Pub Date : 2017-12-31DOI: 10.1080/08913819508443379
N. Schofield
The purpose of rational choice is to provide a grand theoretical framework for designing human institutions. Once theoretical work had shown how markets optimally aggregated preferences, attempts were made to extend the theory from markets to politics. Attempts by Downs and Olson to describe elections and collective action produced relatively poor predictions, but impelled game theorists to generalize preference‐based theories to include belief formation. A consequence of this change is that the theory is no longer purely axiomatic, but draws on insights about human behavior from other disciplines and empirical analysis of the role institutions play in determining beliefs.
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Pub Date : 2017-12-31DOI: 10.12987/9780300146424-013
K. Shepsle
{"title":"Statistical Political Philosophy and Positive Political Theory","authors":"K. Shepsle","doi":"10.12987/9780300146424-013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300146424-013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":270344,"journal":{"name":"The Rational Choice Controversy","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132992837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-31DOI: 10.1080/08913819508443377
J. Murphy
Donald Green and Ian Shapiro discover a curious gulf between the prestige of rational choice approaches and the dearth of solid empirical findings. But we can understand neither the prestige of rational choice theory nor its pathologies unless we see it as a variant of the equilibrium analysis found in physics, economics, and biology. Only such a global perspective on rational choice theory will reveal its core assumptions and the likely shape of its future in political science. In this light, the growing dominance of rational choice theory in political science is all but inevitable and its pathologies are all but inescapable.
{"title":"Rational Choice Theory as Social Physics","authors":"J. Murphy","doi":"10.1080/08913819508443377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913819508443377","url":null,"abstract":"Donald Green and Ian Shapiro discover a curious gulf between the prestige of rational choice approaches and the dearth of solid empirical findings. But we can understand neither the prestige of rational choice theory nor its pathologies unless we see it as a variant of the equilibrium analysis found in physics, economics, and biology. Only such a global perspective on rational choice theory will reveal its core assumptions and the likely shape of its future in political science. In this light, the growing dominance of rational choice theory in political science is all but inevitable and its pathologies are all but inescapable.","PeriodicalId":270344,"journal":{"name":"The Rational Choice Controversy","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116995268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-31DOI: 10.1080/08913819508443373
M. Fiorina
Don Green and Ian Shapiro's Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, despite the impressive amount of work that has gone into it, is undercut by a number of serious misunderstandings of the use of the rational choice approach by students of American politics. Furthermore, Green and Shapiro adopt an extremely pinched notion of an empirical contribution and an outmoded and idealized view of the scientific method. If their standards were adopted, it would be difficult to allow that anyone in political science has made an empirical contribution, or that political science is a scientific enterprise.
{"title":"Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise","authors":"M. Fiorina","doi":"10.1080/08913819508443373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913819508443373","url":null,"abstract":"Don Green and Ian Shapiro's Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, despite the impressive amount of work that has gone into it, is undercut by a number of serious misunderstandings of the use of the rational choice approach by students of American politics. Furthermore, Green and Shapiro adopt an extremely pinched notion of an empirical contribution and an outmoded and idealized view of the scientific method. If their standards were adopted, it would be difficult to allow that anyone in political science has made an empirical contribution, or that political science is a scientific enterprise.","PeriodicalId":270344,"journal":{"name":"The Rational Choice Controversy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125977136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-31DOI: 10.1080/08913819508443372
J. Ferejohn, Debra M. Satz
Green and Shapiro's critique of rational choice theory underestimates the value of unification and the necessity of universalism in science. The central place of intentionality in social life makes both unification and universalism feasible norms in social science. However, “universalism” in social science may be partial, in that the independence hypothesis—that the causal mechanism governing action is context independent—may hold only locally in certain classes of choice domains.
{"title":"Unification, Universalism, and Rational Choice Theory","authors":"J. Ferejohn, Debra M. Satz","doi":"10.1080/08913819508443372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913819508443372","url":null,"abstract":"Green and Shapiro's critique of rational choice theory underestimates the value of unification and the necessity of universalism in science. The central place of intentionality in social life makes both unification and universalism feasible norms in social science. However, “universalism” in social science may be partial, in that the independence hypothesis—that the causal mechanism governing action is context independent—may hold only locally in certain classes of choice domains.","PeriodicalId":270344,"journal":{"name":"The Rational Choice Controversy","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114885404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-31DOI: 10.1080/08913819508443371
D. Diermeier
In their survey of empirical research based on rational choice theory, Don Green and Ian Shapiro point to a list of methodological deficiencies or “pathologies.” The main problem with Green and Shapiro's list lies in the standards they use to evaluate the achievements of rational choice theory. These standards are derived from a view of empirical research that is deeply questionable and, in the stated form, inconsistent with both standard insights in contemporary philosophy of science and the established practice in the most successful empirical sciences.
{"title":"Rational Choice and the Role of Theory in Political Science","authors":"D. Diermeier","doi":"10.1080/08913819508443371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913819508443371","url":null,"abstract":"In their survey of empirical research based on rational choice theory, Don Green and Ian Shapiro point to a list of methodological deficiencies or “pathologies.” The main problem with Green and Shapiro's list lies in the standards they use to evaluate the achievements of rational choice theory. These standards are derived from a view of empirical research that is deeply questionable and, in the stated form, inconsistent with both standard insights in contemporary philosophy of science and the established practice in the most successful empirical sciences.","PeriodicalId":270344,"journal":{"name":"The Rational Choice Controversy","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121128959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-31DOI: 10.1080/08913819508443376
S. Lohmann
Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that rational choice scholarship in political science is excessively theory‐driven: too few of its theoretical insights have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived. But rational choice theorizing has the potential to identify and correct logical inconsistencies and slippages. It is thus valuable even if the resulting theories are not tested empirically. When Green and Shapiro's argument concerning collective dilemmas and free riding is formalized, it turns out to be deeply flawed and in many respects outright false. Their mistake is common enough: they misclassify a variety of collective dilemmas as prisoner's dilemmas. Because they misunderstand the theory of rational choice, Green and Shapiro allege that it is refuted by empirical findings that, in fact, support it.
{"title":"The Poverty of Green and Shapiro","authors":"S. Lohmann","doi":"10.1080/08913819508443376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913819508443376","url":null,"abstract":"Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that rational choice scholarship in political science is excessively theory‐driven: too few of its theoretical insights have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived. But rational choice theorizing has the potential to identify and correct logical inconsistencies and slippages. It is thus valuable even if the resulting theories are not tested empirically. When Green and Shapiro's argument concerning collective dilemmas and free riding is formalized, it turns out to be deeply flawed and in many respects outright false. Their mistake is common enough: they misclassify a variety of collective dilemmas as prisoner's dilemmas. Because they misunderstand the theory of rational choice, Green and Shapiro allege that it is refuted by empirical findings that, in fact, support it.","PeriodicalId":270344,"journal":{"name":"The Rational Choice Controversy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115891594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-31DOI: 10.1080/08913819508443382
D. Green, I. Shapiro
More than three decades after its advent in political science, rational choice theory has yet to add appreciably to the stock of knowledge about politics. In Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory we traced this failure to methodological defects rooted in the aspiration to come up with universal theories of politics. After responding to criticisms of our argument, we elaborate on our earlier recommendations about how to improve the quality of rational choice applications. Building on suggestions of contributors to this volume, we lay out an empirically based research program designed to delineate the conditions under which rational choice explanations are likely to be useful.
{"title":"Pathologies Revisited: Reflections on Our Critics","authors":"D. Green, I. Shapiro","doi":"10.1080/08913819508443382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08913819508443382","url":null,"abstract":"More than three decades after its advent in political science, rational choice theory has yet to add appreciably to the stock of knowledge about politics. In Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory we traced this failure to methodological defects rooted in the aspiration to come up with universal theories of politics. After responding to criticisms of our argument, we elaborate on our earlier recommendations about how to improve the quality of rational choice applications. Building on suggestions of contributors to this volume, we lay out an empirically based research program designed to delineate the conditions under which rational choice explanations are likely to be useful.","PeriodicalId":270344,"journal":{"name":"The Rational Choice Controversy","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115365483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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