The distributions of firm size, span of control, and managerial incomes are modeled as the joint outcome of market assignments of personnel to hierarchical positions. Assigning persons of superior talent to top positions increases productivity by more than the increments of their abilities because greater talent filters through the entire firm by a recursive chain of command technology. These multiplicative effects support enormous rewards for top level management in large organizations. Also, superior managers control more than proportionately larger firms. Consequently, the distributions of reward and firm size are skewed relative to the distribution of abilities.
{"title":"Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings","authors":"S. Rosen","doi":"10.2307/3003456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003456","url":null,"abstract":"The distributions of firm size, span of control, and managerial incomes are modeled as the joint outcome of market assignments of personnel to hierarchical positions. Assigning persons of superior talent to top positions increases productivity by more than the increments of their abilities because greater talent filters through the entire firm by a recursive chain of command technology. These multiplicative effects support enormous rewards for top level management in large organizations. Also, superior managers control more than proportionately larger firms. Consequently, the distributions of reward and firm size are skewed relative to the distribution of abilities.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129304670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article is concerned with the possibility that natural selection can lead to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium where otherwise identical profit maximizing firms follow distinctly different strategies. In biology such occurrences are called polymorphic equilibrium. We develop a model of nonprice competition and from this model two classes of polymorphic equilibria arise. In the first class, advertising by expanding market demand can create a niche large enough to sustain entry by nonadvertising firms. Thus, otherwise identical firms following advertising and no advertising strategies can coexist with equal profits in a polymorphic equilibrium The second class of polymorphic equilibria includes the case where advertising does not expand market demand and instead only affects market shares. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications that polymorphism has for empirical work in economics.
{"title":"Polymorphic Equilibrium in Advertising","authors":"W. Hallagan, Wayne H. Joerding","doi":"10.2307/3003546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003546","url":null,"abstract":"This article is concerned with the possibility that natural selection can lead to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium where otherwise identical profit maximizing firms follow distinctly different strategies. In biology such occurrences are called polymorphic equilibrium. We develop a model of nonprice competition and from this model two classes of polymorphic equilibria arise. In the first class, advertising by expanding market demand can create a niche large enough to sustain entry by nonadvertising firms. Thus, otherwise identical firms following advertising and no advertising strategies can coexist with equal profits in a polymorphic equilibrium The second class of polymorphic equilibria includes the case where advertising does not expand market demand and instead only affects market shares. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications that polymorphism has for empirical work in economics.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124615407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
comprehensiveness of both the analysis and the prescription. Beginning with a survey and classification of the various contexts in which regulation is or is seen to be called for-a taxonomy that provides the framework for the entire study-, Breyer then devotes six chapters to a description and appraisal of the six principal regulatory methods-classical "cost-of-service ratemaking," "historically based price regulation," "allocation under a public interest standard," "standard setting," "historically based allocation," and "individualized screening." He next considers various possible "alternatives to classical regulation," and then proceeds to a chapter-by-chapter exposition of three regulatory "mismatches"-instances in which the wrong regulatory solution was adopted for the particular problem perceived; one "partial mismatch"; one "possible match"; and the strategy and process, in which he participated actively, of correcting one of those mismatches-the adoption of classical regulation to handle a perceived problem of excessive competition among airlines. Finally, he wraps up the entire analysis in an excellent concluding chapter, "Generic Approaches to Regulatory Reform." A table in a middle chapter, 10, provides an illuminating summary of the approachthe organization of the entire exposition and the framework for diagnosis and prescription:
{"title":"Breyer's Regulation and Its Reform","authors":"A. Kahn","doi":"10.2307/3003481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003481","url":null,"abstract":"comprehensiveness of both the analysis and the prescription. Beginning with a survey and classification of the various contexts in which regulation is or is seen to be called for-a taxonomy that provides the framework for the entire study-, Breyer then devotes six chapters to a description and appraisal of the six principal regulatory methods-classical \"cost-of-service ratemaking,\" \"historically based price regulation,\" \"allocation under a public interest standard,\" \"standard setting,\" \"historically based allocation,\" and \"individualized screening.\" He next considers various possible \"alternatives to classical regulation,\" and then proceeds to a chapter-by-chapter exposition of three regulatory \"mismatches\"-instances in which the wrong regulatory solution was adopted for the particular problem perceived; one \"partial mismatch\"; one \"possible match\"; and the strategy and process, in which he participated actively, of correcting one of those mismatches-the adoption of classical regulation to handle a perceived problem of excessive competition among airlines. Finally, he wraps up the entire analysis in an excellent concluding chapter, \"Generic Approaches to Regulatory Reform.\" A table in a middle chapter, 10, provides an illuminating summary of the approachthe organization of the entire exposition and the framework for diagnosis and prescription:","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127038458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Firms often contract to deliver commodities at prices established before production costs are known. If the amount sold is a function of the quoted price, then the expected benefit profit per unit sold is not, in general, the difference between the unit cost estimate and the price quotation, but rather some smaller amount. Even though they may not understand why they are doing so, firms may learn by experience to add an amount to price quotations necessary to compensate for this effect. An understanding of this effect can lead to more optimal pricing procedures.
{"title":"A Note on Optimal Fixed-Price Bidding with Uncertain Production Cost","authors":"K. Brown","doi":"10.2307/3003251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003251","url":null,"abstract":"Firms often contract to deliver commodities at prices established before production costs are known. If the amount sold is a function of the quoted price, then the expected benefit profit per unit sold is not, in general, the difference between the unit cost estimate and the price quotation, but rather some smaller amount. Even though they may not understand why they are doing so, firms may learn by experience to add an amount to price quotations necessary to compensate for this effect. An understanding of this effect can lead to more optimal pricing procedures.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129103905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider the control of two-party accidents through the use of liability rules that assign damages according to whether or not predetermined standards for care have been met. Particular emphasis is given to how the differential in the costs of accident avoidance activities affects the optimal legal rule and optimal care standards. It is shown that when the costs are close to uniform across individuals, an approximation to the first-best can be obtained. Moreover, alternative legal rules are equally efficient in achieving this situation. When the differential widens, legal rules will differ in their ability to reach the second-best. In contrast to previous models of liability law, it is shown that the courts must play an active adjudicatory role in the optimal solution.
{"title":"On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws","authors":"Jerry R. Green","doi":"10.2307/3003272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003272","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the control of two-party accidents through the use of liability rules that assign damages according to whether or not predetermined standards for care have been met. Particular emphasis is given to how the differential in the costs of accident avoidance activities affects the optimal legal rule and optimal care standards. It is shown that when the costs are close to uniform across individuals, an approximation to the first-best can be obtained. Moreover, alternative legal rules are equally efficient in achieving this situation. When the differential widens, legal rules will differ in their ability to reach the second-best. In contrast to previous models of liability law, it is shown that the courts must play an active adjudicatory role in the optimal solution.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129135104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Contrary to conventional wisdom, a regulated natural monopoly may be vulnerable to entry by uninnovative competitors even if it is producing and pricing efficiently and earning zero economic profits. The causes and consequences of this unsustainability are theoretically examined in an idealized regulatory environment. In particular, strong demand substitution effects and product-specific scale economies work against sustainability. If natural monopoly is unsustainable, no regulated market structure which provides the entire product set can be sustainable.
{"title":"Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly","authors":"J. Panzar, R. Willig","doi":"10.2307/3003484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003484","url":null,"abstract":"Contrary to conventional wisdom, a regulated natural monopoly may be vulnerable to entry by uninnovative competitors even if it is producing and pricing efficiently and earning zero economic profits. The causes and consequences of this unsustainability are theoretically examined in an idealized regulatory environment. In particular, strong demand substitution effects and product-specific scale economies work against sustainability. If natural monopoly is unsustainable, no regulated market structure which provides the entire product set can be sustainable.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129188579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Work is under way on a forecasting method that incorporates explicit representations of the steps in the oil supply process: exploration, reservoir development, and production. The discovery history of a region and other geological data are inputs to a statistical analysis of the exploratory process. The resulting estimate of the size distribution of new reservoirs is combined with an evaluation of reservoir economies -- taking account of engineering cost, oil price, and taxes. The model produces a forecast of additions to the productive reserve base and oil supply. Progress to date is demonstrated in an application to the North Sea.
{"title":"Oil supply forecasting : a disaggregated process approach","authors":"Paul Leo Eckbo, H. Jacoby, James L. Smith","doi":"10.2307/3003622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003622","url":null,"abstract":"Work is under way on a forecasting method that incorporates explicit representations of the steps in the oil supply process: exploration, reservoir development, and production. The discovery history of a region and other geological data are inputs to a statistical analysis of the exploratory process. The resulting estimate of the size distribution of new reservoirs is combined with an evaluation of reservoir economies -- taking account of engineering cost, oil price, and taxes. The model produces a forecast of additions to the productive reserve base and oil supply. Progress to date is demonstrated in an application to the North Sea.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123970476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents an attempt to specify and estimate a simple model of the rate of return phase of a formal regulatory hearing. The specification of the model derives from the author's intensive study of the regulatory decision-making process in New York State. Although well-defined legal rules for the calculation of the allowed rate of return have not evolved in most regulatory jurisdictions, the results indicate that the regulatory agency, in a consistent fashion, makes use of the information provided to it in the regulatory hearing. The rate of return allowed by the commission is shown to depend on the size and relative reasonableness of the firm's request, the presence or absence of cost of capital testimony supporting the firm's request, the presence or absence of intervenors presenting conflicting rate of return testimony, the type of firm making the rate of return request, and a subjective evaluation of the efficiency of the firm making the request. The results also suggest that commission behavior changes in response to problems faced by the regulatory process in a world characterized by rapid inflation.
{"title":"The determination of the -allowed rate of return in a formal regulatory hearing","authors":"P. Joskow","doi":"10.2307/3003042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003042","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an attempt to specify and estimate a simple model of the rate of return phase of a formal regulatory hearing. The specification of the model derives from the author's intensive study of the regulatory decision-making process in New York State. Although well-defined legal rules for the calculation of the allowed rate of return have not evolved in most regulatory jurisdictions, the results indicate that the regulatory agency, in a consistent fashion, makes use of the information provided to it in the regulatory hearing. The rate of return allowed by the commission is shown to depend on the size and relative reasonableness of the firm's request, the presence or absence of cost of capital testimony supporting the firm's request, the presence or absence of intervenors presenting conflicting rate of return testimony, the type of firm making the rate of return request, and a subjective evaluation of the efficiency of the firm making the request. The results also suggest that commission behavior changes in response to problems faced by the regulatory process in a world characterized by rapid inflation.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114084224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper a demand and supply model is constructed for the product (viewers to watch commercial minutes) which the three U.S. commercial television networks sell to advertisers. Estimates of the parameters of the model yielded price elasticities of demand varying from 0.73 to 0.92 but not differing significantly from one. Network audience was found, on the other hand, to be in highly inelastic supply. This suggests that Federal Communications Commission policies which reduce network product -- such as public service requirements, the Prime Time Access Rule, and restrictions on commercial minutes per hour on children's programs -- will have little or no effect on total network revenues.
{"title":"Demand and Supply of Network Television Advertising","authors":"G. W. Bowman","doi":"10.2307/3003201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003201","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper a demand and supply model is constructed for the product (viewers to watch commercial minutes) which the three U.S. commercial television networks sell to advertisers. Estimates of the parameters of the model yielded price elasticities of demand varying from 0.73 to 0.92 but not differing significantly from one. Network audience was found, on the other hand, to be in highly inelastic supply. This suggests that Federal Communications Commission policies which reduce network product -- such as public service requirements, the Prime Time Access Rule, and restrictions on commercial minutes per hour on children's programs -- will have little or no effect on total network revenues.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116295712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the economic theory of investment behavior the form of the optimal production and investment policy depends critically on the form of technology. The purpose of this paper is to select an appropriate description of technology on the basis of empirical evidence for United States manufacturing industries. The evidence is consistent with a production function characterized by elasticity of substitution equal to unity and constant returns to scale. For this description of technology the optimal policy determines an optimal rate of growth of capital and associated capital/output and labor/output ratios for any set of prices of output, labor input, and capital input. The desired level of capital is a perpetually moving target to which actual capital never converges. The corresponding model of investment policy has been employed extensively in econometric studies of investment behavior. Characterization of the form of optimal investment policy makes it possible to resolve the considerable controversy over the interpretation of econometric models of investment.
{"title":"Investment Behavior and the Production Function","authors":"D. Jorgenson","doi":"10.2307/3003076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003076","url":null,"abstract":"In the economic theory of investment behavior the form of the optimal production and investment policy depends critically on the form of technology. The purpose of this paper is to select an appropriate description of technology on the basis of empirical evidence for United States manufacturing industries. The evidence is consistent with a production function characterized by elasticity of substitution equal to unity and constant returns to scale. For this description of technology the optimal policy determines an optimal rate of growth of capital and associated capital/output and labor/output ratios for any set of prices of output, labor input, and capital input. The desired level of capital is a perpetually moving target to which actual capital never converges. The corresponding model of investment policy has been employed extensively in econometric studies of investment behavior. Characterization of the form of optimal investment policy makes it possible to resolve the considerable controversy over the interpretation of econometric models of investment.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121686509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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