Michael D. Kimbrough, Neeru Paharia, X. Wang, Sijing Wei
We provide evidence from the first short-window event study of consumers’ perceptual responses to earnings announcements using daily consumer perception data. We document a positive association between the change in consumers’ overall perceptions of a brand at the time of the earnings announcement and the earnings surprise—that is, a positive consumer earnings response coefficient (CERC). CERC is larger when there is greater traditional news or social media activity, indicating that news dissemination is an important channel for consumers to respond to earnings news. Moreover, CERC varies based on brand and consumer characteristics. Changes in consumer perceptions at the time of the earnings announcement are positively associated with changes in purchase consideration and intent and with changes in realized future sales growth. To maximize identification, we document a positive and statistically significant CERC in a controlled experiment. Our findings demonstrate the importance of earnings to an important stakeholder. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M31; M41; G14.
{"title":"The Brand Value of Earnings: An Event Study of Consumer Responses to Earnings Announcements","authors":"Michael D. Kimbrough, Neeru Paharia, X. Wang, Sijing Wei","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0043","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We provide evidence from the first short-window event study of consumers’ perceptual responses to earnings announcements using daily consumer perception data. We document a positive association between the change in consumers’ overall perceptions of a brand at the time of the earnings announcement and the earnings surprise—that is, a positive consumer earnings response coefficient (CERC). CERC is larger when there is greater traditional news or social media activity, indicating that news dissemination is an important channel for consumers to respond to earnings news. Moreover, CERC varies based on brand and consumer characteristics. Changes in consumer perceptions at the time of the earnings announcement are positively associated with changes in purchase consideration and intent and with changes in realized future sales growth. To maximize identification, we document a positive and statistically significant CERC in a controlled experiment. Our findings demonstrate the importance of earnings to an important stakeholder.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M31; M41; G14.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139021742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates whether and how firms receiving benefits through their connections to politicians use accounting discretion to mitigate the costs associated with negative publicity. I utilize a unique setting that captures the change in political costs arising from chairmanship appointments to influential U.S. Senate committees. Firms in the home state of a promoted officeholder often receive preferential treatment, drawing public scrutiny and incentivizing them to avoid reporting extreme earnings through income smoothing to reduce adverse political attention. Employing a difference-in-differences research design, I find evidence that home-state firms smooth their earnings throughout the officeholder’s tenure following a senator’s promotion to chairman or ranking minority member. Cross-sectional analyses demonstrate that these effects are stronger for firms anticipating higher political costs. Overall, this paper provides evidence of the political cost hypothesis, highlighting the role of political connections in shaping firms’ financial reporting strategies. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; H57.
{"title":"Powerful Politicians, Political Costs, and Income Smoothing","authors":"Sumi Jung","doi":"10.2308/tar-2017-0481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2017-0481","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper investigates whether and how firms receiving benefits through their connections to politicians use accounting discretion to mitigate the costs associated with negative publicity. I utilize a unique setting that captures the change in political costs arising from chairmanship appointments to influential U.S. Senate committees. Firms in the home state of a promoted officeholder often receive preferential treatment, drawing public scrutiny and incentivizing them to avoid reporting extreme earnings through income smoothing to reduce adverse political attention. Employing a difference-in-differences research design, I find evidence that home-state firms smooth their earnings throughout the officeholder’s tenure following a senator’s promotion to chairman or ranking minority member. Cross-sectional analyses demonstrate that these effects are stronger for firms anticipating higher political costs. Overall, this paper provides evidence of the political cost hypothesis, highlighting the role of political connections in shaping firms’ financial reporting strategies.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M40; M41; H57.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138608123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We document time-varying interrelations between aggregate funding conditions and the impact of operating leverage (OL) on stock returns. OL represents a primitive source of risk, which helps explain the well established unconditional relation between OL and future returns. However, the outperformance of firms with high OL occurs exclusively during periods of unconstrained funding. Although high OL represents operational inflexibility, when the Fed eases funding constraints, improved capital availability mitigates this inflexibility. Consequently, investors bid up the prices of stocks with high OL when aggregate funding constraints are loosened to reflect their lower risk and greater expected performance in unconstrained periods. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: E22; E44; E52; G11; G12; G14.
我们记录了总体融资条件与经营杠杆（OL）对股票回报影响之间的时变相互关系。OL 代表了一种原始的风险来源，这有助于解释 OL 与未来回报之间公认的无条件关系。然而，高 OL 公司的超额收益只出现在资金不受限制的时期。虽然高 OL 代表着经营缺乏灵活性，但当美联储放松融资限制时，资本供应的改善会缓解这种缺乏灵活性的情况。因此，当总体资金限制放松时，投资者会抬高 OL 高的股票价格，以反映其在无限制时期的低风险和更高的预期业绩。数据可用性：数据来源于文中引用的公开资料。JEL 分类：E22；E44；E52；G11；G12；G14。
{"title":"Operating Leverage and Stock Returns under Different Aggregate Funding Conditions","authors":"Luis García‐Feijóo, Tyler K. Jensen, Paul D. Koch","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0051","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We document time-varying interrelations between aggregate funding conditions and the impact of operating leverage (OL) on stock returns. OL represents a primitive source of risk, which helps explain the well established unconditional relation between OL and future returns. However, the outperformance of firms with high OL occurs exclusively during periods of unconstrained funding. Although high OL represents operational inflexibility, when the Fed eases funding constraints, improved capital availability mitigates this inflexibility. Consequently, investors bid up the prices of stocks with high OL when aggregate funding constraints are loosened to reflect their lower risk and greater expected performance in unconstrained periods.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: E22; E44; E52; G11; G12; G14.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139014911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the effect of board gender diversity (BGD) on investment outcomes. We identify variation in BGD by compiling, for the first time, a global catalog of 83 BGD interventions implemented in 59 countries between 1999 and 2021. Using a staggered difference-in-differences research design, we document that BGD interventions improve investment outcomes. We find that treated firms reduce inefficient investment by 0.6 percent of total assets or 6.5 percent of total investment and are 4 percentage points more likely to have above-median investment efficiency. Cross-sectional tests reveal more pronounced results when BGD interventions are mandatory, are strongly enforced, and result in larger BGD increases. Event-time, stacked panel, and a wide variety of endogeneity-mitigating robustness tests corroborate. Our plausibly causal inferences have important implications for both research and practice. JEL Classifications: F52; G34; G38; K22; M41; K38.
{"title":"Board Gender Diversity and Investment Efficiency: Global Evidence from 83 Country-Level Interventions","authors":"Dave Baik, Clara Xiaoling Chen, David Godsell","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0251","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We investigate the effect of board gender diversity (BGD) on investment outcomes. We identify variation in BGD by compiling, for the first time, a global catalog of 83 BGD interventions implemented in 59 countries between 1999 and 2021. Using a staggered difference-in-differences research design, we document that BGD interventions improve investment outcomes. We find that treated firms reduce inefficient investment by 0.6 percent of total assets or 6.5 percent of total investment and are 4 percentage points more likely to have above-median investment efficiency. Cross-sectional tests reveal more pronounced results when BGD interventions are mandatory, are strongly enforced, and result in larger BGD increases. Event-time, stacked panel, and a wide variety of endogeneity-mitigating robustness tests corroborate. Our plausibly causal inferences have important implications for both research and practice.\u0000 JEL Classifications: F52; G34; G38; K22; M41; K38.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139013888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dane M. Christensen, Hengda Jin, Joshua A. Lee, Suhas A. Sridharan, Laura A. Wellman
ABSTRACT Prior research suggests that (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intraindustry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms’ political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intraindustry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry- or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms’ disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries’ information environment. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D72; M41; M48.
{"title":"Corporate Political Activism and Information Transfers","authors":"Dane M. Christensen, Hengda Jin, Joshua A. Lee, Suhas A. Sridharan, Laura A. Wellman","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0254","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Prior research suggests that (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intraindustry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms’ political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intraindustry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry- or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms’ disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries’ information environment. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D72; M41; M48.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135714901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eldar Maksymov, Mark E. Peecher, Jeffrey Pickerd, Yuepin Zhou
ABSTRACT Research indicates that auditors have an impoverished understanding of trial preparation factors that, independent of audit quality, can significantly elevate audit litigation risk. As the scholarly literature sheds little insight about the nature and implications of these factors, we identify what factors audit litigators consider in trial preparation, how they expect these factors to affect litigation outcomes, and how they attempt to leverage these factors. To do so, we interview 39 audit litigators, who identify factors germane to trial venues, jury pools, and case arguments. Guided by the elaboration likelihood model, we construct a framework that predicts these factors influence litigation outcomes by changing jurors’ motivation and/or capability to elaborate. Importantly, we find that litigators who defend (sue) auditors strategically maneuver these factors to increase (decrease) the likelihood of higher juror elaboration, because higher elaboration is favorable to auditors. We discuss implications of our results for practice and research. JEL Classifications: K22; K40; K41; M4; M41; M42.
{"title":"How Trial Preparation Factors Influence Audit Litigation Outcomes: Insights from Audit Litigators","authors":"Eldar Maksymov, Mark E. Peecher, Jeffrey Pickerd, Yuepin Zhou","doi":"10.2308/tar-2021-0305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0305","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Research indicates that auditors have an impoverished understanding of trial preparation factors that, independent of audit quality, can significantly elevate audit litigation risk. As the scholarly literature sheds little insight about the nature and implications of these factors, we identify what factors audit litigators consider in trial preparation, how they expect these factors to affect litigation outcomes, and how they attempt to leverage these factors. To do so, we interview 39 audit litigators, who identify factors germane to trial venues, jury pools, and case arguments. Guided by the elaboration likelihood model, we construct a framework that predicts these factors influence litigation outcomes by changing jurors’ motivation and/or capability to elaborate. Importantly, we find that litigators who defend (sue) auditors strategically maneuver these factors to increase (decrease) the likelihood of higher juror elaboration, because higher elaboration is favorable to auditors. We discuss implications of our results for practice and research. JEL Classifications: K22; K40; K41; M4; M41; M42.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135714493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide evidence on effort coordination and information sharing between audit committees and external auditors. We use four effort measures: the risk areas reported by both the auditor and committee, auditor-reported materiality, and committee meetings. We find that the number of risks reported by the auditor (committee) is positively related to the number of risks reported by the committee (auditor) and that lower materiality is associated with more risks that the committee discloses. The evidence also suggests that although risk areas are “sticky,” the committee identifies new risks faster, whereas the auditor focuses on shared risks. Next, our analysis indicates that audit process standardization influences reporting quality in a nonlinear manner. Finally, although audit fees tend to rise with auditor effort, they are unrelated to the committee’s effort. Our findings endorse the service perspective on auditing by emphasizing the collaborative nature of the audit process over individual actors’ self-interests. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; G38.
{"title":"Do Audit Committees and Auditors Coordinate Effort? Evidence from Risk Areas, Materiality and Meetings","authors":"G. Livne, Maria Tsipouridou, Anthony Wood","doi":"10.2308/tar-2020-0441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0441","url":null,"abstract":"We provide evidence on effort coordination and information sharing between audit committees and external auditors. We use four effort measures: the risk areas reported by both the auditor and committee, auditor-reported materiality, and committee meetings. We find that the number of risks reported by the auditor (committee) is positively related to the number of risks reported by the committee (auditor) and that lower materiality is associated with more risks that the committee discloses. The evidence also suggests that although risk areas are “sticky,” the committee identifies new risks faster, whereas the auditor focuses on shared risks. Next, our analysis indicates that audit process standardization influences reporting quality in a nonlinear manner. Finally, although audit fees tend to rise with auditor effort, they are unrelated to the committee’s effort. Our findings endorse the service perspective on auditing by emphasizing the collaborative nature of the audit process over individual actors’ self-interests. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; G38.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139305122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The disclosure requirements of ASC 606 significantly expanded the volume and granularity of revenue information. However, because of the significant judgment associated with the standard, it is unclear whether the new disclosures increased the decision-usefulness of financial reports. To shed light on this question, we investigate the revenue disaggregation requirements of ASC 606. These requirements had significant disclosure consequences, illustrated by an over two-fold increase in the median number of revenue items in disaggregating firms’ reports. Consistent with enhanced decision-usefulness, we find higher (lower) analyst sales forecast accuracy (dispersion) for disaggregating firms. These benefits are primarily present when disaggregation is accompanied by detailed qualitative disclosures, when disaggregated revenues are comparable, and when the granularity of segment information is low. Our study contributes to research evaluating ASC 606 and offers valuable insights to standard-setters currently considering broader disaggregation of income statement items (Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 2022). Data Availability: Data are available from the sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: G24; G30; G34.
{"title":"The Decision-Usefulness of ASC 606 Revenue Disaggregation","authors":"Lisa A. Hinson, Gabriel P. Pündrich, Mark Zakota","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0078","url":null,"abstract":"The disclosure requirements of ASC 606 significantly expanded the volume and granularity of revenue information. However, because of the significant judgment associated with the standard, it is unclear whether the new disclosures increased the decision-usefulness of financial reports. To shed light on this question, we investigate the revenue disaggregation requirements of ASC 606. These requirements had significant disclosure consequences, illustrated by an over two-fold increase in the median number of revenue items in disaggregating firms’ reports. Consistent with enhanced decision-usefulness, we find higher (lower) analyst sales forecast accuracy (dispersion) for disaggregating firms. These benefits are primarily present when disaggregation is accompanied by detailed qualitative disclosures, when disaggregated revenues are comparable, and when the granularity of segment information is low. Our study contributes to research evaluating ASC 606 and offers valuable insights to standard-setters currently considering broader disaggregation of income statement items (Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 2022). Data Availability: Data are available from the sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: G24; G30; G34.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139298613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study offers solutions to help address practical issues researchers generally overlook when assessing gains from a trading signal. Specifically, the methodologies used in previous research generally ignore investor risk aversion when forming portfolios, do not update portfolios as signals arrive, exploit look-ahead biases, do not assess the incremental gains of a new signal, and do not consider market frictions. We examine trading signals based on post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD), the earnings announcement premium (EAP), and earnings announcement rescheduling (RES). Using our proposed approach, we find that portfolios that incorporate the individual signals produce higher Sharpe ratios than equal-weighted portfolios; however, the gains for each signal are concentrated to a few days around the announcement. The EAP and RES signals do not provide incremental portfolio gains over the PEAD signal. After considering market frictions, portfolio performance rapidly attenuates and becomes similar to the SPY ETF as the portfolio size increases. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; G17.
本研究提供的解决方案有助于解决研究人员在评估交易信号收益时普遍忽视的实际问题。具体来说，以往研究中使用的方法一般会忽略投资者在形成投资组合时的风险规避，不会在信号到来时更新投资组合，利用前瞻性偏差，不会评估新信号的增量收益，也不会考虑市场摩擦。我们研究了基于盈利公布后漂移（PEAD）、盈利公布溢价（EAP）和盈利公布重新安排（RES）的交易信号。使用我们提出的方法，我们发现，与等权重投资组合相比，包含单个信号的投资组合能产生更高的夏普比率；但是，每个信号的收益都集中在公告前后的几天内。与 PEAD 信号相比，EAP 和 RES 信号并没有带来增量投资组合收益。考虑市场摩擦因素后，随着投资组合规模的增加，投资组合的表现迅速减弱，变得与 SPY ETF 相似。 JEL 分类：G12; G14; G17G12；G14；G17。
{"title":"Measuring Portfolio Gains: The Case of Earnings Announcement Trading Signals","authors":"Matthew R. Lyle, T. Yohn","doi":"10.2308/tar-2022-0174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0174","url":null,"abstract":"This study offers solutions to help address practical issues researchers generally overlook when assessing gains from a trading signal. Specifically, the methodologies used in previous research generally ignore investor risk aversion when forming portfolios, do not update portfolios as signals arrive, exploit look-ahead biases, do not assess the incremental gains of a new signal, and do not consider market frictions. We examine trading signals based on post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD), the earnings announcement premium (EAP), and earnings announcement rescheduling (RES). Using our proposed approach, we find that portfolios that incorporate the individual signals produce higher Sharpe ratios than equal-weighted portfolios; however, the gains for each signal are concentrated to a few days around the announcement. The EAP and RES signals do not provide incremental portfolio gains over the PEAD signal. After considering market frictions, portfolio performance rapidly attenuates and becomes similar to the SPY ETF as the portfolio size increases. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; G17.","PeriodicalId":22240,"journal":{"name":"The Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139298455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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