Chul Kim, Adam N. Smith, Jaehwan Kim, Greg M. Allenby
This paper investigates the role of the outside good utility function on admissible substitution patterns in direct utility models of discrete/continuous demand. We first present a set of novel results that characterize the functional form of price effects within this class of models. The results highlight the relative inflexibility of many standard outside good utility functions. We then propose a new outside good utility function that admits more flexible marginal utility curves. Our empirical analysis uses household scanner panel data from the potato chip category, where we find empirical support for non-standard rates of satiation for the outside good. We then show how the restrictive substitution patterns induced by standard utility specifications may distort price elasticities and optimal pricing decisions.
{"title":"Capturing Flexible Price Elasticities in Direct Utility Models","authors":"Chul Kim, Adam N. Smith, Jaehwan Kim, Greg M. Allenby","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3539001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3539001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the role of the outside good utility function on admissible substitution patterns in direct utility models of discrete/continuous demand. We first present a set of novel results that characterize the functional form of price effects within this class of models. The results highlight the relative inflexibility of many standard outside good utility functions. We then propose a new outside good utility function that admits more flexible marginal utility curves. Our empirical analysis uses household scanner panel data from the potato chip category, where we find empirical support for non-standard rates of satiation for the outside good. We then show how the restrictive substitution patterns induced by standard utility specifications may distort price elasticities and optimal pricing decisions.","PeriodicalId":216133,"journal":{"name":"MKTG: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123995551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates how consumers might form inferences from the mere fact that they observe a targeted ad and how firms facing these consumer must choose targeting strategy optimally under competition.
{"title":"Targeted Advertising and Consumer Inference","authors":"Jiwoong Shin, Jungju Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3688258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3688258","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how consumers might form inferences from the mere fact that they observe a targeted ad and how firms facing these consumer must choose targeting strategy optimally under competition.","PeriodicalId":216133,"journal":{"name":"MKTG: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125769986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a model of inter-temporal and intra-temporal price discrimination by monopoly airlines to study the ability of different discriminatory pricing mechanisms to increase efficiency and the associated distributional implications. To estimate the model, we use unique data from international airline markets with flight-level variation in prices across time, cabins, and markets and information on passengers’ reasons for travel and time of purchase. The current pricing practice yields approximately 77% of the first-best welfare. The source of this inefficiency arises primarily from private information about passenger valuations, not dynamic uncertainty about demand. We also find that if airlines could discriminate between business and leisure passengers, total welfare would improve at the expense of business passenger surplus. Also, replacing the current pricing that involves screening passengers across cabin classes with offering a single cabin class has minimal effect on total welfare.
{"title":"Price Discrimination in International Airline Markets","authors":"Gaurab Aryal, C. Murry, Jonathan W. Williams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3288276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3288276","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We develop a model of inter-temporal and intra-temporal price discrimination by monopoly airlines to study the ability of different discriminatory pricing mechanisms to increase efficiency and the associated distributional implications. To estimate the model, we use unique data from international airline markets with flight-level variation in prices across time, cabins, and markets and information on passengers’ reasons for travel and time of purchase. The current pricing practice yields approximately 77% of the first-best welfare. The source of this inefficiency arises primarily from private information about passenger valuations, not dynamic uncertainty about demand. We also find that if airlines could discriminate between business and leisure passengers, total welfare would improve at the expense of business passenger surplus. Also, replacing the current pricing that involves screening passengers across cabin classes with offering a single cabin class has minimal effect on total welfare.","PeriodicalId":216133,"journal":{"name":"MKTG: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"161 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129103052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates a manufacturer’s ability to influence compliance rates among its authorized online retailers by exploiting changes in the minimum advertised price (MAP) policy and in dealer agreements. MAP is a pricing policy widely used by manufacturers to influence prices set by their downstream partners. A MAP policy imposes a lower bound on advertised prices, subjecting violating retailers to punishments such as termination of distribution agreements. Despite this threat, violations are common. I uncover two key elements to improve compliance: customization to the online environment and credible monitoring and punishments. I analyze the pricing, enforcement, and channel management policies of a manufacturer over several years. During this period, new channel policies take effect, providing a quasi-experiment. The new policies lead to substantially fewer violations. With improved compliance, channel prices increase by 2% without loss in volume. The reduction in violations is particularly stark ...
{"title":"Online MAP Enforcement: Evidence From a Quasi-Experiment","authors":"A. Israeli","doi":"10.1287/mksc.2018.1092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2018.1092","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates a manufacturer’s ability to influence compliance rates among its authorized online retailers by exploiting changes in the minimum advertised price (MAP) policy and in dealer agreements. MAP is a pricing policy widely used by manufacturers to influence prices set by their downstream partners. A MAP policy imposes a lower bound on advertised prices, subjecting violating retailers to punishments such as termination of distribution agreements. Despite this threat, violations are common. I uncover two key elements to improve compliance: customization to the online environment and credible monitoring and punishments. I analyze the pricing, enforcement, and channel management policies of a manufacturer over several years. During this period, new channel policies take effect, providing a quasi-experiment. The new policies lead to substantially fewer violations. With improved compliance, channel prices increase by 2% without loss in volume. The reduction in violations is particularly stark ...","PeriodicalId":216133,"journal":{"name":"MKTG: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121351298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the interaction between a firm and consumers under the consideration of corporate social responsibility. The firm can be either socially responsible or socially irresponsible; however, the consumers cannot observe the firm’s exact type, which is private information. The firm can try to signal its type through pricing and other information sharing mechanisms (e.g., issue sustainability reports and obtain third-party certifications). We find that due to the existence of asymmetric information, increasing consumer awareness of corporate social responsibility does not necessarily help promote responsible corporate behaviors. Specifically, when a larger fraction of consumers become socially concerned or when the consumers have stronger willingness to reward (punish) the responsible (irresponsible) firm, the responsible firm could be worse off whereas the irresponsible firm could be better off. This is because the seemingly attractive trend in consumer behavior will affect the responsible firm’s signaling cost as well as its equilibrium strategy (separating vs. pooling). In addition, we find that improving the signaling accuracy will always benefit the responsible firm but may or may not hurt the irresponsible firm. Our results suggest that addressing the information asymmetry issue is the key in promoting corporate social responsibility. In particular, concerned parties should first exert efforts to create transparency in firms’ sustainability practices before making investments to educate consumers and influence their purchasing behaviors.
{"title":"Effect of Consumer Awareness on Corporate Social Responsibility under Asymmetric Information","authors":"Xiaomeng Guo, Guang Xiao, Fuqiang Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3039862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3039862","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the interaction between a firm and consumers under the consideration of corporate social responsibility. The firm can be either socially responsible or socially irresponsible; however, the consumers cannot observe the firm’s exact type, which is private information. The firm can try to signal its type through pricing and other information sharing mechanisms (e.g., issue sustainability reports and obtain third-party certifications). We find that due to the existence of asymmetric information, increasing consumer awareness of corporate social responsibility does not necessarily help promote responsible corporate behaviors. Specifically, when a larger fraction of consumers become socially concerned or when the consumers have stronger willingness to reward (punish) the responsible (irresponsible) firm, the responsible firm could be worse off whereas the irresponsible firm could be better off. This is because the seemingly attractive trend in consumer behavior will affect the responsible firm’s signaling cost as well as its equilibrium strategy (separating vs. pooling). In addition, we find that improving the signaling accuracy will always benefit the responsible firm but may or may not hurt the irresponsible firm. Our results suggest that addressing the information asymmetry issue is the key in promoting corporate social responsibility. In particular, concerned parties should first exert efforts to create transparency in firms’ sustainability practices before making investments to educate consumers and influence their purchasing behaviors.","PeriodicalId":216133,"journal":{"name":"MKTG: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125957678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Seeberger, Arnd Huchzermeier, David I. Schroeder
Online e-tailers face return rates of up to 50%, sharply reducing profits. They pursue two classes of mitigation-actions: First, proactive returns management controls the number of returns by adjusting, e.g., retail price, restocking fee, and hassle costs. This makes returns less attractive, yet also discourages purchases. Second, salvaging generates additional revenue. It weakens returns' negative impact by reselling them at original retail price in the primary market, at a discount in the secondary market, or to the manufacturer at wholesale price. Recognizing the importance of salvaging, we analyze the impact of non-zero salvage values on retail price, restocking fee, and profit under competition. In case consumers can return and exchange their purchase and salvage values are below production cost, a higher salvage value does not necessarily increase profit due to competitive pressure on prices, profits may decline in the salvage value. Counter-intuitively, there is a salvage value from which further increasing it actually reduces profit. Not being aware of this dynamic and simply striving for the highest salvage value endangers a firm's profitability. To the contrary, for salvage values above production cost, salvaging decreases restocking fee and retail price while increasing profit. Here, restocking fees should be zero. While this runs counter to current academic thinking, various e-tailers capitalize salvage values as high as the original retail price. Implementing our findings results in more consumer-friendly procedures for returns and higher profits, creating a win-win situation for consumers and retailers.
{"title":"Competitive Returns Management: Why Higher Salvage Values are Not Necessarily Better","authors":"D. Seeberger, Arnd Huchzermeier, David I. Schroeder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3045102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3045102","url":null,"abstract":"Online e-tailers face return rates of up to 50%, sharply reducing profits. They pursue two classes of mitigation-actions: First, proactive returns management controls the number of returns by adjusting, e.g., retail price, restocking fee, and hassle costs. This makes returns less attractive, yet also discourages purchases. Second, salvaging generates additional revenue. It weakens returns' negative impact by reselling them at original retail price in the primary market, at a discount in the secondary market, or to the manufacturer at wholesale price. Recognizing the importance of salvaging, we analyze the impact of non-zero salvage values on retail price, restocking fee, and profit under competition. In case consumers can return and exchange their purchase and salvage values are below production cost, a higher salvage value does not necessarily increase profit due to competitive pressure on prices, profits may decline in the salvage value. Counter-intuitively, there is a salvage value from which further increasing it actually reduces profit. Not being aware of this dynamic and simply striving for the highest salvage value endangers a firm's profitability. To the contrary, for salvage values above production cost, salvaging decreases restocking fee and retail price while increasing profit. Here, restocking fees should be zero. While this runs counter to current academic thinking, various e-tailers capitalize salvage values as high as the original retail price. Implementing our findings results in more consumer-friendly procedures for returns and higher profits, creating a win-win situation for consumers and retailers.","PeriodicalId":216133,"journal":{"name":"MKTG: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114787587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nishant Mishra, S. Najafi, Sami Najafi Asadolahi, A. Tsay
We consider the optimal pricing of a freemium product offered by a firm to consumers who are loss-averse with stochastic and endogenous reference points, and the role of the consumers' surprise on their purchase decision about the premium version, after experiencing the free version. We formulate the problem as a multistage Stackelberg game and investigate its equilibrium by determining the consumers' optimal purchase plan, the firm's optimal price to charge for the premium version, and the optimal quality level that the firm sets for the premium version. We show that a consumer becomes more willing to buy the premium version if he becomes somewhat dissatisfied to realize that the free version's value is lower than his expectation. This result goes against the common advice by practitioners that the firms must under-promise and over-deliver to ensure higher profitability. We show that the somewhat-dissatisfied consumer is not only more willing to buy the premium version, but he also could pay a price higher than its realized value. This is a result that does not occur when the consumer is satisfied or entirely dissatisfied with the free version. It also explains the real phenomenon in which many consumers run up massive bills in using freemium products. We show that, increasing the premium version's quality could cause the firm to optimally reduce its price, which is in contrast to our common quality-price intuition: a higher quality product should be sold more expensively. When the quality, price and the consumer's purchase plan are jointly optimized, we show that, the optimal price can increase in the order quantity. This behavior counters the common expectation that when the firm has more available units it should sell them cheaper to avoid the risk of unsold inventory.
{"title":"How Freemium Gets Consumers to Pay a Premium: The Role of Loss-Aversion","authors":"Nishant Mishra, S. Najafi, Sami Najafi Asadolahi, A. Tsay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2961548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2961548","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the optimal pricing of a freemium product offered by a firm to consumers who are loss-averse with stochastic and endogenous reference points, and the role of the consumers' surprise on their purchase decision about the premium version, after experiencing the free version. We formulate the problem as a multistage Stackelberg game and investigate its equilibrium by determining the consumers' optimal purchase plan, the firm's optimal price to charge for the premium version, and the optimal quality level that the firm sets for the premium version. We show that a consumer becomes more willing to buy the premium version if he becomes somewhat dissatisfied to realize that the free version's value is lower than his expectation. This result goes against the common advice by practitioners that the firms must under-promise and over-deliver to ensure higher profitability. We show that the somewhat-dissatisfied consumer is not only more willing to buy the premium version, but he also could pay a price higher than its realized value. This is a result that does not occur when the consumer is satisfied or entirely dissatisfied with the free version. It also explains the real phenomenon in which many consumers run up massive bills in using freemium products. We show that, increasing the premium version's quality could cause the firm to optimally reduce its price, which is in contrast to our common quality-price intuition: a higher quality product should be sold more expensively. When the quality, price and the consumer's purchase plan are jointly optimized, we show that, the optimal price can increase in the order quantity. This behavior counters the common expectation that when the firm has more available units it should sell them cheaper to avoid the risk of unsold inventory.","PeriodicalId":216133,"journal":{"name":"MKTG: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"166 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132584014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Davide Crapis, Bar Ifrach, Costis Maglaras, M. Scarsini
A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its effect on the seller's pricing decision. Consumers follow an intuitive non-Bayesian decision rule and, under some conditions, eventually learn the product's quality. We show how the learning trajectory can be approximated in settings with high demand intensity via a mean-field approximation that highlights the dynamics of this learning process, its dependence on the price, and the market heterogeneity with respect to quality preferences. Two pricing policies are studied: a static price, and one with a single price change. Finally, numerical experiments suggest that pricing policies that account for social learning may increase revenues considerably relative to policies that do not.
{"title":"Monopoly Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning","authors":"Davide Crapis, Bar Ifrach, Costis Maglaras, M. Scarsini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1957924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1957924","url":null,"abstract":"A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its effect on the seller's pricing decision. Consumers follow an intuitive non-Bayesian decision rule and, under some conditions, eventually learn the product's quality. We show how the learning trajectory can be approximated in settings with high demand intensity via a mean-field approximation that highlights the dynamics of this learning process, its dependence on the price, and the market heterogeneity with respect to quality preferences. Two pricing policies are studied: a static price, and one with a single price change. Finally, numerical experiments suggest that pricing policies that account for social learning may increase revenues considerably relative to policies that do not.","PeriodicalId":216133,"journal":{"name":"MKTG: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117170107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Finnish Abstract: Maaraavassa markkina-asemassa olevalla yrityksella on riski joutua saalistushinnoitteluepailyn kohteeksi, kun se kayttaa erasta markkinoinnin keskeista kilpailukeinoa: hintakilpailua ja erityisesti hinnanalennuksia. Taman artikkelin tarkoituksena on selvittaa tallaisten saalistushinnoitteluepailyjen problematiikkaa yrityksen liiketaloudellisesta (markkinoinnin) nakokulmasta, ja siten taydentaa perinteista yritysjuridista ja kansantaloudellista nakokulmaa asiaan. Perusteena nakokulmaan on se, etta viranomais- ja oikeuskaytannossa seka -ohjeistuksessa korostetaan, etta mahdollisen saalistushinnoitteluepailyn arvioinnissa on tarkasteltava hinnoittelun logiikkaa yrityksen omasta perspektiivista hinnoittelupaatoksen tekotilanteessa (ts. ex ante; ei jalkikateen) – seka erityisesti sen erityiset markkinaolosuhteet ja liiketaloudelliset realiteetit huomioon ottaen. Artikkeli ottaa siksi tarkasteluun taman (1) markkinaolosuhteiden ja liiketoimintamallin realiteetteja hahmottavan (2) ja etukateisarviointia korostavan nakokulman. Nakokulmaan liittyvaa problematiikkaa havainnollistamme kolmen erityisen toimialan ja liiketoimintamallin tapauksessa: (a) ohjelmistoliiketoiminnassa, (b) tiettya avainraaka-ainetta moneksi lopputuotteeksi jalostavassa prosessiteollisuudessa seka (c) tuottajaosuuskuntien omistamissa yrityksissa. Analyysimme osoittaa, etta jos yrityksen markkinaolosuhteiden ja liiketoimintamallin realiteetteja ei oteta huomioon, viranomaiset saattavat epailla yritysta saalistushinnoittelusta silloinkin, kun saalistushinnoittelua ei tapahdu – tai toisaalta jattaa huomaamatta saalistushinnoittelun silloin, kun siihen syyllistytaan. English Abstract: A firm in a dominant market position faces the risk of being suspected of predatory pricing, when it utilizes certain marketing actions, especially price cuts. The purpose of this article is to analyze the problematic nature of predatory pricing suspicions from the business administration perspective of the firm. In the guidelines of competition authorities, it is emphasized that in evaluating possible predatory pricing actions, the pricing logics of the firm must be assessed from the firm's own, ex ante perspective, by taking into account its market conditions and business realities. The article therefore adopts this perspective and demonstrates the challenges related to this perspective in the case of three special business models: in software business industries, in process industries that refine a key raw material into multiple end-products, and in firms owned by production cooperatives. The analysis shows that if the market conditions and economic realities of the firm's business model are not taken into account, authorities may suspect the firm of predatory pricing when such pricing does not actually occur – or, alternatively, not recognize predatory pricing in cases where it actually takes place.
{"title":"Saalistushinnoittelun ennakkoarviointi yrityksen markkinaolosuhteiden ja liiketaloudellisten realiteettien näkökulmasta (Ex-Ante Assessment of Predatory Pricing from the Perspective of the Firm's Market Conditions and Business Model)","authors":"J. Aspara, Kari Hoppu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2314875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2314875","url":null,"abstract":"Finnish Abstract: Maaraavassa markkina-asemassa olevalla yrityksella on riski joutua saalistushinnoitteluepailyn kohteeksi, kun se kayttaa erasta markkinoinnin keskeista kilpailukeinoa: hintakilpailua ja erityisesti hinnanalennuksia. Taman artikkelin tarkoituksena on selvittaa tallaisten saalistushinnoitteluepailyjen problematiikkaa yrityksen liiketaloudellisesta (markkinoinnin) nakokulmasta, ja siten taydentaa perinteista yritysjuridista ja kansantaloudellista nakokulmaa asiaan. Perusteena nakokulmaan on se, etta viranomais- ja oikeuskaytannossa seka -ohjeistuksessa korostetaan, etta mahdollisen saalistushinnoitteluepailyn arvioinnissa on tarkasteltava hinnoittelun logiikkaa yrityksen omasta perspektiivista hinnoittelupaatoksen tekotilanteessa (ts. ex ante; ei jalkikateen) – seka erityisesti sen erityiset markkinaolosuhteet ja liiketaloudelliset realiteetit huomioon ottaen. Artikkeli ottaa siksi tarkasteluun taman (1) markkinaolosuhteiden ja liiketoimintamallin realiteetteja hahmottavan (2) ja etukateisarviointia korostavan nakokulman. Nakokulmaan liittyvaa problematiikkaa havainnollistamme kolmen erityisen toimialan ja liiketoimintamallin tapauksessa: (a) ohjelmistoliiketoiminnassa, (b) tiettya avainraaka-ainetta moneksi lopputuotteeksi jalostavassa prosessiteollisuudessa seka (c) tuottajaosuuskuntien omistamissa yrityksissa. Analyysimme osoittaa, etta jos yrityksen markkinaolosuhteiden ja liiketoimintamallin realiteetteja ei oteta huomioon, viranomaiset saattavat epailla yritysta saalistushinnoittelusta silloinkin, kun saalistushinnoittelua ei tapahdu – tai toisaalta jattaa huomaamatta saalistushinnoittelun silloin, kun siihen syyllistytaan. English Abstract: A firm in a dominant market position faces the risk of being suspected of predatory pricing, when it utilizes certain marketing actions, especially price cuts. The purpose of this article is to analyze the problematic nature of predatory pricing suspicions from the business administration perspective of the firm. In the guidelines of competition authorities, it is emphasized that in evaluating possible predatory pricing actions, the pricing logics of the firm must be assessed from the firm's own, ex ante perspective, by taking into account its market conditions and business realities. The article therefore adopts this perspective and demonstrates the challenges related to this perspective in the case of three special business models: in software business industries, in process industries that refine a key raw material into multiple end-products, and in firms owned by production cooperatives. The analysis shows that if the market conditions and economic realities of the firm's business model are not taken into account, authorities may suspect the firm of predatory pricing when such pricing does not actually occur – or, alternatively, not recognize predatory pricing in cases where it actually takes place.","PeriodicalId":216133,"journal":{"name":"MKTG: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"285 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124551672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As sellers increasingly turn to multi-channel retailing, the opportunity to implement different pricing policies has grown. With the advent of the internet, many traditionally bargained products such as automobiles, jewelry, watches, appliances and furniture are now being offered online at a fixed pre-determined price. We explore the strategy of simultaneously offering two pricing formats (fixed and bargained) via two different channels (online and brick and mortar) and find that in a market where there are two types of consumers—those with a high cost of haggling and others with a lower cost—a dual-pricing strategy is optimal only when there are enough high haggling-cost consumers, but not too many, and when the haggling costs between the two types of consumers are sufficiently different. We also find that it is optimal for the seller to specify a higher-than-cost minimum acceptable price as the price floor of bargaining. By doing so, the seller increases the bargained price by complementing the salesperson's bargaining ability, and also softens the internal competition between the two channels. Finally, we find that, surprisingly, the dual-pricing strategy may serve fewer customers while still being more profitable than a single price structure. The implications for consumer surplus are also explored.
{"title":"The Effects of a 'No-Haggle' Channel on Marketing Strategies","authors":"Xiaohua Zeng, Srabana Dasgupta, C. Weinberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2449307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2449307","url":null,"abstract":"As sellers increasingly turn to multi-channel retailing, the opportunity to implement different pricing policies has grown. With the advent of the internet, many traditionally bargained products such as automobiles, jewelry, watches, appliances and furniture are now being offered online at a fixed pre-determined price. We explore the strategy of simultaneously offering two pricing formats (fixed and bargained) via two different channels (online and brick and mortar) and find that in a market where there are two types of consumers—those with a high cost of haggling and others with a lower cost—a dual-pricing strategy is optimal only when there are enough high haggling-cost consumers, but not too many, and when the haggling costs between the two types of consumers are sufficiently different. We also find that it is optimal for the seller to specify a higher-than-cost minimum acceptable price as the price floor of bargaining. By doing so, the seller increases the bargained price by complementing the salesperson's bargaining ability, and also softens the internal competition between the two channels. Finally, we find that, surprisingly, the dual-pricing strategy may serve fewer customers while still being more profitable than a single price structure. The implications for consumer surplus are also explored.","PeriodicalId":216133,"journal":{"name":"MKTG: Pricing (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123771053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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