without clear signposts of progress, cooperation engagements will continue to be hampered by redundant or irrelevant training that limits the return on investment for the DOD and strategic U.S. partners.","PeriodicalId":168300,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Advanced Military Studies","volume":"36 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120908298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：