Pub Date : 2019-07-25DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846466.003.0001
N. Roughley
This chapter poses the question of whether humans might be essentially normative animals, i.e. whether traditionally prominent specificities of the human life form—our linguistic, social, and moral “natures”—might ground in a basic susceptibility, or proclivity to the deontic regulation of thought and behaviour: the “normative animal thesis.” The chapter lays out the issues at stake in attempting to answer this question. It divides into two main parts. The first begins by clarifying the—norm-related—concept of normativity at issue, distinguishing it from the—reason-related—conceptualisation current in meta-ethics and theories of rationality. It then discusses the primary candidates for generic features of norms, before dividing the normative animal thesis into various sub-claims. The second part presents the key questions at issue in the discussion of social, moral, and linguistic norms, comparing ways of conceiving them and marking the significance of such conceptualisations for the normative animal thesis.
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Pub Date : 2019-07-25DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846466.003.0012
N. Kompa
How might language have evolved and which (types of) norms, if any, might have played a role in shaping it? This chapter addresses these two questions by first exploring differences between human language and animal communication systems; the difference between natural signs, signals, and non-natural signs (symbols) will be elaborated. The author claims that normativity enters the picture only at the level of symbols. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to the question of what kinds of norms might have played a role in the evolution of symbolic communication. The author argues, firstly, that a certain level of cooperation is needed if non-natural signs are to be interpretable at all; secondly, a type of prudential norm emerges as signs acquire stable meaning; thirdly, interpretation of implicit communication is governed by pragmatic norms, too.
{"title":"Language Evolution and Linguistic Norms","authors":"N. Kompa","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190846466.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190846466.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"How might language have evolved and which (types of) norms, if any, might have played a role in shaping it? This chapter addresses these two questions by first exploring differences between human language and animal communication systems; the difference between natural signs, signals, and non-natural signs (symbols) will be elaborated. The author claims that normativity enters the picture only at the level of symbols. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to the question of what kinds of norms might have played a role in the evolution of symbolic communication. The author argues, firstly, that a certain level of cooperation is needed if non-natural signs are to be interpretable at all; secondly, a type of prudential norm emerges as signs acquire stable meaning; thirdly, interpretation of implicit communication is governed by pragmatic norms, too.","PeriodicalId":197122,"journal":{"name":"The Normative Animal?","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131557542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-25DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846466.003.0016
N. Roughley
The chapter examines the evidence for the normative animal thesis gathered in the contributions to this volume and pinpoints the issues that would have to be resolved in order for the thesis to be clearly true. It begins by approaching the question via the phenomena of social norms, which uncontroversially exist and pervasively structure human practice. The decisive question then concerns the extent to which key features of the deontic orientation at work among agents subject to these norms are also at work in moral and linguistic practice. The two key features identified in the chapter are that of normative action guidance and the assignment of deontic statuses, in particular of obligations and rights. It is argued that there are prospects for a sufficiently broad conception of these two features to allow for a generic conceptualisation of “normativity” or deonticity that is in play in all three areas.
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Pub Date : 2019-07-25DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780190846466.003.0004
Christoph Antweiler
Why are humans norm-addictive and what are the functions of norms in human cultures? This chapter inquires into social norms from the perspective of cultural anthropology. Cultural anthropologists investigate norms through long-term fieldwork of peoples in their natural settings and by systematic cross-cultural comparison. Core elements of the holistic anthropological concept of culture are concerned with social norms. The principal function of social norms is to allow for effective, coordinated, and predictable action in human collectives. Cross-cultural studies reveal that a strong orientation toward norms is universal. Most norms are learnt through socialization from family members or other kindred. Recent studies revealed that norms locally regarded as crucial often are transmitted by emotionally intensive teaching. The chapter also critically discusses some problems of interdisciplinary research into norms, such as the different understandings of “expected” and the dissimilar empirical accessibility of norms as psychic orientations among different primates.
{"title":"On the Human Addiction to Norms","authors":"Christoph Antweiler","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190846466.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190846466.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Why are humans norm-addictive and what are the functions of norms in human cultures? This chapter inquires into social norms from the perspective of cultural anthropology. Cultural anthropologists investigate norms through long-term fieldwork of peoples in their natural settings and by systematic cross-cultural comparison. Core elements of the holistic anthropological concept of culture are concerned with social norms. The principal function of social norms is to allow for effective, coordinated, and predictable action in human collectives. Cross-cultural studies reveal that a strong orientation toward norms is universal. Most norms are learnt through socialization from family members or other kindred. Recent studies revealed that norms locally regarded as crucial often are transmitted by emotionally intensive teaching. The chapter also critically discusses some problems of interdisciplinary research into norms, such as the different understandings of “expected” and the dissimilar empirical accessibility of norms as psychic orientations among different primates.","PeriodicalId":197122,"journal":{"name":"The Normative Animal?","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134628762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0003
P. Kappeler, C. Fichtel, C. V. van Schaik
This chapter explores the notion that the behavioural and cognitive constituents of human social norms have equivalents or precursors in humans’ closest living relatives, the non-human primates. Scrutiny of the definitions of various forms of conformity revealed, on the one hand, that some key features defining social norms are essentially impossible to infer in animals so that from a purist perspective, homologous equivalents of social norms cannot be demonstrated. On the other hand, this review revealed that functional equivalents or precursors of behavioural, emotional, and cognitive mechanisms constituting normative conformity are present and ubiquitous among (group-living haplorhine) non-human primates and that social patterns reflecting normative conformity have been described, hence supporting the authors’ main thesis that this salient aspect of human sociality, even though it may depend upon some uniquely derived features, has strong and long roots in the evolutionary history shared with other primates.
{"title":"There Ought to Be Roots","authors":"P. Kappeler, C. Fichtel, C. V. van Schaik","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the notion that the behavioural and cognitive constituents of human social norms have equivalents or precursors in humans’ closest living relatives, the non-human primates. Scrutiny of the definitions of various forms of conformity revealed, on the one hand, that some key features defining social norms are essentially impossible to infer in animals so that from a purist perspective, homologous equivalents of social norms cannot be demonstrated. On the other hand, this review revealed that functional equivalents or precursors of behavioural, emotional, and cognitive mechanisms constituting normative conformity are present and ubiquitous among (group-living haplorhine) non-human primates and that social patterns reflecting normative conformity have been described, hence supporting the authors’ main thesis that this salient aspect of human sociality, even though it may depend upon some uniquely derived features, has strong and long roots in the evolutionary history shared with other primates.","PeriodicalId":197122,"journal":{"name":"The Normative Animal?","volume":"219 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115860734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-18DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0007
C. V. van Schaik, Judith M Burkart
Normative behavior is a human universal that is intimately linked to morality. Morality is an adaptation to the specifically human subsistence niche of hunting and gathering, which is skill-intensive and therefore relies on transmission of opaque knowledge and involves critical interdependence, reliance on coordinated division of labor, and synchronized collective action. This lifestyle requires the presence of a variety of emotions that coevolved with it as the proximate mechanisms enabling this adaptive function. The high-urgency feel to many of these emotions reflects their functional importance: it serves to give them priority over other motivations. It is also what, to contemporary humans, makes them recognizable as moral. The key components of human morality are (1) prosocial emotions, and (2) an urge to conform. Together, they produce the urge to comply with moral norms. Normativity is thus an integral part of human morality. It evolved when two preferences came together. Strong informational conformity, needed to enable the transmission of opaque knowledge, was already present in the anthropoid primate ancestors of hominids and hominins. The added component evolved with the evolution of strong interdependence: a strong concern for one’s reputation and fear of punishment, and thus strongly prosocial emotions. Thus, the emergence of normativity in our ancestors does not require a special explanation: it was an automatic byproduct of the emergence of moral behavior in our ancestors.
{"title":"The Evolution of Human Normativity","authors":"C. V. van Schaik, Judith M Burkart","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Normative behavior is a human universal that is intimately linked to morality. Morality is an adaptation to the specifically human subsistence niche of hunting and gathering, which is skill-intensive and therefore relies on transmission of opaque knowledge and involves critical interdependence, reliance on coordinated division of labor, and synchronized collective action. This lifestyle requires the presence of a variety of emotions that coevolved with it as the proximate mechanisms enabling this adaptive function. The high-urgency feel to many of these emotions reflects their functional importance: it serves to give them priority over other motivations. It is also what, to contemporary humans, makes them recognizable as moral. The key components of human morality are (1) prosocial emotions, and (2) an urge to conform. Together, they produce the urge to comply with moral norms. Normativity is thus an integral part of human morality. It evolved when two preferences came together. Strong informational conformity, needed to enable the transmission of opaque knowledge, was already present in the anthropoid primate ancestors of hominids and hominins. The added component evolved with the evolution of strong interdependence: a strong concern for one’s reputation and fear of punishment, and thus strongly prosocial emotions. Thus, the emergence of normativity in our ancestors does not require a special explanation: it was an automatic byproduct of the emergence of moral behavior in our ancestors.","PeriodicalId":197122,"journal":{"name":"The Normative Animal?","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133428072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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