Pub Date : 2022-02-14DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.34
R. Simpson
There are prima facie ethical reasons and prudential reasons for people to avoid or withdraw from social media platforms. But in response to pushes for people to quit social media, a number of authors have argued that there is something ethically questionable about quitting social media: that it involves—typically, if not necessarily—an objectionable expression of privilege on the part of the quitter. This chapter contextualizes privilege-based objections to quitting social media and explains the underlying principles and assumptions that feed into these objections. The chapter shows how they misrepresent the kind of act people are performing in quitting, in part by downplaying its role in promoting reforms in communication systems and technologies. And it suggests that this misrepresentation is related to a more widespread, and ultimately insidious, tendency to think of recently established technological states of affairs as permanent fixtures of our society.
{"title":"The Ethics of Quitting Social Media","authors":"R. Simpson","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.34","url":null,"abstract":"There are prima facie ethical reasons and prudential reasons for people to avoid or withdraw from social media platforms. But in response to pushes for people to quit social media, a number of authors have argued that there is something ethically questionable about quitting social media: that it involves—typically, if not necessarily—an objectionable expression of privilege on the part of the quitter. This chapter contextualizes privilege-based objections to quitting social media and explains the underlying principles and assumptions that feed into these objections. The chapter shows how they misrepresent the kind of act people are performing in quitting, in part by downplaying its role in promoting reforms in communication systems and technologies. And it suggests that this misrepresentation is related to a more widespread, and ultimately insidious, tendency to think of recently established technological states of affairs as permanent fixtures of our society.","PeriodicalId":262957,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics","volume":"291 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114203980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-14DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.14
J. Danaher
This chapter addresses the growing problem of unwanted sexual interactions in virtual environments. It reviews the available evidence regarding the prevalence and severity of this problem. It then argues that due to the potential harms of such interactions, as well as their non-consensual nature, there is a good prima facie argument for viewing them as serious moral wrongs. Does this prima facie argument hold up to scrutiny? After considering three major objections (the ‘it’s not real’ objection, the ‘it’s just a game’ objection, and the ‘unrestricted consent’ objection), this chapter argues that it does. The chapter closes by reviewing some of the policy options available to us in addressing the problem of virtual sexual assault.
{"title":"The Ethics of Virtual Sexual Assault","authors":"J. Danaher","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.14","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses the growing problem of unwanted sexual interactions in virtual environments. It reviews the available evidence regarding the prevalence and severity of this problem. It then argues that due to the potential harms of such interactions, as well as their non-consensual nature, there is a good prima facie argument for viewing them as serious moral wrongs. Does this prima facie argument hold up to scrutiny? After considering three major objections (the ‘it’s not real’ objection, the ‘it’s just a game’ objection, and the ‘unrestricted consent’ objection), this chapter argues that it does. The chapter closes by reviewing some of the policy options available to us in addressing the problem of virtual sexual assault.","PeriodicalId":262957,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127119468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-14DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.22
K. Hadjimatheou, C. Nathan
Predictive policing using complex algorithms is on the rise. It involves the use of data-analysis tools and empirical research to formulate and validate predictions. In this chapter, the authors focus on two kinds of ethical issue this raises. The first is the way that such algorithms can absorb and then amplify existing biases and prejudices. The second is the way that predictive policing can lead to improper restrictions of liberty, overriding our norms concerning the need for individualized suspicion and respect for autonomy. Neither is a necessary consequence of predictive policing. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to institute ways to counteract these effects in a proactive way.
{"title":"The Ethics of Predictive Policing","authors":"K. Hadjimatheou, C. Nathan","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.22","url":null,"abstract":"Predictive policing using complex algorithms is on the rise. It involves the use of data-analysis tools and empirical research to formulate and validate predictions. In this chapter, the authors focus on two kinds of ethical issue this raises. The first is the way that such algorithms can absorb and then amplify existing biases and prejudices. The second is the way that predictive policing can lead to improper restrictions of liberty, overriding our norms concerning the need for individualized suspicion and respect for autonomy. Neither is a necessary consequence of predictive policing. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to institute ways to counteract these effects in a proactive way.","PeriodicalId":262957,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115104171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-14DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.37
J. Danaher
Advances in automation threaten to radically alter the workplace of the future. What implications does this have for the ethics of work? For better or worse, work plays a central role in distributing goods to people in the modern world. This includes the good of income, of course, but it also includes meaning-related goods such as a sense of purpose, mastery over some skill set, social contribution, and social status. Will automation rob large numbers of people of these goods too? What can be done to compensate them for these losses? Reviewing the possibilities, this chapter ultimately argues that the best way to mitigate these losses might be to transition to a post-work society.
{"title":"Automation and the Future of Work","authors":"J. Danaher","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.37","url":null,"abstract":"Advances in automation threaten to radically alter the workplace of the future. What implications does this have for the ethics of work? For better or worse, work plays a central role in distributing goods to people in the modern world. This includes the good of income, of course, but it also includes meaning-related goods such as a sense of purpose, mastery over some skill set, social contribution, and social status. Will automation rob large numbers of people of these goods too? What can be done to compensate them for these losses? Reviewing the possibilities, this chapter ultimately argues that the best way to mitigate these losses might be to transition to a post-work society.","PeriodicalId":262957,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134542512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-08DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.5
Emily Sullivan, M. Alfano
People have always shared information through chains and networks of testimony. It is arguably part of what makes us human and enables us to live in cooperative communities with populations greater than 150 or so. The invention of the internet and the rise of social media have turbocharged our ability to share information. This chapter develops a normative epistemic framework for sharing information online. This framework takes into account both ethical and epistemic considerations that are intertwined in typical cases of online testimony. The authors argue that, while the current state of affairs is not entirely novel, recent technological developments call for a rethinking of the norms of testimony, as well as the articulation of a set of virtuous dispositions that people would do well to cultivate in their capacity as conduits (not just sources or receivers) of information.
{"title":"A Normative Framework for Sharing Information Online","authors":"Emily Sullivan, M. Alfano","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.5","url":null,"abstract":"People have always shared information through chains and networks of testimony. It is arguably part of what makes us human and enables us to live in cooperative communities with populations greater than 150 or so. The invention of the internet and the rise of social media have turbocharged our ability to share information. This chapter develops a normative epistemic framework for sharing information online. This framework takes into account both ethical and epistemic considerations that are intertwined in typical cases of online testimony. The authors argue that, while the current state of affairs is not entirely novel, recent technological developments call for a rethinking of the norms of testimony, as well as the articulation of a set of virtuous dispositions that people would do well to cultivate in their capacity as conduits (not just sources or receivers) of information.","PeriodicalId":262957,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics","volume":"165 1-3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133697394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-08DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.11
D. Cocking
The online social revolution has seen the pursuit of friendship online become core business of the internet and part of the friendships and social lives of most of us. This chapter provides an overview of the burgeoning contemporary research concerning online friendship and of the main themes, since Aristotle, on the nature and value of friendship. It also aims to provide some substantial fresh research for future analyses. It argues that the pursuit of friendship relies heavily upon the rich, face-to-face dynamic of plural modes of self-expression and communication that we have engaged in for thousands of years. Our social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, flatline much of this territory, and as a result much of the moral universe that we have built upon it is lost or distorted online. The chapter concludes by suggesting that we need to better understand this social dependence of our values and valuing, both to improve the value-sensitive design of life online, and, where this social dependence cannot be well captured, to also improve our engagement in our traditional worlds and so help get us offline.
{"title":"Friendship Online","authors":"D. Cocking","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.11","url":null,"abstract":"The online social revolution has seen the pursuit of friendship online become core business of the internet and part of the friendships and social lives of most of us. This chapter provides an overview of the burgeoning contemporary research concerning online friendship and of the main themes, since Aristotle, on the nature and value of friendship. It also aims to provide some substantial fresh research for future analyses. It argues that the pursuit of friendship relies heavily upon the rich, face-to-face dynamic of plural modes of self-expression and communication that we have engaged in for thousands of years. Our social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, flatline much of this territory, and as a result much of the moral universe that we have built upon it is lost or distorted online. The chapter concludes by suggesting that we need to better understand this social dependence of our values and valuing, both to improve the value-sensitive design of life online, and, where this social dependence cannot be well captured, to also improve our engagement in our traditional worlds and so help get us offline.","PeriodicalId":262957,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132901851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-08DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.3
Sven Nyholm
The rapid introduction of different kinds of robots and other machines with artificial intelligence into different domains of life raises the question of whether robots can be moral agents and moral patients. In other words, can robots perform moral actions? Can robots be on the receiving end of moral actions? To explore these questions, this chapter relates the new area of the ethics of human–robot interaction to traditional ethical theories such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics. These theories were developed with the assumption that the paradigmatic examples of moral agents and moral patients are human beings. As this chapter argues, this creates challenges for anybody who wishes to extend the traditional ethical theories to new questions of whether robots can be moral agents and/or moral patients.
{"title":"The Ethics of Human–Robot Interaction and Traditional Moral Theories","authors":"Sven Nyholm","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.3","url":null,"abstract":"The rapid introduction of different kinds of robots and other machines with artificial intelligence into different domains of life raises the question of whether robots can be moral agents and moral patients. In other words, can robots perform moral actions? Can robots be on the receiving end of moral actions? To explore these questions, this chapter relates the new area of the ethics of human–robot interaction to traditional ethical theories such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics. These theories were developed with the assumption that the paradigmatic examples of moral agents and moral patients are human beings. As this chapter argues, this creates challenges for anybody who wishes to extend the traditional ethical theories to new questions of whether robots can be moral agents and/or moral patients.","PeriodicalId":262957,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125878407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-10DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.10
J. Howard
Social media are now central sites of democratic discourse among citizens. But are some contributions to social media too extreme to be permitted? This entry considers the permissibility of suppressing extreme speech on social media, such as terrorist propaganda and racist hate speech. It begins by considering the argument that such restrictions on speech would wrong democratic citizens, violating their freedom of expression. It proceeds to investigate the moral responsibilities of social media companies to suppress extreme speech, and whether these ought to be enforced through the law. Finally, it explores an alternative mechanism for combatting extreme speech on social media—counter-speech—and evaluates its prospects.
{"title":"Extreme Speech, Democratic Deliberation, and Social Media","authors":"J. Howard","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.10","url":null,"abstract":"Social media are now central sites of democratic discourse among citizens. But are some contributions to social media too extreme to be permitted? This entry considers the permissibility of suppressing extreme speech on social media, such as terrorist propaganda and racist hate speech. It begins by considering the argument that such restrictions on speech would wrong democratic citizens, violating their freedom of expression. It proceeds to investigate the moral responsibilities of social media companies to suppress extreme speech, and whether these ought to be enforced through the law. Finally, it explores an alternative mechanism for combatting extreme speech on social media—counter-speech—and evaluates its prospects.","PeriodicalId":262957,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129726345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-10DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.36
Karina Vold, Daniel R. Harris
Alan Turing, one of the fathers of computing, warned that artificial intelligence (AI) could one day pose an existential risk to humanity. Today, recent advancements in the field of AI have been accompanied by a renewed set of existential warnings. But what exactly constitutes an existential risk? And how exactly does AI pose such a threat? In this chapter, we aim to answer these questions. In particular, we will critically explore three commonly cited reasons for thinking that AI poses an existential threat to humanity: the control problem, the possibility of global disruption from an AI race dynamic, and the weaponization of AI.
{"title":"How Does Artificial Intelligence Pose an Existential Risk?","authors":"Karina Vold, Daniel R. Harris","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.36","url":null,"abstract":"Alan Turing, one of the fathers of computing, warned that artificial intelligence (AI) could one day pose an existential risk to humanity. Today, recent advancements in the field of AI have been accompanied by a renewed set of existential warnings. But what exactly constitutes an existential risk? And how exactly does AI pose such a threat? In this chapter, we aim to answer these questions. In particular, we will critically explore three commonly cited reasons for thinking that AI poses an existential threat to humanity: the control problem, the possibility of global disruption from an AI race dynamic, and the weaponization of AI.","PeriodicalId":262957,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124447510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-10DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.6
Neil Levy
The blame for fake news obviously lies with the producers. It is plausible, nevertheless, that consumers have a responsibility to avoid fake news, to engage in fact-checking, or to seek multiple sources, including sources with different ideologies. This chapter argues that these strategies have limited utility and if the problem of fake news is to be effectively addressed, we need responses at the supply end, not the consumption end. Since suppliers, who are often ill motivated, cannot be expected to offer or consent to these responses, we need effective regulation or control of sources. The author sketches proposals compatible with maintaining the rights of everyone to free speech.
{"title":"Fake News","authors":"Neil Levy","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.6","url":null,"abstract":"The blame for fake news obviously lies with the producers. It is plausible, nevertheless, that consumers have a responsibility to avoid fake news, to engage in fact-checking, or to seek multiple sources, including sources with different ideologies. This chapter argues that these strategies have limited utility and if the problem of fake news is to be effectively addressed, we need responses at the supply end, not the consumption end. Since suppliers, who are often ill motivated, cannot be expected to offer or consent to these responses, we need effective regulation or control of sources. The author sketches proposals compatible with maintaining the rights of everyone to free speech.","PeriodicalId":262957,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126212412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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