This study examines executive compensation determinants in the U.S. financial services sector. Multiple theories of executive pay are discussed and tested using a relatively homogenous sample. We perform an in-depth look at the corporate governance and ownership structure of the companies selected. The analysis is conducted for the financial sector as a whole and for each of three sub-groups: commercial banks, brokerage and other non-depository institutions, and insurance companies. Variables that proxy for managerial strategic discretion and task complexity are found to best explain CEO compensation. Corporate governance, including board characteristics and external ownership, is the second leading determinant of pay variation, while firm performance and CEO specific characteristics seem to play the least role. We explore the simultaneous relationship between compensation, firm performance, and board strength and find evidence that the board of directors provides a monitoring function and that a strong board appears to be a substitute with incentive compensation for aligning incentives. These findings, when viewed with subsequent firm performance, support an efficient contracting argument.
{"title":"A Unified Analysis of Executive Pay: The Case of the Financial Sector","authors":"E. Talmor, James S. Wallace","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.215630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.215630","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines executive compensation determinants in the U.S. financial services sector. Multiple theories of executive pay are discussed and tested using a relatively homogenous sample. We perform an in-depth look at the corporate governance and ownership structure of the companies selected. The analysis is conducted for the financial sector as a whole and for each of three sub-groups: commercial banks, brokerage and other non-depository institutions, and insurance companies. Variables that proxy for managerial strategic discretion and task complexity are found to best explain CEO compensation. Corporate governance, including board characteristics and external ownership, is the second leading determinant of pay variation, while firm performance and CEO specific characteristics seem to play the least role. We explore the simultaneous relationship between compensation, firm performance, and board strength and find evidence that the board of directors provides a monitoring function and that a strong board appears to be a substitute with incentive compensation for aligning incentives. These findings, when viewed with subsequent firm performance, support an efficient contracting argument.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124596797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study, we estimate the expected cost of equity capital using the unrestricted form of the classic dividend discount formula and examine the extent to which these estimates (rDIV ) reliably proxy for expected cost of equity capital. We find that the rDIV estimates are associated with six risk proxies suggested by theory and prior research in a manner consistent with expectations; the explanatory power of the model is approximately 26%. Based on these results we conclude that the rDIV estimates are a valid proxy for expected cost of equity capital. Estimating rDIV requires a terminal value forecast. Since such forecasts are not always available we also assess the reliability of estimates produced by imposing three alternative terminal value assumptions on the dividend discount model. Specifically, rGORDON (Gordon and Gordon (1997)) imposes a firm-specific assumption; rGLS (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001)) imposes an industry-specific assumption and rOJN (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2000) and Gode and Mohanram (2001)) imposes an economy-wide assumption. We find that the rGORDON estimates have the highest correlation with rDIV and behave in a manner consistent with expectations with respect to their relationships with the risk proxies. We conclude that, when sufficient data to estimate rDIV is unavailable, rGORDON represents a reasonable substitute. Finally, our data indicate that although rDIV and rGORDON reflect the distribution of expected cost of equity capital, neither measure (nor any of the alternatives) should be relied upon to estimate the magnitude of expected cost of equity capital and/or implied risk premiums.
在本研究中，我们使用经典股息贴现公式的无限制形式估计权益资本的预期成本，并检查这些估计(rDIV)在多大程度上可靠地代表权益资本的预期成本。我们发现rDIV估计值与理论和先前研究建议的六个风险代理相关联，其方式与预期一致;模型的解释能力约为26%。基于这些结果，我们得出结论，rDIV估计是权益资本预期成本的有效代理。估计rDIV需要一个终端值预测。由于这种预测并不总是可用的，我们还通过对股息贴现模型施加三种替代终端价值假设来评估估计的可靠性。具体来说，rGORDON (Gordon and Gordon(1997))提出了一个企业特定假设;rGLS (Gebhardt, Lee和Swaminathan(2001))提出了一个特定行业的假设，而rOJN (Ohlson和Juettner-Nauroth(2000)以及Gode和Mohanram(2001))提出了一个经济范围的假设。我们发现rGORDON估计与rDIV的相关性最高，并且在与风险代理的关系方面表现出与预期一致的方式。我们的结论是，当没有足够的数据来估计rDIV时，rGORDON是一个合理的替代品。最后，我们的数据表明，尽管rDIV和rGORDON反映了权益资本预期成本的分布，但无论哪种测量(或任何替代方法)都不应依赖于估计权益资本预期成本和/或隐含风险溢价的大小。
{"title":"Estimating Expected Cost of Equity Capital: A Theory-Based Approach","authors":"Christine Botosan, Marlene A. Plumlee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.279309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.279309","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we estimate the expected cost of equity capital using the unrestricted form of the classic dividend discount formula and examine the extent to which these estimates (rDIV ) reliably proxy for expected cost of equity capital. We find that the rDIV estimates are associated with six risk proxies suggested by theory and prior research in a manner consistent with expectations; the explanatory power of the model is approximately 26%. Based on these results we conclude that the rDIV estimates are a valid proxy for expected cost of equity capital. Estimating rDIV requires a terminal value forecast. Since such forecasts are not always available we also assess the reliability of estimates produced by imposing three alternative terminal value assumptions on the dividend discount model. Specifically, rGORDON (Gordon and Gordon (1997)) imposes a firm-specific assumption; rGLS (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001)) imposes an industry-specific assumption and rOJN (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2000) and Gode and Mohanram (2001)) imposes an economy-wide assumption. We find that the rGORDON estimates have the highest correlation with rDIV and behave in a manner consistent with expectations with respect to their relationships with the risk proxies. We conclude that, when sufficient data to estimate rDIV is unavailable, rGORDON represents a reasonable substitute. Finally, our data indicate that although rDIV and rGORDON reflect the distribution of expected cost of equity capital, neither measure (nor any of the alternatives) should be relied upon to estimate the magnitude of expected cost of equity capital and/or implied risk premiums.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128917907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We find that analysts' forecast errors are predicted by past accounting accruals (adjustments to cash flows to obtain reported earnings) among both equity issuers and nonissuers. Analysts are more optimistic for the subsequent four years for issuers reporting higher issue-year accruals. The predictive power is greater for discretionary accruals than nondiscretionary accruals and is independent of the presence of an underwriting affiliation. Predicted forecast errors from accruals significantly explain the long-term underperformance of new issuers. The predictability of forecast errors among nonissuers suggests that analysts' credulity about accruals management more generally contributes to market inefficiency. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
{"title":"Why Do New Issues and High-Accrual Firms Underperform: The Role of Analysts' Credulity","authors":"S. Teoh, T. Wong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.276628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.276628","url":null,"abstract":"We find that analysts' forecast errors are predicted by past accounting accruals (adjustments to cash flows to obtain reported earnings) among both equity issuers and nonissuers. Analysts are more optimistic for the subsequent four years for issuers reporting higher issue-year accruals. The predictive power is greater for discretionary accruals than nondiscretionary accruals and is independent of the presence of an underwriting affiliation. Predicted forecast errors from accruals significantly explain the long-term underperformance of new issuers. The predictability of forecast errors among nonissuers suggests that analysts' credulity about accruals management more generally contributes to market inefficiency. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130734326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the theoretical underpinnings for the use of equity and earnings in economic analysis, certain financial ratios are not suited for econometric models. In particular, when reported shareholder's equity and/or earnings are less than zero, an inverse relationship can exist between financial ratios and actual firm performance. Although certain earnings ratios can be corrected when this happens, corrections to other ratios, in particular those involving negative book values for equity would result in severe sample bias, erroneous results, and misleading conclusions.
{"title":"Lemmings to the Sea: The Inappropriate Use of Financial Ratios in Empirical Analysis","authors":"Susanne Trimbath","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.270342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.270342","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the theoretical underpinnings for the use of equity and earnings in economic analysis, certain financial ratios are not suited for econometric models. In particular, when reported shareholder's equity and/or earnings are less than zero, an inverse relationship can exist between financial ratios and actual firm performance. Although certain earnings ratios can be corrected when this happens, corrections to other ratios, in particular those involving negative book values for equity would result in severe sample bias, erroneous results, and misleading conclusions.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117167801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The role of "gatekeepers" as reputational intermediaries who can be more easily deterred than the principals they serve has been developed in theory, but less often examined in practice. Initially, this article seeks to define the conditions under which gatekeeper liability is likely to work - and, correspondingly, the conditions under which it is more likely to fail. Then, after reviewing the recent empirical literature on earnings management, it concludes that the independent auditor does not today satisfy the conditions under which gatekeeper liability should produce high law compliance. A variety of explanations - poor observability, implicit collusion, and high agency costs within the gatekeeper - provide overlapping explanations for gatekeeper failure. What remedy should work best to minimize such failures? As a more appropriate and supplementary remedy to reliance on class action litigation, this article recommends fundamental reform of the governance of the accounting profession. In particular, it contrasts the structure of self-regulation within the broker-dealer industry with the absence of similar self-discipline in the accounting profession. While such reform may be unlikely, its absence strongly implies that earnings management is likely to remain a pervasive phenomenon.
{"title":"The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting","authors":"J. Coffee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.270944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.270944","url":null,"abstract":"The role of \"gatekeepers\" as reputational intermediaries who can be more easily deterred than the principals they serve has been developed in theory, but less often examined in practice. Initially, this article seeks to define the conditions under which gatekeeper liability is likely to work - and, correspondingly, the conditions under which it is more likely to fail. Then, after reviewing the recent empirical literature on earnings management, it concludes that the independent auditor does not today satisfy the conditions under which gatekeeper liability should produce high law compliance. A variety of explanations - poor observability, implicit collusion, and high agency costs within the gatekeeper - provide overlapping explanations for gatekeeper failure. What remedy should work best to minimize such failures? As a more appropriate and supplementary remedy to reliance on class action litigation, this article recommends fundamental reform of the governance of the accounting profession. In particular, it contrasts the structure of self-regulation within the broker-dealer industry with the absence of similar self-discipline in the accounting profession. While such reform may be unlikely, its absence strongly implies that earnings management is likely to remain a pervasive phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129299931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Healy and Palepu (2001) provide a broad review of the empirical disclosure literature. This discussion expands on their survey of the empirical voluntary disclosure literature, and offers more specific suggestions for future research.
{"title":"A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion","authors":"J. Core","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.258513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.258513","url":null,"abstract":"Healy and Palepu (2001) provide a broad review of the empirical disclosure literature. This discussion expands on their survey of the empirical voluntary disclosure literature, and offers more specific suggestions for future research.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122215235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We empirically investigate valuations of Internet firms at various stages of the initial public offering (IPO) from two perspectives. First, we examine the association between the valuation of Internet IPOs and a set of financial and nonfinancial variables, which prior anecdotal or empirical evidence suggests may serve as value drivers. Second, we document differences in IPO valuations between Internet and non-Internet firms as well as across different stages in the IPO process—i.e., initial prospectus price, final offer price, and first trading day price—within each set of firms. Our primary two conclusions are as follows. First, there are noticeable differences between valuations of Internet and non-Internet firms, especially at the prospectus and final IPO stage. Specifically, the valuation of non-Internet firms generally follows the conventional wisdom regarding valuation: positive earnings and cash flows are priced, while negative earnings and negative cash flows are not. The valuation of Internet firms, however, departs from conventional wisdom, with earnings not being priced, and negative cash flows being priced perhaps because they are viewed as investments. This difference between the two classes of firms may be expected, given the age and unique nature of the Internet industry. Second, there are significant differences between the initial valuation of firms at the prospectus and IPO stage and their valuation by the stock market at the end of the first trading day. For non-Internet firms, the difference is largely ascribed to the relative offering size. For Internet firms, however, the differences are with respect to positive cash flows, sales growth, R&D, and high-risk warnings, in addition to the relative offering size.
{"title":"Valuation of Internet Stocks - an IPO Perspective","authors":"Eli Bartov, Partha Mohanram, Chandra Seethamraju","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.267928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.267928","url":null,"abstract":"We empirically investigate valuations of Internet firms at various stages of the initial public offering (IPO) from two perspectives. First, we examine the association between the valuation of Internet IPOs and a set of financial and nonfinancial variables, which prior anecdotal or empirical evidence suggests may serve as value drivers. Second, we document differences in IPO valuations between Internet and non-Internet firms as well as across different stages in the IPO process—i.e., initial prospectus price, final offer price, and first trading day price—within each set of firms. Our primary two conclusions are as follows. First, there are noticeable differences between valuations of Internet and non-Internet firms, especially at the prospectus and final IPO stage. Specifically, the valuation of non-Internet firms generally follows the conventional wisdom regarding valuation: positive earnings and cash flows are priced, while negative earnings and negative cash flows are not. The valuation of Internet firms, however, departs from conventional wisdom, with earnings not being priced, and negative cash flows being priced perhaps because they are viewed as investments. This difference between the two classes of firms may be expected, given the age and unique nature of the Internet industry. Second, there are significant differences between the initial valuation of firms at the prospectus and IPO stage and their valuation by the stock market at the end of the first trading day. For non-Internet firms, the difference is largely ascribed to the relative offering size. For Internet firms, however, the differences are with respect to positive cash flows, sales growth, R&D, and high-risk warnings, in addition to the relative offering size.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123252930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Compares three definitions of earnings management used by accounting researchers and three methods of estimating it: aggregate accruals, specific accruals and discontinuities in earnings distribution. Discusses evidence relating to the reasons for income‐increasing earnings management, income‐decreasing earnings management and specific contexts, e.g. financial institutions with regulatory constraints. Concludes that, although the evidence is limited, managers are more likely to manipulate income up rather than down; and identifies some opportunities for further research.
{"title":"Earnings Management: A Perspective","authors":"M. Beneish","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.269625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.269625","url":null,"abstract":"Compares three definitions of earnings management used by accounting researchers and three methods of estimating it: aggregate accruals, specific accruals and discontinuities in earnings distribution. Discusses evidence relating to the reasons for income‐increasing earnings management, income‐decreasing earnings management and specific contexts, e.g. financial institutions with regulatory constraints. Concludes that, although the evidence is limited, managers are more likely to manipulate income up rather than down; and identifies some opportunities for further research.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127482334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the effects of competitive bidding on clients' and service providers' decisions. We examine the determinants of clients' decisions to choose private negotiations (i.e., only one bidder) versus competitive bidding (i.e., multiple bidders) and the effect of that choice on the bidding firm's engagement planning and bid pricing decisions. The data used to conduct this examination include actual evaluations of prospective clients for whom the participating firm's personnel decided to issue an engagement bid during 1997 and 1998. Our findings reveal various cost-benefit tradeoffs involved in clients' decisions to choose private negotiations versus competitive bidding. Results also show that competitive bidding is associated with an increase in planned engagement effort, an increase in the use of quality-enhancing personnel allocations, and reduced fee rates.
{"title":"The Role of Competitive Bidding in the Market for Initial Attest Engagements","authors":"J. Bedard, Michael L. Ettredge, Karla M. Zehms","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.197868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.197868","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the effects of competitive bidding on clients' and service providers' decisions. We examine the determinants of clients' decisions to choose private negotiations (i.e., only one bidder) versus competitive bidding (i.e., multiple bidders) and the effect of that choice on the bidding firm's engagement planning and bid pricing decisions. The data used to conduct this examination include actual evaluations of prospective clients for whom the participating firm's personnel decided to issue an engagement bid during 1997 and 1998. Our findings reveal various cost-benefit tradeoffs involved in clients' decisions to choose private negotiations versus competitive bidding. Results also show that competitive bidding is associated with an increase in planned engagement effort, an increase in the use of quality-enhancing personnel allocations, and reduced fee rates.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114953181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the context of the recent debate that was stimulated by Sutton and Arnold's paper entitled "Toward a Framework for a Corporate Single Audit", this paper examines the impact of environmental audit and eco-labelling strategies on governance arrangements in the forestry industry. In particular, it shows how consumer-driven forest management audits sanctioned by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) could shift much of the responsibility for sustainable forest management from state bureaucracy to management control mechanisms within forest exploitation companies. The paper uses evidence from a case study of Leroy Gabon, a large Franco-German logging concession in the Congo basin rainforest, to analyse the impact of a third-party audit of forest management processes based upon FSC principles. The findings reveal tensions between claims to professionalism of the FSC (and one of its accredited auditors, i.e. Societe Generale de Surveillance) on the one hand, and sustainability concerns of stakeholders (notably representatives of indigenous people, environmental campaigners, Friends of the Earth, and Rainforest Coalition) on the other.
{"title":"Auditing and Governance in the Forestry Industry: Between Protest and Professionalism","authors":"Charles Elad","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.261309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.261309","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of the recent debate that was stimulated by Sutton and Arnold's paper entitled \"Toward a Framework for a Corporate Single Audit\", this paper examines the impact of environmental audit and eco-labelling strategies on governance arrangements in the forestry industry. In particular, it shows how consumer-driven forest management audits sanctioned by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) could shift much of the responsibility for sustainable forest management from state bureaucracy to management control mechanisms within forest exploitation companies. The paper uses evidence from a case study of Leroy Gabon, a large Franco-German logging concession in the Congo basin rainforest, to analyse the impact of a third-party audit of forest management processes based upon FSC principles. The findings reveal tensions between claims to professionalism of the FSC (and one of its accredited auditors, i.e. Societe Generale de Surveillance) on the one hand, and sustainability concerns of stakeholders (notably representatives of indigenous people, environmental campaigners, Friends of the Earth, and Rainforest Coalition) on the other.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114596500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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