The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics最新文献_第2页

The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics

Pub Date : 2021-11-10 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.16

R. Sparrow

In an influential essay, published in the 1980s, philosopher of technology Langdon Winner (1980), asked, ‘Do artefacts have politics?’ His answer, confirmed by subsequent decades of science and technology studies, was a resounding ‘Yes!’ Artefacts have political choices embedded in their design and entrench these politics in their applications. Moreover, because technologies are better suited to serving some ends rather than others, artefacts shape the societies in which they are developed by shaping the circumstances of their own use. This chapter explores how robots have politics and how those politics are relevant to their ethics. It suggests that, for a number of reasons, robots have more politics than do other sorts of artefacts.

在20世纪80年代发表的一篇有影响力的文章中，技术哲学家兰登·温纳(1980)问道:“人工制品有政治吗?”随后几十年的科学技术研究证实了他的回答:“是的!”“人工制品在其设计中嵌入了政治选择，并在其应用中巩固了这些政治。此外，由于技术更适合于服务于某些目的而不是其他目的，人工制品通过塑造其自身使用的环境来塑造其发展所在的社会。本章探讨了机器人如何拥有政治以及这些政治如何与它们的伦理相关。这表明，由于种种原因，机器人比其他种类的人工制品更具政治性。

引用次数: 2

The Ethics of Sex Robots 性爱机器人的伦理

The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics

Pub Date : 2021-11-10 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.13

A. Sterri, B. Earp

What, if anything, is wrong with having sex with a robot? For the sake of this chapter, we will assume that sexbots are ‘mere’ machines that are reliably identifiable as such, despite their human-like appearance and behaviour. Under these stipulations, sexbots themselves can no more be harmed, morally speaking, than your dishwasher. However, there may still be something wrong about the production, distribution, and use of such sexbots. In this chapter, we examine whether sex with robots is intrinsically or instrumentally wrong and critically assess different regulatory responses. They defend a harm reduction approach to sexbot regulation, analogous to the approach that has been considered in other areas, concerning, for example, drugs and sex work.

如果和机器人做爱有什么不对的话?为了本章的目的，我们将假设性爱机器人“仅仅”是可以可靠识别的机器，尽管它们的外表和行为与人类相似。根据这些规定，从道德上讲，性爱机器人本身不会受到伤害，就像你的洗碗机一样。然而，这种性爱机器人的生产、传播和使用可能仍然存在一些问题。在本章中，我们研究了与机器人发生性关系是否在本质上或工具上是错误的，并批判性地评估了不同的监管反应。他们主张采取减少伤害的方法来监管性爱机器人，类似于在其他领域考虑的方法，例如涉及毒品和性工作。

引用次数: 3

Price Discrimination in the Digital Age 数字时代的价格歧视

The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics

Pub Date : 2021-11-10 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.24

K. Lippert‐Rasmussen, Lauritz Aastrup Munch

This chapter discusses the morality of online price discrimination. Price discrimination is a widespread type of market behaviour and it occurs, roughly, when a seller systematically charges different prices for the same product when it is offered to different groups of customers. Price discrimination occurs both online and offline, but some find the practice particularly suspicious when deployed in online markets. This asymmetry, we argue, calls for an explanation. In the chapter, we define price discrimination and review a number of explanations of why, and when, price discrimination is morally objectionable. We argue that online price discrimination will often prove more problematic than its offline counterpart, but also that neither practice is necessarily morally wrong.

本章讨论了网络价格歧视的道德问题。价格歧视是一种普遍存在的市场行为，它大致发生在销售者有系统地对提供给不同顾客群体的同一产品收取不同的价格时。价格歧视线上线下都有，但一些人认为，这种做法在线上市场尤为可疑。我们认为，这种不对称需要一个解释。在本章中，我们定义了价格歧视，并回顾了价格歧视为何以及何时在道德上令人反感的一些解释。我们认为，网上的价格歧视往往比线下的价格歧视更有问题，但这两种做法在道德上都不一定是错误的。

引用次数: 0

Is There Collective Responsibility for Misogyny Perpetrated on Social Media? 社交媒体上的厌女症是否有集体责任?

The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics

Pub Date : 2021-11-10 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.9

H. Lawford-Smith, J. Megarry

Women, particularly those who work in public positions (such as journalists, politicians, celebrities, activists) are subject to disproportionate amounts of abuse on social media platforms such as Twitter. This abuse occurs in a landscape that those platforms designed and that they maintain. Focusing in particular on Twitter, as typical of the kind of platform we are interested in, this chapter argues that it is the platform, not (usually) the individuals who use it, that bears collective responsibility as a corporate agent for misogyny. Social media platforms, however, should not overstep the prevention of misogyny into interference in open political debates.

女性，特别是那些在公共职位上工作的女性(如记者、政治家、名人、活动家)在Twitter等社交媒体平台上受到了不成比例的虐待。这种滥用发生在这些平台设计和维护的环境中。作为我们感兴趣的典型平台，本章特别关注Twitter，认为是这个平台，而不是(通常)使用它的个人，承担了作为厌女症企业代理人的集体责任。然而，社交媒体平台不应超越对厌女症的预防，而干涉公开的政治辩论。

引用次数: 0

Algorithmic Bias and Access to Opportunities 算法偏见和获得机会

The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics

Pub Date : 2021-11-10 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.21

Lisa Herzog

The chapter discusses the problem of algorithmic bias in decision-making processes that determine access to opportunities, such as recidivism scores, college admission decisions, or loan scores. After describing the technical bases of algorithmic bias, it asks how to evaluate them, drawing on Iris Marion Young’s perspective of structural (in)justice. The focus is in particular on the risk of so-called ‘Matthew effects’, in which privileged individuals gain more advantages, while those who are already disadvantaged suffer further. Some proposed solutions are discussed, with an emphasis on the need to take a broad, interdisciplinary perspective rather than a purely technical perspective. The chapter also replies to the objection that private firms cannot be held responsible for addressing structural injustices and concludes by emphasizing the need for political and social action.

本章讨论了在决定获得机会的决策过程中的算法偏差问题，例如累犯分数、大学录取决定或贷款分数。在描述了算法偏见的技术基础之后，它询问了如何评估它们，并借鉴了Iris Marion Young的结构正义(in)观点。研究的重点是所谓的“马太效应”的风险，即享有特权的人获得更多的优势，而那些已经处于不利地位的人则遭受更大的损失。讨论了一些建议的解决办法，重点是需要采取广泛的跨学科观点，而不是纯粹的技术观点。本章还答复了反对意见，即私营公司不能对解决结构性不公正负责，并在结束时强调需要采取政治和社会行动。

引用次数: 1