Prevent’s execution has become increasingly complicated. One major criticism of the Prevent strategy, proven throughout the research, is the almost streamlined focus on the Islamist terrorist threat and ideology, resulting in marginalization of certain communities, divisiveness within society and what are now known as ‘suspect communities.’ An inclusion of all forms of terrorist ideology within all levels of preventative work would allow for a wider-ranging support system and an eradication of significantly more terrorist threats. Right-wing extremist group National Action have already been proscribed as a terrorist organization under the TA 2000: a step in the right direction, and yet, the most recent Independent Review of Terrorism Legislation has shown 38% of Prevent referrals to be of a ‘mixed, unstable or unclear ideology’. Prevent must act as unbiased and impartial in its execution which requires cooperation from all strands and gradations and continual revision of policy to assist with this.
{"title":"Laws and Measures Preventing Terrorism in the UK: A Necessary Evil?","authors":"Lucy M. Moran","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3864203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3864203","url":null,"abstract":"Prevent’s execution has become increasingly complicated. One major criticism of the Prevent strategy, proven throughout the research, is the almost streamlined focus on the Islamist terrorist threat and ideology, resulting in marginalization of certain communities, divisiveness within society and what are now known as ‘suspect communities.’ An inclusion of all forms of terrorist ideology within all levels of preventative work would allow for a wider-ranging support system and an eradication of significantly more terrorist threats. Right-wing extremist group National Action have already been proscribed as a terrorist organization under the TA 2000: a step in the right direction, and yet, the most recent Independent Review of Terrorism Legislation has shown 38% of Prevent referrals to be of a ‘mixed, unstable or unclear ideology’. Prevent must act as unbiased and impartial in its execution which requires cooperation from all strands and gradations and continual revision of policy to assist with this.","PeriodicalId":273343,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Combating Terrorism (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125856341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do government protections, and violations, of its citizens’ civil liberties influence the country's exposure to terrorism? Existing research remains divided. We contribute clarity to these debates by examining the distinct effects of specific types of civil liberties: physical integrity (e.g., freedom from extra-judicial torture and killing), political liberties (e.g., freedom of expression and assembly), and private liberties (e.g., freedom of thought and religion and property rights). We distinguish these civil liberties dimensions from the role of institutions for political selection (e.g., elections) and horizontal accountability (e.g., checks and balances, executive constraints). We argue physical integrity rights decrease terrorism, by reducing grievances against and increasing trust in the state, while political liberties increase terrorism, by both incentivizing violence among those with extremist goals and protecting their ability to organize. Empirically, we measure a country's exposure to terrorism using the Global Terrorism Database. We isolate the effects of government actions on these civil liberties dimensions from each other, and from the effects of the state's political institutions, by leveraging the Varieties of Democracy data. Our sample covers 177 states from 1970 to 2018. We find evidence consistent with our hypotheses regarding the effects of the distinct component dimensions of civil liberties.
{"title":"Terrorism and the Varieties of Civil Liberties","authors":"Michael A. Rubin, Richard K. Morgan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3361330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3361330","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do government protections, and violations, of its citizens’ civil liberties influence the country's exposure to terrorism? Existing research remains divided. We contribute clarity to these debates by examining the distinct effects of specific types of civil liberties: physical integrity (e.g., freedom from extra-judicial torture and killing), political liberties (e.g., freedom of expression and assembly), and private liberties (e.g., freedom of thought and religion and property rights). We distinguish these civil liberties dimensions from the role of institutions for political selection (e.g., elections) and horizontal accountability (e.g., checks and balances, executive constraints). We argue physical integrity rights decrease terrorism, by reducing grievances against and increasing trust in the state, while political liberties increase terrorism, by both incentivizing violence among those with extremist goals and protecting their ability to organize. Empirically, we measure a country's exposure to terrorism using the Global Terrorism Database. We isolate the effects of government actions on these civil liberties dimensions from each other, and from the effects of the state's political institutions, by leveraging the Varieties of Democracy data. Our sample covers 177 states from 1970 to 2018. We find evidence consistent with our hypotheses regarding the effects of the distinct component dimensions of civil liberties.","PeriodicalId":273343,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Combating Terrorism (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115389532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Blair, E. Chenoweth, Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, P. Potter
Cooperation among militant organizations contributes to capability but also presents security risks. This is particularly the case when organizations face substantial repression from the state. As a consequence, for cooperation to emerge and persist when it is most valuable, militant groups must have means of committing to cooperation even when the incentives to defect are high. We posit that shared ideology plays this role by providing community monitoring, authority structures, trust, and transnational networks. We test this theory using new, expansive, time-series data on relationships between militant organizations from 1950-2016, which we introduce here. The results show that when groups share an ideology, and especially religion, they are more likely to initiate material alliances. Moreover, in the face of repression from the state, shared ideology is associated with sustained cooperation. These findings contextualize and expand upon important existing research demonstrating that connections between violent, nonstate actors strongly shape their tactical and strategic behavior.
{"title":"Honor Among Thieves: Understanding Rhetorical and Material Cooperation Among Militant Groups","authors":"C. Blair, E. Chenoweth, Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, P. Potter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3545006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3545006","url":null,"abstract":"Cooperation among militant organizations contributes to capability but also presents security risks. This is particularly the case when organizations face substantial repression from the state. As a consequence, for cooperation to emerge and persist when it is most valuable, militant groups must have means of committing to cooperation even when the incentives to defect are high. We posit that shared ideology plays this role by providing community monitoring, authority structures, trust, and transnational networks. We test this theory using new, expansive, time-series data on relationships between militant organizations from 1950-2016, which we introduce here. The results show that when groups share an ideology, and especially religion, they are more likely to initiate material alliances. Moreover, in the face of repression from the state, shared ideology is associated with sustained cooperation. These findings contextualize and expand upon important existing research demonstrating that connections between violent, nonstate actors strongly shape their tactical and strategic behavior.","PeriodicalId":273343,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Combating Terrorism (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128951709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What preferences motivate the severity of terrorist attacks? I investigate how Boko Haram terrorists adjust their fatalities when unexpectedly deprived of public attention, relative to Al Shabaab terrorists, that were not deprived of public attention. Losing public attention raises the severity of terrorism: Boko Haram terrorist fatalities surged following the rebasing of Nigeria's economy, which catapulted the country into Africa's largest and the top twenty-five worldwide. The largest spike in Boko Haram terrorist fatalities occurred in the wake of the Nigerian Ebola health crisis. Although Boko Haram claims an anti-education sentiment, their fatalities do not actually differ significantly from Al Shabaab fatalities during the Nigerian national basic education examination. Overall, terrorists consider well-being changes as threats that have more validity than the persuasiveness of their own claimed ideologies. The results are robust to acknowledging other conflict actors in Nigeria and Somalia that have distinct motivations. Terrorist groups do not significantly vary the severity of their attacks during Ramadan. Given extremists' vulnerable self-concepts, emphasizing revealed relative preferences may undermine terrorist credibility and recruitment.
{"title":"Narcissism Over Ideology: Revealed versus Stated Terrorist Preferences","authors":"K. Opoku-Agyemang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2938780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2938780","url":null,"abstract":"What preferences motivate the severity of terrorist attacks? I investigate how Boko Haram terrorists adjust their fatalities when unexpectedly deprived of public attention, relative to Al Shabaab terrorists, that were not deprived of public attention. Losing public attention raises the severity of terrorism: Boko Haram terrorist fatalities surged following the rebasing of Nigeria's economy, which catapulted the country into Africa's largest and the top twenty-five worldwide. The largest spike in Boko Haram terrorist fatalities occurred in the wake of the Nigerian Ebola health crisis. Although Boko Haram claims an anti-education sentiment, their fatalities do not actually differ significantly from Al Shabaab fatalities during the Nigerian national basic education examination. Overall, terrorists consider well-being changes as threats that have more validity than the persuasiveness of their own claimed ideologies. The results are robust to acknowledging other conflict actors in Nigeria and Somalia that have distinct motivations. Terrorist groups do not significantly vary the severity of their attacks during Ramadan. Given extremists' vulnerable self-concepts, emphasizing revealed relative preferences may undermine terrorist credibility and recruitment.","PeriodicalId":273343,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Combating Terrorism (Topic)","volume":"64 15","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120887358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During 2005-2013, missiles fired from US drones led to verified deaths of some 80,000 Pakistanis (49,000 civilians); and associated domestic subversion and terrorism, to the estimated death of another 50,000. More have been dying since 2013. There is a need to defend the nation, better. To do so requires a grand strategy. While, there are objective limits to the scope for sovereign action, hostile information operations have sapped the will to resist of those, who take decisions and make public opinion, in Pakistan, leading to greater helplessness than is warranted. Identifying four emergent global trends, the article outlines a grand strategy — of sovereign development — which would provide an overall integrated approach to strategic communication, diplomacy, development, and defence. It concludes by identifying some constraints to implementation and suggesting ways to overcome them.
{"title":"Sovereign Development: Outline of a Grand Strategy for Pakistan","authors":"A. Zaman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3220254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3220254","url":null,"abstract":"During 2005-2013, missiles fired from US drones led to verified deaths of some 80,000 Pakistanis (49,000 civilians); and associated domestic subversion and terrorism, to the estimated death of another 50,000. More have been dying since 2013. There is a need to defend the nation, better. To do so requires a grand strategy. While, there are objective limits to the scope for sovereign action, hostile information operations have sapped the will to resist of those, who take decisions and make public opinion, in Pakistan, leading to greater helplessness than is warranted. Identifying four emergent global trends, the article outlines a grand strategy — of sovereign development — which would provide an overall integrated approach to strategic communication, diplomacy, development, and defence. It concludes by identifying some constraints to implementation and suggesting ways to overcome them.","PeriodicalId":273343,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Combating Terrorism (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123953227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public warnings have the potential to be a powerful tool to mitigate the threat from terrorism: the public is alerted, and in response, the terrorist may defer or deflect his attack. Paradoxically, warnings can be a victim of their own success. The absence of an attack may be misconstrued by the warning recipients as a false alarm, leading to warning fatigue and a dampened response to future warnings -- also referred to as the "cry-wolf" effect. To capture this phenomenon, we model the interaction between the defender and the terrorist using a dynamic game-theoretic framework. We find that a more effective warning shifts emphasis from the direct benefit of mitigating losses from an attack, to the indirect benefit of inducing the terrorist to defer his attack to a later time. We examine the implications of this finding in the context of defending a single location, and two locations. For instance, we find that the frequent occurrence of false alarms does not necessarily imply political gamesmanship; an increase in the terrorist's readiness can result in a lower frequency of terrorist attacks; issuing a joint warning across two locations can be optimal even when the asymmetry in their vulnerability is high. Our results clarify conventional wisdom, and hence, have important policy implications.
{"title":"Public Warnings in Counterterrorism Operations: Managing the 'Cry-Wolf' Effect when Facing a Strategic Adversary","authors":"Nitin Bakshi, Edieal J. Pinker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2659028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2659028","url":null,"abstract":"Public warnings have the potential to be a powerful tool to mitigate the threat from terrorism: the public is alerted, and in response, the terrorist may defer or deflect his attack. Paradoxically, warnings can be a victim of their own success. The absence of an attack may be misconstrued by the warning recipients as a false alarm, leading to warning fatigue and a dampened response to future warnings -- also referred to as the \"cry-wolf\" effect. To capture this phenomenon, we model the interaction between the defender and the terrorist using a dynamic game-theoretic framework. We find that a more effective warning shifts emphasis from the direct benefit of mitigating losses from an attack, to the indirect benefit of inducing the terrorist to defer his attack to a later time. We examine the implications of this finding in the context of defending a single location, and two locations. For instance, we find that the frequent occurrence of false alarms does not necessarily imply political gamesmanship; an increase in the terrorist's readiness can result in a lower frequency of terrorist attacks; issuing a joint warning across two locations can be optimal even when the asymmetry in their vulnerability is high. Our results clarify conventional wisdom, and hence, have important policy implications.","PeriodicalId":273343,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Combating Terrorism (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133877487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Las Vegas, Nevada, has long been known as “America’s playground” due in large part to the casino and gaming business that thrives within this desert city. Along with the glitz, glamor, and sparkling lights of the casinos come the hopes of hitting the jackpot — whether through the luck of an honest wager or from cheating the house. Because of the large amount of money handled by Las Vegas casinos, casinos are continually seeking ways to protect and increase their profits through various security measures — which has made Las Vegas a technology innovator. This paper discusses some of the technology used in casinos to protect their investment and how casinos gather and share information, not only among themselves; but, with the federal government. Because of the events on September 11, 2001, the federal government’s interest in Las Vegas technology was piqued by the development of a system that could link together “non-obvious” and seemingly random information. This paper asserts that this technology combined with the “mosaic effect” allows the federal government an even greater ability to know specific details about the lives of its citizens. While acknowledging this technology exists, this paper provides recommendations that citizen groups should urge government officials to adopt regarding the government’s use of this technology.
{"title":"Las Vegas is America's Playground . . . And Its Security Lab: How the Technology Developed to Protect Casinos Earnings is Also Helping to Protect Against Terrorism and Why We Should Be Concerned","authors":"Gregory Gunn","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2624018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2624018","url":null,"abstract":"Las Vegas, Nevada, has long been known as “America’s playground” due in large part to the casino and gaming business that thrives within this desert city. Along with the glitz, glamor, and sparkling lights of the casinos come the hopes of hitting the jackpot — whether through the luck of an honest wager or from cheating the house. Because of the large amount of money handled by Las Vegas casinos, casinos are continually seeking ways to protect and increase their profits through various security measures — which has made Las Vegas a technology innovator. This paper discusses some of the technology used in casinos to protect their investment and how casinos gather and share information, not only among themselves; but, with the federal government. Because of the events on September 11, 2001, the federal government’s interest in Las Vegas technology was piqued by the development of a system that could link together “non-obvious” and seemingly random information. This paper asserts that this technology combined with the “mosaic effect” allows the federal government an even greater ability to know specific details about the lives of its citizens. While acknowledging this technology exists, this paper provides recommendations that citizen groups should urge government officials to adopt regarding the government’s use of this technology.","PeriodicalId":273343,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Combating Terrorism (Topic)","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123349151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Post-September 11 legal events have demonstrated that ideological agendas distort the deliberation required for sound advice about national security. Legal issue entrepreneurs who market a theory without context exalt short-term interests and encourage executive unilateralism. These perils have emerged in a number of recent developments, including the torture memos drafted by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and the destruction of CIA interrogation tapes. In the post-September 11 legal climate, issue entrepreneurs saw legal constraints as "lawfare" against American interests. The lawfare critics extolled parsimony as a virtue - advancing the lawfare construct to explain as many complex events as possible. However, the lawfare critics failed to recognize that legal constraints can also empower decisionmakers, by checking the executive's tendency to discount reputational and other long-term values. Unfortunately, existing remedies are not a good fit for the problems caused by issue entrepreneurship. Tort litigation, such as the recent suit by Jose Padilla against John Yoo, risks personalizing the problem and neglecting systemic issues. The informal norms approach suggested by a number of OLC alumni, while offering a number of excellent proposals such as citing and distinguishing adverse authority, has not attracted stakeholders across the political spectrum. A structural reform approach that replaces OLC with an adjudicative entity may produce an inquisitorial tribunal that lacks sharp adversarial inputs and loses influence to more pliable players such as White House counsel. To transcend these difficulties, lawyers should turn to a model of dialogic equipoise relying on two values: transparency and tailoring. Dialogic equipoise allows the president to take action that is inconsistent with the most accurate reading of sources of authority. However, action must be both interstitial - with a clear exit strategy - and publicly disclosed. To implement the dialogic equipoise model, the Article recommends a blended approach, including a safe harbor for publicly disclosed legal opinions, consideration of institutional consequences, assertion of the least drastic rationale for executive power, and an ex ante role for Inspectors General and OLC in document preservation. This blended regime can reinforce deliberation when exigencies obscure the teachings of prudence.
{"title":"True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers","authors":"Peter S. Margulies","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1097314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1097314","url":null,"abstract":"Post-September 11 legal events have demonstrated that ideological agendas distort the deliberation required for sound advice about national security. Legal issue entrepreneurs who market a theory without context exalt short-term interests and encourage executive unilateralism. These perils have emerged in a number of recent developments, including the torture memos drafted by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and the destruction of CIA interrogation tapes. In the post-September 11 legal climate, issue entrepreneurs saw legal constraints as \"lawfare\" against American interests. The lawfare critics extolled parsimony as a virtue - advancing the lawfare construct to explain as many complex events as possible. However, the lawfare critics failed to recognize that legal constraints can also empower decisionmakers, by checking the executive's tendency to discount reputational and other long-term values. Unfortunately, existing remedies are not a good fit for the problems caused by issue entrepreneurship. Tort litigation, such as the recent suit by Jose Padilla against John Yoo, risks personalizing the problem and neglecting systemic issues. The informal norms approach suggested by a number of OLC alumni, while offering a number of excellent proposals such as citing and distinguishing adverse authority, has not attracted stakeholders across the political spectrum. A structural reform approach that replaces OLC with an adjudicative entity may produce an inquisitorial tribunal that lacks sharp adversarial inputs and loses influence to more pliable players such as White House counsel. To transcend these difficulties, lawyers should turn to a model of dialogic equipoise relying on two values: transparency and tailoring. Dialogic equipoise allows the president to take action that is inconsistent with the most accurate reading of sources of authority. However, action must be both interstitial - with a clear exit strategy - and publicly disclosed. To implement the dialogic equipoise model, the Article recommends a blended approach, including a safe harbor for publicly disclosed legal opinions, consideration of institutional consequences, assertion of the least drastic rationale for executive power, and an ex ante role for Inspectors General and OLC in document preservation. This blended regime can reinforce deliberation when exigencies obscure the teachings of prudence.","PeriodicalId":273343,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Combating Terrorism (Topic)","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127092790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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