"'What is Neoliberalism? And What Has it Meant?': A Primer" endeavors to offer the reader a broad understanding of what has in recent years become the controversial idea, "neoliberalism," on the basis of four claims it makes, explains and defends. These are, namely,
1. Neoliberalism is a distinct phenomenon, extending but also distinct from classical liberalism; and while broadly identifiable with certain prescriptions (deregulation, privatization, etc.) ultimately taking the form of the economic model here termed "Neoliberal Financialization" (distinguishable from the preceding Keynesian Fordism).
2. Neoliberalism, while developing over the course of the twentieth century, became an effective political force amid the crisis of the 1970s, primarily as a response to economic developments rather than the "intellectual fashions" emphasized by many of its chroniclers.
3. Neoliberalism's economic results have consistently fallen short of the promises made for them over past decades, whether the issue is industrial renewal, economic development, economic growth, the attainment of sounder government finances or anything else, but that policymakers and elites (who have done well out of the era) have remained committed to the model in spite of its disappointments.
4. Neoliberalism has never enjoyed broad public appeal, and been the object of popular backlashes during the decades in which it has prevailed, up to the present. Recent years have seen stronger challenges, identifiable with such events as "Brexit" and recent presidential elections in the U.S., but especially from the right the challenge has been limited, and overall the neoliberal model remains dominant.
{"title":"'What is Neoliberalism? And What Has it Meant?': A Primer","authors":"N. Elhefnawy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3761219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3761219","url":null,"abstract":"\"'What is Neoliberalism? And What Has it Meant?': A Primer\" endeavors to offer the reader a broad understanding of what has in recent years become the controversial idea, \"neoliberalism,\" on the basis of four claims it makes, explains and defends. These are, namely,<br><br>1. Neoliberalism is a distinct phenomenon, extending but also distinct from classical liberalism; and while broadly identifiable with certain prescriptions (deregulation, privatization, etc.) ultimately taking the form of the economic model here termed \"Neoliberal Financialization\" (distinguishable from the preceding Keynesian Fordism).<br><br>2. Neoliberalism, while developing over the course of the twentieth century, became an effective political force amid the crisis of the 1970s, primarily as a response to economic developments rather than the \"intellectual fashions\" emphasized by many of its chroniclers.<br><br>3. Neoliberalism's economic results have consistently fallen short of the promises made for them over past decades, whether the issue is industrial renewal, economic development, economic growth, the attainment of sounder government finances or anything else, but that policymakers and elites (who have done well out of the era) have remained committed to the model in spite of its disappointments.<br><br>4. Neoliberalism has never enjoyed broad public appeal, and been the object of popular backlashes during the decades in which it has prevailed, up to the present. Recent years have seen stronger challenges, identifiable with such events as \"Brexit\" and recent presidential elections in the U.S., but especially from the right the challenge has been limited, and overall the neoliberal model remains dominant.","PeriodicalId":283935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Democratic Theory (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129007006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A review of Nancy MacLean's Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right's Stealth Plan for America that focuses on the implications of her historiographic method in reading Jim Buchanan's work, and the resulting failure to take seriously the underlying framework of constitutional political economy that informed both Jim Buchanan's and Frank H. Knight's work.
{"title":"Reading the Hermeneutics of Suspicion with Suspicion: A Review Essay on Nancy MacLean's Democracy in Chains","authors":"Ross B. Emmett","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3187542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3187542","url":null,"abstract":"A review of Nancy MacLean's Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right's Stealth Plan for America that focuses on the implications of her historiographic method in reading Jim Buchanan's work, and the resulting failure to take seriously the underlying framework of constitutional political economy that informed both Jim Buchanan's and Frank H. Knight's work.","PeriodicalId":283935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Democratic Theory (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131570638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Throughout his career, James Buchanan displayed a remarkable consistency regarding the didactic role of the properly trained economist. As he would say, it takes varied iterations to force alien concepts upon reluctant minds. What he regarded as the role of the properly trained economist is just a variation on his understanding of constitutional political economy. According to Buchanan, properly trained economists occupy dual, roles as economic scientists and political economists. As economic scientists they understand how spontaneous orders emerge as a result of self-interested behavior under alternative institutional arrangements. As political economists they may propose changes to existing institutions for the purpose of better facilitating the mutually shared goals among free and responsible individuals. Such proposals are not technical advice to a benevolent dictator, but conjectures about Pareto improvements to be tested through democratic deliberation. These related, but distinct, roles, have a non-normative and didactic basis, which is to teach citizens of a democratic society that there are opportunities for mutual gains from trade.
{"title":"James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist","authors":"Peter J. Boettke, Rosolino A. Candela","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3189882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3189882","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout his career, James Buchanan displayed a remarkable consistency regarding the didactic role of the properly trained economist. As he would say, it takes varied iterations to force alien concepts upon reluctant minds. What he regarded as the role of the properly trained economist is just a variation on his understanding of constitutional political economy. According to Buchanan, properly trained economists occupy dual, roles as economic scientists and political economists. As economic scientists they understand how spontaneous orders emerge as a result of self-interested behavior under alternative institutional arrangements. As political economists they may propose changes to existing institutions for the purpose of better facilitating the mutually shared goals among free and responsible individuals. Such proposals are not technical advice to a benevolent dictator, but conjectures about Pareto improvements to be tested through democratic deliberation. These related, but distinct, roles, have a non-normative and didactic basis, which is to teach citizens of a democratic society that there are opportunities for mutual gains from trade.","PeriodicalId":283935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Democratic Theory (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124378844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper offers an outline of a large body of economic literature which discusses the advantages of a system of employee-managed firms: the disempowerment of capitalists thanks to the suppression of their right to make decisions in cooperative firms; appreciable efficiency gains from worker involvement in production processes; a softer competitive regime and small risks of insolvency; an end to external firm control and, consequently, to the sway of multinational corporations; reduced monopoly building; a socially determined income distribution pattern and economic efficiency gains from a lesser need for state intervention.
{"title":"On the Advantages of a System of Labour-Managed Firms","authors":"B. Jossa","doi":"10.5947/JEOD.2016.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5947/JEOD.2016.002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper offers an outline of a large body of economic literature which discusses the advantages of a system of employee-managed firms: the disempowerment of capitalists thanks to the suppression of their right to make decisions in cooperative firms; appreciable efficiency gains from worker involvement in production processes; a softer competitive regime and small risks of insolvency; an end to external firm control and, consequently, to the sway of multinational corporations; reduced monopoly building; a socially determined income distribution pattern and economic efficiency gains from a lesser need for state intervention.","PeriodicalId":283935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Democratic Theory (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116696111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A number of methodological problems in relation to democracy studies are analyzed. The author considers procedural democracy problems from the institutional and rational – choice points of view. Analyzing advantages and disadvantages of such approaches, the author comes to conclusion that the institutional features of the democratic structure have an important character. They include the variants of individual and collective strategies of social development, which involves a range of social options, which are available for social actors, problem of the “free rider”, which the procedural democracy tries to resolve, and “failures of democracy” which are considered as a product of social structure. The author believes that ideological understanding of democracy should be rejected and that we need more institutional studies of democracies.
{"title":"Procedural Democracy and Social Structure","authors":"M. Barbashin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2887728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2887728","url":null,"abstract":"A number of methodological problems in relation to democracy studies are analyzed. The author considers procedural democracy problems from the institutional and rational – choice points of view. Analyzing advantages and disadvantages of such approaches, the author comes to conclusion that the institutional features of the democratic structure have an important character. They include the variants of individual and collective strategies of social development, which involves a range of social options, which are available for social actors, problem of the “free rider”, which the procedural democracy tries to resolve, and “failures of democracy” which are considered as a product of social structure. The author believes that ideological understanding of democracy should be rejected and that we need more institutional studies of democracies.","PeriodicalId":283935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Democratic Theory (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123108320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The principle of one person — one vote is central to modern notions of democracy. Political equality requires that all citizens are able to make their voices heard in the political process and that elected officials are continually responsive to the needs of their constituents. Nevertheless, socio-economic status is fast becoming a major determinant in the amount of influence a citizen commands in American politics. By examining recent trends in political participation and consulting low-income Americans directly, this paper demonstrates the widening gulf in political voice and power along socio-economic lines when it comes to voting and volunteering in election campaigns; funding candidates for public office; and engaging Washington directly through lobbying and interest groups. Americans with limited incomes and education are found to be less than half as likely to vote in national elections as their more privileged counterparts (often for reasons beyond their own control, including formal disenfranchisement) and far less likely to participate in lobbying and other forms of political expression. When it comes to funding elections, a tiny fraction of wealthy Americans, drawn primarily from business and the law, provides more campaign money than 99.9 percent of the population combined. These and other findings point to an emerging institutional corruption, wherein political leaders are largely dependent on a small and unrepresentative economic elite rather than the public at large. Left unchecked, such dependence corruption threatens to deepen systemic poverty and inequality in the United States.
{"title":"Democracy in Poverty: A View from Below","authors":"D. Weeks","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2264877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2264877","url":null,"abstract":"The principle of one person — one vote is central to modern notions of democracy. Political equality requires that all citizens are able to make their voices heard in the political process and that elected officials are continually responsive to the needs of their constituents. Nevertheless, socio-economic status is fast becoming a major determinant in the amount of influence a citizen commands in American politics. By examining recent trends in political participation and consulting low-income Americans directly, this paper demonstrates the widening gulf in political voice and power along socio-economic lines when it comes to voting and volunteering in election campaigns; funding candidates for public office; and engaging Washington directly through lobbying and interest groups. Americans with limited incomes and education are found to be less than half as likely to vote in national elections as their more privileged counterparts (often for reasons beyond their own control, including formal disenfranchisement) and far less likely to participate in lobbying and other forms of political expression. When it comes to funding elections, a tiny fraction of wealthy Americans, drawn primarily from business and the law, provides more campaign money than 99.9 percent of the population combined. These and other findings point to an emerging institutional corruption, wherein political leaders are largely dependent on a small and unrepresentative economic elite rather than the public at large. Left unchecked, such dependence corruption threatens to deepen systemic poverty and inequality in the United States.","PeriodicalId":283935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Democratic Theory (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134220845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recapitulates the devolution of the democratic form of government as Plato described and the issues needed for stability as noted by Aristotle and will demonstrate that the utilitarian analysis of Dr. David Levy and Sandra Peart give an academically rigorous explanation of Plato’s writings on the dissolution of democratic forms of government and the rise of tyrants.
{"title":"Loss of Sympathy and the Platonic Death of Democracy","authors":"R. McFadden","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2282526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2282526","url":null,"abstract":"Recapitulates the devolution of the democratic form of government as Plato described and the issues needed for stability as noted by Aristotle and will demonstrate that the utilitarian analysis of Dr. David Levy and Sandra Peart give an academically rigorous explanation of Plato’s writings on the dissolution of democratic forms of government and the rise of tyrants.","PeriodicalId":283935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Democratic Theory (Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122019122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are 'modern societies' necessarily democratic societies and capitalist (or: market) societies? This is what most of the social sciences of the post-Second World War period have assumed, while only some strands of critical, often Marx-inspired approaches contested this connection. This essay briefly reconsiders the link between democracy and capitalism both in theoretical and historical terms to then advance a hypothesis about the current constellation of political and economic modernity which seems to be marked by a paradox. On the one hand, both democracy, apparently spreading through 'waves of democratization', and capitalism, as the outcome of economic globalization, seem to be without alternative. On the other hand, current capitalism is highly crisis-ridden and democracy, at least in Europe, witnesses strong signs of disaffection. In this light, the essay proposes to see the current constellation as the outcome of a democratic crisis of capitalism during the 1970s. The reasoning proceeds in five steps. First, we will reconsider theories that have assumed that there is a strong conceptual connection between democracy and capitalism. Secondly, we will briefly review the history of the relation between modern capitalism and modern democracy from their beginnings until the 1970s to refine the ideas about such conceptual link. These two steps, thirdly, will allow for an interim conclusion to understand the double crisis of the 1970s, of both capitalism and democracy, an understanding that opens the path to two observations – the fourth and fifth steps – on the current condition of global capitalism and the alleged global movement of democratisation. First, the developments of the past four decades can be seen as a transformation of capitalism in reaction to democratic demands. Extrapolating from this insight, second, one may ask whether there is not a basic tension between economic and political modernity, given the evident difficulty of keeping political citizenship connected to socio-economic citizenship.
{"title":"The Democratic Crisis of Capitalism: Reflections on Political and Economic Modernity in Europe","authors":"P. Wagner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1969031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1969031","url":null,"abstract":"Are 'modern societies' necessarily democratic societies and capitalist (or: market) societies? This is what most of the social sciences of the post-Second World War period have assumed, while only some strands of critical, often Marx-inspired approaches contested this connection. This essay briefly reconsiders the link between democracy and capitalism both in theoretical and historical terms to then advance a hypothesis about the current constellation of political and economic modernity which seems to be marked by a paradox. On the one hand, both democracy, apparently spreading through 'waves of democratization', and capitalism, as the outcome of economic globalization, seem to be without alternative. On the other hand, current capitalism is highly crisis-ridden and democracy, at least in Europe, witnesses strong signs of disaffection. In this light, the essay proposes to see the current constellation as the outcome of a democratic crisis of capitalism during the 1970s. The reasoning proceeds in five steps. First, we will reconsider theories that have assumed that there is a strong conceptual connection between democracy and capitalism. Secondly, we will briefly review the history of the relation between modern capitalism and modern democracy from their beginnings until the 1970s to refine the ideas about such conceptual link. These two steps, thirdly, will allow for an interim conclusion to understand the double crisis of the 1970s, of both capitalism and democracy, an understanding that opens the path to two observations – the fourth and fifth steps – on the current condition of global capitalism and the alleged global movement of democratisation. First, the developments of the past four decades can be seen as a transformation of capitalism in reaction to democratic demands. Extrapolating from this insight, second, one may ask whether there is not a basic tension between economic and political modernity, given the evident difficulty of keeping political citizenship connected to socio-economic citizenship.","PeriodicalId":283935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Democratic Theory (Topic)","volume":"250 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115502597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Democracy is often perceived or justified as a means to realizing voters' preferences. Two major difficulties have received much attention: how to aggregate votes and how to align the interests of representatives with the preferences of voters. This paper identifies a third difficulty which stems from the fact that some voters care not only about the electoral outcome (Outcome preferences) but also about the act of voting itself (Voting preferences). If Voting and Outcome preferences are incongruent, then democracy may not be able to satisfy voters’ preferences even if all voters have identical preferences and if all representatives scrupulously implement the policies voters choose. Indeed, as no voter is likely to be pivotal, rational voters would tend to vote primarily on the basis of their Voting preferences. In this case, the person elected (or the policy executed) may not be the one voters wish to see elected (or executed). Taking Voting preferences seriously sheds new light on classical controversies in political theory, e.g., the delegate/trustee controversy, the democratic deficit, and judicial review. We show that, at times, seemingly undemocratic practices could be understood as a means to facilitate the simultaneous satisfaction of both Outcome and Voting preferences.
{"title":"Which Preferences Can Democracy Serve?","authors":"Alon Harel, Moses Shayo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1951451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1951451","url":null,"abstract":"Democracy is often perceived or justified as a means to realizing voters' preferences. Two major difficulties have received much attention: how to aggregate votes and how to align the interests of representatives with the preferences of voters. This paper identifies a third difficulty which stems from the fact that some voters care not only about the electoral outcome (Outcome preferences) but also about the act of voting itself (Voting preferences). If Voting and Outcome preferences are incongruent, then democracy may not be able to satisfy voters’ preferences even if all voters have identical preferences and if all representatives scrupulously implement the policies voters choose. Indeed, as no voter is likely to be pivotal, rational voters would tend to vote primarily on the basis of their Voting preferences. In this case, the person elected (or the policy executed) may not be the one voters wish to see elected (or executed). Taking Voting preferences seriously sheds new light on classical controversies in political theory, e.g., the delegate/trustee controversy, the democratic deficit, and judicial review. We show that, at times, seemingly undemocratic practices could be understood as a means to facilitate the simultaneous satisfaction of both Outcome and Voting preferences.","PeriodicalId":283935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Democratic Theory (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131166457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I would like to establish the priority of Aristotle in the thought of George Frederick Holmes (1820-1897), the South's leading philosopher of the nineteenth century. Accompanying this aim is the possibility of an improved understanding of the historical "Mind of the South" and its particular orientation to the ongoing rise of modern civilization. Holmes copiously presented a firmly articulated "metaphysics" in a myriad of articles over a period stretching from the early 1840's until the end of the 1870's. Holmes spent much of his philosophical energy struggling with such then influential moderns as Comte, Spencer and Darwin. But for all that the basis of his thought remained Aristotelian in nature. If it be allowed that Aristotle can make a "comeback" under today's conditions perhaps George Frederick Holmes is also entitled to be viewed once again as a "live option" given the fundamentally Aristotelian nature of his thought.
{"title":"The Aristotelianism of George Frederick Holmes","authors":"Colin D. Pearce","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1365356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1365356","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I would like to establish the priority of Aristotle in the thought of George Frederick Holmes (1820-1897), the South's leading philosopher of the nineteenth century. Accompanying this aim is the possibility of an improved understanding of the historical \"Mind of the South\" and its particular orientation to the ongoing rise of modern civilization. Holmes copiously presented a firmly articulated \"metaphysics\" in a myriad of articles over a period stretching from the early 1840's until the end of the 1870's. Holmes spent much of his philosophical energy struggling with such then influential moderns as Comte, Spencer and Darwin. But for all that the basis of his thought remained Aristotelian in nature. If it be allowed that Aristotle can make a \"comeback\" under today's conditions perhaps George Frederick Holmes is also entitled to be viewed once again as a \"live option\" given the fundamentally Aristotelian nature of his thought.","PeriodicalId":283935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Democratic Theory (Topic)","volume":"222 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131786355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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