A substantial literature has examined negotiation problems. Throughout this literature, scholars have assumed that participants approach negotiations with the intent of reaching a deal and that negotiation participants cannot be significantly harmed by the negotiation process. In this paper, we challenge these assumptions. We define situations in which negotiators use the negotiation process to achieve goals other than reaching a potential agreement as instrumental negotiations. We explore the implications of this broader conceptualization of negotiations both theoretically and experimentally. We demonstrate that the mere possibility of encountering an instrumental negotiator significantly changes Nash equilibria and actual behavior; some negotiators are harmed by instrumental negotiators and other negotiators reject sincere overtures to negotiate. The possibility of instrumental negotiations significantly harms profits. We consider theoretical, prescriptive, and policy implications of these results.
{"title":"Getting to NO: Theory and Evidence for Instrumental Negotiations","authors":"Krishnan S. Anand, P. Feldman, M. Schweitzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1127882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1127882","url":null,"abstract":"A substantial literature has examined negotiation problems. Throughout this literature, scholars have assumed that participants approach negotiations with the intent of reaching a deal and that negotiation participants cannot be significantly harmed by the negotiation process. In this paper, we challenge these assumptions. We define situations in which negotiators use the negotiation process to achieve goals other than reaching a potential agreement as instrumental negotiations. We explore the implications of this broader conceptualization of negotiations both theoretically and experimentally. We demonstrate that the mere possibility of encountering an instrumental negotiator significantly changes Nash equilibria and actual behavior; some negotiators are harmed by instrumental negotiators and other negotiators reject sincere overtures to negotiate. The possibility of instrumental negotiations significantly harms profits. We consider theoretical, prescriptive, and policy implications of these results.","PeriodicalId":264966,"journal":{"name":"Two-Party Negotiations","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126616406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I consider two new simple bargaining games in which two players bargain over division of a fixed amount of money. Both games are strategically equivalent to the dictator game, in that one player has the unilateral ability to determine the allocation. However, that player can instead choose to share decision-making power with the other. In this way, I take a broader view of fairness than past experiments, considering both distributive justice (how much I get) and procedural justice (the rules governing how I get it). First, players often decide to empower the other player, even though there is no strategic reason to do so, implying an innate concern with procedural justice. Second, divisions in these games are much more equitable than in traditional dictator games, suggesting that a fair procedure may elicit fair distribution. Thus, past rejection of the fairness hypothesis (arguing that fairness concerns would lead to similar distributions in the ultimatum and dictator games) may be due to a failure to account for fairness as both a distributive and procedural concern.
{"title":"Rethinking the Fairness Hypothesis: Procedural Justice in Simple Bargaining Games","authors":"Mikhael Shor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1073885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1073885","url":null,"abstract":"I consider two new simple bargaining games in which two players bargain over division of a fixed amount of money. Both games are strategically equivalent to the dictator game, in that one player has the unilateral ability to determine the allocation. However, that player can instead choose to share decision-making power with the other. In this way, I take a broader view of fairness than past experiments, considering both distributive justice (how much I get) and procedural justice (the rules governing how I get it). First, players often decide to empower the other player, even though there is no strategic reason to do so, implying an innate concern with procedural justice. Second, divisions in these games are much more equitable than in traditional dictator games, suggesting that a fair procedure may elicit fair distribution. Thus, past rejection of the fairness hypothesis (arguing that fairness concerns would lead to similar distributions in the ultimatum and dictator games) may be due to a failure to account for fairness as both a distributive and procedural concern.","PeriodicalId":264966,"journal":{"name":"Two-Party Negotiations","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130910680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adopting a theoretical model of expertise, this paper integrates the nascent literature on emotion in negotiation with the learning sciences literature to suggest how emotion management expertise can be developed. Emotion management expertise requires a negotiator to develop heightened sensitivities to emotional cues and the ability, not only to accurately identify the relevance of emotional dynamics to the negotiation, but also the ability to strategically display one's own emotions and respond to emotions displayed by others. The paper delineates approaches for developing such expertise in the classroom, and identifies directions for future empirical research on emotions in negotiations.
{"title":"Developing Evidence-Based Expertise in Emotion Management: Strategically Displaying and Responding to Emotions in Negotiations","authors":"Georges Potworowski, Shirli Kopelman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1020626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1020626","url":null,"abstract":"Adopting a theoretical model of expertise, this paper integrates the nascent literature on emotion in negotiation with the learning sciences literature to suggest how emotion management expertise can be developed. Emotion management expertise requires a negotiator to develop heightened sensitivities to emotional cues and the ability, not only to accurately identify the relevance of emotional dynamics to the negotiation, but also the ability to strategically display one's own emotions and respond to emotions displayed by others. The paper delineates approaches for developing such expertise in the classroom, and identifies directions for future empirical research on emotions in negotiations.","PeriodicalId":264966,"journal":{"name":"Two-Party Negotiations","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125190716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can households make efficient choices? The fact that cohabitation and marriage are partnerships for joint production and consumption imply that their gains are highest when household members cooperate. At the same time, empirical findings suggest that spousal specialization and labor force attachment do influence the threat points of each spouse. As a consequence, specialization and spousal cooperation can be costly for household members. While the existing literature is divided on whether household choices are made efficiently or not, there does not yet exist an attempt to identify the marriage market and household dynamics that could induce endogenous cooperation and efficiency within the households. This paper incorporates the process of spousal matching into a household labor supply model in which (a) couples engage in home production, (b) there are potential gains from specialization but specializing in home production lowers market wages, and (c) intra-marital allocations are determined by an endogenous sharing rule that is driven by actual wage earnings. The incentives to specialize are high when wage or spousal endowment inequality is relatively high. Still, when there are equal numbers of men and women in the marriage markets, spousal specialization may not occur unless there exists a commitment mechanism. However, when the sex ratio is not equal to unity and there are singles in equilibrium who are of the same sex as spouses that specialize in market production, matching in asymmetric marriage markets induces spousal cooperation and specialization.
{"title":"Bargaining and Specialization in Marriage","authors":"Murat F. Iyigun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.822285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.822285","url":null,"abstract":"Can households make efficient choices? The fact that cohabitation and marriage are partnerships for joint production and consumption imply that their gains are highest when household members cooperate. At the same time, empirical findings suggest that spousal specialization and labor force attachment do influence the threat points of each spouse. As a consequence, specialization and spousal cooperation can be costly for household members. While the existing literature is divided on whether household choices are made efficiently or not, there does not yet exist an attempt to identify the marriage market and household dynamics that could induce endogenous cooperation and efficiency within the households. This paper incorporates the process of spousal matching into a household labor supply model in which (a) couples engage in home production, (b) there are potential gains from specialization but specializing in home production lowers market wages, and (c) intra-marital allocations are determined by an endogenous sharing rule that is driven by actual wage earnings. The incentives to specialize are high when wage or spousal endowment inequality is relatively high. Still, when there are equal numbers of men and women in the marriage markets, spousal specialization may not occur unless there exists a commitment mechanism. However, when the sex ratio is not equal to unity and there are singles in equilibrium who are of the same sex as spouses that specialize in market production, matching in asymmetric marriage markets induces spousal cooperation and specialization.","PeriodicalId":264966,"journal":{"name":"Two-Party Negotiations","volume":"1 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114119750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Traditional arguments against women as leaders suggest that women would not be extended the trust necessary for leadership and/or that women undermine their own bargaining position by extending too much trust to others. We examine data from a laboratory test in which pairs of subjects are given the task of negotiating a wage-labor agreement. We first derive the optimal contract offer for principals and response by agents. We find that men and women do not reach different bargaining outcomes. We also find that women in authority are perceived as more trustworthy than men with authority, and women are no more or less trusting than men of their superiors or subordinates. The perceived trust is not rooted in differential wage terms but is based on the negotiation setting. Thus, women are likely to be extended the trust necessary to lead and are not likely to produce outcomes that are significantly different from men.
{"title":"Experimental Tests for Gender Effects in a Principal-Agent Game","authors":"Andrew B. Whitford","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.788764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.788764","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional arguments against women as leaders suggest that women would not be extended the trust necessary for leadership and/or that women undermine their own bargaining position by extending too much trust to others. We examine data from a laboratory test in which pairs of subjects are given the task of negotiating a wage-labor agreement. We first derive the optimal contract offer for principals and response by agents. We find that men and women do not reach different bargaining outcomes. We also find that women in authority are perceived as more trustworthy than men with authority, and women are no more or less trusting than men of their superiors or subordinates. The perceived trust is not rooted in differential wage terms but is based on the negotiation setting. Thus, women are likely to be extended the trust necessary to lead and are not likely to produce outcomes that are significantly different from men.","PeriodicalId":264966,"journal":{"name":"Two-Party Negotiations","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130868197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tina Nabatchi, Lisa Blomgren Amsler (formerly Bingham), D. Good
This study examines the relationship between organizational justice and workplace mediation. Despite the value of using organizational justice to assess the perceived fairness of workplace mediation, there may be some problems with the wholesale application of the traditional four-factor model of organizational justice to such processes. The most obvious problem is the application of a model designed to assess justice perception in a two-way supervisor-subordinate relationship (as is the case in most organizational justice research) to a mediation process where there are multiple and divergent directions of interaction and reduced power imbalances. This study proposes and tests a six-factor model of organizational justice for application to workplace mediation. It finds that a six-factor model provides a significantly better fit for workplace mediation than the traditional four-factor model. This result has implications for both the theory and practice behind workplace mediation.
{"title":"Organizational Justice and Dispute Resolution: A Six-Factor Model for Workplace Mediation","authors":"Tina Nabatchi, Lisa Blomgren Amsler (formerly Bingham), D. Good","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.735145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.735145","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the relationship between organizational justice and workplace mediation. Despite the value of using organizational justice to assess the perceived fairness of workplace mediation, there may be some problems with the wholesale application of the traditional four-factor model of organizational justice to such processes. The most obvious problem is the application of a model designed to assess justice perception in a two-way supervisor-subordinate relationship (as is the case in most organizational justice research) to a mediation process where there are multiple and divergent directions of interaction and reduced power imbalances. This study proposes and tests a six-factor model of organizational justice for application to workplace mediation. It finds that a six-factor model provides a significantly better fit for workplace mediation than the traditional four-factor model. This result has implications for both the theory and practice behind workplace mediation.","PeriodicalId":264966,"journal":{"name":"Two-Party Negotiations","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132507874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Two experiments tested the relationship between first impressions and trust in simulated negotiations. Experiment 1 tested the impact of Social Motive and Behavioral Consistency on trust and impressions in a 2-party negotiation. Negotiators established a positive cycle of trust in which initial impressions and trust predicted later impressions and trust. Initial trust was higher and impressions were more positive when negotiators had a cooperative, rather than an individualistic, social motive. They remained stable when the other party (a confederate) displayed behavioral consistency, but changed in response to behavioral inconsistency. Both worsened if the other party changed from cooperation to competition, but improved if the change was from competition to cooperation. Experiment 2 tested the relationship between trust, impressions and outcomes in a 3-party negotiation that manipulated negotiators' power. Analyses again demonstrated a positive cycle of trust, although the strength with which this cycle emerged varied with negotiators' power. Identification based trust predicted the high and low power parties' outcomes, whereas knowledge based trust predicted the medium power party's outcome. A more detailed analysis showed that a complex network of trust relationships determined outcome share, which was predicted not only by who was trusted but also by who was distrusted.
{"title":"Spirals of Trust: Identifying the Factors that Shape and Sustain Trust in Negotiation","authors":"Mara Olekalns, Feyona Lau, Philip L. Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.305145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.305145","url":null,"abstract":"Two experiments tested the relationship between first impressions and trust in simulated negotiations. Experiment 1 tested the impact of Social Motive and Behavioral Consistency on trust and impressions in a 2-party negotiation. Negotiators established a positive cycle of trust in which initial impressions and trust predicted later impressions and trust. Initial trust was higher and impressions were more positive when negotiators had a cooperative, rather than an individualistic, social motive. They remained stable when the other party (a confederate) displayed behavioral consistency, but changed in response to behavioral inconsistency. Both worsened if the other party changed from cooperation to competition, but improved if the change was from competition to cooperation. Experiment 2 tested the relationship between trust, impressions and outcomes in a 3-party negotiation that manipulated negotiators' power. Analyses again demonstrated a positive cycle of trust, although the strength with which this cycle emerged varied with negotiators' power. Identification based trust predicted the high and low power parties' outcomes, whereas knowledge based trust predicted the medium power party's outcome. A more detailed analysis showed that a complex network of trust relationships determined outcome share, which was predicted not only by who was trusted but also by who was distrusted.","PeriodicalId":264966,"journal":{"name":"Two-Party Negotiations","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125700453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reviews the history of bilateral trade negotiations between Taiwan and the U.S. The question posed at the outset is: does bilateralism enhance or jeopardize multilateralism? The U.S.-Taiwan experience seems to suggest a grossly negative answer. Bilateral negotiations for market opening with the threat of unilateral trade sanctions (such as Section 301 action) tend to encourage trade preferences and U.S. negotiators are inclined to accept such preferential arrangements in areas where U.S. domestic interests are homogeneous and concentrated. Even in the case of tariff negotiations where any tariff concessions made by Taiwan are extended to other trading partners on an MFN basis, bilateralism does not necessarily enhance multilateral principles. The scope of tariff concessions made by Taiwan shows a strong bias in favor of the sectors in which the U.S. has a comparative advantage in Taiwan's market and the sectors in which U.S. domestic industries exhibit monopoly power. Meanwhile, U.S. commitments to GATT strengthen its position in bilateral negotiations and help persuade Taiwan, which is not a member of GATT, to make similar concessions.
{"title":"Bilateral Negotiations and Multilateral Trade: The Case of Taiwan-U.S. Trade Talks","authors":"Tain-Jy Chen, Meng-Chun Liu","doi":"10.3386/W5324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W5324","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the history of bilateral trade negotiations between Taiwan and the U.S. The question posed at the outset is: does bilateralism enhance or jeopardize multilateralism? The U.S.-Taiwan experience seems to suggest a grossly negative answer. Bilateral negotiations for market opening with the threat of unilateral trade sanctions (such as Section 301 action) tend to encourage trade preferences and U.S. negotiators are inclined to accept such preferential arrangements in areas where U.S. domestic interests are homogeneous and concentrated. Even in the case of tariff negotiations where any tariff concessions made by Taiwan are extended to other trading partners on an MFN basis, bilateralism does not necessarily enhance multilateral principles. The scope of tariff concessions made by Taiwan shows a strong bias in favor of the sectors in which the U.S. has a comparative advantage in Taiwan's market and the sectors in which U.S. domestic industries exhibit monopoly power. Meanwhile, U.S. commitments to GATT strengthen its position in bilateral negotiations and help persuade Taiwan, which is not a member of GATT, to make similar concessions.","PeriodicalId":264966,"journal":{"name":"Two-Party Negotiations","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127196042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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