Research on international conflict has mostly focused on explaining events such as the onset or termination of wars, rather than on trying to predict them. Recently, however, forecasts of political phenomena have received growing attention. Predictions of violent events, in particular, have been increasingly accurate using various methods ranging from expert knowledge to quantitative methods and formal modeling. Yet, we know little about the limits of these approaches, even though information about these limits has critical implications for both future research and policy-making. In particular, are our predictive inaccuracies due to limitations of our models, data, or assumptions, in which case improvements should occur incrementally. Or are there aspects of conflicts that will always remain fundamentally unpredictable? After reviewing some of the current approaches to forecasting conflict, I suggest avenues of research that could disentangle the causes of our current predictive failures.
{"title":"Conflict Forecasting and Its Limits","authors":"Thomas Chadefaux","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2920514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2920514","url":null,"abstract":"Research on international conflict has mostly focused on explaining events such as the onset or termination of wars, rather than on trying to predict them. Recently, however, forecasts of political phenomena have received growing attention. Predictions of violent events, in particular, have been increasingly accurate using various methods ranging from expert knowledge to quantitative methods and formal modeling. Yet, we know little about the limits of these approaches, even though information about these limits has critical implications for both future research and policy-making. In particular, are our predictive inaccuracies due to limitations of our models, data, or assumptions, in which case improvements should occur incrementally. Or are there aspects of conflicts that will always remain fundamentally unpredictable? After reviewing some of the current approaches to forecasting conflict, I suggest avenues of research that could disentangle the causes of our current predictive failures.","PeriodicalId":234067,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies: Scientific Study eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121193207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Researchers have proposed various theories to explain overbidding in rent-seeking contents, including mistakes, systematic biases, the utility of winning, and relative payoff maximization. Through an eight-part experiment, we test and find significant support for the existing theories. Also, we discover some new explanations based on cognitive ability and impulsive behavior. Out of all explanations examined, we find that impulsivity is the most important factor explaining overbidding in contests.
{"title":"Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding in Rent-Seeking Contests","authors":"Roman M. Sheremeta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2676419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2676419","url":null,"abstract":"Researchers have proposed various theories to explain overbidding in rent-seeking contents, including mistakes, systematic biases, the utility of winning, and relative payoff maximization. Through an eight-part experiment, we test and find significant support for the existing theories. Also, we discover some new explanations based on cognitive ability and impulsive behavior. Out of all explanations examined, we find that impulsivity is the most important factor explaining overbidding in contests.","PeriodicalId":234067,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies: Scientific Study eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123817531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The last fifty years have seen two big changes in world politics. First, the most important violent conflicts now largely play out within states rather than between great powers. Second, the decrease in transportation cost has pulled even the smallest and remote countries in the the global exchange of goods and services. In this paper we study how these two fundamental elements of modern world politics interact by analyzing the effects of the trade in small arms on the severity of civil war measured in terms of battle deaths. Using an instrumental variables approach we provide credible evidence that the trade in small arms increases the deadliness for combatants in civil war. Our results also show that sanctions and arms embargoes decrease the loss of combatant life. In addition, our estimation strategy implies an effect of markets and the arms trade network on the transmission of violence to civil war locations. In essence the results show that the arms trade produces a law of conservation of violence. As one civil war ends, the resulting changes in the international market leads other war torn countries’ imports to increase, which in turn increases the number of casualties in ongoing civil wars.
{"title":"Trading Fire: The Arms Trade Network and Civil War","authors":"B. Benson, Kristopher W. Ramsay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2835679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835679","url":null,"abstract":"The last fifty years have seen two big changes in world politics. First, the most important violent conflicts now largely play out within states rather than between great powers. Second, the decrease in transportation cost has pulled even the smallest and remote countries in the the global exchange of goods and services. In this paper we study how these two fundamental elements of modern world politics interact by analyzing the effects of the trade in small arms on the severity of civil war measured in terms of battle deaths. Using an instrumental variables approach we provide credible evidence that the trade in small arms increases the deadliness for combatants in civil war. Our results also show that sanctions and arms embargoes decrease the loss of combatant life. In addition, our estimation strategy implies an effect of markets and the arms trade network on the transmission of violence to civil war locations. In essence the results show that the arms trade produces a law of conservation of violence. As one civil war ends, the resulting changes in the international market leads other war torn countries’ imports to increase, which in turn increases the number of casualties in ongoing civil wars.","PeriodicalId":234067,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies: Scientific Study eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128090900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We prove that the normalization rule in Bond and Syropoulos (1996, Journal of International Economics 40, 411-437) that sets the world price of good 1 as the numeraire causes asymmetry in the Nash equilibrium. Such rule contradicts their symmetric assumption when one derives other blocs' optimum tariffs from their viewpoints. We further show that under symmetry their results are consistent only in the case of two trading blocs.
我们证明了Bond and Syropoulos (1996, Journal of International Economics 40, 411-437)中以商品1的世界价格为数值的归一化规则导致纳什均衡中的不对称性。当人们从其他集团的观点推导出最优关税时，这一规则与他们的对称假设相矛盾。我们进一步证明，在对称条件下，它们的结果只在两个贸易集团的情况下是一致的。
{"title":"A Note on the Size of Trading Blocs, Market Power and World Welfare Effects","authors":"Winston W. Chang, Tai-liang Chen, Tetsuya Saito","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2786379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2786379","url":null,"abstract":"We prove that the normalization rule in Bond and Syropoulos (1996, Journal of International Economics 40, 411-437) that sets the world price of good 1 as the numeraire causes asymmetry in the Nash equilibrium. Such rule contradicts their symmetric assumption when one derives other blocs' optimum tariffs from their viewpoints. We further show that under symmetry their results are consistent only in the case of two trading blocs.","PeriodicalId":234067,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies: Scientific Study eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129043702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic grievances, particularly those caused by landholding inequality, play a central role in theories of political instability and civil conflict. However, cross-national empirical studies have failed to confirm the link between unequal distributions of land and civil war. This is due to problems in measuring and theorizing rural inequality. A measure of landholding inequality which accounts for landlessness captures economic grievances in the countryside and is predicted to be correlated with conflict. Gini coefficients of the concentration of land ownership do not only capture grievances among landowners, but also their ability to act collectively as rebels and a repressive rural elite. The relationship between landholding Ginis and conflict is shaped like an inverted 'U': inequality is associated with an increasing likelihood of conflict, but as concentration of landholdings and grievances reach very high levels the likelihood of conflict decreases with the formation of a small repressive class of landowners. Results of regressions using new data on overall land inequality and the concentration of landholdings confirm these predictions, suggesting that landholding inequality should not be ruled out as an important underlying cause of civil war.
{"title":"Rural Grievances, Landholding Inequality and Civil Conflict","authors":"Henry Thomson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2551186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2551186","url":null,"abstract":"Economic grievances, particularly those caused by landholding inequality, play a central role in theories of political instability and civil conflict. However, cross-national empirical studies have failed to confirm the link between unequal distributions of land and civil war. This is due to problems in measuring and theorizing rural inequality. A measure of landholding inequality which accounts for landlessness captures economic grievances in the countryside and is predicted to be correlated with conflict. Gini coefficients of the concentration of land ownership do not only capture grievances among landowners, but also their ability to act collectively as rebels and a repressive rural elite. The relationship between landholding Ginis and conflict is shaped like an inverted 'U': inequality is associated with an increasing likelihood of conflict, but as concentration of landholdings and grievances reach very high levels the likelihood of conflict decreases with the formation of a small repressive class of landowners. Results of regressions using new data on overall land inequality and the concentration of landholdings confirm these predictions, suggesting that landholding inequality should not be ruled out as an important underlying cause of civil war.","PeriodicalId":234067,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies: Scientific Study eJournal","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124033467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose, develop, and analyze a mathematical model of intergroup attitudes in a community that is divided between two distinct social groups (which may be distinguished by religion, ethnicity, or some other socially distinguishing factor). The model is based on very simple premises that are both intuitive and justified by sociological research. We investigate the behavior of the model in various special cases, for various model configurations. We discuss the stability of the model, and the continuous or discontinuous dependence of model behavior on various parameters. Finally, we discuss possible implications for strategies to improve intergroup affinity, and to defuse tension and prevent deterioration of intergroup relationships.
{"title":"Affinity and Hostility in Divided Communities: A Mathematical Model","authors":"C. Thron, R. McCoy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2687353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2687353","url":null,"abstract":"We propose, develop, and analyze a mathematical model of intergroup attitudes in a community that is divided between two distinct social groups (which may be distinguished by religion, ethnicity, or some other socially distinguishing factor). The model is based on very simple premises that are both intuitive and justified by sociological research. We investigate the behavior of the model in various special cases, for various model configurations. We discuss the stability of the model, and the continuous or discontinuous dependence of model behavior on various parameters. Finally, we discuss possible implications for strategies to improve intergroup affinity, and to defuse tension and prevent deterioration of intergroup relationships.","PeriodicalId":234067,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies: Scientific Study eJournal","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132340083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In “Political Devolution and Resistance to Foreign Rule,” Ferwerda and Miller (FM) use a natural experiment during WWII France to argue that devolution of authority to local elites mitigates resistance to foreign rule. We dispute FM’s claims on four levels. First, the Line of Demarcation dividing France was delineated with the goal of keeping strategic railways under direct German control, invalidating FM’s natural experiment research design. Second, the higher level of resistance they observe in directly occupied France results from the Resistance’s efforts to target these strategic railways. Third, FM’s argument is not supported by the overall pattern of resistance in metropolitan France between 1940-44. Finally, FM’s data is unsuitable for testing theories connecting the location of an attack with its perpetrators’ precise geographic origins. These problems lead us to argue for the epistemic priority of treatment-assignment causal process observations over balance checks on pretreatment covariates when validating natural experiments.
{"title":"What's in a Line? Natural Experiments and the Line of Demarcation in WWII Occupied France","authors":"M. Kocher, Nuno P. Monteiro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2555716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2555716","url":null,"abstract":"In “Political Devolution and Resistance to Foreign Rule,” Ferwerda and Miller (FM) use a natural experiment during WWII France to argue that devolution of authority to local elites mitigates resistance to foreign rule. We dispute FM’s claims on four levels. First, the Line of Demarcation dividing France was delineated with the goal of keeping strategic railways under direct German control, invalidating FM’s natural experiment research design. Second, the higher level of resistance they observe in directly occupied France results from the Resistance’s efforts to target these strategic railways. Third, FM’s argument is not supported by the overall pattern of resistance in metropolitan France between 1940-44. Finally, FM’s data is unsuitable for testing theories connecting the location of an attack with its perpetrators’ precise geographic origins. These problems lead us to argue for the epistemic priority of treatment-assignment causal process observations over balance checks on pretreatment covariates when validating natural experiments.","PeriodicalId":234067,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies: Scientific Study eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130919942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study focused on the investigation of the organizational conflicts and ways and methods of their regulation in the human resource management system. The research was based on Marxist and Lewis Coser’s approaches to studying organizational conflicts, collaboration among employees and everyday organizational practices. The research questions were as follows: which objectives the HRM department is assigned with; what is the place of the department in the organization; which problems the head of the department and employees are faced with in everyday activity; what is the practice used in the organization for managing conflicts. In order to achieve the target, researcher analyzed the data collected in the company named "Parfum", Saint Petersburg, Russia. The methodology used in this research was a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. After an expert in-depth interview with the head of the HRM department of the company, a questionnaire survey of employees was conducted. The result showed that the organization’s staff as a group is an important social foundation of this company; and conflicts that arise within the company are solved most often with the involvement of the head of this department.
{"title":"Social Practice of Conflict Management in HRM System: A Parfum Company Case in Saint-Petersburg (Russia)","authors":"Anastasia Kraiukhina, M. Rubtcova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2613556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2613556","url":null,"abstract":"This study focused on the investigation of the organizational conflicts and ways and methods of their regulation in the human resource management system. The research was based on Marxist and Lewis Coser’s approaches to studying organizational conflicts, collaboration among employees and everyday organizational practices. The research questions were as follows: which objectives the HRM department is assigned with; what is the place of the department in the organization; which problems the head of the department and employees are faced with in everyday activity; what is the practice used in the organization for managing conflicts. In order to achieve the target, researcher analyzed the data collected in the company named \"Parfum\", Saint Petersburg, Russia. The methodology used in this research was a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. After an expert in-depth interview with the head of the HRM department of the company, a questionnaire survey of employees was conducted. The result showed that the organization’s staff as a group is an important social foundation of this company; and conflicts that arise within the company are solved most often with the involvement of the head of this department.","PeriodicalId":234067,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies: Scientific Study eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114877558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that the relationship between exposure to violence and support for political violence is not linear. These variables rather have a U-curved relationship. Exposure to violence, until a certain threshold, increases empathy. Empathy, in turn, decreases support for political violence. Once that threshold is passed, however, one can argue that exposure to violence should induce support for political violence. The paper uses the Afrobarometer (2008) data. It focuses on Liberia which has not been explored by scholars working on attitudes towards political violence before. The findings provide support for the hypothesis.
{"title":"Does Exposure to Violence Increase or Decrease Support for Political Violence?","authors":"Direnç Kanol","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2573300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2573300","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that the relationship between exposure to violence and support for political violence is not linear. These variables rather have a U-curved relationship. Exposure to violence, until a certain threshold, increases empathy. Empathy, in turn, decreases support for political violence. Once that threshold is passed, however, one can argue that exposure to violence should induce support for political violence. The paper uses the Afrobarometer (2008) data. It focuses on Liberia which has not been explored by scholars working on attitudes towards political violence before. The findings provide support for the hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":234067,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies: Scientific Study eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114938532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We assess the certainty with which terrorist groups can repeatedly inflict fatalities in terrorist attacks. A terrorist group is particularly dangerous that can inflict higher levels of fatalities with more certainty than other groups. We develop a fatalities-to-variability (F-V) measurement statistic to shed some light on the risk-adjusted brutality of terrorist groups. A relatively high F-V ratio indicates that a terrorist group demonstrates a capability to inflict fatalities with less variable outcomes across attacks than other groups. An increasing F-V ratio indicates an enhancement of this capability. Terrorist groups observed to be increasing the F-V ratio of their actions may be special cause for concern, especially when F increases concomitant with decreases in V. We compute the F-V statistic for every terrorist group that was active during the period 2000 to 2008. We assess the results and compare the relative brutality of terrorist groups. We examine several prominent cases including Algerian terrorism, Al-Qa`ida, the Taliban, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Islamic State (ISIS). ISIS has been accorded considerable attention recently. However, its emergence as a terrorist group with a relatively high F-V ratio can be traced to as early as 2007.
{"title":"Terrorist Group Brutality and the Emergence of the Islamic State","authors":"P. J. Phillips","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2479740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2479740","url":null,"abstract":"We assess the certainty with which terrorist groups can repeatedly inflict fatalities in terrorist attacks. A terrorist group is particularly dangerous that can inflict higher levels of fatalities with more certainty than other groups. We develop a fatalities-to-variability (F-V) measurement statistic to shed some light on the risk-adjusted brutality of terrorist groups. A relatively high F-V ratio indicates that a terrorist group demonstrates a capability to inflict fatalities with less variable outcomes across attacks than other groups. An increasing F-V ratio indicates an enhancement of this capability. Terrorist groups observed to be increasing the F-V ratio of their actions may be special cause for concern, especially when F increases concomitant with decreases in V. We compute the F-V statistic for every terrorist group that was active during the period 2000 to 2008. We assess the results and compare the relative brutality of terrorist groups. We examine several prominent cases including Algerian terrorism, Al-Qa`ida, the Taliban, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Islamic State (ISIS). ISIS has been accorded considerable attention recently. However, its emergence as a terrorist group with a relatively high F-V ratio can be traced to as early as 2007.","PeriodicalId":234067,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Studies: Scientific Study eJournal","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121452791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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