Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.4467/20801335pbw.23.025.18767
Ryszard Oleszkowicz
{"title":"Jacek Bartosiak, Najlepsze miejsce na świecie. Gdzie Wschód zderza się z Zachodem","authors":"Ryszard Oleszkowicz","doi":"10.4467/20801335pbw.23.025.18767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.025.18767","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":196713,"journal":{"name":"Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego","volume":"36 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138984325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.4467/20801335pbw.23.019.18761
Anna Maria Dyner
W artykule autorka opisuje, w jaki sposób stosowaną w psychologii zasadę lustra, polegającą na odnajdywaniu w innych ludziach cech, które jednostka usiłuje wyprzeć, można wykorzystać do typowania potencjalnych zagrożeń ze strony Rosji i Białorusi. Wysuwa hipotezę, że dzięki analizie największych zagrożeń wymienianych przez te państwa, m.in. w dokumentach strategicznych, można wnioskować, zgodnie z zasadą lustra, w jakich sferach będą one najaktywniej prowadzić wrogie działania wobec członków NATO. Wskazuje m.in. działania hybrydowe, które Rosja i współpracująca z nią Białoruś mogą podjąć względem państw zachodnich, jednak bez do-głębnej analizy tych zagadnień. Tym samym artykuł nie wyczerpuje tematu, a jedynie stanowi próbę zasygnalizowania jednej z metod analizy zagrożeń płynących z Rosji i Białorusi. The mirror principle in assessing hybrid threats emanating from Russia and Belarus: In this article, the author describes how the mirror principle used in psychology, which is based on finding in other people traits that an individual tries to suppress, can be used to identify potential threats from Russia and Belarus. She puts forward the hypothesis that by analysing the greatest threats mentioned by these countries, e.g. in strategic documents, it is possible to deduce, according to the principle of the mirror, in which spheres they will most actively conduct hostile actions against NATO members. Among other things, the hybrid actions that Russia and cooperating Belarus may take against Western states are indicated, but without an in-depth analysis of these issues. Thus, the article does not exhaust the topic, but merely attempts to signal one method of analysing the threats emanating from Russia and Belarus.
{"title":"Zasada lustra w ocenie zagrożeń hybrydowych płynących z Rosji i Białorusi","authors":"Anna Maria Dyner","doi":"10.4467/20801335pbw.23.019.18761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.019.18761","url":null,"abstract":"W artykule autorka opisuje, w jaki sposób stosowaną w psychologii zasadę lustra, polegającą na odnajdywaniu w innych ludziach cech, które jednostka usiłuje wyprzeć, można wykorzystać do typowania potencjalnych zagrożeń ze strony Rosji i Białorusi. Wysuwa hipotezę, że dzięki analizie największych zagrożeń wymienianych przez te państwa, m.in. w dokumentach strategicznych, można wnioskować, zgodnie z zasadą lustra, w jakich sferach będą one najaktywniej prowadzić wrogie działania wobec członków NATO. Wskazuje m.in. działania hybrydowe, które Rosja i współpracująca z nią Białoruś mogą podjąć względem państw zachodnich, jednak bez do-głębnej analizy tych zagadnień. Tym samym artykuł nie wyczerpuje tematu, a jedynie stanowi próbę zasygnalizowania jednej z metod analizy zagrożeń płynących z Rosji i Białorusi.\u0000\u0000The mirror principle in assessing hybrid threats emanating from Russia and Belarus: In this article, the author describes how the mirror principle used in psychology, which is based on finding in other people traits that an individual tries to suppress, can be used to identify potential threats from Russia and Belarus. She puts forward the hypothesis that by analysing the greatest threats mentioned by these countries, e.g. in strategic documents, it is possible to deduce, according to the principle of the mirror, in which spheres they will most actively conduct hostile actions against NATO members. Among other things, the hybrid actions that Russia and cooperating Belarus may take against Western states are indicated, but without an in-depth analysis of these issues. Thus, the article does not exhaust the topic, but merely attempts to signal one method of analysing the threats emanating from Russia and Belarus.","PeriodicalId":196713,"journal":{"name":"Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego","volume":"28 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138984421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.4467/20801335pbw.23.029.18771
J. Keplin
Ensuring security in an increasingly complex and uncertain world requires states to address a number of challenges. These include the need to remain cooperative in the international space and the need to pursue their strategic objectives. Often these are followed up by intentional or unintentional threats that can effectively destabilise not only a single state, but also an entire region. Their emergence may be the result of a lack of resilience against hostile actions by state or non-state actors who, in order to achieve their objectives, undertake, among other things, hybrid activities. However, the terms ‘state resilience’ and ‘hybrid activities’ are insufficiently precisely formulated in the literature and described in a conceptual rather than a definitional manner. Both national and NATO documents lack universally accepted definitions of these terms. The aim of this article is to present the concept of building state resilience to hybrid activities.
{"title":"Building state resilience against hybrid activities","authors":"J. Keplin","doi":"10.4467/20801335pbw.23.029.18771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.029.18771","url":null,"abstract":"Ensuring security in an increasingly complex and uncertain world requires states to address a number of challenges. These include the need to remain cooperative in the international space and the need to pursue their strategic objectives. Often these are followed up by intentional or unintentional threats that can effectively destabilise not only a single state, but also an entire region. Their emergence may be the result of a lack of resilience against hostile actions by state or non-state actors who, in order to achieve their objectives, undertake, among other things, hybrid activities. However, the terms ‘state resilience’ and ‘hybrid activities’ are insufficiently precisely formulated in the literature and described in a conceptual rather than a definitional manner. Both national and NATO documents lack universally accepted definitions of these terms. The aim of this article is to present the concept of building state resilience to hybrid activities.","PeriodicalId":196713,"journal":{"name":"Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego","volume":"25 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138984131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.4467/20801335pbw.23.023.18765
Bolesław Piasecki
Artykuł jest poświęcony zbadaniu przyczyn anomalii jakościowych i ilościowych w zakresie działalności agentów penetracyjnych w ramach systemu bezpieczeństwa Republiki Łotwy oraz innych państw NATO w okresie po rozpadzie Związku Sowieckiego. Autor przed-stawia wybrane przypadki szpiegostwa na terenie Republiki Łotwy i proponuje wyjaśnienia rozbieżności między tym krajem bałtyckim i innymi państwami NATO w liczbie wykrytych agentów. Anomalies in the activities of counterintelligence services. The case of the Republic of Latvia: The article is devoted to examining the causes of qualitative and quantitative anomalies in the activity of penetration agents within the security system of the Republic of Latvia and other NATO countries in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The author presents selected cases of espionage within the Republic of Latvia and proposes explanations for the discrepancies between this Baltic country and other NATO countries in the number of detected agents.
{"title":"Anomalie w działalności służb kontrwywiadowczych. Przypadek Republiki Łotwy","authors":"Bolesław Piasecki","doi":"10.4467/20801335pbw.23.023.18765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.023.18765","url":null,"abstract":"Artykuł jest poświęcony zbadaniu przyczyn anomalii jakościowych i ilościowych w zakresie działalności agentów penetracyjnych w ramach systemu bezpieczeństwa Republiki Łotwy oraz innych państw NATO w okresie po rozpadzie Związku Sowieckiego. Autor przed-stawia wybrane przypadki szpiegostwa na terenie Republiki Łotwy i proponuje wyjaśnienia rozbieżności między tym krajem bałtyckim i innymi państwami NATO w liczbie wykrytych agentów.\u0000\u0000Anomalies in the activities of counterintelligence services. The case of the Republic of Latvia: The article is devoted to examining the causes of qualitative and quantitative anomalies in the activity of penetration agents within the security system of the Republic of Latvia and other NATO countries in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The author presents selected cases of espionage within the Republic of Latvia and proposes explanations for the discrepancies between this Baltic country and other NATO countries in the number of detected agents.","PeriodicalId":196713,"journal":{"name":"Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego","volume":"24 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138984209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.4467/20801335pbw.23.028.18770
Michał Frejlich
Współcześnie wojska specjalne są elitą sił zbrojnych. Zarówno Stany Zjednoczone, jak i Rzeczpospolita Polska dysponują siłami operacji specjalnych, które wielokrotnie współpracowały ze sobą w ramach szkoleń i działań bojowych. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przeanalizowanie i wskazanie podobieństw pomiędzy wybranymi jednostkami specjalnymi Stanów Zjednoczonych a Jednostką Woj-skową GROM na podstawie porównania odpowiadających sobie formacji. Jednostki uznane przez autora za swoje odpowiedniki zostały porównane w czterech kategoriach: 1) przeznaczenie, 2) historia powstawania i rozwój w początkowym okresie istnienia, 3) aktlalna organizacja, 4) selekcja i trening. The influence of the United States on the Special Mission Unit GROM in 1989-2021 in a comparative perspective: Special forces are the elite of modern armed forces. Both the United States and the Republic of Poland have special operations forces that have repeatedly cooperated with each other in training and combat operations. The aim of this study is to examine and describe the similarities between selected special operations units of the United States and the Special Mission Unit GROM on the basis of comparison of corresponding formations. The units considered by the author as their counterparts were compared based on four categories: 1) purpose, 2) unit’s history and development in the initial period, 3) contemporary organization, 4) selection and training.
{"title":"Wpływ Stanów Zjednoczonych na Jednostkę Wojskową GROM w latach 1989–2021 w perspektywie porównawczej","authors":"Michał Frejlich","doi":"10.4467/20801335pbw.23.028.18770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.028.18770","url":null,"abstract":"Współcześnie wojska specjalne są elitą sił zbrojnych. Zarówno Stany Zjednoczone, jak i Rzeczpospolita Polska dysponują siłami operacji specjalnych, które wielokrotnie współpracowały ze sobą w ramach szkoleń i działań bojowych. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przeanalizowanie i wskazanie podobieństw pomiędzy wybranymi jednostkami specjalnymi Stanów Zjednoczonych a Jednostką Woj-skową GROM na podstawie porównania odpowiadających sobie formacji. Jednostki uznane przez autora za swoje odpowiedniki zostały porównane w czterech kategoriach: 1) przeznaczenie, 2) historia powstawania i rozwój w początkowym okresie istnienia, 3) aktlalna organizacja, 4) selekcja i trening.\u0000\u0000The influence of the United States on the Special Mission Unit GROM in 1989-2021 in a comparative perspective: Special forces are the elite of modern armed forces. Both the United States and the Republic of Poland have special operations forces that have repeatedly cooperated with each other in training and combat operations. The aim of this study is to examine and describe the similarities between selected special operations units of the United States and the Special Mission Unit GROM on the basis of comparison of corresponding formations. The units considered by the author as their counterparts were compared based on four categories: 1) purpose, 2) unit’s history and development in the initial period, 3) contemporary organization, 4) selection and training.","PeriodicalId":196713,"journal":{"name":"Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego","volume":"25 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138984547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.4467/20801335pbw.23.032.18774
Józef Kozłowski
The phases of preparation, analysis, integration, initial interpretation of data and intelligence are relatively widely described in the literature. Only the field of assessing the certainty of sources and the reliability of data and intelligence has not kept pace with the development of other elements in the domain of information operations. In view of the increasing intensity of activities carried out by potential adversaries, the methods, techniques and tools currently in use should be critically evaluated and their limitations identified, and attempts should be made to develop and implement new processes and procedures. Above all, the capacity to prepare and communicate increasingly accurate assessments of the certainty of sources and the reliability of data and information must be enhanced. Therefore, it is necessary to: quantify the accuracy of the information, prepare new procedures and software, study the degree of information redundancy, its completeness and level of diagnosticity. Acquisition and analytical apparatus staff must be aware of existing limitations and search for ways to solve problems. Such a search should not focus on one-size-fits-all methods, but on a pragmatic approach to each element.
{"title":"Practical dimension of issues related to assessing the reliability of sources and the trustworthiness of data and information","authors":"Józef Kozłowski","doi":"10.4467/20801335pbw.23.032.18774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.032.18774","url":null,"abstract":"The phases of preparation, analysis, integration, initial interpretation of data and intelligence are relatively widely described in the literature. Only the field of assessing the certainty of sources and the reliability of data and intelligence has not kept pace with the development of other elements in the domain of information operations. In view of the increasing intensity of activities carried out by potential adversaries, the methods, techniques and tools currently in use should be critically evaluated and their limitations identified, and attempts should be made to develop and implement new processes and procedures. Above all, the capacity to prepare and communicate increasingly accurate assessments of the certainty of sources and the reliability of data and information must be enhanced. Therefore, it is necessary to: quantify the accuracy of the information, prepare new procedures and software, study the degree of information redundancy, its completeness and level of diagnosticity. Acquisition and analytical apparatus staff must be aware of existing limitations and search for ways to solve problems. Such a search should not focus on one-size-fits-all methods, but on a pragmatic approach to each element.","PeriodicalId":196713,"journal":{"name":"Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego","volume":"34 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138984047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.4467/20801335pbw.23.034.18776
Bolesław Piasecki
The article is devoted to examining the causes of qualitative and quantitative anomalies in the activity of penetration agents within the security system of the Republic of Latvia and other NATO countries in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The author presents selected cases of espionage within the Republic of Latvia and proposes explanations for the discrepancies between this Baltic country and other NATO countries in the number of detected agents.
{"title":"Anomalies in the activities of counterintelligence services. The case of the Republic of Latvia","authors":"Bolesław Piasecki","doi":"10.4467/20801335pbw.23.034.18776","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.034.18776","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to examining the causes of qualitative and quantitative anomalies in the activity of penetration agents within the security system of the Republic of Latvia and other NATO countries in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The author presents selected cases of espionage within the Republic of Latvia and proposes explanations for the discrepancies between this Baltic country and other NATO countries in the number of detected agents.","PeriodicalId":196713,"journal":{"name":"Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego","volume":"23 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138984256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.4467/20801335pbw.23.024.18766
Piotr Kosmaty
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie problematyki szczególnej prawnokarnej ochrony Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. W nawiązaniu do przedwojennego ustawodawstwa został poddany analizie art. 134 Kodeksu karnego, kryminalizujący zachowania będące zamachem na życie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, który postrzegany nie jako konkretna osoba, lecz jako podmiot uosabiający majestat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej jest jednym z głównych gwarantów sprawnego i niezakłóconego funkcjonowania organizmu państwowego. Zamach na osobę sprawującą ten urząd może być początkiem zarówno wewnętrznej, jak i zewnętrznej destabilizacji państwa, a zagrożenie jego bezpieczeństwa pojawia się już w momencie przygotowań do popełnienia tego przestępstwa. Autor nie neguje przy tym faktu, że ten przepis wzmacnia także ochronę życia i zdrowia tej osoby, uznaje jednak, że jest to uboczny przedmiot ochrony. W artykule przedstawiono argumenty przemawiające za penalizacją wszelkich zachowań noszących znamiona przygotowania do zbrodni zamachu na życie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wzorem twórców Kodeksu karnego z 1932 r. Assassination attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Poland pursuant to Article 134 of the Criminal Code: The aim of this article is to present the issue of special criminal law protection of the President of the Republic of Poland. With reference to pre-war legislation, Article 134 of the Criminal Code was analysed, which criminalises behaviour constituting an attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Poland, who, perceived not as a specific person but as an entity embodying the majesty of the Republic of Poland, is one of the main guarantors of the efficient and undisturbed functioning of the state organism. An assassination attempt on the holder of this office may be the beginning of both internal and external destabilisation of the state, and the threat to its security appears already at the moment of preparation to commit this crime. While the author of the article does not deny that this provision also strengthens the protection of this person’s life and health, he recognises that this is an incidental object of protection. The article presents arguments in favour of the criminalisation of any behaviour bearing the features of preparation for the crime of an attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Poland, following the example of the authors of the Criminal Code of 1932.
{"title":"Zamach na życie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w świetle art. 134 Kodeksu karnego","authors":"Piotr Kosmaty","doi":"10.4467/20801335pbw.23.024.18766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.024.18766","url":null,"abstract":"Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie problematyki szczególnej prawnokarnej ochrony Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. W nawiązaniu do przedwojennego ustawodawstwa został poddany analizie art. 134 Kodeksu karnego, kryminalizujący zachowania będące zamachem na życie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, który postrzegany nie jako konkretna osoba, lecz jako podmiot uosabiający majestat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej jest jednym z głównych gwarantów sprawnego i niezakłóconego funkcjonowania organizmu państwowego. Zamach na osobę sprawującą ten urząd może być początkiem zarówno wewnętrznej, jak i zewnętrznej destabilizacji państwa, a zagrożenie jego bezpieczeństwa pojawia się już w momencie przygotowań do popełnienia tego przestępstwa. Autor nie neguje przy tym faktu, że ten przepis wzmacnia także ochronę życia i zdrowia tej osoby, uznaje jednak, że jest to uboczny przedmiot ochrony. W artykule przedstawiono argumenty przemawiające za penalizacją wszelkich zachowań noszących znamiona przygotowania do zbrodni zamachu na życie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wzorem twórców Kodeksu karnego z 1932 r.\u0000\u0000Assassination attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Poland pursuant to Article 134 of the Criminal Code: The aim of this article is to present the issue of special criminal law protection of the President of the Republic of Poland. With reference to pre-war legislation, Article 134 of the Criminal Code was analysed, which criminalises behaviour constituting an attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Poland, who, perceived not as a specific person but as an entity embodying the majesty of the Republic of Poland, is one of the main guarantors of the efficient and undisturbed functioning of the state organism. An assassination attempt on the holder of this office may be the beginning of both internal and external destabilisation of the state, and the threat to its security appears already at the moment of preparation to commit this crime. While the author of the article does not deny that this provision also strengthens the protection of this person’s life and health, he recognises that this is an incidental object of protection. The article presents arguments in favour of the criminalisation of any behaviour bearing the features of preparation for the crime of an attempt on the life of the President of the Republic of Poland, following the example of the authors of the Criminal Code of 1932.","PeriodicalId":196713,"journal":{"name":"Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego","volume":"27 21","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138984371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.4467/20801335pbw.23.033.18775
Dominik Smyrgała
After regaining its independence in 1918, Poland faced a number of security challenges. The most important of these was survival in the face of revisionist steps taken by aggressive neighbours, including Germany and the USSR. One important aspect of this threat was to determine the risk of the Weimar Republic unleashing chemical warfare against the Second Republic. In order to cope with this intelligence task, the Second Department of Polish General Staff developed a number of instructions whose structure and internal logic is comparable to the indicator analysis technique developed only 60 years later by the American Intelligence Community. On the basis of material preserved in the State Archive in Gdańsk and contemporary textbooks on information analysis techniques, it is shown how officers of Polish military intelligence, decades before the method of indicator analysis was formalised, developed their own way, which is essentially identical to it. This demonstrates the remarkable innovation and organisational capacity of the newly forming intelligence service of the reborn state.
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Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.4467/20801335pbw.23.022.18764
Dominik Smyrgała
Po odzyskaniu niepodległości w 1918 r. Polska stanęła przed wieloma wyzwaniami związanymi z zapewnieniem sobie bezpieczeństwa. Najważniejszym z nich było przetrwanie w obliczu rewizjonistycznych kroków podejmowanych przez agresywnych sąsiadów, w tym Niemcy i ZSRR. Jednym z istotnych aspektów tego zagrożenia było określenie ryzyka rozpętania przez Republikę Weimarską wojny chemicznej przeciwko II Rzeczpospolitej. W celu poradzenia sobie z tym zadaniem wywiadowczym Oddział II SG WP opracował wiele instrukcji, których struktura i wewnętrzna logika jest porównywalna z techniką analizy indykatorów rozwiniętą dopiero 60 lat później przez amerykańską wspólnotę wywiadowczą. Na podstawie materiałów zachowanych w Archiwum Państwowym w Gdańsku oraz współczesnych podręczników dotyczących technik analizy informacji przedstawiono, jak oficerowie polskiego wywiadu wojskowego na dekady przed sformalizowaniem metody analizy indykatorów opracowali własny sposób, który w zasadzie jest z nią tożsamy. Dowodzi to niezwykłej innowacyjności i zdolności organizacyjnych formującej się dopiero służby wywiadowczej odrodzonego państwa. Indicator analysis as a way for the Second Department of Polish General Staff to counter the risk of chemical warfare being unleashed by Germany in the 1920s: After regaining its independence in 1918, Poland faced a number of security challenges. The most important of these was survival in the face of revisionist steps taken by aggressive neighbours, including Germany and the USSR. One important aspect of this threat was to determine the risk of the Weimar Republic unleashing chemical warfare against the Second Republic. In order to cope with this intelligence task, the Second Department of Polish General Staff developed a number of instructions whose structure and internal logic is comparable to the indicator analysis technique developed only 60 years later by the American Intelligence Community. On the basis of material preserved in the State Archive in Gdańsk and contemporary textbooks on information analysis techniques, it is shown how officers of Polish military intelligence, decades before the method of indicator analysis was formalised, developed their own way, which is essentially identical to it. This demonstrates the remarkable innovation and organisational capacity of the newly forming intelligence service of the reborn state.
{"title":"Analiza indykatorów jako sposób przeciwdziałania przez Oddział II SG WP ryzyku rozpętania wojny chemicznej przez Niemcy w latach 20. XX wieku","authors":"Dominik Smyrgała","doi":"10.4467/20801335pbw.23.022.18764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335pbw.23.022.18764","url":null,"abstract":"Po odzyskaniu niepodległości w 1918 r. Polska stanęła przed wieloma wyzwaniami związanymi z zapewnieniem sobie bezpieczeństwa. Najważniejszym z nich było przetrwanie w obliczu rewizjonistycznych kroków podejmowanych przez agresywnych sąsiadów, w tym Niemcy i ZSRR. Jednym z istotnych aspektów tego zagrożenia było określenie ryzyka rozpętania przez Republikę Weimarską wojny chemicznej przeciwko II Rzeczpospolitej. W celu poradzenia sobie z tym zadaniem wywiadowczym Oddział II SG WP opracował wiele instrukcji, których struktura i wewnętrzna logika jest porównywalna z techniką analizy indykatorów rozwiniętą dopiero 60 lat później przez amerykańską wspólnotę wywiadowczą. Na podstawie materiałów zachowanych w Archiwum Państwowym w Gdańsku oraz współczesnych podręczników dotyczących technik analizy informacji przedstawiono, jak oficerowie polskiego wywiadu wojskowego na dekady przed sformalizowaniem metody analizy indykatorów opracowali własny sposób, który w zasadzie jest z nią tożsamy. Dowodzi to niezwykłej innowacyjności i zdolności organizacyjnych formującej się dopiero służby wywiadowczej odrodzonego państwa.\u0000\u0000Indicator analysis as a way for the Second Department of Polish General Staff to counter the risk of chemical warfare being unleashed by Germany in the 1920s: After regaining its independence in 1918, Poland faced a number of security challenges. The most important of these was survival in the face of revisionist steps taken by aggressive neighbours, including Germany and the USSR. One important aspect of this threat was to determine the risk of the Weimar Republic unleashing chemical warfare against the Second Republic. In order to cope with this intelligence task, the Second Department of Polish General Staff developed a number of instructions whose structure and internal logic is comparable to the indicator analysis technique developed only 60 years later by the American Intelligence Community. On the basis of material preserved in the State Archive in Gdańsk and contemporary textbooks on information analysis techniques, it is shown how officers of Polish military intelligence, decades before the method of indicator analysis was formalised, developed their own way, which is essentially identical to it. This demonstrates the remarkable innovation and organisational capacity of the newly forming intelligence service of the reborn state.","PeriodicalId":196713,"journal":{"name":"Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego","volume":"25 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138984556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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