Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198859635.003.0006
Shmuel Nili
This chapter examines how the integrity framework bears on political honors, understood as any form of special symbolic recognition accorded by political entities to individuals, to particular social groups, or to particular social causes. Rather than focusing on honorees’ personal integrity, the chapter argues that honors decisions ought to focus on marking and reinforcing appropriate moral commitments of the collective in whose name the honor is being (or has been) awarded. Suggesting that political honors can often fulfill their collectivist functions even when they involve no individual politicians, the chapter also shows how the collectivist approach can account for cases where there is a particularly firm intuition that political leaders should be at the center of political honors. Rejecting an individual desert alternative to the collectivist approach, the chapter ends by showing how the collectivist approach can guide decisions regarding the withdrawal of political honors, without falling back either on individual integrity or on individual desert.
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Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198859635.003.0002
Shmuel Nili
This opening chapter spells out the key concepts deployed throughout the book. It also contends, against integrity skeptics of various types, that personal integrity, understood as fidelity to one’s fundamental commitments, can actually have independent moral significance. The focus is on two arguments, both revolving around unconditional commitments. The first, the unfairness argument, holds that since morality itself pushes agents to incorporate certain unconditional commitments into their self-conception, it is unfair to criticize agents who go on to treat these commitments as an independent factor in their moral deliberation. The second argument links agents’ unconditional moral commitments to their self-respect. Both arguments allow us to see why one’s integrity is not simply parasitic upon one “doing the right thing.” Rather, integrity can inform the analysis of what one morally ought to do.
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