Pub Date : 2019-06-11DOI: 10.4324/9780203703809-19
Kostas Kampourakis
{"title":"How Are the Uncertainties in Scientific Knowledge Represented in the Public Sphere?","authors":"Kostas Kampourakis","doi":"10.4324/9780203703809-19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203703809-19","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":183754,"journal":{"name":"What Is Scientific Knowledge?","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117158210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-11DOI: 10.4324/9780203703809-14
Janet A. Kourany
{"title":"What Grounds Do We Have for the Validity of Scientific Findings?","authors":"Janet A. Kourany","doi":"10.4324/9780203703809-14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203703809-14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":183754,"journal":{"name":"What Is Scientific Knowledge?","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116242908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is a survey chapter about issues in the epistemology of elementary arithmetic. Given the title of this volume, it is worth noting right at the outset that the classification of arithmetic as science is itself philosophically debatable, and that this debate overlaps with debates about the epistemology of arithmetic. It is also important to note that a survey chapter should not be mistaken for a comprehensive, definitive, or unbiased introduction to all that is important about its topic. It is rather an exercise in curation: a selection of material is prepared for display, and the selection process is influenced not only by the author’s personal opinions as to what is interesting and/or worthy, but also by various contingencies of her training, and my survey reflects my training in Anglo-American analytic philosophy of mathematics. Although I’m surveying an area of epistemology, I will classify approaches by metaphysical outlook. The reason for this is that the epistemology and metaphysics of arithmetic are so intimately intertwined that I have generally found it difficult to understand the shape of the epistemological terrain except by reference to the corresponding metaphysical landmarks. For instance, it makes little sense to say that arithmetical knowledge is a kind of “maker’s knowledge” unless arithmetic is in some way mind-dependent, or to classify it as a subspecies of logical knowledge unless arithmetical truth is a species of logical truth. I will be discussing 2+2=4 as an easily-graspable example of an elementary arithmetical truth, our knowledge of which stands in need of philosophical explanation. While some of the surveyed approaches to this explanatory demand proceed by rejecting the presumed explanandum—i.e. by denying that 2+2=4 is known (or even true)—for clarity and ease of expression I will proceed as if 2+2=4 is a known truth except when discussing these approaches. The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I identify two key challenges for an epistemology of simple arithmetic, and then adduce two constraints on what should count as a successful response. Next, I discuss ways of addressing these challenges, grouped according to their corresponding metaphysical outlook. The subsequent sections survey non-reductive Platonist approaches, look at reductions (often better labelled “identifications”), and consider an array of anti-realist strategies. I conclude with a brief summary, returning to the question of arithmetic’s status as science.
{"title":"How Do We Know That 2 + 2 = 4?","authors":"C. Jenkins","doi":"10.4324/9780203703809-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203703809-8","url":null,"abstract":"This is a survey chapter about issues in the epistemology of elementary arithmetic. Given the title of this volume, it is worth noting right at the outset that the classification of arithmetic as science is itself philosophically debatable, and that this debate overlaps with debates about the epistemology of arithmetic. It is also important to note that a survey chapter should not be mistaken for a comprehensive, definitive, or unbiased introduction to all that is important about its topic. It is rather an exercise in curation: a selection of material is prepared for display, and the selection process is influenced not only by the author’s personal opinions as to what is interesting and/or worthy, but also by various contingencies of her training, and my survey reflects my training in Anglo-American analytic philosophy of mathematics. Although I’m surveying an area of epistemology, I will classify approaches by metaphysical outlook. The reason for this is that the epistemology and metaphysics of arithmetic are so intimately intertwined that I have generally found it difficult to understand the shape of the epistemological terrain except by reference to the corresponding metaphysical landmarks. For instance, it makes little sense to say that arithmetical knowledge is a kind of “maker’s knowledge” unless arithmetic is in some way mind-dependent, or to classify it as a subspecies of logical knowledge unless arithmetical truth is a species of logical truth. I will be discussing 2+2=4 as an easily-graspable example of an elementary arithmetical truth, our knowledge of which stands in need of philosophical explanation. While some of the surveyed approaches to this explanatory demand proceed by rejecting the presumed explanandum—i.e. by denying that 2+2=4 is known (or even true)—for clarity and ease of expression I will proceed as if 2+2=4 is a known truth except when discussing these approaches. The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I identify two key challenges for an epistemology of simple arithmetic, and then adduce two constraints on what should count as a successful response. Next, I discuss ways of addressing these challenges, grouped according to their corresponding metaphysical outlook. The subsequent sections survey non-reductive Platonist approaches, look at reductions (often better labelled “identifications”), and consider an array of anti-realist strategies. I conclude with a brief summary, returning to the question of arithmetic’s status as science.","PeriodicalId":183754,"journal":{"name":"What Is Scientific Knowledge?","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127446314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-11DOI: 10.4324/9780203703809-13
E. Peterson
{"title":"Can Scientific Knowledge Sift the Wheat from the Tares?","authors":"E. Peterson","doi":"10.4324/9780203703809-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203703809-13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":183754,"journal":{"name":"What Is Scientific Knowledge?","volume":"240 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125766894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bradford Hill (1965) highlighted nine aspects of the complex evidential situation a medical researcher faces when determining whether a causal relation exists between a disease and various conditions associated with it. These aspects are widely cited in the literature on epidemiological inference as justifying an inference to a causal claim, but the epistemological basis of the Hill aspects is not understood. We offer an explanatory coherentist interpretation, explicated by Thagard's ECHO model of explanatory coherence. The ECHO model captures the complexity of epidemiological inference and provides a tractable model for inferring disease causation. We apply this model to three cases: the inference of a causal connection between the Zika virus and birth defects, the classic inference that smoking causes cancer, and John Snow’s inference about the cause of cholera. Introduction Bradford Hill asked “In what circumstances can we pass from ... [an] observed association to a verdict of causation? Upon what basis should we proceed to do so?’’ (Hill 1965, p. 295) Hill’s expertise lay in the relationship between work conditions and illness. He often 1 Acknowledgments: Thanks to Mike Bishop, Kostos Kampouratis, Kevin McCain, and Chase Wrenn for comments on an earlier draft.
Bradford Hill(1965)强调了医学研究人员在确定疾病和与之相关的各种状况之间是否存在因果关系时所面临的复杂证据情况的九个方面。这些方面在流行病学推断的文献中被广泛引用，作为证明对因果主张的推断的理由，但希尔方面的认识论基础尚未得到理解。我们提出了一种解释连贯主义的解释，即塔加德的解释连贯的ECHO模型。ECHO模型抓住了流行病学推断的复杂性，为推断疾病原因提供了一个易于处理的模型。我们将这个模型应用于三个案例:兹卡病毒和出生缺陷之间因果关系的推论，吸烟导致癌症的经典推论，以及约翰·斯诺关于霍乱原因的推论。布拉德福德·希尔问道:“在什么情况下，我们可以从……观察到的与因果关系的关联?我们应该在什么基础上着手这样做呢?(Hill 1965, p. 295) Hill的专长在于工作条件和疾病之间的关系。致谢:感谢Mike Bishop, Kostos Kampouratis, Kevin McCain和Chase雷恩对早期草稿的评论。
{"title":"How Do Medical Researchers Make Causal Inferences?","authors":"O. Dammann, Ted L. Poston, Paul Thagard","doi":"10.4324/9780203703809-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203703809-3","url":null,"abstract":"Bradford Hill (1965) highlighted nine aspects of the complex evidential situation a medical researcher faces when determining whether a causal relation exists between a disease and various conditions associated with it. These aspects are widely cited in the literature on epidemiological inference as justifying an inference to a causal claim, but the epistemological basis of the Hill aspects is not understood. We offer an explanatory coherentist interpretation, explicated by Thagard's ECHO model of explanatory coherence. The ECHO model captures the complexity of epidemiological inference and provides a tractable model for inferring disease causation. We apply this model to three cases: the inference of a causal connection between the Zika virus and birth defects, the classic inference that smoking causes cancer, and John Snow’s inference about the cause of cholera. Introduction Bradford Hill asked “In what circumstances can we pass from ... [an] observed association to a verdict of causation? Upon what basis should we proceed to do so?’’ (Hill 1965, p. 295) Hill’s expertise lay in the relationship between work conditions and illness. He often 1 Acknowledgments: Thanks to Mike Bishop, Kostos Kampouratis, Kevin McCain, and Chase Wrenn for comments on an earlier draft.","PeriodicalId":183754,"journal":{"name":"What Is Scientific Knowledge?","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114498976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Are Scientific Concepts?","authors":"T. Arabatzis","doi":"10.4324/9780203703809-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203703809-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":183754,"journal":{"name":"What Is Scientific Knowledge?","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124420078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.4324/9780203703809-18
R. Peels
An influential idea in science, philosophy, and popular science writing these days is that science and the natural sciences in particular always reliably lead to rational belief and knowledge, whereas non-scientific sources of belief never do. This chapter discusses a specific argument against scientism. It focuses on scientism as an epistemological rather than an ontological claim that as a claim to the effect that only science delivers rational belief or knowledge rather than as the claim that what exists is only what science tells exists or only that which can in principle be investigated by science. A first response to the argument from self-referential incoherence is that we do or at least can have scientific evidence for scientism. It is undeniable that science has an impressive track record. A second line of response is that we can rationally believe some proposition p only if p is the result of science or if p is the thesis of scientism itself.
{"title":"Should We Accept Scientism?","authors":"R. Peels","doi":"10.4324/9780203703809-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203703809-18","url":null,"abstract":"An influential idea in science, philosophy, and popular science writing these days is that science and the natural sciences in particular always reliably lead to rational belief and knowledge, whereas non-scientific sources of belief never do. This chapter discusses a specific argument against scientism. It focuses on scientism as an epistemological rather than an ontological claim that as a claim to the effect that only science delivers rational belief or knowledge rather than as the claim that what exists is only what science tells exists or only that which can in principle be investigated by science. A first response to the argument from self-referential incoherence is that we do or at least can have scientific evidence for scientism. It is undeniable that science has an impressive track record. A second line of response is that we can rationally believe some proposition p only if p is the result of science or if p is the thesis of scientism itself.","PeriodicalId":183754,"journal":{"name":"What Is Scientific Knowledge?","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123152329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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