Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0007
R. Stern
This chapter argues that Løgstrup’s position on the question of moral obligation is closest to a natural law outlook, not only in The Ethical Demand but also in later works when he speaks of his ‘ontological ethics’ and ‘the sovereign expressions of life’ (§7.1). Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim that Løgstrup is not a natural law theorist (§7.2), and also Stephen Darwall’s claim that in this earlier work Løgstrup was a divine command theorist (§7.3), are both considered and rejected. The next section argues that the natural law theory Løgstrup adopted is non-theistic rather than theistic (§7.4). Finally, this account of Løgstrup as a natural law theorist is connected to subsequent chapters, where it will be suggested that this approach underpins his critique of Kant and Kierkegaard, as well as setting him at odds with Levinas and Darwall (§7.5).
{"title":"Normativity as Natural Law","authors":"R. Stern","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that Løgstrup’s position on the question of moral obligation is closest to a natural law outlook, not only in The Ethical Demand but also in later works when he speaks of his ‘ontological ethics’ and ‘the sovereign expressions of life’ (§7.1). Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim that Løgstrup is not a natural law theorist (§7.2), and also Stephen Darwall’s claim that in this earlier work Løgstrup was a divine command theorist (§7.3), are both considered and rejected. The next section argues that the natural law theory Løgstrup adopted is non-theistic rather than theistic (§7.4). Finally, this account of Løgstrup as a natural law theorist is connected to subsequent chapters, where it will be suggested that this approach underpins his critique of Kant and Kierkegaard, as well as setting him at odds with Levinas and Darwall (§7.5).","PeriodicalId":184927,"journal":{"name":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129006549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0011
R. Stern
This chapter considers Løgstrup’s relation to Martin Luther. It begins by outlining Luther’s account of human wickedness, and the crucial role this plays in his distinctive theology and ethics. It then shows how Løgstrup takes over this account, but also departs from Luther in certain fundamental respects (§11.1). It then considers how K. Olesen Larsen, building on Kierkegaard, exploits this departure to mount a critical challenge to Løgstrup (§11.2). It is then shown how Løgstrup might respond to Olesen Larsen, but in a way that reveals how his ethics is indeed a step beyond Luther, but arguably a defensible one (§11.3). Finally, the chapter considers how Løgstrup deals with an issue that is central to his Lutheran approach, namely the conception of moral agency that is possible on this model, making a critical comparison with Iris Murdoch (§11.4).
{"title":"Learning from Luther","authors":"R. Stern","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers Løgstrup’s relation to Martin Luther. It begins by outlining Luther’s account of human wickedness, and the crucial role this plays in his distinctive theology and ethics. It then shows how Løgstrup takes over this account, but also departs from Luther in certain fundamental respects (§11.1). It then considers how K. Olesen Larsen, building on Kierkegaard, exploits this departure to mount a critical challenge to Løgstrup (§11.2). It is then shown how Løgstrup might respond to Olesen Larsen, but in a way that reveals how his ethics is indeed a step beyond Luther, but arguably a defensible one (§11.3). Finally, the chapter considers how Løgstrup deals with an issue that is central to his Lutheran approach, namely the conception of moral agency that is possible on this model, making a critical comparison with Iris Murdoch (§11.4).","PeriodicalId":184927,"journal":{"name":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121777088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0008
R. Stern
This chapter considers in more detail how it is that the kind of natural law approach embodied in Løgstrup’s ‘ontological ethics’ puts him at odds with both Kant and Kierkegaard, and leads him to convict them of formalism. Løgstrup’s claim is that by failing to adopt his approach, neither Kant nor Kierkegaard can do justice to the ethical demand, as they see it as deriving from the authority of a commander. The difficulty is that such authority is ‘content-independent’ in H. L. A. Hart’s sense, making the reason to act that one has been commanded, rather than the vulnerability of the other person, which in these situations should be the right reason on which to act. If Løgstrup is correct, it is argued that his critique also has significant implications against contemporary attempts to ground ethical obligation in the authority of practical reason and divine command respectively.
{"title":"Confronting Kant and Kierkegaard","authors":"R. Stern","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers in more detail how it is that the kind of natural law approach embodied in Løgstrup’s ‘ontological ethics’ puts him at odds with both Kant and Kierkegaard, and leads him to convict them of formalism. Løgstrup’s claim is that by failing to adopt his approach, neither Kant nor Kierkegaard can do justice to the ethical demand, as they see it as deriving from the authority of a commander. The difficulty is that such authority is ‘content-independent’ in H. L. A. Hart’s sense, making the reason to act that one has been commanded, rather than the vulnerability of the other person, which in these situations should be the right reason on which to act. If Løgstrup is correct, it is argued that his critique also has significant implications against contemporary attempts to ground ethical obligation in the authority of practical reason and divine command respectively.","PeriodicalId":184927,"journal":{"name":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130833807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0001
R. Stern
This chapter covers the ‘Introduction’ to K. E. Løgstrup’s The Ethical Demand, and the first two chapters of the book. These provide the foundation for Løgstrup’s account of the ethical demand, by relating it to Jesus’s proclamation to love our neighbour, while showing how the demand grows out of the interdependence of human beings, an interdependence that can be illustrated through the key example of trust. Løgstrup also defends the claim that the demand to care for the other is ‘unspoken’ or ‘silent’, and begins to contrast the demand to social norms, while also responding to the worry that the demand might encourage us to ‘encroach’ on the lives of others, arguing in the second chapter of his book that we cannot escape this problem by seeking relationships that involve an intimacy which somehow does away with any mediation between individuals.
本章涵盖了K. E. l . øgstrup的《道德需求》的“引言”，以及该书的前两章。这些为洛格斯特鲁普对道德需求的描述提供了基础，通过将其与耶稣爱我们邻居的宣言联系起来，同时展示了需求是如何从人类的相互依存中产生的，这种相互依存可以通过信任的关键例子来说明。洛格斯特鲁普也为关心他人的需求是“无言的”或“沉默的”这一说法进行了辩护，并开始将这种需求与社会规范进行对比，同时也回应了这种需求可能会鼓励我们“侵犯”他人生活的担忧，他在书的第二章中辩称，我们无法通过寻求涉及亲密关系的关系来逃避这个问题，这种关系在某种程度上消除了个人之间的任何调解。
{"title":"The Ethical Demand and Its Basis","authors":"R. Stern","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter covers the ‘Introduction’ to K. E. Løgstrup’s The Ethical Demand, and the first two chapters of the book. These provide the foundation for Løgstrup’s account of the ethical demand, by relating it to Jesus’s proclamation to love our neighbour, while showing how the demand grows out of the interdependence of human beings, an interdependence that can be illustrated through the key example of trust. Løgstrup also defends the claim that the demand to care for the other is ‘unspoken’ or ‘silent’, and begins to contrast the demand to social norms, while also responding to the worry that the demand might encourage us to ‘encroach’ on the lives of others, arguing in the second chapter of his book that we cannot escape this problem by seeking relationships that involve an intimacy which somehow does away with any mediation between individuals.","PeriodicalId":184927,"journal":{"name":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124033672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0003
R. Stern
This chapter covers Chapters 5 and 6 of The Ethical Demand. Having distinguished the ethical demand from social norms, Løgstrup now turns to consider where this leaves him in relation to Christian ethics, and his claim to be operating from a ‘purely human’ standpoint. While he resists the suggestion that Christianity can break the ‘silence’ of the demand by providing it with a content that rests on religious doctrines, Løgstrup also claims that the ethical demand only makes sense if we consider life to be a gift, which raises the interpretative question whether for Løgstrup the giver of this gift is God, or whether this idea can be made sense of in more secular terms.
{"title":"Christian Ethics and Life as a Gift","authors":"R. Stern","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter covers Chapters 5 and 6 of The Ethical Demand. Having distinguished the ethical demand from social norms, Løgstrup now turns to consider where this leaves him in relation to Christian ethics, and his claim to be operating from a ‘purely human’ standpoint. While he resists the suggestion that Christianity can break the ‘silence’ of the demand by providing it with a content that rests on religious doctrines, Løgstrup also claims that the ethical demand only makes sense if we consider life to be a gift, which raises the interpretative question whether for Løgstrup the giver of this gift is God, or whether this idea can be made sense of in more secular terms.","PeriodicalId":184927,"journal":{"name":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129653945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0005
R. Stern
This chapter covers Chapters 10 and 11 of The Ethical Demand, which focus on how Løgstrup sees the demand in relation to science on the one hand, and poetry on the other. In relation to science, Løgstrup argues for a form of philosophy that might be seen to challenge the ‘anti-metaphysical’ assumptions of scientific thinking, particularly in the way his account attributes a kind of normative authority to the demand as standing in judgement over our actions. Løgstrup also considers how far certain kinds of scientific determinism might pose a challenge to ethics, arguing that this challenge can be resisted. In Chapter 11, Løgstrup asks whether poetry can have implications for ethics, suggesting poetry can break through the triviality in which our lives are often lived, thus making us properly attentive to the world that surrounds us, including other people.
{"title":"Ethics, Science, and Poetry","authors":"R. Stern","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter covers Chapters 10 and 11 of The Ethical Demand, which focus on how Løgstrup sees the demand in relation to science on the one hand, and poetry on the other. In relation to science, Løgstrup argues for a form of philosophy that might be seen to challenge the ‘anti-metaphysical’ assumptions of scientific thinking, particularly in the way his account attributes a kind of normative authority to the demand as standing in judgement over our actions. Løgstrup also considers how far certain kinds of scientific determinism might pose a challenge to ethics, arguing that this challenge can be resisted. In Chapter 11, Løgstrup asks whether poetry can have implications for ethics, suggesting poetry can break through the triviality in which our lives are often lived, thus making us properly attentive to the world that surrounds us, including other people.","PeriodicalId":184927,"journal":{"name":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122874672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0006
R. Stern
This chapter focuses on Chapter 12 of The Ethical Demand, while offering a concluding interpretation of the book as a whole. In Chapter 12, Løgstrup returns to the proclamation of Jesus, and what it is that makes his proclamation a religious matter, not a merely secular one. Løgstrup suggests that Jesus proclaims God’s forgiveness for failing to meet the demand, and so speaks on divine authority. He also suggests that such forgiveness can only come from God, as human beings are all equally prone to failure and so are not in a position to forgive each other, as they are not in a position to blame them either. Thus, whereas the demand is comprehensible in strictly human terms, divine forgiveness belongs to the unforeseen part of Jesus’s proclamation, but not in a way that jeopardizes Løgstrup’s claim to have made the ethical demand itself comprehensible from a human standpoint.
{"title":"Forgiveness and the Limits of Ethics","authors":"R. Stern","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on Chapter 12 of The Ethical Demand, while offering a concluding interpretation of the book as a whole. In Chapter 12, Løgstrup returns to the proclamation of Jesus, and what it is that makes his proclamation a religious matter, not a merely secular one. Løgstrup suggests that Jesus proclaims God’s forgiveness for failing to meet the demand, and so speaks on divine authority. He also suggests that such forgiveness can only come from God, as human beings are all equally prone to failure and so are not in a position to forgive each other, as they are not in a position to blame them either. Thus, whereas the demand is comprehensible in strictly human terms, divine forgiveness belongs to the unforeseen part of Jesus’s proclamation, but not in a way that jeopardizes Løgstrup’s claim to have made the ethical demand itself comprehensible from a human standpoint.","PeriodicalId":184927,"journal":{"name":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125118124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0010
R. Stern
This chapter contrasts Løgstrup’s position with the account of moral obligation offered by Stephen Darwall, which bases obligation on second-personal authority. The chapter begins by setting out Darwall’s position (§10.1). It then focuses on three respects in which he could seem to claim an advantage over Løgstrup: namely, in the way he links obligations to rights; in the place he gives to respect for autonomy in his account; and in the greater explanatory resources he has available to make sense of the idea of moral obligation (§10.2). The chapter then considers responses that Løgstrup might give to these challenges (§10.3), arguing that Løgstrup’s objection to the command account of obligation is also telling against Darwall.
{"title":"Dealing with Darwall","authors":"R. Stern","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter contrasts Løgstrup’s position with the account of moral obligation offered by Stephen Darwall, which bases obligation on second-personal authority. The chapter begins by setting out Darwall’s position (§10.1). It then focuses on three respects in which he could seem to claim an advantage over Løgstrup: namely, in the way he links obligations to rights; in the place he gives to respect for autonomy in his account; and in the greater explanatory resources he has available to make sense of the idea of moral obligation (§10.2). The chapter then considers responses that Løgstrup might give to these challenges (§10.3), arguing that Løgstrup’s objection to the command account of obligation is also telling against Darwall.","PeriodicalId":184927,"journal":{"name":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122312505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0004
R. Stern
This chapter covers Chapters 7 to 9 of The Ethical Demand. In these chapters, Løgstrup considers how it is that the demand enters our life as a demand, which happens when natural love fails, and we therefore come to feel under some obligation to do what we would have done, had we loved the other person properly. The demand is thus characterized as unfulfillable, as once it arises, we have already failed to love and so to respond to the other in the right way. Nonetheless, Løgstrup argues, we cannot use this unfulfillability to claim that the demand no longer applies to us, as the failure to love is our fault, while any goodness must be attributed to life and not ourselves. This failure is reflected in the many and various ways which we find to wriggle out of facing up to the demand and what it requires of us.
{"title":"The Ethical Demand and the Failure of Love","authors":"R. Stern","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829027.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter covers Chapters 7 to 9 of The Ethical Demand. In these chapters, Løgstrup considers how it is that the demand enters our life as a demand, which happens when natural love fails, and we therefore come to feel under some obligation to do what we would have done, had we loved the other person properly. The demand is thus characterized as unfulfillable, as once it arises, we have already failed to love and so to respond to the other in the right way. Nonetheless, Løgstrup argues, we cannot use this unfulfillability to claim that the demand no longer applies to us, as the failure to love is our fault, while any goodness must be attributed to life and not ourselves. This failure is reflected in the many and various ways which we find to wriggle out of facing up to the demand and what it requires of us.","PeriodicalId":184927,"journal":{"name":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128359516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0002
R. Stern
This chapter covers Chapters 3 and 4 of The Ethical Demand. In these chapters, Løgstrup adds to his characterization of the demand by claiming that it is ‘radical’. He explains this radicality in terms of various further key features, including the way it may intrude on our lives and pick us out as individuals, while even the enemy is included in the requirement on us to care. At the same time, Løgstrup argues that we do not have the right to make the demand, while also denying that it is ‘limitless’. The features of the demand that make it radical distinguish it from the social norms, while the unconditional and absolute nature of the demand contrasts with the variable character of such norms, a contrast which he uses to respond to the challenge of relativism.
{"title":"The Ethical Demand and Social Norms","authors":"R. Stern","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198829027.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter covers Chapters 3 and 4 of The Ethical Demand. In these chapters, Løgstrup adds to his characterization of the demand by claiming that it is ‘radical’. He explains this radicality in terms of various further key features, including the way it may intrude on our lives and pick us out as individuals, while even the enemy is included in the requirement on us to care. At the same time, Løgstrup argues that we do not have the right to make the demand, while also denying that it is ‘limitless’. The features of the demand that make it radical distinguish it from the social norms, while the unconditional and absolute nature of the demand contrasts with the variable character of such norms, a contrast which he uses to respond to the challenge of relativism.","PeriodicalId":184927,"journal":{"name":"The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133614948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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