Organizations face unique challenges when simultaneously pursuing conflicting organization-level objectives. We study how frontline employees deal with competing financial and social objectives within the context of Emergency Medical Services. Using data from 31 US states, we find that even in the absence of direct financial incentives, emergency crews are responsive to the financial objective of their agencies by providing differential service to patients based on their ability to pay. Private insurance and Medicare patients receive more procedures (6.1% and 1.9%) and have longer transport times (5.3% and 4.0%) than Medicaid patients after controlling for call and patient characteristics. Importantly, we also find evidence suggesting that EMS crews vacillate between the financial and social objectives between calls, depending on the relative salience of the objective.
{"title":"Employee Dilemmas from Competing Organizational Objectives: Insights from Emergency Medical Services","authors":"Timothy Gubler, Haibo Liu, Alex Roman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3871392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3871392","url":null,"abstract":"Organizations face unique challenges when simultaneously pursuing conflicting organization-level objectives. We study how frontline employees deal with competing financial and social objectives within the context of Emergency Medical Services. Using data from 31 US states, we find that even in the absence of direct financial incentives, emergency crews are responsive to the financial objective of their agencies by providing differential service to patients based on their ability to pay. Private insurance and Medicare patients receive more procedures (6.1% and 1.9%) and have longer transport times (5.3% and 4.0%) than Medicaid patients after controlling for call and patient characteristics. Importantly, we also find evidence suggesting that EMS crews vacillate between the financial and social objectives between calls, depending on the relative salience of the objective.","PeriodicalId":201085,"journal":{"name":"BHNP: Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125864937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-profit organizations recently started to use virtual reality (VR) technology to inform the public about their causes, and for fundraising. It is assumed that 360° videos experienced with VR devices create empathy and understanding, and may increase donations. In this study, we test the new VR technique in a controlled lab experiment with real financial decisions. Subjects first perform a real effort task to earn money. Next, using a head-mounted display, subjects experience a 360° video of the destroyed city of Aleppo. Finally, subjects can donate to a local organization helping refugees. We find, compared to a written ask treatment, VR increases both the percentage of givers and the donated amount; women’s decisions mainly drive the differences. A control treatment showing the same 360° video on a flat monitor is not as effective as the VR condition.
{"title":"Does Virtual Reality Increase Charitable Giving? An Experimental Study","authors":"Ö. Gürerk, Alina Kasulke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3072002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3072002","url":null,"abstract":"Non-profit organizations recently started to use virtual reality (VR) technology to inform the public about their causes, and for fundraising. It is assumed that 360° videos experienced with VR devices create empathy and understanding, and may increase donations. In this study, we test the new VR technique in a controlled lab experiment with real financial decisions. Subjects first perform a real effort task to earn money. Next, using a head-mounted display, subjects experience a 360° video of the destroyed city of Aleppo. Finally, subjects can donate to a local organization helping refugees. We find, compared to a written ask treatment, VR increases both the percentage of givers and the donated amount; women’s decisions mainly drive the differences. A control treatment showing the same 360° video on a flat monitor is not as effective as the VR condition.","PeriodicalId":201085,"journal":{"name":"BHNP: Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116299874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public sectors are under increasing pressure to provide better services and improve their efficiency in order to boost economic growth and social welfare. The promotion of R&D and innovation has proved to be a key determinant of economic performance of countries. However, little is known about the effect of publicly funded R&D activities on the performance and efficiency of public sectors. A better understanding behind such relationship is crucial, particularly in present times of public budget constraints. Accordingly, the article measures the public sector performance and efficiency of European countries by the construction of composite indicators. Moreover, it explores and tests the role of publicly funded R&D on public sector performance (using multivariate techniques and econometric analyses) and efficiency (by means of a non‐parametric approach). Results indicate that publicly funded R&D should be considered a dimension of public sector performance, particularly when complementarities between private and public R&D emerge, but that it also plays a role on its efficiency.
{"title":"Publicly Funded R&D for Public Sector Performance and Efficiency: Evidence from Europe","authors":"A. Maroto, Jorge Gallego, L. Rubalcaba","doi":"10.1111/radm.12215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/radm.12215","url":null,"abstract":"Public sectors are under increasing pressure to provide better services and improve their efficiency in order to boost economic growth and social welfare. The promotion of R&D and innovation has proved to be a key determinant of economic performance of countries. However, little is known about the effect of publicly funded R&D activities on the performance and efficiency of public sectors. A better understanding behind such relationship is crucial, particularly in present times of public budget constraints. Accordingly, the article measures the public sector performance and efficiency of European countries by the construction of composite indicators. Moreover, it explores and tests the role of publicly funded R&D on public sector performance (using multivariate techniques and econometric analyses) and efficiency (by means of a non‐parametric approach). Results indicate that publicly funded R&D should be considered a dimension of public sector performance, particularly when complementarities between private and public R&D emerge, but that it also plays a role on its efficiency.","PeriodicalId":201085,"journal":{"name":"BHNP: Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121923852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An important incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance is the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the optimal monitoring cost is 60 percent of the cost in the current US system. (JEL D82, H24, J64, J65)
{"title":"Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring","authors":"David L. Fuller, B. Ravikumar, Yuzhe Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2116703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2116703","url":null,"abstract":"An important incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance is the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the optimal monitoring cost is 60 percent of the cost in the current US system. (JEL D82, H24, J64, J65)","PeriodicalId":201085,"journal":{"name":"BHNP: Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124850802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-03-10DOI: 10.3726/978-3-653-04103-3/15
Oliver Budzinski
This paper provides an economic analysis of the competition effects of UEFA's financial fair play regulations. It concludes that the restrictive effects of the break-even rule cannot be justified by a legitimate objective defense (according to European competition policy) because significant financial problems due to overinvestment are not inherent to European football.
{"title":"The Competition Economics of Financial Fair Play","authors":"Oliver Budzinski","doi":"10.3726/978-3-653-04103-3/15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-04103-3/15","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an economic analysis of the competition effects of UEFA's financial fair play regulations. It concludes that the restrictive effects of the break-even rule cannot be justified by a legitimate objective defense (according to European competition policy) because significant financial problems due to overinvestment are not inherent to European football.","PeriodicalId":201085,"journal":{"name":"BHNP: Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130677533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In academics, idea plagiarism is a sin of the first magnitude, whereas in business and politics, it is considered, well, academic - of no practical significance. Where do think tanks fit on that spectrum? Are they fish or fowl, or neither? Compared to academic scholars, think tank scholars have a greater incentive to plagiarize ideas. The pressure to claim credit in both scholarly communities is great, but the pressure to give credit is relatively weak in think tanks. One reason is that the problem-solution structure of think tank work doesn’t include a contribution-to-literature section. Another reason is that think tanks don’t publish their work in peer-reviewed publications, which are well-designed for cost-effectively weeding out idea plagiarism. Think tanks may claim to respect original work as much as universities. But that doesn’t mean it’s in their self-interest to act in accordance with those values. This paper provides eight case studies related to such behavior. The paper assumes that if think tank scholars, like academic scholars, claim to provide original work, then they should be held accountable for proving that they in fact do so. The author hopes that others will investigate the limitations of such an assumption.Unfortunately, the two traditional approaches to discouraging idea theft, passing intellectual property law (primarily used in commerce) and relying on private institutions to cultivate social sanctions (primarily used in academics) are not well suited for think tanks. An alternative approach is a hybrid policy where law is used to strengthen social sanctions. For example, libel and transparency laws pertaining to think tanks could be reformed to encourage a more robust market in evaluations of public policy credit claims.
{"title":"Think Tanks’ Dirty Little Secret: Power, Public Policy, and Plagiarism","authors":"J. Snider","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2307250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2307250","url":null,"abstract":"In academics, idea plagiarism is a sin of the first magnitude, whereas in business and politics, it is considered, well, academic - of no practical significance. Where do think tanks fit on that spectrum? Are they fish or fowl, or neither? Compared to academic scholars, think tank scholars have a greater incentive to plagiarize ideas. The pressure to claim credit in both scholarly communities is great, but the pressure to give credit is relatively weak in think tanks. One reason is that the problem-solution structure of think tank work doesn’t include a contribution-to-literature section. Another reason is that think tanks don’t publish their work in peer-reviewed publications, which are well-designed for cost-effectively weeding out idea plagiarism. Think tanks may claim to respect original work as much as universities. But that doesn’t mean it’s in their self-interest to act in accordance with those values. This paper provides eight case studies related to such behavior. The paper assumes that if think tank scholars, like academic scholars, claim to provide original work, then they should be held accountable for proving that they in fact do so. The author hopes that others will investigate the limitations of such an assumption.Unfortunately, the two traditional approaches to discouraging idea theft, passing intellectual property law (primarily used in commerce) and relying on private institutions to cultivate social sanctions (primarily used in academics) are not well suited for think tanks. An alternative approach is a hybrid policy where law is used to strengthen social sanctions. For example, libel and transparency laws pertaining to think tanks could be reformed to encourage a more robust market in evaluations of public policy credit claims.","PeriodicalId":201085,"journal":{"name":"BHNP: Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126651475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper shows that the time-consistent policy of public bailout affects the private liquidity choice of banks in several ways. First, banks anticipate public support in a liquidity crisis and seek large and socially inefficient exposures to shadow banking, defined as a privately costly technology that allows banks to liquefy their balance sheet. In this way, banks reduce their liquidity need in terms of expensive sovereign debt securities and boost leverage. Second, the liquidity choice becomes risky even with respect to the sovereign debt securities portfolio allocation: banks protected by guarantees from a healthy risk-free government load with cheaper non-domestic risky sovereign debt as they expect to extract public support even in the presence of some sovereign default. Finally, the propensity to expose to shadow banking is procyclical. These insights have important implications in terms of regulation. Global reforms that curb banks' ability to extract free insurance from the public bailout would promote efficiency. Policymakers should resort to a full-blown ban on shadow banking only if the previous goal is unattainable.
{"title":"Shadow Banking, Sovereign Risk and Collective Moral Hazard","authors":"G. di Iasio, F. Pierobon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2060839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2060839","url":null,"abstract":"The paper shows that the time-consistent policy of public bailout affects the private liquidity choice of banks in several ways. First, banks anticipate public support in a liquidity crisis and seek large and socially inefficient exposures to shadow banking, defined as a privately costly technology that allows banks to liquefy their balance sheet. In this way, banks reduce their liquidity need in terms of expensive sovereign debt securities and boost leverage. Second, the liquidity choice becomes risky even with respect to the sovereign debt securities portfolio allocation: banks protected by guarantees from a healthy risk-free government load with cheaper non-domestic risky sovereign debt as they expect to extract public support even in the presence of some sovereign default. Finally, the propensity to expose to shadow banking is procyclical. These insights have important implications in terms of regulation. Global reforms that curb banks' ability to extract free insurance from the public bailout would promote efficiency. Policymakers should resort to a full-blown ban on shadow banking only if the previous goal is unattainable.","PeriodicalId":201085,"journal":{"name":"BHNP: Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132915924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Occupy movement, which has been responsible for several million dollars of property damage and thousands of arrests related to civil disobedience, has been able to accept tax deductible gifts under the aegis of a fiscal sponsor. This draft paper examines fiscal sponsorship and the relationship between Occupy Wall Street and its 501(c)(3) fiscal sponsor.
{"title":"Occupy Wall Street and Tax Exemption","authors":"P. Thompson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2051774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2051774","url":null,"abstract":"The Occupy movement, which has been responsible for several million dollars of property damage and thousands of arrests related to civil disobedience, has been able to accept tax deductible gifts under the aegis of a fiscal sponsor. This draft paper examines fiscal sponsorship and the relationship between Occupy Wall Street and its 501(c)(3) fiscal sponsor.","PeriodicalId":201085,"journal":{"name":"BHNP: Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127511092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the financing and liquidation decisions of firms that face a labor market with search frictions. By inducing bankruptcy, debt can facilitate the process of creative destruction (i.e., the elimination of inefficient firms and the creation of new firms) but can also lead to excessive liquidation and unemployment in particular, during economic downturns. Within this setting, we examine policy interventions that influence the firms׳ financing and liquidation choices. We consider the role of monetary policy, which can reduce debt burdens during economy-wide downturns, and tax policy, which can influence the incentives of firms to use debt financing.
{"title":"Debt, Labor Markets and the Creation and Destruction of Firms","authors":"Andrés Almazán, Adolfo de Motta, S. Titman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2021162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021162","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the financing and liquidation decisions of firms that face a labor market with search frictions. By inducing bankruptcy, debt can facilitate the process of creative destruction (i.e., the elimination of inefficient firms and the creation of new firms) but can also lead to excessive liquidation and unemployment in particular, during economic downturns. Within this setting, we examine policy interventions that influence the firms׳ financing and liquidation choices. We consider the role of monetary policy, which can reduce debt burdens during economy-wide downturns, and tax policy, which can influence the incentives of firms to use debt financing.","PeriodicalId":201085,"journal":{"name":"BHNP: Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131100502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that large-scale debt-financed public infrastructure spending, in addition to (a) generating growth and employment on a similarly large scale and (b) significantly reducing inefficiency-generated public and private costs economy-wide, will also (c) be substantially “self-financing” by dint of the revenue gains that it likewise will generate. Not to pursue such projects now, moreover, with (a) labor, material, and financing costs at historic lows, and (b) cost-acceleration set to kick-in in the very near future, will itself occasion large-scale implicit costs. Insofar as these investments are agreed by all to be necessary at some point, now is that point.
{"title":"Public Infrastructure Investment, Renewed Economic Growth, and the U.S. Fiscal Position","authors":"R. Hockett, R. Frank","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1987656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1987656","url":null,"abstract":"We show that large-scale debt-financed public infrastructure spending, in addition to (a) generating growth and employment on a similarly large scale and (b) significantly reducing inefficiency-generated public and private costs economy-wide, will also (c) be substantially “self-financing” by dint of the revenue gains that it likewise will generate. Not to pursue such projects now, moreover, with (a) labor, material, and financing costs at historic lows, and (b) cost-acceleration set to kick-in in the very near future, will itself occasion large-scale implicit costs. Insofar as these investments are agreed by all to be necessary at some point, now is that point.","PeriodicalId":201085,"journal":{"name":"BHNP: Public Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130364590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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