The objective of this study is threefold. Our primary objective is to determine the point at which earnings become low enough to trigger a liquidation (abandonment) option during the 1998 fiscal year on the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq. Second, we investigate whether that earnings level is intertemporally stable by investigating the valuation significance of earnings and book value during two pooled time periods from 1994 to 1998 and from 1989 to 1998. Third, we seek to determine whether the decreased valuation significance in earnings is associated with a simultaneous increase in the valuation significance of book value during all three time periods examined. Key Words: Earnings; Book value of equity; Valuation; Abandonment option
{"title":"When are Profitable Earnings Low Enough to Trigger a Liquidation Option?","authors":"Oliver Schnusenberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.237129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237129","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this study is threefold. Our primary objective is to determine the point at which earnings become low enough to trigger a liquidation (abandonment) option during the 1998 fiscal year on the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq. Second, we investigate whether that earnings level is intertemporally stable by investigating the valuation significance of earnings and book value during two pooled time periods from 1994 to 1998 and from 1989 to 1998. Third, we seek to determine whether the decreased valuation significance in earnings is associated with a simultaneous increase in the valuation significance of book value during all three time periods examined. Key Words: Earnings; Book value of equity; Valuation; Abandonment option","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128545023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
type="main" xml:lang="en"> Prior research suggests that financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock prices underreact to earnings news. This paper provides evidence that analysts and investors correct this underreaction in response to the next earnings announcement and to other (non-earnings-surprise) information available between earnings announcements. Our evidence also suggests that analysts and investors underreact to information reflected in analysts’ earnings forecast revisions and that non-earnings-surprise information helps correct this underreaction as well. Controlling for corrective non-earnings-surprise information significantly increases estimates of the degree to which analysts’ forecasting behavior can explain drifts in returns following both earnings announcements and analysts’ earnings forecast revisions.
{"title":"Investor and (Value Line) Analyst Underreaction to Information About Future Earnings: The Corrective Role of Non-Earnings-Surprise Information","authors":"P. Brous, Philip B. Shane","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.271916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.271916","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:lang=\"en\"> Prior research suggests that financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock prices underreact to earnings news. This paper provides evidence that analysts and investors correct this underreaction in response to the next earnings announcement and to other (non-earnings-surprise) information available between earnings announcements. Our evidence also suggests that analysts and investors underreact to information reflected in analysts’ earnings forecast revisions and that non-earnings-surprise information helps correct this underreaction as well. Controlling for corrective non-earnings-surprise information significantly increases estimates of the degree to which analysts’ forecasting behavior can explain drifts in returns following both earnings announcements and analysts’ earnings forecast revisions.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127232089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a model of asset sale under uncertainty and derives an optimal scrapping rule. It shows that under certain conditions an asset should be scrapped when its operating profit first reaches a critical level. A testable equation based on the model is suggested. The model may be applied to voluntary liquidations, plant closures, sell-off, spin-off and the examination of takeover premiums.
{"title":"An Option Pricing Approach to Asset Sale","authors":"J. Song, Shumei Gao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.237368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237368","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a model of asset sale under uncertainty and derives an optimal scrapping rule. It shows that under certain conditions an asset should be scrapped when its operating profit first reaches a critical level. A testable equation based on the model is suggested. The model may be applied to voluntary liquidations, plant closures, sell-off, spin-off and the examination of takeover premiums.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126966192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Changing management accounting systems requires more than appropriate implementation.It is argued that structural characteristics of an organization, centralization in particular, should also be taken into account when deciding on a change.Centralization implies higher costs of communication because the decision-maker has to obtain information from organizational participants who have incentives to inffluence the decision.A limit on communication reduces inffluence costs but at the same time it also lowers the quality of the decision.As a result of that, centralized organizations (i) will implement changes in their accounting systems less often than decentralized ones (ii) will more often implement top-down, i.e. ignore local information.
{"title":"Organizational Design and Management Accounting Change","authors":"M. Matějka, Anja M. B. De Waegenaere","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.246943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.246943","url":null,"abstract":"Changing management accounting systems requires more than appropriate implementation.It is argued that structural characteristics of an organization, centralization in particular, should also be taken into account when deciding on a change.Centralization implies higher costs of communication because the decision-maker has to obtain information from organizational participants who have incentives to inffluence the decision.A limit on communication reduces inffluence costs but at the same time it also lowers the quality of the decision.As a result of that, centralized organizations (i) will implement changes in their accounting systems less often than decentralized ones (ii) will more often implement top-down, i.e. ignore local information.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121812695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this research we consider how disclosure of accounting policy interacts with subsequent choice over voluntary disclosure of a non-financial performance metric. We compare and contrast regimes. In the first, firms are free to choose between a conservative or an aggressive accounting policy before they decide whether to make additional voluntary disclosures. In the other regime, all firms either voluntarily or via mandation use the same accounting policy. We then investigate the cost of capital for firms under the two regimes. We show that communication via voluntary disclosure need not be a simple substitute for communication via accounting policy choice. Key Words: Voluntary disclosure; Accounting policy choice; Cost of capital
{"title":"Disclosure Interactions: Accounting Policy Choice and Voluntary Disclosure Effects on the Cost of Capital","authors":"M. Gietzmann, Marco Trombetta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.236439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.236439","url":null,"abstract":"In this research we consider how disclosure of accounting policy interacts with subsequent choice over voluntary disclosure of a non-financial performance metric. We compare and contrast regimes. In the first, firms are free to choose between a conservative or an aggressive accounting policy before they decide whether to make additional voluntary disclosures. In the other regime, all firms either voluntarily or via mandation use the same accounting policy. We then investigate the cost of capital for firms under the two regimes. We show that communication via voluntary disclosure need not be a simple substitute for communication via accounting policy choice. Key Words: Voluntary disclosure; Accounting policy choice; Cost of capital","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122754892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates auditor choice in Greece in the five years subsequent to the 1992 liberalization of the audit market. We analyze auditor choices by 205 companies which, by 1997, represented almost 90% of the companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. We find that the level of shareholdings by foreign shareholders is positively associated with choice of a Big Six versus any other auditor both immediately after liberalization in 1993 and still in 1997, indicative of the role of the Big Six in providing audit credibility in the eyes of international investors. In addition, Big Six auditors strengthened their position in the finance sector and, outside the finance sector, among larger companies over the period studied. We also find that in both 1993 and 1997 Big Six firms were distinguished specifically from the second-tier international firms, consistent with the view that, in post-liberalization Greece, companies by their choice of auditor appear to be distinguishing Big Six firms from all others but not between second-tier international firms and local auditors. These findings shed light on the hitherto unresearched area of which companies Big Six auditors target in order to gain market share when they are new entrants in an environment radically changed by regulatory reform. In addition the research extends the auditor brand name reputation debate by its finding that, in post-liberalization Greece, second-tier international firms appear to be distinguished from the Big Six but not from the local audit firms.
{"title":"The International Audit Firms as New Entrants - an Empirical Analysis of Auditor Selection in Greece, 1993 to 1997","authors":"Gikas Manalis, D. Citron","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.233635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.233635","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates auditor choice in Greece in the five years subsequent to the 1992 liberalization of the audit market. We analyze auditor choices by 205 companies which, by 1997, represented almost 90% of the companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. We find that the level of shareholdings by foreign shareholders is positively associated with choice of a Big Six versus any other auditor both immediately after liberalization in 1993 and still in 1997, indicative of the role of the Big Six in providing audit credibility in the eyes of international investors. In addition, Big Six auditors strengthened their position in the finance sector and, outside the finance sector, among larger companies over the period studied. We also find that in both 1993 and 1997 Big Six firms were distinguished specifically from the second-tier international firms, consistent with the view that, in post-liberalization Greece, companies by their choice of auditor appear to be distinguishing Big Six firms from all others but not between second-tier international firms and local auditors. These findings shed light on the hitherto unresearched area of which companies Big Six auditors target in order to gain market share when they are new entrants in an environment radically changed by regulatory reform. In addition the research extends the auditor brand name reputation debate by its finding that, in post-liberalization Greece, second-tier international firms appear to be distinguished from the Big Six but not from the local audit firms.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122960992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The principles that govern the recognition of revenues (and expenses) are the key determinants of the properties of accrual accounting information. This paper studies the revenue recognition question from a stewardship perspective. Our results show that it is optimal to carry products at their historical costs until revenues are realized. Revenues are considered realized when the amount of associated cash flows can be measured in an objective and verifiable fashion. In contrast, we demonstrate that mark-to-market accounting, although sensible from an equity valuation perspective, generally does not provide efficient aggregation of raw information to solve the stewardship problems. In particular, mark-to-market accounting based on anticipated performance of the manager does not necessarily induce the manager to actually deliver such performance. Our analysis also identifies situations where the realization principle needs to be modified with the asset valuation rule of lower-of-cost-or-market. Such results highlight that conservatism may be a desirable feature of accounting measurements for managerial performance evaluation purposes.
{"title":"Revenue Recognition in a Multiperiod Agency Setting","authors":"S. Dutta, Xiao-Jun Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.231128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.231128","url":null,"abstract":"The principles that govern the recognition of revenues (and expenses) are the key determinants of the properties of accrual accounting information. This paper studies the revenue recognition question from a stewardship perspective. Our results show that it is optimal to carry products at their historical costs until revenues are realized. Revenues are considered realized when the amount of associated cash flows can be measured in an objective and verifiable fashion. In contrast, we demonstrate that mark-to-market accounting, although sensible from an equity valuation perspective, generally does not provide efficient aggregation of raw information to solve the stewardship problems. In particular, mark-to-market accounting based on anticipated performance of the manager does not necessarily induce the manager to actually deliver such performance. Our analysis also identifies situations where the realization principle needs to be modified with the asset valuation rule of lower-of-cost-or-market. Such results highlight that conservatism may be a desirable feature of accounting measurements for managerial performance evaluation purposes.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123011165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theodore E. Christensen, Jennifer J. Gaver, Pamela S. Stuerke
This paper examines the association between pre-disclosure uncertainty and investor reliance on reported earnings. Our study is unique because it incorporates both context-specific and forecast-based measures of uncertainty. The analysis is based on data for 118 publicly-traded property and casualty insurers for the period 1989 through 1998. We find significantly positive correlations among loss exposure, our context-based measure of uncertainty, and more general measures of uncertainty based on analysts' forecasts. Further, each uncertainty measure considered individually is significantly associated with the magnitude of abnormal returns around subsequent earnings announcements. However, the relation between loss exposure and abnormal returns is nonlinear. Although the market response to earnings generally increases with the firm's exposure to losses in the prior period, that effect is attenuated when the loss is very large. Simultaneous consideration of contextual and forecast-based measures of uncertainty indicates that, once forecast-based measures are taken into account, our contextual measure of uncertainty provides little incremental explanatory power for abnormal returns. The fact that generalized uncertainty measures based on analysts' forecasts apparently outperform a context-specific variable is good news for empirical researchers confronted with samples drawn from diverse industry settings. Taken together, our results provide compelling support for the view that investor reliance on reported earnings increases in periods of heightened uncertainty about the firm's prospects.
{"title":"The Relation between Investor Uncertainty and Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements: Evidence from the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry","authors":"Theodore E. Christensen, Jennifer J. Gaver, Pamela S. Stuerke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.230751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.230751","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the association between pre-disclosure uncertainty and investor reliance on reported earnings. Our study is unique because it incorporates both context-specific and forecast-based measures of uncertainty. The analysis is based on data for 118 publicly-traded property and casualty insurers for the period 1989 through 1998. We find significantly positive correlations among loss exposure, our context-based measure of uncertainty, and more general measures of uncertainty based on analysts' forecasts. Further, each uncertainty measure considered individually is significantly associated with the magnitude of abnormal returns around subsequent earnings announcements. However, the relation between loss exposure and abnormal returns is nonlinear. Although the market response to earnings generally increases with the firm's exposure to losses in the prior period, that effect is attenuated when the loss is very large. Simultaneous consideration of contextual and forecast-based measures of uncertainty indicates that, once forecast-based measures are taken into account, our contextual measure of uncertainty provides little incremental explanatory power for abnormal returns. The fact that generalized uncertainty measures based on analysts' forecasts apparently outperform a context-specific variable is good news for empirical researchers confronted with samples drawn from diverse industry settings. Taken together, our results provide compelling support for the view that investor reliance on reported earnings increases in periods of heightened uncertainty about the firm's prospects.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134149309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate whether CEOs manage the timing of their voluntary disclosures around stock option awards. We conjecture that CEOs manage investors' expectations around award dates by delaying good news and rushing forward bad news. For a sample of 2,039 CEO option awards by 572 firms with fixed award schedules, we document changes in share prices and analyst earnings forecasts around option awards that are consistent with our conjecture. We also provide more direct evidence based on management earnings forecasts issued prior to award dates. Our findings suggest that CEOs make opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option compensation.
{"title":"CEO Stock Option Awards and Corporate Voluntary Disclosures","authors":"David Aboody, Ron Kasznik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.144589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.144589","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether CEOs manage the timing of their voluntary disclosures around stock option awards. We conjecture that CEOs manage investors' expectations around award dates by delaying good news and rushing forward bad news. For a sample of 2,039 CEO option awards by 572 firms with fixed award schedules, we document changes in share prices and analyst earnings forecasts around option awards that are consistent with our conjecture. We also provide more direct evidence based on management earnings forecasts issued prior to award dates. Our findings suggest that CEOs make opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option compensation.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126610478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
'Creative accounting' involves accountants in making accounting policy choices or manipulating transactions in such a way as to give the impression in the accounts that they prefer. While regarded as unethical by most observers, a defence of creative accounting can be based on the ability of the users of accounts to identify bias in accounting policy choices and make appropriate adjustments. In this paper we take the example of the Barcelona Football Club where the club management made three key accounting policy choices that presented a favourable position, and a supporters' club presented an alternative report choosing three alternative accounting policies that presented an unfavourable position. We presented each of these financial reports to one of two groups of Spanish bank loan offices, with supporting notes making the impact of the accounting policy choices clear. We found that the more favourable set of accounts was significantly more likely to attract a positive response to a loan request. This result undermines the defence for creative accounting, based on the ability of users to identify manipulation.
{"title":"The Ethics of Creative Accounting: Some Spanish Evidence","authors":"Oriol Amat, J. Blake, Ester Oliveras","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.230872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.230872","url":null,"abstract":"'Creative accounting' involves accountants in making accounting policy choices or manipulating transactions in such a way as to give the impression in the accounts that they prefer. While regarded as unethical by most observers, a defence of creative accounting can be based on the ability of the users of accounts to identify bias in accounting policy choices and make appropriate adjustments. In this paper we take the example of the Barcelona Football Club where the club management made three key accounting policy choices that presented a favourable position, and a supporters' club presented an alternative report choosing three alternative accounting policies that presented an unfavourable position. We presented each of these financial reports to one of two groups of Spanish bank loan offices, with supporting notes making the impact of the accounting policy choices clear. We found that the more favourable set of accounts was significantly more likely to attract a positive response to a loan request. This result undermines the defence for creative accounting, based on the ability of users to identify manipulation.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115576726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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