The paper provides a novel theory of income distribution and achieves an integration of monetary and value theories along Ricardian lines, extended to a monetary production economy as understood by Keynes. In a monetary economy, capital is a fund that must be maintained. This idea is captured in the circuit of capital as first defined by Marx. We introduce the circuit of fixed capital; this circuit is closed when the present value of prospective returns from employing it is equal to its supply price. In a steady-growth equilibrium with nominal wages and interest rates given, the equation that closes the circuit of fixed capital can be solved for prices, implying a definitive income distribution. Accordingly, the imputation for fixed capital costs is equivalent to that of a money contract of equal length, which is the payment per period that will repay the cost of the fixed asset, together with interest. It follows that if capital assets remain in use for a period longer than is required to amortize them, their earnings beyond that period have an element of pure rent.
{"title":"Income Distribution in a Monetary Economy: A Ricardo-Keynes Synthesis","authors":"N. Ekinci","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1856126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1856126","url":null,"abstract":"The paper provides a novel theory of income distribution and achieves an integration of monetary and value theories along Ricardian lines, extended to a monetary production economy as understood by Keynes. In a monetary economy, capital is a fund that must be maintained. This idea is captured in the circuit of capital as first defined by Marx. We introduce the circuit of fixed capital; this circuit is closed when the present value of prospective returns from employing it is equal to its supply price. In a steady-growth equilibrium with nominal wages and interest rates given, the equation that closes the circuit of fixed capital can be solved for prices, implying a definitive income distribution. Accordingly, the imputation for fixed capital costs is equivalent to that of a money contract of equal length, which is the payment per period that will repay the cost of the fixed asset, together with interest. It follows that if capital assets remain in use for a period longer than is required to amortize them, their earnings beyond that period have an element of pure rent.","PeriodicalId":249249,"journal":{"name":"POL: Other Strategy & Macroeconomic Policy (Topic)","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127367762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper focuses specifically on interfirm strategic collaboration as a vehicle for knowledge management across firm boundaries. Drawing on the widely accepted exploitation/exploration dichotomy, this article contributes to research concerning alliance dynamics by combining elements related to alliance formation, negotiation and outcomes. By integrating the exploitation/exploration arguments into a set of knowledge-related strategic motives for alliance formation, the main arguments focus on the influence of governance mechanisms on the relationship between strategic fit and outcome in terms of knowledge. This paper integrates the emergent knowledge-based theories of alliance formation (and outcome) with existing theories related to governance and coordination in an attempt to explain how the knowledge outcome of collaborative relationships may be determined by the strategic fit of partner motives, influenced by the mix of contractual and procedural governance. A series of testable propositions are derived in order to answer the following question: Do combinations of contractual and procedural coordination, given specific strategic fit, explain performance differentials?
{"title":"Strategic Fit and the Role of Contractual and Procedural Governance in Alliances: A Dynamic Perspective","authors":"B. Nielsen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1102153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1102153","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses specifically on interfirm strategic collaboration as a vehicle for knowledge management across firm boundaries. Drawing on the widely accepted exploitation/exploration dichotomy, this article contributes to research concerning alliance dynamics by combining elements related to alliance formation, negotiation and outcomes. By integrating the exploitation/exploration arguments into a set of knowledge-related strategic motives for alliance formation, the main arguments focus on the influence of governance mechanisms on the relationship between strategic fit and outcome in terms of knowledge. This paper integrates the emergent knowledge-based theories of alliance formation (and outcome) with existing theories related to governance and coordination in an attempt to explain how the knowledge outcome of collaborative relationships may be determined by the strategic fit of partner motives, influenced by the mix of contractual and procedural governance. A series of testable propositions are derived in order to answer the following question: Do combinations of contractual and procedural coordination, given specific strategic fit, explain performance differentials?","PeriodicalId":249249,"journal":{"name":"POL: Other Strategy & Macroeconomic Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130872400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Global imbalances associated with the U.S. current account deficit have given rise to speculation about the nature of the impending adjustment: Will it be smooth and gradual, or will it be sudden and costly? This paper summarizes the two views and then considers three historical periods with similar pressures--an earlier era of globalization from 1870 to 1914, the interwar gold standard, and Bretton Woods. A comparison of the periods and their outcomes suggests current global imbalances might resolve themselves quietly.
{"title":"Globalization and Imbalances in Historical Perspective","authors":"Michael D. Bordo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1024835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1024835","url":null,"abstract":"Global imbalances associated with the U.S. current account deficit have given rise to speculation about the nature of the impending adjustment: Will it be smooth and gradual, or will it be sudden and costly? This paper summarizes the two views and then considers three historical periods with similar pressures--an earlier era of globalization from 1870 to 1914, the interwar gold standard, and Bretton Woods. A comparison of the periods and their outcomes suggests current global imbalances might resolve themselves quietly.","PeriodicalId":249249,"journal":{"name":"POL: Other Strategy & Macroeconomic Policy (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126812325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent research in macroeconomics -- both theoretical and empirical -- has resurrected the idea that capital market imperfections may be significant factors in business volatility by making new progress in characterizing the mechanisms. This paper outlines a case for a financial aspect to business fluctuations, in light of the contributions of this new literature. We present a theoretical model that explicitly motivates how financial factors may affect investment. We then report some existing tests of the model's basic predictions4 and also present two new sets of results. The first demonstrates that the inverse relation between sales variability and size documented in many studies may be due to financial rather than technological factors, in contrast to the conventional view. The second lends support to a theoretical prediction of the model. that the effects of capital market frictions on investment should be asymmetric -- having more impact in recessions than booms. The final section presents conclusions, and addresses some policy questions.
{"title":"Financial Factors in Business Fluctuations","authors":"M. Gertler, R. Hubbard","doi":"10.3386/W2758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W2758","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research in macroeconomics -- both theoretical and empirical -- has resurrected the idea that capital market imperfections may be significant factors in business volatility by making new progress in characterizing the mechanisms. This paper outlines a case for a financial aspect to business fluctuations, in light of the contributions of this new literature. We present a theoretical model that explicitly motivates how financial factors may affect investment. We then report some existing tests of the model's basic predictions4 and also present two new sets of results. The first demonstrates that the inverse relation between sales variability and size documented in many studies may be due to financial rather than technological factors, in contrast to the conventional view. The second lends support to a theoretical prediction of the model. that the effects of capital market frictions on investment should be asymmetric -- having more impact in recessions than booms. The final section presents conclusions, and addresses some policy questions.","PeriodicalId":249249,"journal":{"name":"POL: Other Strategy & Macroeconomic Policy (Topic)","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132598829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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