BACKGROUND. Values are concepts or beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors, that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and are ordered by relative importance. Referring to Scheler’s philosophical concept, the hierarchies of values among Polish students were compared between 2006 (Fanslau & Brycz, 2006) and 2017. PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE. 603 (in total) adults participated in two studies. All of them were undergraduate students of various Universities from the Tri-City. They filled in the Scheler’s Value Scale. RESULTS. The results showed that the model hierarchy of values postulated by philosophers is not reflected in the minds of young (18–33 years old) Poles now and it was not reflected over a decade ago either. Moreover, significant differences between the levels of certain values were found. CONCLUSIONS. It turned out that philosophical theories once accepted and adapted to psychology no longer have the same meaning as before. Value priorities change and they are ordered according to subjective validity.
{"title":"Do Good Old Philosophical Values Work Today? Polish Students’ Value Priorities in 2006 and 2017 – A Comparative Study","authors":"Agnieszka Fanslau, H. Brycz","doi":"10.26881/MAES.2019.1.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26881/MAES.2019.1.11","url":null,"abstract":"BACKGROUND. Values are concepts or beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors, that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and are ordered by relative importance. Referring to Scheler’s philosophical concept, the hierarchies of values among Polish students were compared between 2006 (Fanslau & Brycz, 2006) and 2017. \u0000PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE. 603 (in total) adults participated in two studies. All of them were undergraduate students of various Universities from the Tri-City. They filled in the Scheler’s Value Scale. \u0000RESULTS. The results showed that the model hierarchy of values postulated by philosophers is not reflected in the minds of young (18–33 years old) Poles now and it was not reflected over a decade ago either. Moreover, significant differences between the levels of certain values were found. \u0000CONCLUSIONS. It turned out that philosophical theories once accepted and adapted to psychology no longer have the same meaning as before. Value priorities change and they are ordered according to subjective validity.","PeriodicalId":230730,"journal":{"name":"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133868870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Celem analizy jest próba interpretacji znaczeń nadawanych wymianie barterowej przez jej uczestników. Ramę interpretacyjną stanowią dwa konteksty teoretyczne: dyskurs odwzajemnienia i dyskurs samowystarczalności, w których ulokowałyśmy wypowiedzi badanych. Pierwszy z nich odsyła do strategii działania zakorzenionej w tradycjach i rytuałach gospodarki przedpieniężnej, drugi natomiast nawiązuje do klasycznej liberalnej wykładni człowieczeństwa, wypełniającego się w działaniach ukierunkowanych na pozyskiwanie niezależności od innych. Napięcia powstające między tymi strategiami wyjaśnia koncepcja szacunku Richarda Sennetta, zgodnie z którą jest on zyskiwany przez dawanie innym lub przez samorozwój. Analizowane interpretacje uczestników wymiany barterowej wskazują, że obydwie strategie są przez nich traktowane jako wzajemnie niesprzeczne sposoby wyjaśniania praktyk, w których biorą udział.
{"title":"Wymiana barterowa jako strategia ubogich – między odwzajemnieniem a samowystarczalnością","authors":"Małgorzata Lewartowska-Zychowicz, Longina Strumska-Cylwik","doi":"10.26881/MAES.2019.1.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26881/MAES.2019.1.12","url":null,"abstract":"Celem analizy jest próba interpretacji znaczeń nadawanych wymianie barterowej przez jej uczestników. Ramę interpretacyjną stanowią dwa konteksty teoretyczne: dyskurs odwzajemnienia i dyskurs samowystarczalności, w których ulokowałyśmy wypowiedzi badanych. Pierwszy z nich odsyła do strategii działania zakorzenionej w tradycjach i rytuałach gospodarki przedpieniężnej, drugi natomiast nawiązuje do klasycznej liberalnej wykładni człowieczeństwa, wypełniającego się w działaniach ukierunkowanych na pozyskiwanie niezależności od innych. Napięcia powstające między tymi strategiami wyjaśnia koncepcja szacunku Richarda Sennetta, zgodnie z którą jest on zyskiwany przez dawanie innym lub przez samorozwój. Analizowane interpretacje uczestników wymiany barterowej wskazują, że obydwie strategie są przez nich traktowane jako wzajemnie niesprzeczne sposoby wyjaśniania praktyk, w których biorą udział.","PeriodicalId":230730,"journal":{"name":"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica","volume":"34 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114134455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author explores Ingarden’s aesthetics taking as a leading thread his repeated attempts at a refutation of the common locus of relativity of taste. Ingarden’s position is summarized in four theses: (1) values do exist as the proper correlates of aesthetic experience, (2) aesthetic values must be distinguished from artistic values, (3) artistic and aesthetic values are founded in other ontic strata, and finally (4) acts of valuation in aesthetic experience are presupposed by value judgements. In the light of the philosophical and phenomenological interpretation of the physical theory of relativity (special and general) by authors such as Weyl or Geiger, Ingarden’s refutation of the relativity of taste appears as incomplete. The phenomenology of aesthetic experience formulated by Geiger and Husserl and their own refutations of relativism in general and aesthetic relativism in particular suggest a more fruitful approach, which is undermined by Ingarden: the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjective aesthetic experience.
{"title":"Relativity of Taste without Relativism. An Introduction to Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience","authors":"C. Lobo","doi":"10.26881/MAES.2019.1.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26881/MAES.2019.1.03","url":null,"abstract":"The author explores Ingarden’s aesthetics taking as a leading thread his repeated attempts at a refutation of the common locus of relativity of taste. Ingarden’s position is summarized in four theses: (1) values do exist as the proper correlates of aesthetic experience, (2) aesthetic values must be distinguished from artistic values, (3) artistic and aesthetic values are founded in other ontic strata, and finally (4) acts of valuation in aesthetic experience are presupposed by value judgements. In the light of the philosophical and phenomenological interpretation of the physical theory of relativity (special and general) by authors such as Weyl or Geiger, Ingarden’s refutation of the relativity of taste appears as incomplete. The phenomenology of aesthetic experience formulated by Geiger and Husserl and their own refutations of relativism in general and aesthetic relativism in particular suggest a more fruitful approach, which is undermined by Ingarden: the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjective aesthetic experience.","PeriodicalId":230730,"journal":{"name":"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129522637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article represents a critical re-evaluation of the contribution to psychiatry and psychotherapy made by Heidegger. The author gives a detailed analysis of “Zollikon Seminars”, placing emphasis on Heideggerian concept of the human being in the first part of the article. According to Heidegger, the human being is not just present in the world, but he is present in the world along with other beings, he exists in indissociability with things, with the world. The existence of the human being, but not its interpretation, which reduces the concept of the human being to thinking, consciousness or instinct, represents the starting point of his philosophical inquiry. But that, which ever-already is, needs to be given an opportunity to show itself. Therefore, the matter of the causal explanation, given with a view to psychotherapy became one of the focal points for “Zollikon Seminars”. The second part of the article is devoted to critique of Freud, delivered by Heidegger, which clarified Heidegger’s approach to the existence of the human being through the striking antithesis of causality and motivation and critique of the causal explanation. The third part of the article comprises a reference to psychopathology and the practice of psychiatry, which, according to our reckoning, Heidegger has elided in his reflections. It is fair to assume that, if Heidegger gave consideration to the uniqueness of the psychopathology practice, which its phenomena appear in, with regard to the causal explanation, his intuition on this subject, concerning a radical distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of causality, could take a different direction. Having examined the critique, delivered by him, more intently, we are able to say that Heidegger, despite his innovative approach, still, did not take into consideration a number of problems, being present in the practice of psychotherapy and psychiatry. Nevertheless, the importance of Heideggerian approach resides primarily in a fact that Heidegger, for his part, insisted on the “productive meeting” of philosophers and psychiatrists, meant to amend understanding of the practice of psychiatry. An opportunity to combine the causal and the hermeneutic approaches in psychiatry was not considered by Heidegger, although, it seems to us, it is exactly the practice of psychiatry, which the “meeting” of the causal theory and philosophy can become really potentially productive and “stimulating” in.
{"title":"Heidegger’s Critique of Causal Explanation in Relation to Psychotherapy. Critical Sketches on Heidegger’s “Zollikon Seminars”","authors":"N. Artemenko","doi":"10.26881/MAES.2019.1.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26881/MAES.2019.1.07","url":null,"abstract":"The article represents a critical re-evaluation of the contribution to psychiatry and psychotherapy made by Heidegger. The author gives a detailed analysis of “Zollikon Seminars”, placing emphasis on Heideggerian concept of the human being in the first part of the article. According to Heidegger, the human being is not just present in the world, but he is present in the world along with other beings, he exists in indissociability with things, with the world. The existence of the human being, but not its interpretation, which reduces the concept of the human being to thinking, consciousness or instinct, represents the starting point of his philosophical inquiry. But that, which ever-already is, needs to be given an opportunity to show itself. Therefore, the matter of the causal explanation, given with a view to psychotherapy became one of the focal points for “Zollikon Seminars”. The second part of the article is devoted to critique of Freud, delivered by Heidegger, which clarified Heidegger’s approach to the existence of the human being through the striking antithesis of causality and motivation and critique of the causal explanation. The third part of the article comprises a reference to psychopathology and the practice of psychiatry, which, according to our reckoning, Heidegger has elided in his reflections. It is fair to assume that, if Heidegger gave consideration to the uniqueness of the psychopathology practice, which its phenomena appear in, with regard to the causal explanation, his intuition on this subject, concerning a radical distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of causality, could take a different direction. Having examined the critique, delivered by him, more intently, we are able to say that Heidegger, despite his innovative approach, still, did not take into consideration a number of problems, being present in the practice of psychotherapy and psychiatry. Nevertheless, the importance of Heideggerian approach resides primarily in a fact that Heidegger, for his part, insisted on the “productive meeting” of philosophers and psychiatrists, meant to amend understanding of the practice of psychiatry. An opportunity to combine the causal and the hermeneutic approaches in psychiatry was not considered by Heidegger, although, it seems to us, it is exactly the practice of psychiatry, which the “meeting” of the causal theory and philosophy can become really potentially productive and “stimulating” in.","PeriodicalId":230730,"journal":{"name":"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica","volume":"324 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116825622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Even if Roman Ingarden did not develop an ethics stricto sensu, and although his philosophy cannot be immediately associated with a “practical turn” in phenomenology, his investigation of the essence of the real world brought him to consider the nature of man and the ontological conditions of possibility of his morally oriented actions. Without expressing normative prescriptions, and maintaining his observations in the field of eidetic description, the author felt the need to provide a foundation for ethics, inasmuch as he strived to both highlight ethical phenomenon evidence in material ontology contexts, as well as demonstrate the structural presuppositions of this phenomenon within the context of formal ontology. It is exactly this priority of ontological investigation that represents one of the most original contributions of the Polish philosopher on practical topics. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the way in which such a particular phenomenologicalontological metaethics takes shape through the theses expressed in Ingarden’s articles on human nature and responsibility.
{"title":"Roman Ingarden: Phenomenology, Responsibility and the Ontological Foundations of Morality","authors":"Simona Bertolini","doi":"10.26881/MAES.2019.1.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26881/MAES.2019.1.04","url":null,"abstract":"Even if Roman Ingarden did not develop an ethics stricto sensu, and although his philosophy cannot be immediately associated with a “practical turn” in phenomenology, his investigation of the essence of the real world brought him to consider the nature of man and the ontological conditions of possibility of his morally oriented actions. Without expressing normative prescriptions, and maintaining his observations in the field of eidetic description, the author felt the need to provide a foundation for ethics, inasmuch as he strived to both highlight ethical phenomenon evidence in material ontology contexts, as well as demonstrate the structural presuppositions of this phenomenon within the context of formal ontology. It is exactly this priority of ontological investigation that represents one of the most original contributions of the Polish philosopher on practical topics. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the way in which such a particular phenomenologicalontological metaethics takes shape through the theses expressed in Ingarden’s articles on human nature and responsibility.","PeriodicalId":230730,"journal":{"name":"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130618934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article on Irena Krońska (1915–1973) I attempt to present three stages in her approach towards the philosophy of Roman Ingarden. The first one may be associated with her review in Revue philosophique de France et de l’étranger of 1949, printed following the publication of the Controversy over the Existence of the World, Volume 1. The second one encompasses the period up to 1968 when Krońska was cooperating with Ingarden. The third one covers the period after Ingarden’s death in 1970 and provides an assessment of his work, largely in the framework of correspondence between Krońska and Patočka. I maintain that Krońska was consistent in her criticism, voiced from the perspective of Phenomenology, inasmuch as she disapproved of Ingarden’s ontologicism and sense of “positivism” that was in his removedness and lack of ethic-existential content which for Krońska constituted the essence of philosophy.
{"title":"Irena Krońska: A Student and a Critic of Roman Ingarden’s Philosophy","authors":"W. Starzyński","doi":"10.26881/MAES.2019.1.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26881/MAES.2019.1.05","url":null,"abstract":"In this article on Irena Krońska (1915–1973) I attempt to present three stages in her approach towards the philosophy of Roman Ingarden. The first one may be associated with her review in Revue philosophique de France et de l’étranger of 1949, printed following the publication of the Controversy over the Existence of the World, Volume 1. The second one encompasses the period up to 1968 when Krońska was cooperating with Ingarden. The third one covers the period after Ingarden’s death in 1970 and provides an assessment of his work, largely in the framework of correspondence between Krońska and Patočka. I maintain that Krońska was consistent in her criticism, voiced from the perspective of Phenomenology, inasmuch as she disapproved of Ingarden’s ontologicism and sense of “positivism” that was in his removedness and lack of ethic-existential content which for Krońska constituted the essence of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":230730,"journal":{"name":"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica","volume":"352 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131786319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses the relationship between phenomenology and political activism in the work of two lesser-known second-generation phenomenologists: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Aurel Kolnai. As young philosophers in the 1920s, Hildebrand and Kolnai became staunch adherents of the phenomenological movement. Influenced especially by Max Scheler and Adolf Reinach, they were particularly interested in questions of ethical theory and moral action. In the 1930s, with the rise of Hitler, they joined an important circle of conservative Catholic critics of Nazism based around the journal Der christliche Ständestaat in Vienna. After examining the links between phenomenology and activism in their work, my essay concludes by considering how these two thinkers can revise our understanding of phenomenology’s history of social engagement and its potential relevance to social and political debate today.
{"title":"Phenomenology contra Nazism: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Aurel Kolnai","authors":"Michael D. Gubser","doi":"10.26881/MAES.2019.1.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26881/MAES.2019.1.06","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the relationship between phenomenology and political activism in the work of two lesser-known second-generation phenomenologists: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Aurel Kolnai. As young philosophers in the 1920s, Hildebrand and Kolnai became staunch adherents of the phenomenological movement. Influenced especially by Max Scheler and Adolf Reinach, they were particularly interested in questions of ethical theory and moral action. In the 1930s, with the rise of Hitler, they joined an important circle of conservative Catholic critics of Nazism based around the journal Der christliche Ständestaat in Vienna. After examining the links between phenomenology and activism in their work, my essay concludes by considering how these two thinkers can revise our understanding of phenomenology’s history of social engagement and its potential relevance to social and political debate today.","PeriodicalId":230730,"journal":{"name":"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124514024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The author interprets Michalski’s philosophical account of eternity presented in his last book on Nietzsche – The Flame of Eternity. An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Thought. It is argued that in order to understand Michalski’s position one has to contextualize his philosophy, and refer to Heidegger’s and Patočka’s thought. The author tracks the way of how to understand the problem of eternity by reference to Ancient Greek philosophy, e.g., Anaximander. The thesis presented in the paper is that whereas for Patočka human temporality attains meaning through a movement of freedom in the rupture of eternity, for Michalski human temporality attains meaning through a movement of desire in the rapture of eternity.
{"title":"The Rupture and The Rapture: Eternity in Jan Patočka and Krzysztof Michalski","authors":"N. Warren","doi":"10.26881/MAES.2019.1.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26881/MAES.2019.1.08","url":null,"abstract":"The author interprets Michalski’s philosophical account of eternity presented in his last book on Nietzsche – The Flame of Eternity. An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Thought. It is argued that in order to understand Michalski’s position one has to contextualize his philosophy, and refer to Heidegger’s and Patočka’s thought. The author tracks the way of how to understand the problem of eternity by reference to Ancient Greek philosophy, e.g., Anaximander. The thesis presented in the paper is that whereas for Patočka human temporality attains meaning through a movement of freedom in the rupture of eternity, for Michalski human temporality attains meaning through a movement of desire in the rapture of eternity.","PeriodicalId":230730,"journal":{"name":"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124099204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I compare (using as paradigmatic examples E. Stein and R. Ingarden) phenomenological theories of empathy (understood as “mind-reading”) with contemporary cognitivists’ approach to this issue, arguing that although they are prima facie incompatible, in fact they can be seen as complementary. Since empathy is indispensable in practice, a correct conceptualization of this topic is desirable.
{"title":"On Empathy. E. Stein and R. Ingarden vs. Cognitive Psychology","authors":"T. Kakol","doi":"10.26881/maes.2019.1.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26881/maes.2019.1.02","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I compare (using as paradigmatic examples E. Stein and R. Ingarden) phenomenological theories of empathy (understood as “mind-reading”) with contemporary cognitivists’ approach to this issue, arguing that although they are prima facie incompatible, in fact they can be seen as complementary. Since empathy is indispensable in practice, a correct conceptualization of this topic is desirable.","PeriodicalId":230730,"journal":{"name":"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129899919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article presents main tendencies in the reception of phenomenology in the light of Marxism in Poland in the post-war period. As it is argued, although phenomenology was marginalized and even refused from the Marxist position, a dialogue between both traditions established interesting developments, especially with regard to the problem of the body, and constitution of solidarity as a social phenomenon. The main thesis of the study is that the confrontation with Marxism enabled phenomenologists a problematization of the phenomenon of work as a specific way of being. The article is divided into three parts. First, the author defines main ideological points of the Marxist critique of phenomenology, i.e., a critique of phenomenology as a bourgeois philosophy that cannot offer anything to the communist society since it abandons the sphere of praxis. Next, positive developments of the phenomenological method are to be reconstructed; moreover, the author analyzes Szewczyk’s original reading of Husserl, and his analysis of experience of the body. Finally, the article points out a Marxist background of some thoughts of Wojtyła and Tischner, including Tischner’s ethics of solidarity, and Wojtyła’s emphasis on human dignity.
{"title":"Praxis, the Body, and Solidarity: Some Reflections on the Marxist Readings of Phenomenology in Poland (1945–1989)","authors":"W. Płotka","doi":"10.26881/MAES.2019.1.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26881/MAES.2019.1.09","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents main tendencies in the reception of phenomenology in the light of Marxism in Poland in the post-war period. As it is argued, although phenomenology was marginalized and even refused from the Marxist position, a dialogue between both traditions established interesting developments, especially with regard to the problem of the body, and constitution of solidarity as a social phenomenon. The main thesis of the study is that the confrontation with Marxism enabled phenomenologists a problematization of the phenomenon of work as a specific way of being. The article is divided into three parts. First, the author defines main ideological points of the Marxist critique of phenomenology, i.e., a critique of phenomenology as a bourgeois philosophy that cannot offer anything to the communist society since it abandons the sphere of praxis. Next, positive developments of the phenomenological method are to be reconstructed; moreover, the author analyzes Szewczyk’s original reading of Husserl, and his analysis of experience of the body. Finally, the article points out a Marxist background of some thoughts of Wojtyła and Tischner, including Tischner’s ethics of solidarity, and Wojtyła’s emphasis on human dignity.","PeriodicalId":230730,"journal":{"name":"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131119196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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