Pub Date : 2021-04-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0009
S. Kuruvilla
This chapter focuses on a detailed investigation of a global retailer's attempt to integrate sourcing and compliance as a way to increase the coupling of private regulation and worker outcomes. The case study shows how this global retailer successfully aligned its sourcing and compliance activities and offers lessons for the rest of the industry. First, the case implies that it is highly unlikely large companies' compliance departments can establish the linkage between compliance and sourcing on their own. Second, it is worth noting that the linkage would not have been possible had it not been for a well-developed compliance system already operating for many years with a high profile in the corporate organization. Third, developing a software architecture that included comprehensive supplier scorecards facilitated linking compliance with sourcing. Fourth, the Pangia case highlights the transactional mentality that permeates sourcing operations in the apparel industry. Fifth, the case makes clear that changing the transactional mentality may well require a change of talent. Sixth, benchmarking with firms outside the industry was crucial for learning new lessons. And the final lesson is that vendors will respond to incentives to change their behavior.
{"title":"Aligning Sourcing and Compliance Inside a Global Corporation","authors":"S. Kuruvilla","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on a detailed investigation of a global retailer's attempt to integrate sourcing and compliance as a way to increase the coupling of private regulation and worker outcomes. The case study shows how this global retailer successfully aligned its sourcing and compliance activities and offers lessons for the rest of the industry. First, the case implies that it is highly unlikely large companies' compliance departments can establish the linkage between compliance and sourcing on their own. Second, it is worth noting that the linkage would not have been possible had it not been for a well-developed compliance system already operating for many years with a high profile in the corporate organization. Third, developing a software architecture that included comprehensive supplier scorecards facilitated linking compliance with sourcing. Fourth, the Pangia case highlights the transactional mentality that permeates sourcing operations in the apparel industry. Fifth, the case makes clear that changing the transactional mentality may well require a change of talent. Sixth, benchmarking with firms outside the industry was crucial for learning new lessons. And the final lesson is that vendors will respond to incentives to change their behavior.","PeriodicalId":20516,"journal":{"name":"Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77460655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-15DOI: 10.7591/CORNELL/9781501754517.003.0005
Jinsun Bae
{"title":"4. Has Private Regulation Improved Labor Practices in Global Supply Chains?","authors":"Jinsun Bae","doi":"10.7591/CORNELL/9781501754517.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/CORNELL/9781501754517.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20516,"journal":{"name":"Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81789160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-15DOI: 10.7591/CORNELL/9781501754517.003.0004
Chunyun Li
{"title":"3. Causal Complexity: The Varied Determinants of Compliance and Workplace-Level Improvements","authors":"Chunyun Li","doi":"10.7591/CORNELL/9781501754517.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/CORNELL/9781501754517.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20516,"journal":{"name":"Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73278825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0003
S. Kuruvilla
This chapter discusses practice multiplicity in the implementation of private regulation programs. As private regulation unfolded through the 1990s and early 2000s, the number of codes of conduct also proliferated — and there are now likely numerous different codes across different companies, each with some degree of variation. While codes relating to labor standards were initially quite diverse, individual company codes have gradually coalesced into multi stakeholder institution (MSI) codes or industrywide codes. Nevertheless, wide variations remain. All this variation is a problem: it “complicates the work that industry players have to do to implement policies” and “contributes to a sense of confusion among an external audience of consumers, governments, and activists groups.” This confusion and debate is the result of practice multiplicity and is a fundamental cause of the decoupling between private regulation policies and positive outcomes for workers. For a more detailed view of practice multiplicity in action, the chapter turns to an empirical investigation regarding multiplicity in the implementation of private regulation approaches by different companies sourcing from the same supplier.
{"title":"Practice Multiplicity in the Implementation of Private Regulation Programs","authors":"S. Kuruvilla","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses practice multiplicity in the implementation of private regulation programs. As private regulation unfolded through the 1990s and early 2000s, the number of codes of conduct also proliferated — and there are now likely numerous different codes across different companies, each with some degree of variation. While codes relating to labor standards were initially quite diverse, individual company codes have gradually coalesced into multi stakeholder institution (MSI) codes or industrywide codes. Nevertheless, wide variations remain. All this variation is a problem: it “complicates the work that industry players have to do to implement policies” and “contributes to a sense of confusion among an external audience of consumers, governments, and activists groups.” This confusion and debate is the result of practice multiplicity and is a fundamental cause of the decoupling between private regulation policies and positive outcomes for workers. For a more detailed view of practice multiplicity in action, the chapter turns to an empirical investigation regarding multiplicity in the implementation of private regulation approaches by different companies sourcing from the same supplier.","PeriodicalId":20516,"journal":{"name":"Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89049225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0002
Ning Li
This chapter focuses on assessing data reliability, using data provided by AUDCO (a large auditing company) from more than forty thousand audits spanning seven-years across twelve countries and thirteen industries. It highlights China, which reports very high levels of unreliable audit information, and examines the role played by a “gray” actor — the audit consulting company (ACC) — in helping suppliers “pass” audits. ACCs provide a variety of services, including falsification of audit records. The chapter then considers how ACCs “advertise” their services and how they work, through a detailed analysis of an audit consultant's work logs, as well as an assessment of why ACCs may be so successful. The analysis suggests that getting a clear picture of what is really happening in a factory requires a nuanced understanding of the nature of the data that auditors examine. It points to the need for auditors to be better trained at spotting falsified data but also to triangulate with other data and information sources (perhaps from workers). Ultimately, the results show that the lack of reliable data provided to auditors is a major reason for the decoupling we see between private regulation practices and sustainable improvements in working conditions in global supply chains across multiple industries and countries.
{"title":"Behavioral Invisibility","authors":"Ning Li","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on assessing data reliability, using data provided by AUDCO (a large auditing company) from more than forty thousand audits spanning seven-years across twelve countries and thirteen industries. It highlights China, which reports very high levels of unreliable audit information, and examines the role played by a “gray” actor — the audit consulting company (ACC) — in helping suppliers “pass” audits. ACCs provide a variety of services, including falsification of audit records. The chapter then considers how ACCs “advertise” their services and how they work, through a detailed analysis of an audit consultant's work logs, as well as an assessment of why ACCs may be so successful. The analysis suggests that getting a clear picture of what is really happening in a factory requires a nuanced understanding of the nature of the data that auditors examine. It points to the need for auditors to be better trained at spotting falsified data but also to triangulate with other data and information sources (perhaps from workers). Ultimately, the results show that the lack of reliable data provided to auditors is a major reason for the decoupling we see between private regulation practices and sustainable improvements in working conditions in global supply chains across multiple industries and countries.","PeriodicalId":20516,"journal":{"name":"Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79763889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0010
S. Kuruvilla
This chapter studies specific ways in which opacity can be reduced — through the use of niche institutions, by stimulating the internalization goals of private regulation, and through fostering a critical mindset. It draws attention to the varieties of transparency required and specifically to the integration and inclusion of workers in private regulation programs to stimulate internalization of goals, especially through worker participation in compliance auditing and through methods such as surveys by which workers' perspectives are heard. The chapter then highlights the need for more data sharing, data analysis, and predictive modeling and concludes with specific recommendations for the variety of actors in private regulation to move the institutional field from opacity to transparency. Only through data analysis can we generate the predictive models that allow for evidence-based decision making and identification of other means by which the coupling of private regulation programs with worker outcomes can be increased. Ultimately, workers and trade unions, in what has been called contingent coupling, can help “shrink the gap between practices and outcomes” for workers by leveraging the private regulation policies of brands.
{"title":"From Opacity to Transparency","authors":"S. Kuruvilla","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter studies specific ways in which opacity can be reduced — through the use of niche institutions, by stimulating the internalization goals of private regulation, and through fostering a critical mindset. It draws attention to the varieties of transparency required and specifically to the integration and inclusion of workers in private regulation programs to stimulate internalization of goals, especially through worker participation in compliance auditing and through methods such as surveys by which workers' perspectives are heard. The chapter then highlights the need for more data sharing, data analysis, and predictive modeling and concludes with specific recommendations for the variety of actors in private regulation to move the institutional field from opacity to transparency. Only through data analysis can we generate the predictive models that allow for evidence-based decision making and identification of other means by which the coupling of private regulation programs with worker outcomes can be increased. Ultimately, workers and trade unions, in what has been called contingent coupling, can help “shrink the gap between practices and outcomes” for workers by leveraging the private regulation policies of brands.","PeriodicalId":20516,"journal":{"name":"Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72878655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0008
Matthew Fischer-Daly
This chapter explores the potential for changes in corporate governance to overcome the decoupling problem in private regulation, through a detailed examination of the case of benefit corporations. In the United States, a benefit corporation is a type of for-profit corporate entity that includes among its goals — in addition to profits — a positive impact on society, workers, the community, and the environment. The chapter argues that the B-Corp movement is a false promise because of the legal limitations of actors to seek remedy if a benefit corporation does not meet its “benefit goals” and because of a variety of issues in the certification process for such a corporation. This argument is supported through the analysis of the private regulation program of a leading benefit corporation, which shows that its status has in no way improved coupling between private regulation practices and outcomes. It would seem that the benefit corporation certification is simply another modern ritual of due diligence, although there is a need for additional research on benefit corporations to confirm this conclusion.
{"title":"Are Changes in Corporate Governance an Answer?","authors":"Matthew Fischer-Daly","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754517.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the potential for changes in corporate governance to overcome the decoupling problem in private regulation, through a detailed examination of the case of benefit corporations. In the United States, a benefit corporation is a type of for-profit corporate entity that includes among its goals — in addition to profits — a positive impact on society, workers, the community, and the environment. The chapter argues that the B-Corp movement is a false promise because of the legal limitations of actors to seek remedy if a benefit corporation does not meet its “benefit goals” and because of a variety of issues in the certification process for such a corporation. This argument is supported through the analysis of the private regulation program of a leading benefit corporation, which shows that its status has in no way improved coupling between private regulation practices and outcomes. It would seem that the benefit corporation certification is simply another modern ritual of due diligence, although there is a need for additional research on benefit corporations to confirm this conclusion.","PeriodicalId":20516,"journal":{"name":"Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84898524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-15DOI: 10.7591/CORNELL/9781501754517.003.0007
Matthew Fischer-Daly, Christopher P. Raymond
This chapter addresses freedom of association (FOA) and collective bargaining (CB) in global supply chains. FOA and CB rights are internationally recognized as core and fundamental human rights of global citizens. Thus, in 1998 when the International Labour Organization recast its objectives to promote “decent work,” FOA and CB were among the “core labor rights,” along with the freedom from child and forced labor and freedom from discrimination. The chapter uses diverse datasets from brands, auditing firms, multi stakeholder institutions (MSIs), and Better Work to assess FOA and CB in the global apparel industry and substantiate the arguments. The breadth of the data permits systematic and comprehensive analysis of the incidence and nature of FOA violations and the influence of FOA and CB on overall labor standards in the industry. FOA and CB show great promise for improving compliance with codes of conduct overall — the expressed goal of private regulation — but FOA and CB are the least supported rights in current private regulation efforts. In other words, most companies with private regulation programs are eschewing the very rights that could potentially improve the functioning of their private regulation programs.
{"title":"6. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining in Global Supply Chains","authors":"Matthew Fischer-Daly, Christopher P. Raymond","doi":"10.7591/CORNELL/9781501754517.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/CORNELL/9781501754517.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses freedom of association (FOA) and collective bargaining (CB) in global supply chains. FOA and CB rights are internationally recognized as core and fundamental human rights of global citizens. Thus, in 1998 when the International Labour Organization recast its objectives to promote “decent work,” FOA and CB were among the “core labor rights,” along with the freedom from child and forced labor and freedom from discrimination. The chapter uses diverse datasets from brands, auditing firms, multi stakeholder institutions (MSIs), and Better Work to assess FOA and CB in the global apparel industry and substantiate the arguments. The breadth of the data permits systematic and comprehensive analysis of the incidence and nature of FOA violations and the influence of FOA and CB on overall labor standards in the industry. FOA and CB show great promise for improving compliance with codes of conduct overall — the expressed goal of private regulation — but FOA and CB are the least supported rights in current private regulation efforts. In other words, most companies with private regulation programs are eschewing the very rights that could potentially improve the functioning of their private regulation programs.","PeriodicalId":20516,"journal":{"name":"Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76524898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1515/9781501754548-006
{"title":"2. Practice Multiplicity in the Implementation of Private Regulation Programs","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501754548-006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501754548-006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20516,"journal":{"name":"Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87035225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1515/9781501754548-009
Jinsun Bae
{"title":"5. Wages in Global Supply Chains","authors":"Jinsun Bae","doi":"10.1515/9781501754548-009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501754548-009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20516,"journal":{"name":"Private Regulation of Labor Standards in Global Supply Chains","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85245630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：