Pub Date : 2020-09-22DOI: 10.23943/PRINCETON/9780691207537.003.0011
C. Vergara
This chapter discusses possible scenarios in which plebeian power could be institutionalized from the point of view of revolutionary politics. It argues that if the aim of revolution is liberty, which demands self-emancipatory political action, then revolutionary change could be achieved without the need of an outright revolution. It also refers to the redistribution of political power that could be done by revolutionary reformers within the boundaries of the Constitution or by the people themselves, claiming collective power and authority by disrupting the ordinary administration of power with their extraordinary political action in local assemblies. The chapter emphasizes that the only power with enough authority to lead structural reforms would be the one exerted by the assembled many themselves. It reviews the proposed blueprint for institutionalizing the power of the many that contributes to guiding prudent and able leaders, revolutionary vanguards, and commonsense people.
{"title":"Epilogue: What Is to Be Done?","authors":"C. Vergara","doi":"10.23943/PRINCETON/9780691207537.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23943/PRINCETON/9780691207537.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses possible scenarios in which plebeian power could be institutionalized from the point of view of revolutionary politics. It argues that if the aim of revolution is liberty, which demands self-emancipatory political action, then revolutionary change could be achieved without the need of an outright revolution. It also refers to the redistribution of political power that could be done by revolutionary reformers within the boundaries of the Constitution or by the people themselves, claiming collective power and authority by disrupting the ordinary administration of power with their extraordinary political action in local assemblies. The chapter emphasizes that the only power with enough authority to lead structural reforms would be the one exerted by the assembled many themselves. It reviews the proposed blueprint for institutionalizing the power of the many that contributes to guiding prudent and able leaders, revolutionary vanguards, and commonsense people.","PeriodicalId":218680,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Corruption","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130893687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter begins by presenting Niccolò Machiavelli's constitutional thought as the foundation of a type of constitutionalism that is material in its analysis of law and procedures, and anti-oligarchic in its institutional design. It recognizes the influence that socioeconomic inequalities exert over political power, in which Machiavelli embraces conflict as the effective cause of free government and strives to empower and channel emancipatory, plebeian energies through the constitutional order. It also focuses on Machiavelli's most important contribution to materialist constitutionalism: the plebeian nature of constituent power. The chapter contends that the constituent power in Machiavelli serves not as a bridge between basic principles and politics, but rather as the power exerted to resist oppression and establish plebeian and anti-oligarchic institutions. It looks at the democratic theory on the constituent power that has been conceived as the autopoietic power of the community.
{"title":"4. Machiavelli on the Plebeian Power to Create and Punish","authors":"C. Vergara","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvzgb6x2.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzgb6x2.9","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter begins by presenting Niccolò Machiavelli's constitutional thought as the foundation of a type of constitutionalism that is material in its analysis of law and procedures, and anti-oligarchic in its institutional design. It recognizes the influence that socioeconomic inequalities exert over political power, in which Machiavelli embraces conflict as the effective cause of free government and strives to empower and channel emancipatory, plebeian energies through the constitutional order. It also focuses on Machiavelli's most important contribution to materialist constitutionalism: the plebeian nature of constituent power. The chapter contends that the constituent power in Machiavelli serves not as a bridge between basic principles and politics, but rather as the power exerted to resist oppression and establish plebeian and anti-oligarchic institutions. It looks at the democratic theory on the constituent power that has been conceived as the autopoietic power of the community.","PeriodicalId":218680,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Corruption","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128185609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter is devoted to the constitutional thought of Nicolas de Condorcet and the challenge of representing the sovereign demos. It examines Condorcet's proposal for considering the people in its institutional character rather than as an atomized collective subject that can never be made fully present and properly represented. It also refers to Condorcet's proposal of a republican framework in which the ruling power of making laws and decisions about administration is concentrated in a representative assembly as an alternative to the liberal constitution established in the American colonies. The chapter highlights an institutionalized popular power, a network of primary assemblies, that are aimed at checking its laws, policies, and abuses. It presents an in-depth analysis of the 1793 constitutional plan for the French republic proposed by Condorcet, which read through the lens of his egalitarian tracts on education, slavery, and the rights of women.
{"title":"Condorcet on Primary Assemblies","authors":"C. Vergara","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvzgb6x2.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzgb6x2.10","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is devoted to the constitutional thought of Nicolas de Condorcet and the challenge of representing the sovereign demos. It examines Condorcet's proposal for considering the people in its institutional character rather than as an atomized collective subject that can never be made fully present and properly represented. It also refers to Condorcet's proposal of a republican framework in which the ruling power of making laws and decisions about administration is concentrated in a representative assembly as an alternative to the liberal constitution established in the American colonies. The chapter highlights an institutionalized popular power, a network of primary assemblies, that are aimed at checking its laws, policies, and abuses. It presents an in-depth analysis of the 1793 constitutional plan for the French republic proposed by Condorcet, which read through the lens of his egalitarian tracts on education, slavery, and the rights of women.","PeriodicalId":218680,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Corruption","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123749700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter highlights plebeianism as a political philosophy in the works of Martin Breaugh and Jeffrey Green and provides an in-depth analysis of recent attempts at retrieving the mixed constitution and proposing institutional innovations by John McCormick and Lawrence Hamilton. It looks at McCormick's proposals to revive the office of the Tribunate of the Plebs and bring back plebeian power to exert extraordinary punishment against agents of corruption. It also argues that McCormick's radical republican interpretation of Niccolò Machiavelli places class struggle, the threat of plutocracy, and the need for popular institutions to control the rich at the center of material constitutionalism. The chapter explores the illiberal nature of McCormick's proposals and the legitimacy problems arising from lottery as mode of selection. It explores Hamilton's proposal to combine consulting participatory institutions with an updated tribune of the plebs and a plebeian electoral procedure.
{"title":"Contemporary Plebeian Thought","authors":"C. Vergara","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvzgb6x2.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvzgb6x2.13","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter highlights plebeianism as a political philosophy in the works of Martin Breaugh and Jeffrey Green and provides an in-depth analysis of recent attempts at retrieving the mixed constitution and proposing institutional innovations by John McCormick and Lawrence Hamilton. It looks at McCormick's proposals to revive the office of the Tribunate of the Plebs and bring back plebeian power to exert extraordinary punishment against agents of corruption. It also argues that McCormick's radical republican interpretation of Niccolò Machiavelli places class struggle, the threat of plutocracy, and the need for popular institutions to control the rich at the center of material constitutionalism. The chapter explores the illiberal nature of McCormick's proposals and the legitimacy problems arising from lottery as mode of selection. It explores Hamilton's proposal to combine consulting participatory institutions with an updated tribune of the plebs and a plebeian electoral procedure.","PeriodicalId":218680,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Corruption","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133562440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.1525/9780520939486-012
S. Hyde
{"title":"Epilogue: What Is to Be Done?","authors":"S. Hyde","doi":"10.1525/9780520939486-012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520939486-012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":218680,"journal":{"name":"Systemic Corruption","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117210380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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