We consider a three-member organization in which one member retires in each period and the incumbent members vote to admit a candidate to fill the vacancy. Candidates differ in quality and belong to one of two types, and majority-type members share the total rent of that period. We characterize the symmetric Markov equilibria with undominated strategies and compare the long-term welfare among them. Unanimity voting is better than majority voting at promoting long-term welfare. In addition, organizations with a certain degree of incongruity perform better in the long run than either harmonious or very divided organizations. (JEL D23, D71, D72)
{"title":"A Theory of Organizational Dynamics: Internal Politics and Efficiency","authors":"H. Cai, Hong Feng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.943608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.943608","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a three-member organization in which one member retires in each period and the incumbent members vote to admit a candidate to fill the vacancy. Candidates differ in quality and belong to one of two types, and majority-type members share the total rent of that period. We characterize the symmetric Markov equilibria with undominated strategies and compare the long-term welfare among them. Unanimity voting is better than majority voting at promoting long-term welfare. In addition, organizations with a certain degree of incongruity perform better in the long run than either harmonious or very divided organizations. (JEL D23, D71, D72)","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115411897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I analyze investors' decisions to be active or passive by introducing opportunity costs of market participation and endogenous occupational choices into a heterogeneous-agent noisy rational expectations equilibrium model. In equilibrium, agents with low information production costs and high initial wealth become retail investors; those with low information production costs but low initial wealth become money managers; and those with high information production costs delegate their portfolio decisions. The model not only explains the relative magnitude of institutional and individual investment in a general equilibrium setting, but also sheds new light on the relationship between investor composition and asset price properties.
{"title":"Information Production, Endogenous Occupational Choices, and Delegated Portfolio Management","authors":"Jie He","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1343294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1343294","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze investors' decisions to be active or passive by introducing opportunity costs of market participation and endogenous occupational choices into a heterogeneous-agent noisy rational expectations equilibrium model. In equilibrium, agents with low information production costs and high initial wealth become retail investors; those with low information production costs but low initial wealth become money managers; and those with high information production costs delegate their portfolio decisions. The model not only explains the relative magnitude of institutional and individual investment in a general equilibrium setting, but also sheds new light on the relationship between investor composition and asset price properties.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134427787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article develops a theory of resource allocation in internal capital markets that is consistent with the empirical finding that multidivision firms bias their investment levels in favor of divisions with weaker investment prospects. Headquarters has private information about the capital productivities of its divisions; therefore, capital allocations in the present serve as a signal to divisional managers about future allocations. To facilitate effort provision, headquarters biases capital allocation so as to not disclose productivity differences across divisions or to credibly signal their absence. The capital allocation bias is time-varying and the relationship between the bias and the difference in average division productivities is inversely U-shaped.
{"title":"Informed Headquarters and Socialistic Internal Capital Markets","authors":"Daniel Hoang, Martin E. Ruckes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1296643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1296643","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops a theory of resource allocation in internal capital markets that is consistent with the empirical finding that multidivision firms bias their investment levels in favor of divisions with weaker investment prospects. Headquarters has private information about the capital productivities of its divisions; therefore, capital allocations in the present serve as a signal to divisional managers about future allocations. To facilitate effort provision, headquarters biases capital allocation so as to not disclose productivity differences across divisions or to credibly signal their absence. The capital allocation bias is time-varying and the relationship between the bias and the difference in average division productivities is inversely U-shaped.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"35 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123466509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The alliance governance – whether equity or nonequity based – through which an alliance is governed serves as a mechanism to protect a firm from partner’s opportunistic behavior, manage resource dependence and facilitate knowledge sharing. Alliance governance structure also reflects the risk, reward and control that partners perceive in a relationship. In light of the conflicts and instabilities reported in strategic alliances, it is critical to examine the interorganizational domain that affects the endurance and continuity of collaboration and explain how the alliance interface contexts determines the structuring of alliance governance. An empirical examination, using survey and archival data, revealed that the complexity of alliance task, balance of power, and competitive scope between partners are significantly related to the mode of alliance governance – whether nonequity, minority-equity, or joint venture.
{"title":"Role of Context and Contest in the Structuring of Alliance Governance","authors":"Senthilkumar Muthusamy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.955088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.955088","url":null,"abstract":"The alliance governance – whether equity or nonequity based – through which an alliance is governed serves as a mechanism to protect a firm from partner’s opportunistic behavior, manage resource dependence and facilitate knowledge sharing. Alliance governance structure also reflects the risk, reward and control that partners perceive in a relationship. In light of the conflicts and instabilities reported in strategic alliances, it is critical to examine the interorganizational domain that affects the endurance and continuity of collaboration and explain how the alliance interface contexts determines the structuring of alliance governance. An empirical examination, using survey and archival data, revealed that the complexity of alliance task, balance of power, and competitive scope between partners are significantly related to the mode of alliance governance – whether nonequity, minority-equity, or joint venture.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131855391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Resource-based research sustains that organisations (and thus teams) create value through in-ternally developed and complementary acquired resources, through the management of re-sources and the development of routines. In this study, we advance the understanding of the impact of resources and capabilities by investigating the role of moderators on the key factors of team performance and address the question when the whole is more than the sum of its parts. We develop and test hypotheses as to how managerial experience helps to foster the development of internal resources and group routines, to extract more value from bought re-sources, how internally developed resources reinforce group routines and how financial resources influence group routines, the acquisition of resources as well as the development of internal resources. Data consisted of 270 observations from European professional football leagues over a five-year period. The results confirm that the edifice of competitive advantage is based on a complex resource bundle based on non-obvious interactions between its ele-ments. The complex inter-linkages, reinforcing effects and trade-offs between resources require non-obvious decisions regarding their employment and are best understood by experienced managers.
{"title":"Which Types of Resources are Necessary to Achieve Competitive Advantage?","authors":"C. Lechner, Sveinn Vidar Gudmundsson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1308889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1308889","url":null,"abstract":"Resource-based research sustains that organisations (and thus teams) create value through in-ternally developed and complementary acquired resources, through the management of re-sources and the development of routines. In this study, we advance the understanding of the impact of resources and capabilities by investigating the role of moderators on the key factors of team performance and address the question when the whole is more than the sum of its parts. We develop and test hypotheses as to how managerial experience helps to foster the development of internal resources and group routines, to extract more value from bought re-sources, how internally developed resources reinforce group routines and how financial resources influence group routines, the acquisition of resources as well as the development of internal resources. Data consisted of 270 observations from European professional football leagues over a five-year period. The results confirm that the edifice of competitive advantage is based on a complex resource bundle based on non-obvious interactions between its ele-ments. The complex inter-linkages, reinforcing effects and trade-offs between resources require non-obvious decisions regarding their employment and are best understood by experienced managers.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128580485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides empirical evidence that lumpy investment projects provide firms with the opportunity to adjust leverage at low marginal cost. Consistent with a theoretical model, I find that 1) firms sequence equity before debt during the financing period of their investment projects, and 2) that firms adjust their leverage ratios toward their target leverage during these investment periods. I also show that proactive increases in leverage observed in other studies can be explained by the evolution of firms' target leverage ratios over the financing period of a project. My results are consistent with trade-off theory and imply that firms move toward their target capital structures when they invest.
{"title":"Capital Structure and Large Investment Projects","authors":"Evan Dudley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1030118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1030118","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides empirical evidence that lumpy investment projects provide firms with the opportunity to adjust leverage at low marginal cost. Consistent with a theoretical model, I find that 1) firms sequence equity before debt during the financing period of their investment projects, and 2) that firms adjust their leverage ratios toward their target leverage during these investment periods. I also show that proactive increases in leverage observed in other studies can be explained by the evolution of firms' target leverage ratios over the financing period of a project. My results are consistent with trade-off theory and imply that firms move toward their target capital structures when they invest.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127840350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After the demise of “real” socialism and the decline of “western” socialism, socialism can be salvaged as a social preference system oriented towards equality and social justice, to be implemented without systemic constraints in the organizational and institutional sense. At the same time there is a case for maintaining an institutional framework allowing different forms of economic organization,capitalist and non-capitalist,to compete on equal footing, in an evolutionary perspective, thus allowing the second to develop if proven efficient. Another way for a spontaneous extension of the domain of socialism could derive from the socialization of consumption, if the consumption of public goods continues to make up a growing component of real consumption.
{"title":"The Economic System as an End or as a Means and the Future of Socialism: An Evolutionary Viewpoint","authors":"A. Chilosi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.372182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.372182","url":null,"abstract":"After the demise of “real” socialism and the decline of “western” socialism, socialism can be salvaged as a social preference system oriented towards equality and social justice, to be implemented without systemic constraints in the organizational and institutional sense. At the same time there is a case for maintaining an institutional framework allowing different forms of economic organization,capitalist and non-capitalist,to compete on equal footing, in an evolutionary perspective, thus allowing the second to develop if proven efficient. Another way for a spontaneous extension of the domain of socialism could derive from the socialization of consumption, if the consumption of public goods continues to make up a growing component of real consumption.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131117167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a methodology for the estimation of extreme loss event probability and the value at risk, which takes into account both the magnitudes and the intensity of the extreme losses. Specifically, the extreme loss magnitudes are modeled with a generalized Pareto distribution, whereas their intensity is captured by an autoregressive conditional duration model, a type of self-exciting point process. This allows for an explicit interaction between the magnitude of the past losses and the intensity of future extreme losses. The intensity is further used in the estimation of extreme loss event probability. The method is illustrated and backtested on 10 assets and compared with the established and baseline methods. The results show that our method outperforms the baseline methods, competes with an established method, and provides additional insight and interpretation into the prediction of extreme loss event probability.
{"title":"Intensity Based Estimation of Extreme Loss Event Probability and Value-at-Risk","authors":"K. Hamidieh, Stilian A. Stoev, G. Michailidis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1107538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1107538","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a methodology for the estimation of extreme loss event probability and the value at risk, which takes into account both the magnitudes and the intensity of the extreme losses. Specifically, the extreme loss magnitudes are modeled with a generalized Pareto distribution, whereas their intensity is captured by an autoregressive conditional duration model, a type of self-exciting point process. This allows for an explicit interaction between the magnitude of the past losses and the intensity of future extreme losses. The intensity is further used in the estimation of extreme loss event probability. The method is illustrated and backtested on 10 assets and compared with the established and baseline methods. The results show that our method outperforms the baseline methods, competes with an established method, and provides additional insight and interpretation into the prediction of extreme loss event probability.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133933909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines marathon successions, which I define as top executive searches that are extended past the formal departure notice of the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO). Marathons should be used when search costs are high and when little time passes from when the incumbent steps down to when they leave the firm. Consistent with these predictions, marathons primarily follow surprise departures and forced turnovers. Marathons are also likely for firms operating in heterogeneous industries that face early tenure incumbent departures. These findings shed light on an increasingly prevalent form of succession and provide insight into the rationale and implications behind the announcement.
{"title":"The Effects of Succession Choice Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcements: Evidence from Marathon Successions","authors":"Vincent J. Intintoli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1267429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1267429","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines marathon successions, which I define as top executive searches that are extended past the formal departure notice of the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO). Marathons should be used when search costs are high and when little time passes from when the incumbent steps down to when they leave the firm. Consistent with these predictions, marathons primarily follow surprise departures and forced turnovers. Marathons are also likely for firms operating in heterogeneous industries that face early tenure incumbent departures. These findings shed light on an increasingly prevalent form of succession and provide insight into the rationale and implications behind the announcement.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116187870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes a unit-contingent power purchase agreement between an electricity distributor and a power plant. Under such a contract the distributor pays the plant a fixed price if the plant is operational and nothing if plant outage occurs. Pricing a unit-contingent contract is complicated by the fact that the plant's true status is its private information. The difference between the electricity spot price and the unit-contingent contract price provides an incentive for the plant to misreport its status and earn profit at the distributor's expense. To prevent misreporting, the distributor may inspect the plant and levy penalties if misreporting is discovered. We find that some type of misreporting under certain circumstances can benefit both the plant and the distributor, because it serves as a risk-allocation mechanism between the two parties. We show that such a risk-allocation mechanism is equivalent to using state-contingent options and prohibiting misreporting.
{"title":"Unit-Contingent Power Purchase Agreement and Asymmetric Information about Plant Outage","authors":"Owen Q. Wu, V. Babich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1326438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1326438","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes a unit-contingent power purchase agreement between an electricity distributor and a power plant. Under such a contract the distributor pays the plant a fixed price if the plant is operational and nothing if plant outage occurs. Pricing a unit-contingent contract is complicated by the fact that the plant's true status is its private information. The difference between the electricity spot price and the unit-contingent contract price provides an incentive for the plant to misreport its status and earn profit at the distributor's expense. To prevent misreporting, the distributor may inspect the plant and levy penalties if misreporting is discovered. We find that some type of misreporting under certain circumstances can benefit both the plant and the distributor, because it serves as a risk-allocation mechanism between the two parties. We show that such a risk-allocation mechanism is equivalent to using state-contingent options and prohibiting misreporting.","PeriodicalId":201603,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets eJournal","volume":"PP 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126358598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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