This chapter examines the end of the Year of Intelligence. Public interest began to wane following the release by the Senate’s Church Committee of a report on assassinations, and the death of Central Intelligence Officer Richard Welch in Athens, Greece, prompted pushback against further investigation. The report of the House’s Pike Committee was classified. The outcome of the year laid the groundwork for much of the current architecture for intelligence oversight. Both critics and supporters of the investigations were disappointed by their ultimate outcomes. The Year of Intelligence also prompted both internal and external questioning of the propriety of the relationships between the CIA and news media, especially following an article in Rolling Stone by Carl Bernstein alleging that the CIA had made widespread use of the press in the Cold War. The combination of the Year of Intelligence, Bernstein’s reporting, and the continual generational change of reporters and CIA officers fundamentally changed the nature of the relationships between the CIA and the press.
{"title":"The Year of Intelligence’s Contentious End","authors":"D. Hadley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.11","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the end of the Year of Intelligence. Public interest began to wane following the release by the Senate’s Church Committee of a report on assassinations, and the death of Central Intelligence Officer Richard Welch in Athens, Greece, prompted pushback against further investigation. The report of the House’s Pike Committee was classified. The outcome of the year laid the groundwork for much of the current architecture for intelligence oversight. Both critics and supporters of the investigations were disappointed by their ultimate outcomes. The Year of Intelligence also prompted both internal and external questioning of the propriety of the relationships between the CIA and news media, especially following an article in Rolling Stone by Carl Bernstein alleging that the CIA had made widespread use of the press in the Cold War. The combination of the Year of Intelligence, Bernstein’s reporting, and the continual generational change of reporters and CIA officers fundamentally changed the nature of the relationships between the CIA and the press.","PeriodicalId":177527,"journal":{"name":"The Rising Clamor","volume":"380 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129737115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines the CIA in one of its most activist periods in the 1950s, under the leadership of Allen Dulles. An advocate for covert action and a man with considerable connections to the press, Dulles oversaw successful CIA interventions in Iran (Operation TPAJAX) in 1953 and Guatemala (Operation PBSUCCESS) in 1954. Though the ultimate outcome of the interventions would prove detrimental to the countries involved and to the United States’ own national security interests, the CIA and the Eisenhower administration viewed them as unalloyed successes. The press also generally did not report that the United States had been involved—with some notable exceptions. Dulles leaked details of the operations to a friendly reporter, so the CIA could take credit for its activities without formal acknowledgment. The New York Times also acquiesced to a request to keep a reporter out of Guatemala, but internal deliberations reveal a substantial degree of caution on the part of the Times’s management where the CIA was concerned.
{"title":"Allen Dulles and Covert Intervention","authors":"D. Hadley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.6","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the CIA in one of its most activist periods in the 1950s, under the leadership of Allen Dulles. An advocate for covert action and a man with considerable connections to the press, Dulles oversaw successful CIA interventions in Iran (Operation TPAJAX) in 1953 and Guatemala (Operation PBSUCCESS) in 1954. Though the ultimate outcome of the interventions would prove detrimental to the countries involved and to the United States’ own national security interests, the CIA and the Eisenhower administration viewed them as unalloyed successes. The press also generally did not report that the United States had been involved—with some notable exceptions. Dulles leaked details of the operations to a friendly reporter, so the CIA could take credit for its activities without formal acknowledgment. The New York Times also acquiesced to a request to keep a reporter out of Guatemala, but internal deliberations reveal a substantial degree of caution on the part of the Times’s management where the CIA was concerned.","PeriodicalId":177527,"journal":{"name":"The Rising Clamor","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126980052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines the increasingly contested discourse over intelligence during the 1970s. Though the 1960s saw the emergence of a new generation of reporters that would challenge the CIA, that generation had not necessarily become the majority, and there continued to be strong advocates, both publicly and privately, for the CIA in major news organizations. Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms sought to combine his predecessors’ better quality of press relations with greater conservatism in CIA activities to protect his agency. Ultimately, however, the insistence of the Nixon administration that the CIA undermine the democratically elected Salvador Allende of Chile, the crisis of Watergate, and the continuing fallout from the war in Vietnam undermined the CIA’s ability to influence the press. The New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh prompted the CIA’s greatest crisis when, at the end of 1974, he revealed the existence of an illegal CIA domestic surveillance program.
{"title":"The Clash of Intelligence Advocates and Critics","authors":"D. Hadley","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfjcx3w.9","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the increasingly contested discourse over intelligence during the 1970s. Though the 1960s saw the emergence of a new generation of reporters that would challenge the CIA, that generation had not necessarily become the majority, and there continued to be strong advocates, both publicly and privately, for the CIA in major news organizations. Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms sought to combine his predecessors’ better quality of press relations with greater conservatism in CIA activities to protect his agency. Ultimately, however, the insistence of the Nixon administration that the CIA undermine the democratically elected Salvador Allende of Chile, the crisis of Watergate, and the continuing fallout from the war in Vietnam undermined the CIA’s ability to influence the press. The New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh prompted the CIA’s greatest crisis when, at the end of 1974, he revealed the existence of an illegal CIA domestic surveillance program.","PeriodicalId":177527,"journal":{"name":"The Rising Clamor","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127630546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-14DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813177373.003.0009
D. Hadley
This conclusion argues that the end of the Year of Intelligence and the revelation of previous contacts between the press and the CIA altered the relationships of the press and the CIA that had existed before 1975–1976, helping accelerate preexisting trends. Advocates for and critics of the CIA were both disappointed by the Year of Intelligence’s outcome, and the divide between the two would grow increasingly partisan and continue over time. The conclusion also reflects on the importance of national and geopolitical circumstances in press-CIA relationships, determining that, though old relationships changed, an environment less critical than the post-Watergate 1970s, such as the one that emerged after the 9/11 terrorists attacks, could produce cooperative relationships once again. Finally, the conclusion argues that the Central Intelligence Agency has grown more sophisticated in its public relations approach, looking to film and television rather than print media to influence opinion.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"D. Hadley","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813177373.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813177373.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This conclusion argues that the end of the Year of Intelligence and the revelation of previous contacts between the press and the CIA altered the relationships of the press and the CIA that had existed before 1975–1976, helping accelerate preexisting trends. Advocates for and critics of the CIA were both disappointed by the Year of Intelligence’s outcome, and the divide between the two would grow increasingly partisan and continue over time. The conclusion also reflects on the importance of national and geopolitical circumstances in press-CIA relationships, determining that, though old relationships changed, an environment less critical than the post-Watergate 1970s, such as the one that emerged after the 9/11 terrorists attacks, could produce cooperative relationships once again. Finally, the conclusion argues that the Central Intelligence Agency has grown more sophisticated in its public relations approach, looking to film and television rather than print media to influence opinion.","PeriodicalId":177527,"journal":{"name":"The Rising Clamor","volume":"194 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114234974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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