This paper examines the impact of accounting information on first the cost of municipal bond insurance and secondly on the credit rating awarded on municipal debt, using data disclosed under Statement No. 34 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB 34) for insured general obligation debt issued by Texas cities. It finds that both governmental fund and government‐wide financial information is related to the cost of municipal bond insurance and the credit rating on municipal debt. The paper also shows that the utilization of accounting information by bond insurers is not identical to its use by a bond rating agency.
{"title":"The Influence of Accounting Information Disclosed Under GASB Statement No. 34 on Municipal Bond Insurance Premiums and Credit Ratings","authors":"Earl D. Benson, Barry R. Marks","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12035","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact of accounting information on first the cost of municipal bond insurance and secondly on the credit rating awarded on municipal debt, using data disclosed under Statement No. 34 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB 34) for insured general obligation debt issued by Texas cities. It finds that both governmental fund and government‐wide financial information is related to the cost of municipal bond insurance and the credit rating on municipal debt. The paper also shows that the utilization of accounting information by bond insurers is not identical to its use by a bond rating agency.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114743343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Federal and state regulators are currently considering the imposition of capital requirements and other prudential rules on various classes of non-bank financial institutions, including insurers and mortgage servicers. This report examines some of the issues involving non-bank financial companies with a focus on non-bank loan mortgage originators and/or servicers (“seller/servicers”) in the context of the evolving discussion among regulators and researchers toward developing “appropriate” regulation and supervision like that traditionally applied to insured depository institutions (IDIs).
{"title":"Capital Requirements for Non-Bank Mortgage Companies","authors":"R. C. Whalen, Marjan Riggi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2447287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2447287","url":null,"abstract":"Federal and state regulators are currently considering the imposition of capital requirements and other prudential rules on various classes of non-bank financial institutions, including insurers and mortgage servicers. This report examines some of the issues involving non-bank financial companies with a focus on non-bank loan mortgage originators and/or servicers (“seller/servicers”) in the context of the evolving discussion among regulators and researchers toward developing “appropriate” regulation and supervision like that traditionally applied to insured depository institutions (IDIs).","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132427886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The economic destruction of the foreclosure crisis and the Great Recession included not only the 4.5 million families who lost their homes and 8 million workers who lost their jobs, but the crippling aftereffect of poor credit histories that affected the ability of these consumers to obtain affordable credit, jobs, rental housing, and insurance. This white paper explores these aftereffects and proposes solutions to help afflicted consumers. It reviews both the harm to individual consumers and the wider impact on economic recovery. It also documents the credit reporting problems caused by errors and anomalies, and discusses the broader problem of relying on past credit history to judge future performance, arguing that such a broad-brush approach fails to distinguish between consumers who are simply unlucky and those who are truly irresponsible. Finally, the paper makes several policy recommendations to assist consumers whose credit reports were damaged by the foreclosure crisis and Great Recession.
{"title":"Solving the Credit Conundrum: Helping Consumers’ Credit Records Impaired by the Foreclosure Crisis and Great Recession","authors":"C. Wu","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2398540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2398540","url":null,"abstract":"The economic destruction of the foreclosure crisis and the Great Recession included not only the 4.5 million families who lost their homes and 8 million workers who lost their jobs, but the crippling aftereffect of poor credit histories that affected the ability of these consumers to obtain affordable credit, jobs, rental housing, and insurance. This white paper explores these aftereffects and proposes solutions to help afflicted consumers. It reviews both the harm to individual consumers and the wider impact on economic recovery. It also documents the credit reporting problems caused by errors and anomalies, and discusses the broader problem of relying on past credit history to judge future performance, arguing that such a broad-brush approach fails to distinguish between consumers who are simply unlucky and those who are truly irresponsible. Finally, the paper makes several policy recommendations to assist consumers whose credit reports were damaged by the foreclosure crisis and Great Recession.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115496908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I survey the state of the mortgage loan transfer system, the legal rules that govern it, and the widening gap between those rules and the practices in the secondary mortgage market just prior to the 2008 crisis. The review includes some empirical assessment of the extent of errors and execution problems; the damage done by “robo-signing;” the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) and note delivery practices; and the extent to which courts will prevent or reverse foreclosure sales based on those errors and problems. I then examine why existing legal structures, for both paper-based and electronic transfers, are not working, and the extent to which they have failed, I also identify the key consumer and investor protection values and interests (finality, transparency, fraud protection, and so forth) that must be addressed by the law governing secondary market transfers of home loans. I conclude by outlining options for reforming the mortgage loan transfer system, including the use of a single document merging the note and mortgage, and a structure for the registration of a single authoritative electronic version of the mortgage/note and of all changes in parties to, and terms of, the transaction.
{"title":"Losing the Paper – Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer Protection","authors":"Alan M. White","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2168189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2168189","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I survey the state of the mortgage loan transfer system, the legal rules that govern it, and the widening gap between those rules and the practices in the secondary mortgage market just prior to the 2008 crisis. The review includes some empirical assessment of the extent of errors and execution problems; the damage done by “robo-signing;” the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) and note delivery practices; and the extent to which courts will prevent or reverse foreclosure sales based on those errors and problems. I then examine why existing legal structures, for both paper-based and electronic transfers, are not working, and the extent to which they have failed, I also identify the key consumer and investor protection values and interests (finality, transparency, fraud protection, and so forth) that must be addressed by the law governing secondary market transfers of home loans. I conclude by outlining options for reforming the mortgage loan transfer system, including the use of a single document merging the note and mortgage, and a structure for the registration of a single authoritative electronic version of the mortgage/note and of all changes in parties to, and terms of, the transaction.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115626811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A recent decision applies California’s deficiency bar to the holder of a second mortgage note despite its previous transfer by the holder of the first.
{"title":"Bank of America v. Mitchell (2012) 204 CA4th 1199","authors":"R. Bernhardt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2096380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2096380","url":null,"abstract":"A recent decision applies California’s deficiency bar to the holder of a second mortgage note despite its previous transfer by the holder of the first.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"10 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126951634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In about a quarter of US states, all residential mortgages are essentially non-recourse, meaning that in case of default, the lender can only repossess the house but cannot collect on the private assets and future income of the borrower. This American innovation is now beginning to attract extensive interest abroad, but ironically in the US itself is getting a bad name. The law has been blamed for exacerbating the financial crisis, while stricken homeowners who take advantage of it have been scolded by lenders and even by the Secretary of the Treasury. We propose a fresh and more balanced look at mandatory non-recourse. Contrary to the view that non-recourse regimes lead to a vicious cycle of defaults, we point out that overall default rates have not in fact been meaningfully higher in non-recourse states. Contrary to the view that non-recourse is merely a populist response to over-indebtedness, we present a number of cogent policy justifications for it. Non-recourse can encourage fresh start with less impact on the credit market than bankruptcy; research shows that stricken homeowners are more likely to declare bankruptcy in recourse states. Non-recourse can enhance the accountability of lenders for mortgages. It can provide homeowners with a measure of insurance against loss of home value in cases where this protection would not be provided in the unregulated market due to market failure. We conclude that non-recourse legislation deserves serious, research-based consideration.
{"title":"Non-Recourse Mortgages – A Fresh Start","authors":"Ron Harris, A. Meir","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2028454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2028454","url":null,"abstract":"In about a quarter of US states, all residential mortgages are essentially non-recourse, meaning that in case of default, the lender can only repossess the house but cannot collect on the private assets and future income of the borrower. This American innovation is now beginning to attract extensive interest abroad, but ironically in the US itself is getting a bad name. The law has been blamed for exacerbating the financial crisis, while stricken homeowners who take advantage of it have been scolded by lenders and even by the Secretary of the Treasury. We propose a fresh and more balanced look at mandatory non-recourse. Contrary to the view that non-recourse regimes lead to a vicious cycle of defaults, we point out that overall default rates have not in fact been meaningfully higher in non-recourse states. Contrary to the view that non-recourse is merely a populist response to over-indebtedness, we present a number of cogent policy justifications for it. Non-recourse can encourage fresh start with less impact on the credit market than bankruptcy; research shows that stricken homeowners are more likely to declare bankruptcy in recourse states. Non-recourse can enhance the accountability of lenders for mortgages. It can provide homeowners with a measure of insurance against loss of home value in cases where this protection would not be provided in the unregulated market due to market failure. We conclude that non-recourse legislation deserves serious, research-based consideration.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116837842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mortgages characterized by negative or low early amortization schedules amplify the macroeconomic effects of a housing risk shock. We analyze the role of mortgage amortization in a two-sector DSGE model with housing risk and endogenous default. Mortgage loan contracts extend to two periods and have adjustable rates. The fraction of principal to be repaid in the first period can vary. As the fraction of principal to be paid in the first period falls, steady-state mortgages and leverage increase and the impact of a housing risk shock on consumption and output is amplified. Borrowers prefer negative amortization. If free to choose the amortization schedule, borrowers would repay most of the principal in the last period of the contract. Low early repayments of principal allow borrowers to hold on to their housing stock and postpone default to the second period having incurred small sunk costs.
{"title":"Mortgage Amortization and Amplification","authors":"Luisa Lambertini, Chiara Forlati","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2008617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2008617","url":null,"abstract":"Mortgages characterized by negative or low early amortization schedules amplify the macroeconomic effects of a housing risk shock. We analyze the role of mortgage amortization in a two-sector DSGE model with housing risk and endogenous default. Mortgage loan contracts extend to two periods and have adjustable rates. The fraction of principal to be repaid in the first period can vary. As the fraction of principal to be paid in the first period falls, steady-state mortgages and leverage increase and the impact of a housing risk shock on consumption and output is amplified. Borrowers prefer negative amortization. If free to choose the amortization schedule, borrowers would repay most of the principal in the last period of the contract. Low early repayments of principal allow borrowers to hold on to their housing stock and postpone default to the second period having incurred small sunk costs.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124889872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This White Paper provides background information and explanation in support of passage of the statute that we have drafted -- the Home Mortgage Bridge Loan Assistance Act of 2012 -- by the legislature of New York. Many homeowners now faced with the threat of foreclosure are only temporarily in distress owing to transitory income loss rooted in temporary unemployment or underemployment. In consequence many foreclosures, along with their many harmful effects upon home prices as well as neighborhoods and families, can be avoided at very low cost through bridge loan assistance programs. Pennsylvania's highly successful HEMAP program, instituted in the early 1980s, is a conspicuous case in point. Our draft statute aims to replicate the benefits of HEMAP while also incorporating lessons learned in the several decades since HEMAP's implementation.
{"title":"White Paper In Support of The Home Mortgage Bridge Loan Assistance Act of 2012","authors":"R. Hockett, Michael Campbell","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1987159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1987159","url":null,"abstract":"This White Paper provides background information and explanation in support of passage of the statute that we have drafted -- the Home Mortgage Bridge Loan Assistance Act of 2012 -- by the legislature of New York. Many homeowners now faced with the threat of foreclosure are only temporarily in distress owing to transitory income loss rooted in temporary unemployment or underemployment. In consequence many foreclosures, along with their many harmful effects upon home prices as well as neighborhoods and families, can be avoided at very low cost through bridge loan assistance programs. Pennsylvania's highly successful HEMAP program, instituted in the early 1980s, is a conspicuous case in point. Our draft statute aims to replicate the benefits of HEMAP while also incorporating lessons learned in the several decades since HEMAP's implementation.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122076356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Analysis of a California decision applying usury sanctions to third party investors.
加州对第三方投资者实施高利贷制裁的决定分析。
{"title":"Creative Ventures, LLC v Jim Ward & Assocs.: (2011) 195 CA4th 1430, - CR3d","authors":"R. Bernhardt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1956228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1956228","url":null,"abstract":"Analysis of a California decision applying usury sanctions to third party investors.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114487828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we focus on the concern that a preference for quick sales over traditional reorganization cases - which we see in both the United States and Canada - might allow the debtor’s management to work with secured lenders to extract assets from the debtor in a way that would not be possible in a “normal” bankruptcy case. In particular, we examine how a quick sale can be used to cleanse assets of their association with environmental claims. We also consider how the insolvency systems in our respective countries might adapt to address this problem. Ultimately, the best protection for involuntary creditors, including environmental creditors, is to maximize the value of the debtor’s assets. That counsels for improving stakeholders’ ability to monitor the sale process and ensure that the sale process in not rushed for the sole benefit of senior creditors.
{"title":"Involuntary Creditors and Corporate Bankruptcy","authors":"S. Lubben, Stephanie Ben-Ishai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1938599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1938599","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we focus on the concern that a preference for quick sales over traditional reorganization cases - which we see in both the United States and Canada - might allow the debtor’s management to work with secured lenders to extract assets from the debtor in a way that would not be possible in a “normal” bankruptcy case. In particular, we examine how a quick sale can be used to cleanse assets of their association with environmental claims. We also consider how the insolvency systems in our respective countries might adapt to address this problem. Ultimately, the best protection for involuntary creditors, including environmental creditors, is to maximize the value of the debtor’s assets. That counsels for improving stakeholders’ ability to monitor the sale process and ensure that the sale process in not rushed for the sole benefit of senior creditors.","PeriodicalId":196559,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Consumer Credit Issues (Sub-Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126528927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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